Lakshminarasimhaiah v. The Spl Land Acquisition Officer Utp

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 11th DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.5286 OF 2023 (LAC)

BETWEEN:

1. LAKSHMINARASIMHAIAH SINCE DEAD BY HIS LRS

JAYAKUMAR S/O LATE LAKSHMINARASIMHAIAH, AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS,

¶2PRABHAVATHI W/O SIDDAPPA, AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS,

¶3L. VENKATESH S/O LATE LAKSHMINARASIMHAIAH, AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,

¶4MANJULA W/O RAMADASEGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS,

¶5L. LOKESH S/O LATE LAKSHMINARASIMHAIAH, AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS, RESIDING AT GADIKOPPA VILLAGE, SHIMOGA TALUK

¶6PREMA W/O JAGADISH, AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,

Digitally signed by NAGARATHNA M Location: High Court of Karnataka

ALL ARE RESIDING AT GADIKOPPA VILLAGE, SHIMOGA TALUK. …APPELLANTS (BY SRI. SANGAMESH G. PATIL, ADVOCATE) AND:

¶1THE SPL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER UTP SHIMOGA.

¶2THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER KNNL, UTP, SHIMOGA. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. KHAMROZ KHAN, AGA FOR R1; SRI. B.R.PRASHANTH, ADVOCATE FOR R2)

THIS MFA IS FILED U/S 54(1) OF LAND ACQUISITION ACT, PRAYING TO I)CALL FOR RECORDS II)ORDER FOR MODIFICATION OF THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD PASSED IN LAC NO.109/2003 BY THE LEARNED 1ST ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE(SR.DVN) SHIMOGA DATED:3.02.2011 AND BE PLEASED RE-DETERMINE THE MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND BELONGED TO THE APPELLANT BEARING SY.NO.38/1, MEASURING 1 ACRE 14 AND 1/2 GUNTAS OF ALCOLA VILLAGE, SHIMOGA TALUK AND DISTRICT AND TO FIX THE MARKET VALUE AT RS.150/- PER SQ. FEET AND TO AWARD ALL STATUTORY BENEFITS. III)AND TO GRANT SUCH OTHER RELIEFS AS THIS HON'BLE COURT DEEMS FIT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF THE CASE AND ALLOW THE ABOVE APPEAL WITH COSTS TO MEET THE ENDS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON

05.08.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT, THIS DAY VENKATESH NAIK T J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN and HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T

CAV JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T)

Heard Sri. Sangamesh G. Patil, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri. Khamroz Khan, learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent No.1, and Sri. B.R. Prashanth, learned counsel for respondent No.2.

¶2This appeal is filed challenging the impugned judgment and award dated 03.02.2011 passed in LAC No.109/2003 by the I Addl. Senior Civil Judge and CJM, Shivamogga, seeking to re-determine the market value of the land belonging to the appellants, bearing Sy.No.38/1, measuring 1 acre 14½ guntas, situated at Alkola Village, Shivamogga Taluk and District, acquired by the respondents for 'Upper Thunga Project' and to fix the market value at Rs.150/- per sq. ft.

¶3Learned counsel for the appellants submits that appellant No.3 has filed an application seeking condonation of delay of 3752 days in filing the appeal. It is submitted that appellant is mainly dependent on agricultural income and, since the said land has been acquired, the appellant undertook coolie work, as the income was not sufficient to meet his family

expenses. However, in the year 2022, the appellant suffered from some health issues and was admitted to the hospital.

¶4Appellant No.3 contended that, after excluding the time spent in obtaining the certified copies of the judgment and award, he had to file the appeal within 90 days from the date of the award. However, he could not prefer the same within the stipulated period, which was not intentional. After passing of the award, he requested the respondent to pay the compensation as awarded by the Reference Court, and they informed him that they would prepare the bill and send it for approval to the Government, and after approval, the compensation would be paid. He received the award amount in the year 2012, and the same was very meagre. He had no funds to file an appeal before this Court. He approached the advocate at Shivamogga in the month of April 2023 and, after discussion with his counsel, he came to know that his neighbouring landowner had filed an appeal for enhancement of compensation before this Court. Therefore, he secured a certified copy of the judgment and filed the appeal belatedly. The delay in preferring the appeal was not intentional. Hence, he prayed to allow the appeal and condone the delay.

