Sri Arjun Debbarma v. The State of Tripura

Judgment & Order :

28.05.2024

Whether fit for reporting

:

HON"BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT

Judgment & Order

Heard Learned Counsel Mr. B. Banerjee representing the petitioner and also heard Learned P.P. Mr. Raju Datta representing the State. This revision is filed challenging the order dated 07.03.2024 passed by Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gomati District Udaipur in connection with case no.S.T. No.26 of 2021.

¶2For the sake of convenience, I would like to refer hereinbelow the relevant portion of the order dated 07.03.2024 passed by Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gomati District Udaipur which is as follows:

"Accused persons namely Arjun Debbarma, Chandulal Debbarma and Kanan Debbarma are present with their learned Counsels Mr. A. Das & Mr. A. Iqbal.

Learned Special PP Mr. Paltu Das is present for the prosecution.

Four DW"s are present today.

All of them examined, cross-examined and discharged.

Learned Counsel Mr. A. Das appearing for defence side has filed a petition with prayer for issuing summons upon Sri Swapan Majumder, NOTARY, Govt. of India, Gomati District, Udaipur and Sri Rajib Ghosh Advocate of Gomati Bar Association.

Ld. Special PP raised objection with the prayer of defence side that affidavit of Birmanik Murashing which was notarised before the Notary Swapan Majumder has no relevancy with this case.

Heard both side and considered.

The list of DW"s filed by the defence side on

24.01.2024 showed that there the names of Swapan Majumder and Sri Rajib Ghosh were not listed and today all of a sudden the defence side has filed prayer for issuing summons upon Sri Swapan Majumder, NOTARY, Govt. of India, Gomati District, Udaipur and Sri Rajib Ghosh Advocate of Gomati Bar Association as DW"s on their behalf.

Thus this Court finds no reason to allow the prayer of defence side for issuing summons upon Sri Swapan Majumder and Sri Rajib Ghosh, which is rejected accordingly.

Thus DW"s are hereby closed.

The accused persons are asked to file bond of Rs.45,000/- each with one surety of like amount as per Sec.437A of CrPC on or before the next date.

To 02-04-2024 for filing of bond u/Sec.437A of CrPC/argument."

¶3In course of hearing, Learned Counsel Mr. B. Banerjee submitted before this Court that the present petitioner on

07.03.2024 submitted one petition before the Learned Court below praying for issuing summons upon two witnesses namely Sri Swapan Majumder, Notary, Govt. of India, Gomati District, Udaipur Reg. No.-13507 and Sri Rajib Ghosh, Advocate, Gomati District Bar Association, Udaipur for their examination in support of his defence for proper adjudication of the case but the Learned Court below by order dated 07.03.2024 has

dismissed the said petition of the accused petitioner. Learned Counsel further submitted that in support of defence, the accused adduced four witnesses who were already been examined and if the aforesaid two witnesses are not examined then the accused person would be highly prejudiced but the Learned Court below did not consider the application and rejected the same and fixed the case for hearing of argument.

¶4On the other hand, Learned P.P. Mr. Raju Datta appearing on behalf of the State-respondent submitted before the Court at the time of argument that the present petition is not maintainable as petitioner has challenged an interlocutory order against which no revision lies in view of Section 397 of Cr.P.C and urged for dismissal of this revision petition. He further submitted that from the contents of the order, it is clear that on 24.01.2024 at the time of filing list of witnesses, the names of those witnesses were not furnished by the defence to the prosecution even their names were not submitted before the Court so at this belated stage there was no scope on the part of Learned Court below to entertain the petition and by filing this revision petition the petitioner is trying to drag the proceeding for which Learned P.P. urged for dismissal of this petition with huge costs. Both the Learned Counsel in course of hearing referred few citations which would be discussed in detail in due course of time.

¶5Now, before conclusion of this revision petition, let us examine the legal position. Section 243 provides for evidence

for defence. For the sake of convenience I would like to refer hereinbelow the relevant provision of Section 243 of Cr.P.C. which provides as under: "243. Evidence for defence.- (1) The accused shall then be called upon to enter upon his defence and produce his evidence; and if the accused puts in any written statement, the Magistrate shall file it with the record.

(2) If the accused, after he has entered upon his defence, applies to the Magistrate to issue any process for compelling the attendance of any witness for the purpose of examination or cross-examination, or the production of any document or other thing, the Magistrate shall issue such process unless he considers that such application should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice and such ground shall be recorded by him in writing:

Provided that, when accused has cross-examined or had the opportunity of cross-examining any witness before entering on his defence, the attendance of such witness shall not be compelled under this section, unless the Magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary for the ends of justice.

