Rajesh v. State of Haryana and Another

N.S.SHEKHAWAT , J. (Oral)

¶1The petitioner has filed the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with a prayer to quash FIR No.267 dated 14.09.2020 registered under Sections 148, 149, 307 and 341 of IPC and Section 25 of Arms Act at Police Station Kalayat, District Kaithal (Annexure P-1) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise dated 02.03.2024 (Annexure P-3).

¶2Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that even though, the offence under Section 307 IPC has been added in the present case, but the said offence was added only to aggravate the offence. Rather from the medical case summary (Annexure R-2), it is apparent that the injuries suffered by Jagmal in the instant case have been declared to be grievous in nature and not dangerous to life.

¶3Vide interim order dated 11.03.2024, this Court had directed the parties to appear before the Illaqa Magistrate/trial Court for recording their statements qua compromise within a period of two weeks.

¶4Pursuant to aforesaid order, the parties have appeared before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kaithal and got their statements recorded. Report dated 28.03.2024 has been received whereby after recording the statements of the parties, the Court below has shown its satisfaction that the compromise is genuine, voluntarily and without any pressure.

¶5I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

¶6It has held by the Hon'ble Supreme in the matter of "State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and others", 2019

(2) RCR (Criminal) 255 as under:- ?12. Now so far as the conflict between the decisions of this Court in the cases of Narinder Singh (supra) and Shambhu Kewat (supra) is concerned, in the case of Shambhu Kewat (supra), this Court has noted the difference between the power of compounding of offences conferred on a court under Section 320 Cr.P.C., 1973 and the powers conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 for quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court. In the said decision, this Court further observed that in compounding the offences, the power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 Cr.P.C., 1973 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby, while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal proceedings or criminal complaint under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 is guided by the material on record as to whether ends of justice would justify such exercise of power, although ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. However, in the subsequent decision in the case of Narinder Singh (supra), the very Bench ultimately concluded in paragraph 29 as under: "29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."

¶13Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:

i) that the power conferred under section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;

iv) offences under section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs

29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;

v) while exercising the power under section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc."

¶7The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the matter of "Narinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and another", 2014(2) RCR (Criminal) 482, as under:- ?(vi) Offences under Section 307 I.P.C. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 I.P.C. in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 I.P.C. is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 I.P.C. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship."

¶8From the above referred judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is apparent that each case has to be decided by this Court on its own merits. While exercising the inherent powers, this Court has to examine whether the possibility of conviction is bleak and the continuation of the proceedings would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and would result in futility. No doubt, the offence under Section 307 IPC falls under the category of heinous offences and generally, it has to be treated like an offence against the State/society. However, the relief of quashing of the FIR under 307 IPC cannot be denied to a petitioner only on the ground that the police had added the offence under Section 307 IPC in the FIR. This Court is empowered to look into the nature of injury sustained by the victim and as also the fact as to whether the injury was inflicted on the vital parts of the body. Apart from that, this Court has also to look into the social background of the accused as well as the relationship between the parties. In the present case, Jagmal is stated to have suffered an injury on the pelvis, which is a non-vital part of the body. Apart from that, the said injury has been declared to be grievous and not dangerous to live.

¶11Consequently, keeping in view the report dated

28.03.2024 submitted by the Judicial Magistrate First Class and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of �������� ����������������������������� and �����������������������������, FIR No.267 dated 14.09.2020 registered under Sections 148, 149, 307 and 341 of IPC and Section 25 of Arms Act at Police Station Kalayat, District Kaithal (Annexure P-1) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise deed dated 02.03.2024 (Annexure P-3) are hereby quashed qua the present petitioners.

¶12All pending applications, if any, are also disposed off.

16.07.2024 (N.S.SHEKHAWAT) amit rana JUDGE Whether reasoned/speaking : Yes/No

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH 307 CRM M-12431 of 2024 Date of Decision: 16.07.2024 Rajesh ...Petitioner Versus State of Haryana and another ... Respondents CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.S.SHEKHAWAT Present : Mr. Rahul Gautam, Advocate with Mr. Aman Gautam, Advocate, for the petitioner. Ms. Sheenu Sura, DAG, Haryana. Mr. Suresh K. Kaushik, Advocate for respondent No.2/complainant.