¶5Learned counsel for the appellants places reliance on the judgment in the case of Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in 2025 INSC 550 (arising out of SLP (C) No.670/2020), dated 23.04.2025.

¶6Per contra, Sri. Prashanth B.R., learned counsel for respondent No.2, and the learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent No.1 submit that there is an enormous delay in filing the appeal and that no sufficient cause is shown. It is submitted that appellants have filed the appeal only when they came to know that some higher compensation was awarded to similarly placed persons. It is further submitted that the averments and the documents produced along with the memo do not support the case of the appellant for condoning the delay of 3752 days. It is also submitted that, in the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench in MFA No.1543/2022

(LAC), this Court rejected I.A.No.1/2021 filed for condonation of delay and consequently dismissed the appeal filed by the claimant. The facts involved in the present case and the facts involved in MFA No.1543/2022 are similar. Hence, the delay cannot be condoned.

¶7It is further contended that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to by the appellant also has no application to the facts of the case. It is further contended that, if the delay is condoned and the appeal is allowed in terms of the decision of this Court, there would be great hardship and financial difficulty to the State as well as the beneficiary of the acquisition, and it would open the floodgates for fence-sitters seeking similar relief. Hence, they seek to dismiss the appeal.

¶8We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for respondent No.2, and the learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent No.1, and meticulously perused the affidavit accompanying the application for condonation of delay and other materials available on record.

¶9Appellant No.3 has filed an affidavit in support of an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay. The averments in the affidavit indicate that he is mainly dependent on agriculture for his livelihood and that the major portion of his agricultural land has been acquired. Only a small portion of the dry land is left, which is not suitable for agricultural activity. The affidavit also

indicates that, due to the said acquisition, he lost his land. He is aged about 60 years, and his health also does not permit him to move around. He is a poor and innocent agriculturist. The acquisition has forced him to do coolie work for his family's livelihood and borrow loans from private money lenders for urgent necessities at higher rates of interest. He further contended that he is ready and willing to waive the interest for the delayed period. In similar circumstances, this Court condoned the delay subject to waiver of interest for the delayed period. Hence, he prayed to condone the delay.

¶10The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the following cases, has laid down the law with regard to consideration of an application for condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Basawaraj and Another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81 at paragraph Nos.11 to 15, held as under: "11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no

straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)

¶12It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

¶13The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: "605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of

cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence." An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)

¶14In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .

¶15The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this

Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

(Emphasis supplied)

¶11In the case of Sheo Raj Singh and Others v. Union of India and Others, reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held, in paragraph Nos.30 to 36, as under: "30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial.

¶31Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and

acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.

¶32An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication.

¶33Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind that we are not hearing an application for condonation of delay but sitting in appeal over a discretionary order of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the

case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation would be the question. Law is fairly well-settled that "a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below". If any authority is required, we can profitably refer to the decision in Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa [Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa,

(2003) 10 SCC 390] , which in turn relied on the decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha [Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, (1980) 2 SCC 593 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 197] where it has been held that: "an appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong".

¶34The order under challenge in this appeal is dated 21-12-2011 [Union of India v. Sheo Raj, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 5511] . It was rendered at a point of time when the decisions in Katiji [Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107] , Ramegowda [G. Ramegowda v. LAO, (1988) 2 SCC 142] , Chandra Mani [State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani,

(1996) 3 SCC 132] , K.V. Ayisumma [Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma, (1996) 10 SCC 634] and Lipok AO [State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752 : 2005 SCC

(Cri) 906] were holding the field. It is not that the said decisions do not hold the field now, having been overruled by any subsequent decision. Although there have been some decisions in the recent past [State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 :

(2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 :

(2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 84] is one such decision apart from University of Delhi [University of Delhi v. Union of India,

(2020) 13 SCC 745] ] which have not accepted governmental lethargy, tardiness and indolence in presenting appeals within time as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, yet, the exercise of discretion by the High Court has to be tested on the anvil of the liberal and justice oriented approach expounded in the aforesaid decisions which have been referred to above.