(3) The Magistrate may, before summoning any witness on an application under sub-section(2), require that the reasonable expenses incurred by the witness in attending for the purposes of the trial be deposited in Court."

From the aforesaid provision, it appears that for issuing summons upon any witness, the accused has to apply to the Magistrate or to the Court to issue any process for compelling the attendance of any witness for the purpose of examination or cross-examination and the Magistrate shall issue such process unless he considers that such application should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice and such ground shall be recorded by him in writing.

¶6Here, in this case, as already stated, the accused petitioner on 07.03.2024 filed the petition before the Learned Court below stating inter alia that the victim of this case has

falsely implicated him in this case and the petitioner filed the certified to be true copy of the affidavit before the Court dated

27.01.2022 issued by one Sri Swapan Majumder, Notary and said certified to be true copy he already submitted before the Learned Court and it was required to substantiate the false allegation made by the victim against him. But the Learned Court below at the time of disposal of this petition only mentioned the ground that at the time of filing list of witnesses on 24.01.2024 the names of the persons Sri Swapan Majumder and Sri Rajib Ghosh were not listed and all on a sudden the defence prayed for issuing summons upon those witnesses. Hence, on that ground, the Learned Court below rejected the petition but at the time of dismissal of the petition, no suitable reasons were mentioned by the Learned Trial Court below. Because until and unless it is proved that the petition was submitted just for the purpose of vexation or defeating the ends of justice then in my considered view the Learned Court below is bound to consider the application filed by the accused persons in taking his defence under Section 243 of Cr.P.C.

¶7Since, it is a sessions triable case so let us also examine the relevant portion of Section 233 of Cr.P.C. which provides as under: "233. Entering upon defence.- (1) Where the accused is not acquitted under Section 232, he shall be called upon to enter on his defence and adduce any evidence he may have in support thereof.

(2) If the accused puts in any written statement, the Judge shall file it with the record.

(3) If the accused applies for the issue of any process for compelling the attendance of any

witness or the production of any document or thing, the Judge shall issue such process unless he considers, for reasons to be recorded, that such application should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice."

From the aforesaid provision, it also appears that Court may refuse to accept the petition if it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice. Athough the Learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred the provision of Section 243(2) of Cr.P.C. at the time of hearing of argument.

¶8Now, let us examine what is interlocutory order. In this regard, at the time of hearing of argument, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. B. Banerjee referred one citation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India which was reported in (2007) 2 SCC 258. In Kalyani Baskar v. M.S. Sampoornam dated

11.12.2006 wherein para nos. 4, 5 and 12 provides as under: "4. The Judicial Magistrate dismissed the said application on the ground that the genuineness of the signature could be questioned only at the time of the trial of the compliant. Thereafter, the trial was commenced and the evidence of the respondent was recorded. The banker of the appellant during the cross-examination deposed that he has not verified the signature before returning the cheque in question, as dishonoured. In these circumstances, during the trial of the case the appellant preferred an application under Section 243 CrPC, requesting the Magistrate to send the cheque in question for expert opinion to ascertain the correctness and genuineness of the appellant"s signature appearing thereon. The Magistrate, however, dismissed the application on the ground that it was not mandatory that every disputed document or signature has to be sent to an expert for opinion, that the original document filed in the court cannot be sent out for any reason and that every document filed before the court should be safe till the disposal of the litigation.

¶5Feeling aggrieved by this order, the appellant preferred Criminal Revision Case No.335 of 2002 under Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC in the High Court of Judicature at Madras. The revision petition came to be dismissed by the impugned order. Hence, this appeal by the appellant.

¶12Section 243(2) is clear that a Magistrate holding an inquiry under CrPC in respect of an offence triable by him does not exceed his powers under Section 243(2) if, in the interest of justice, he directs to send the document for enabling the same to be compared by a handwriting expert because even in adopting this course, the purpose is to enable the Magistrate to compare the disputed signature or writing with the admitted writing or signature of the accused and to reach his own conclusion with the assistance of the expert. The appellant is entitled to rebut the case of the respondent and if the document viz. the cheque on which the respondent has relied upon for initiating criminal proceedings against the appellant would furnish good material for rebutting that case, the Magistrate having declined to send the document for the examination and opinion of the handwriting expert has deprived the appellant of an opportunity of rebutting it. The appellant cannot be convicted without an opportunity being given to her to present her evidence and if it is denied to her, there is no fair trial. "Fair trial" includes fair and proper opportunities allowed by law to prove her innocence. Adducing evidence in support of the defence is a valuable right. Denial of that right means denial of fair trial. It is essential that rules of procedure designed to ensure justice should be scrupulously followed, and the courts should be jealous in seeing that there is no breach of them. We have not been able to appreciate the view of the learned Judge of the High Court that the petitioner has filed application under Section 243 CrPC without naming any person as witness or anything to be summoned, which are to be sent for handwriting expert for examination. As noticed above, Section 243(2) CrPC refers to a stage when the prosecution closes its evidence after examining the witnesses and the accused has entered upon his defence. The appellant in this case requests for sending the cheque in question, for opinion of handwriting expert after the respondent has closed her evidence, the Magistrate should have granted such a request unless he thinks that the object of the appellant is vexation or delaying the criminal proceedings. In the circumstances, the order of the High Court impugned in this appeal upholding the order of the Magistrate is erroneous and not sustainable."