¶35We find that the High Court in the present case assigned the following reasons in support of its order:

35.1. The law of limitation was founded on public policy, and that some lapse on the part of a litigant, by itself, would not be sufficient to deny condonation of delay as the same could cause miscarriage of justice.

35.2. The expression "sufficient cause" is elastic enough for courts to do substantial justice. Further, when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against one another, the former would prevail.

35.3. It is upon the courts to consider the sufficiency of cause shown for the delay, and the length of delay is not always decisive while exercising discretion in such matters if the delay is properly explained. Further, the merits of a claim were also to be considered when deciding such applications for condonation of delay.

35.4. Further, a distinction should be drawn between inordinate unexplained delay and explained delay, where in the present case, the first respondent had sufficiently explained the delay on account of negligence on part of the government functionaries and the government counsel on record before the Reference Court.

35.5. The officer responsible for the negligence would be liable to suffer and not public interest through the State.

The High Court felt inclined to take a pragmatic view since the negligence therein did not border on callousness.

¶36Given these reasons, we do not consider discretion to have been exercised by the High Court in an arbitrary manner. The order under challenge had to be a clearly wrong order so as to be liable for interference, which it is not."

(Emphasis supplied)

¶12The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the aforesaid judgments, has taken note of its earlier judgment in the case of Collector (LA) V. Katiji, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107, and held that the approach of the Courts in condoning the delay should be pragmatic when sufficient cause is shown. In the instant case, the cause shown by the appellant is sufficient to condone the delay of nine years.

¶13It would also be useful to refer to the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector (LA), reported in (2024) 12 SCC 336, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held, in paragraph Nos.15, 16, 17 and 26, as under: "15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of limitation is based, the object behind the law of limitation and the mandatory and the directory nature of Section 3

and Section 5 of the Limitation Act that we have to examine and strike a balance between Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay.

¶16Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase 'sufficient cause' used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, this Court in advocating the liberal approach in condoning the delay for 'sufficient cause' held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day's delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of 'sufficient cause' for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The phrases 'liberal approach', 'justice-oriented approach' and cause for the advancement of 'substantial justice' cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

¶17It must always be borne in mind that while construing 'sufficient cause' in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights.

¶26On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power

is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."

(emphasis supplied)

¶14The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the aforesaid judgments, has considered its earlier judgments in the case of Katiji and Basawaraj, referred to supra, and held that the phrases 'liberal approach', 'justice-oriented approach' and 'cause for advancement of substantial justice' cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow a stale matter to be revived and reopened by taking shelter under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Further, it has been held that no Court would be justified in condoning such inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever.

¶15In Suresh Kumar's case, cited supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court, at paragraphs 6 and 8, held as under:

¶6It is a matter of record that the ground taken by the appellant, Suresh Kumar, is that the documents had been given to the concerned person to file an appeal against the order of the Reference Court, but the same was not filed. A perusal of the impugned judgment, however, does not reveal any consideration by the High Court of such ground. In fact, the High Court relied on its earlier order dated 3rd May, 2019, which also is the subject matter of appeal. In Civil Appeal @ SLP(C)No.2832 of 2020 titled Laxmi Narayan & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors., which also arises from the same acquisition proceedings, the application before the High Court was for a condonation of delay of 4908 days in filing the appeal against an order of the Reference Court. The impugned judgment rejects such an application recording the absence of a sufficient cause.

¶8The approach to be adopted in considering whether or not to condone the delay in filing an appeal has been discussed by this Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anand Nag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors.3, wherein it has been observed that :_ "It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:

"1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

¶2Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

¶3"Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

¶4When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

¶5There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

¶6It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical (1987) 2 SCC 107 grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal." [See also: Pathapati Subba Reddy v. LAO4]

¶16The Hon'ble Apex Court, in Dheeraj Singh V. State of Haryana reported in (2014) 14 SCC 127, held that the Court must adopt a liberal approach in condoning the delay. Though there was a long delay in filing the appeal, it was a case of compulsory acquisition, and there had been a difference in the amount of compensation granted to some land losers vis-à-vis others.

¶17The Hon'ble Apex Court, in Market Committee, Hodal V. Krishan Murari and Others, reported in (1996) 1 SCC 311, condoned the delay of 3240 days in preferring the appeal. In Huchana Gowda V. Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer and Another, reported in (2020) 19 SCC 236, the Hon'ble Apex Court condoned the delay of more than 2000 days, taking into account the poverty and illiteracy of the land losers.

¶18In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered view that the delay has to be condoned, since the position that the land loser had, in fact, asked for the appeal to be filed, but it was not filed for no fault of his, is an uncontroverted position of fact. Hence, the delay of 3752 days

in filing the appeal is hereby condoned. Accordingly, I.A.No.1/2023 is allowed.

¶19Insofar as the 'grant of compensation' is concerned, the appellants have taken the contention that the appellants are the owners of the land bearing Sy.No.38/1, measuring 1 acre 14½ guntas, situated at Alkola Village, Shivamogga Taluk and District. The land came to be acquired by the respondents for the 'Upper Thunga Project' under the Preliminary Notification dated 25.01.2001, and the Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation of Rs.3,10,000/- per acre. Hence, the appellants filed a reference application seeking enhancement of compensation before the Reference Court in LAC No.109/2003. The Reference Court allowed the reference application in part and awarded compensation in respect of the land acquired at the rate of Rs.105/- per sq. ft., along with solatium at 30% and other statutory benefits.

¶20On perusal of the order of the Reference Court, it appears that the market value determined by the Reference Court is Rs.105/- per sq. ft. in LAC No.109/2003, based on the judgment of the Reference Court in LAC

No.158/2003, wherein the Reference Court fixed the compensation at Rs.100/- per sq. ft.

¶21It is contended that the judgment and award passed in LAC No.158/2003 was challenged in M.A.No.12/2008, wherein the compensation was enhanced from Rs.105/- to Rs.150/- per sq. ft. Therefore, the appellants are also entitled to similar compensation for the land belonging to the appellants. It is contended that the land covered in LAC No.158/2003 and the present land are very close to each other, as can be seen from Ex.P38 – Sketch. Thus, similar compensation can be granted.

¶22We have perused the material available on record. It is not in dispute that the lands in question were acquired for the 'Upper Thunga Project'. It is also not in dispute that the lands in question are situated in Alkola Village, Shivamogga Taluk.

¶23Learned counsel for the appellants places reliance on the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench in MSA No.33/2011, disposed of on 16.08.2012, and contends that, in respect of the

lands situated at Ankola Village, the land losers were awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.150/- per sq. ft.

¶24We have perused the aforesaid judgment. The Co-ordinate Bench confirmed the order passed by the Reference Court, which granted compensation of Rs.150/- per sq. ft. for the lands situated within Ankola Village. Whereas, the lands acquired in the present case belongs to Alkola Village, Shivamogga.

¶25The Division Bench in MFA No.309/2015, disposed of on 06.11.2025, relying upon the sale statistics, potentiality of the lands and the fact that the lands come under Shivamogga City, confirmed the order of the Reference Court, which granted Rs.105/- per sq. ft. The learned Single Judge in C.R.P. No.417/2018, disposed of on 14.10.2025, held that, for the lands acquired for the 'Upper Thunga Project' within the jurisdiction of Alkola Village, compensation at Rs.105/- per sq. ft. was awarded.

¶26Since this Court, in similarly placed matters arising out of the same Notification and relating to the same village, has come to the conclusion and awarded compensation at Rs.105/-per sq. ft. to the lands situated at Alkola Village, the

compensation awarded by the Reference Court in this case at Rs.105/- per sq. ft. is fair and reasonable. In the above view of the matter, we proceed to pass the following: ORDER

The appeal is dismissed.

Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, do not survive for consideration and accordingly disposed of.

Sd/- (ANU SIVARAMAN) JUDGE

Sd/- (VENKATESH NAIK T) JUDGE

AM