Learned Counsel also referred another citation of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in (2008) 5 SCC 633. In T. Nagappa v. Y.R. Muralidhar dated 24.04.2008 wherein para nos. 8 and 11, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under: "8. An accused has a right to fair trial. He has a right to defend himself as a part of his human as also fundamental right as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The right to defend oneself and for that purpose to adduce evidence is

recognised by Parliament in terms of sub-section(2) of Section 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads as under:

"243. Evidence for defence.- (1) * * *

*

(2) If the accused, after he has entered upon his defence, applies to the Magistrate to issue any process for compelling the attendance of any witness for the purpose of examination or cross-examination, or the production of any document or other thing, the Magistrate shall issue such process unless he considers that such application should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice and such ground shall be recorded by him in writing:

Provided that, when the accused has cross-examined or had the opportunity of cross-examining any witness before entering on his defence, the attendance of such witness shall not be compelled under this section, unless the Magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary for the ends of justice."

¶11The issue now almost stands concluded by a decision of this Court in Kalyani Baskar v. M.S. Sampoornam : (2007) 2 SCC 258 (in which one of us, L.S. Panta, J., was a member) wherein it was held: (SCC p.262, para 12)

"12. Section 243(2) is clear that a Magistrate holding an inquiry under CrPC in respect of an offence triable by him does not exceed his powers under Section 243(2) if, in the interest of justice, he directs to send the document for enabling the same to be compared by a handwriting expert because even in adopting this course, the purpose is to enable the Magistrate to compare the disputed signature or writing with admitted writing or signature of the accused and to reach his own conclusion with the assistance of the expert. The appellant is entitled to rebut the case of the respondent and if the document viz. the cheque on which the respondent has relied upon for initiating criminal proceedings against the appellant would furnish good material for rebutting that case, the Magistrate having declined to send document for examination and opinion of handwriting expert has deprived the appellant of an opportunity of rebutting it. The appellant cannot be convicted without an opportunity being given to her to present her evidence and if it is denied to her, there is no fair trial. "Fair trial" includes fair and proper opportunities allowed by law to prove her innocence. Adducing evidence in support of the defence is a valuable right. Denial of that right means denial of fair trial. It is essential that rules of procedure designed to ensure justice should be scrupulously followed, and the courts should be jealous in seeing that there is no breach of them.""

Learned Counsel further referred another citation reported in AIR 1977 SC 2185. In Amar Nath v. State of Haryana dated 29.07.1977 wherein Hon'ble the Apex Court in para 6 has discussed about interlocutory application herein: "The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term "interlocutory order" as appearing in sub-s(2) of S.397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster"s New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in S.397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in S.397 of the 1973 code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so to be outside purview of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court."

Referring the aforesaid citations, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that by the order dated 07.03.2024 Learned Court below has finally curtailed the right of the petitioner to adduce any further evidence and if his application is not allowed then he would be highly prejudiced to substantiate his defence to the charges levelled against him by

the prosecution in the aforenoted case. And in view of the principle of the Hon'ble Apex Court the aforesaid order was not an interlocutory order as such the petitioner rightly filed the revision petition before this Court to cancel the order and there is no ambiguity on that.

¶9Per contra, Mr. Raju Datta, Learned P.P. representing the prosecution, in course of hearing of argument submitted that the order challenged by the petitioner was an interlocutory order and against an interlocutory order under Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C there is no scope to prefer any revision for which this present petition was not maintainable. He also referred the following citations:

In Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam dated 18.03.2009 reported in (2009) 5 SCC 153, Hon'ble the Apex Court in para 3 & 5 observed as under: "3. On 20-9-2004 the respondent herein filed applications under Section 91 CrPC and Section 311 CrPC, seeking directions to produce the bank pass books, income tax accounts and the LDS deposit receipts of the appellant, as also for recalling him for cross-examination. This was objected to by a reply dated 24-9-2004. The court passed an order on 1-10-2004, rejecting the applications made by the respondent-accused. The respondent-accused filed criminal revisions before the High Court under Section 397 CrPC and the High Court, by the impugned common order, proceeded to allow the same. It is this order, which has fallen for consideration before us in these appeals.

¶5Secondly, what was not realized was that the orders passed by the trial court refusing to call the documents and rejecting the application under Section 311 CrPC, were interlocutory orders and as such, the revision against those orders was clearly barred under Section 397(2) CrPC. The trial court, in its common order, had clearly mentioned that the cheque was admittedly signed by the respondent-accused and the only defence that was raised, was that his signed cheques were lost and that the appellant complainant had falsely used one such cheque. The trial court also recorded a finding that the documents were not necessary. This order did

not, in any manner, decide anything finally. Therefore, both orders i.e. one on application under Section 91 CrPC for production of documents and other on the application under Section 311 CrPC for recalling the witness, were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which case, under Section 397(2), revision was clearly not maintainable. Under such circumstances, learned Judge could not have interfered in his revisional jurisdiction. The impugned judgment is clearly incorrect in law and would have to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed."

In Girish Kumar Suneja v. Central Bureau of investigation dated 13.06.2017 reported in (2017) 14 SCC 809, wherein Hon'ble the Apex Court in para nos. 11, 15, 16, 17, 20, 23 and 24 observed as under:

¶11The Constitution Bench of this Court considered the scope of the revision jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 439 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (the old Code) in Pranab Kumar Mitra v. State of W.B. :1959 Supp(1) SCR

¶63The consideration was in the context of an application for substitution filed by the son of a convict who had challenged his conviction and sentence, but had expired during the pendency of the revision petition. The Constitution Bench held that the revision jurisdiction of the High Court is a discretionary jurisdiction to be exercised in aid of justice. What is significant is that a litigant does not have a right to have a revisable order set aside. Whether the High Court chooses to exercise its revision jurisdiction in a particular case or not depends upon the facts of that case– hence, the reference to the revision jurisdiction as a discretionary jurisdiction. The revision jurisdiction of High Court only conserves the power of the High Court to ensure that justice is done in accordance with recognized rules of criminal jurisprudence and that criminal courts subordinate to the High Court do not exceed their jurisdiction or abuse the powers vested in them by the Criminal Procedure Code (the old Code). In view of these conclusions of Constitution Bench, there is no doubt that the appellants do not have any right to the revision of a revisable order. It was held as follows: (AIR p.147, para 6)

"6. In our opinion, in the absence of statutory provisions, in terms applying to an application in revision, as there are those in Section 431 in respect of criminal appeals, the High Court has the power to pass such orders as to it may seem fit and proper, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction vested in it by Section 439 of the Code. Indeed, it is a discretionary power which has to be exercised in aid of justice. Whether or not the High Court will exercise its revisional jurisdiction in a given

case, must depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case. The revisional powers of the High Court vested in it by Section 439 of the Code, read with Section 435, do not create any right in the litigant, but only conserve with the power of the High Court to see that justice is done in accordance with recognized rules of criminal jurisprudence, or abuse their powers vested in them by the Code."

¶15While the text of sub-section (1) of Section 397 CrPC appears to confer very wide powers on the court in the exercise of its revision jurisdiction, this power is equally severely curtailed by sub-section

(2) thereof. There is a complete prohibition on a court exercising its revision jurisdiction in respect of interlocutory orders. Therefore, what is the nature of orders in respect of which a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction?

¶16There are three categories of orders that a court can pass – final, intermediated and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction – that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order.

¶17The concept of an intermediate order first found mention in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana :(1977) 4 SCC 137 in which case the interpretation and impact of Section 397(2) CrPC came up for consideration. This decision is important for two reasons. Firstly, it gives the historical reason for the enactment of Section 397(2) CrPC and secondly, considering that historical background, it gives a justification for a restrictive meaning to Section 482 CrPC.

¶20As noted in Amar Nath :(1977) 4 SCC 137 the purpose of introducing Section 397(2) CrPC was to curb delays in the decision of criminal cases and thereby to benefit the accused by giving him or her a fair and expeditious trial. Unfortunately, this legislative intendment is sought to be turned topsy-turvy by the appellants.

¶23We may note that in different cases, different expressions are used for the same category of orders – sometimes it is called an intermediate order, sometimes a quasi-final order and sometimes it is called an order that is a matter of moment. Our preference is for the expression "intermediate order" since that brings out the nature of the order more explicitly.

¶24The second reason why Amar Nath :(1977) 4 SCC 137 is important is that it invokes the principle, in the context of criminal law, that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Therefore, when Section 397(2) CrPC prohibits interference in respect of interlocutory orders, Section 482 CrPC cannot be availed of to achieve the same objective. In other words, since Section 397(2) CrPC prohibits interference with interlocutory orders, it would not be permissible to resort to Section 482 CrPC to set

aside an interlocutory order. This is what this Court held: (SCC p.140, para 3)

"3. While we fully agree with the view taken by the learned Judge that where a revision to the High Court against the order of the Subordinate Judge is expressly barred under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the 1973 Code inherent powers contained in Section 482 would not be available to defeat the bar contained in Section 397(2). Section 482 of the 1973 Code contains the inherent powers of the Court and does not confer any new powers but preserves the powers which High Court already possessed. A harmonious construction of Section 397 and 482 would lead to the irresistible conclusion that where a particular order is expressly barred under Section 397(2) and cannot be the subject of revision by the High Court, then to such a case the provisions of Section 482 would not apply. It is well settled that the inherent powers of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision on the subject-matter. Where there is an express provision, barring a particular remedy, the Court cannot resort to the exercise of inherent powers.""

Referring the same, learned P.P. representing the state-respondent submitted that from the contents of the order dated

07.03.2024 passed by Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gomati District Udaipur, it is clearly established that this is an interlocutory order and against an interlocutory order in view of the principles of the Hon'ble Apex Court, there is no scope to prefer any revision petition under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. so Learned P.P. submitted that this present petition is not maintainable and prayed for dismissal of this petition with costs.

¶10I have heard the rival submission of both the parties and gone through the relevant provision of Section 397 of Cr.P.C. and also the principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforenoted cases. Also perused the order dated 07.03.2024 and after perusing the same, it appears to

me that by the said petition, the Learned Trial Court below dismissed the prayer of the accused person to adduce defence witness as the accused petitioner at time of filling of list of witness on 24.01.2024 did not submit the names of those persons to the Court. So, Learned Counsel closed the scope for adducing further evidence and fixed the case for hearing of argument. I have gone through the provision of Section 311 of Cr.P.C. After elaborate hearing of argument of both the sides and also keeping it in mind the principles of the aforesaid citations laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in my considered view, the order dated 07.03.2024 is not an interlocutory order rather it is a final order by which the further right of the accused to adduce further evidence has been finally closed by the Learned Trial Court below for which the revision petitioner is entitled to prefer revision under Section 397 read with Section 401 of Cr.P.C. Although it was the duty of the accused petitioner to submit the detailed list of witnesses at the time of submission before the Learned Trial Court below however, for proper adjudication of this case in my considered view, one opportunity should be given to the petitioner to take steps for issuing summons upon those witness as mentioned in his petition.

¶11In the result, the revision petition is allowed subject to payment of cost of Rs.10,000/- by the accused petitioner to the Learned Court below which be deposited to the treasury by challan by the Learned Trial Court. In the event of deposit of cost, the Learned Court below shall issue summons upon the

witnesses namely Sri Swapan Majumder and Sri Rajib Ghosh, Learned Advocates for their examination on behalf of the accused as a defence and this opportunity will be given only for one time to the accused person to adduce those witnesses. If the accused petitioner fails to adduce those witnesses before the Court then he shall have no liberty to apply for fresh summons to the Learned Court below and the entire cost of the witnesses would be borne by the accused-petitioner. Since the case is at the stage of hearing of argument so all efforts should be made by the Learned Trial Court below to dispose the case within a period of 2(two) months from the date of the receipt of the copy of this judgment/order.

Send down LCR along with copy of this judgment/order. Also a copy of this order be furnished free of cost to the Learned Counsel for the petitioner immediately. The accused person shall appear before the Learned Trial Court below invariably on 07.06.2024 and shall take appropriate steps as ordered by this Court. This revision petition thus stands disposed of.

Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

JUDGE

Deepshikha MOUMIT A DATTA by MOUMITA DATTA Date: 2024.05.29 11:29:20 -07'00'

HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA AGARTALA Crl. Rev. P. No.21 of 2024 Sri Arjun Debbarma, S/O Sri Subal Debbarma, Resident of Samukchhara, P.S. Kakraban, P.O. Udaipur, District-Gomati Tripura ----Petitioner(s) Versus The State of Tripura ----Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Ms. R. Majumder, Adv, Mr. B. Banerjee, Adv. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Raju Datta, P.P. Date of hearing : 22.05.2024 Date of delivery of