Karim Morani v. CBI

order as they are interconnected and, moreover, the stand of the CBI in all these applications is common.

¶2Briefly stated that the facts of the case are that on

21.10.2009, Anti Corruption Branch of CBI had registered aforesaid FIR on allegations of criminal conspiracy and criminal misconduct against the unknown officials of Department of Telecommunications, Government of India some unknown private persons/companies and others under Section 120B IPC BANos.1565-1568/2011 and under Section 13(2) read witin Section 13(l)(d) of tlie Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in respect of allotment of Letters of Intent, Unified Access Services (hereinafter referred to as 'UAS') Licenses 2G Spectrum by the Department of Telecommunications. CBI had filed the first charge sheet on 02.04.2011 in the Court of learned Special Judge, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi against A.Raja, then Minister of Communications Information Technology (A-1), Siddhartha Behura, the then Secretary, Telecom (A-2), R.K.Chandolia, then P.S. to Minister (A-3), Shahid Balwa and Vinod Goenka, Directors, M/s Swan Telecom Pvt. Ltd. (A-4 and A-5 respectively). M/s Swan Telecom Pvt. Ltd (A-6), Sanjay Chandra, Managing Director, M/s Unitech Wireless Tamil Nadu Ltd. (A-7), M/s Unitech Wireless Tamil Nadu Ltd. (A-8), Gautam Doshi, Group Managing Director of Reliance, ADA Group (A-9), Surendra Pipara, Group President of Reliance, BANos.1565-1568/2011 Page5 of39 -f- \ Anil Dhimblnai Ambani Group (A-10), Hah Nair, Sr. Vice President of Reliance, ADA Group (A-11) M/s Reliance Telecom Ltd. (A-12).

¶3A supplementary charge sheet was filed in respect of this very FIR on

25.4.2011 in the Court of learned Special Judge for offences under Section 120B IPC read with Section 7/11/12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against Asif Balwa (A-13) of M/s Kusegaon Fruits & Vegetables Pvt. Ltd.^ Rajiv B.Agarwa! (A-14), Director, Kusegaon Fruits & Vegetables Pvt. Ltd., Kahm Morani (A-15) of M/s.Cineyug Media & Entertainment Pvt. Ltd., Sharad Kumar (A-16), Director/Promoter of M/s.Kalaignar TV Pvt. Ltd. Kanimozhi (A-17) Promoter/Stakeholder of M/s Kalaignar TV Pvt. Ltd. In addition to this, the charge sheet also named A-1, A-4 and A-5. BANos.1565-1568/2011 Page 6 of39 V

¶4An attempt was made by A-16 and A-17 to get regular ball before Court of Special Judge High Court, which proved to be unsuccessful, whereupon SLP(Crl.) Nos.4584-4585/2011 were filed by them before the Supreme Court in which order was passed on

20.06.2011, dismissing the SLPs but giving the liberty to the accused persons to renew the applications for bail after framing of the charges. Similar attempt had been made by some other accused persons but I am not referring to the same as nothing turns on it. The orders on the SLP's of A-16 and A-17 have been referred, by way of sequence of important events, which took place.

¶5All the petitioners i--newed their applications for grant of regular bail in terms of the liberty granted by Supreme Court after framing of charges on

22.10.2011, but these applications were also rejected BA Nos. 1565-1568/2011 -T by the learned Special Judge, which lead to the filing of the present bail applications before this Court.

¶6In the meantime. Supreme Court in another batch of Criminal Appeal Nos.2178 to 2182 of 2011, arising out of the SLP(Crl.), pending before it, passed orders on

23.11.2011, granting regular bail to A-6, A-8, A-9, A-10 and A-11, who were sent for trial by virtue of the first charge sheet.

¶7Though, present batch of bail applications were listed for hearing on 01.12.2011, however, on account of applications of co-accused having been allowed by the Supreme Court and the applications on behalf of the accused having been filed, the date of hearing was preponed to 25.11.2011 from 01.12.2011.

¶8It has been contended by Mr. Altaf Ahmed, the learned senior counsel appearing for Sharad Kumar Kanimozhi, that in view of the orders of the Supreme BANos.1565-1568/2011 ' >- Court in Sanjay Chandra's case (supra) granting them regular bail in respect of the aforesaid FIR, the present petitioners are placed on a much better footing, and therefore, they also deserve.to be enlarged on bail. The learned senior counsel has handed a comparative chart of charges, which were framed against Sharad Kumar Kanimozhi in comparison to other accused persons, who were granted bail by the Apex Court. It was contended that the charges against Sharad Kumar Kanimozhi were much milder and carrying lesser punishment than the one in respect of which the bail was granted by Apex Court. It was further contended that this was in addition to common charges, which were framed against all the 17 accused persons. To give an over-view of comparison of these charges, I deem it proper to reproduce the comparative table of charges given by learned senior counsel. BANos.1565-1568/2011 , Page9 of39 of Substantive Individual Charges Name Charges Name Ciiarges Accused granted baas Accused seeking bail Sanjay Chandra (A-7) Section 420 r/w 120B IPG Kanimozhi Karunanithi (A-17) Section 12 r/w section in alternative Section of PC Act r/w B IPG (5 years) Vinod Goenka (A-5) Section 420 r/w 120 B, Section 12 r/w section or in altern?tVe Section of P.C. Act r/w 120 BIPG Section 193 r/w 120 BIPG Sharad Kumar (A-16) Section 12 r/w Section 7 or in the alternaitive Section 11 of P.C. Act r/w B IPG (5 years) Section 193 r/w 120 B IPG (7 years) Gautam Doshi (A-9) Section 109/420 r/w 120 BIPG Hari Nair (A-10) Section 109/420 r/vv 120 BIPG Surendra Pipara (A-11) Section 109/420 r/w 120 BIPG -X - 0^ Charges Common to All 17 Accused Section .120B r/w 409/420/468/471 IPG and sec. or in tine alternative sec. 12 and 13(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988.

¶9Based on aforesaid comparative table, it was contended by I^Ir.Ahmed, learned senior counsel, that since the maximum sentence in respect of which petitioners have been charged is only five years in comparison to the seven years of punishment which could be imposed on the accused Sanjay Chandra others, who were granted bail, therefore, on principle of parity, petitioners deserve to be extended the benefit of grant of bail.

¶10The second submission of the learned senior counsel is that the trial Court had taken a wrong view both earlier as well as now when it rejected the application for grant of regular bail by referring to a great deal of alleged planning committed by the accused persons and the magnitude of the offence. Similar reasoning was given by the High Court but the Supreme Court has not approved grounds for rejection of bail applications of Sanjay Chandra and others as convincing and if that be so, on the same analogy, the petitioners' bail applications could not be rejected by the learned Special Judge afresh.

¶11The third subm.ission of Mr.Ahmed, learned senior counsel, is that admittedly this is a case where there is no apprehension of the petitioners fleeing from processes of law and tampering with the evidence more so when the substantive evidence, which is sought to be adduced by the CBI against present petitioners, happens to be documentary evidence, which petitioners themselves are relying in order to prove their defence that the'amount of Rs.200 crores, alleged Page 12 of39 V 4? to have been received by Kalaignar TV, was a loan. It is contended that as a matter of fact it was a genuine loan transaction between l^^/s.Cineyug Media and Kalaingar TV and which amount actually stood repaid in the month of February, 2011, therefore, there was absolutely no question of petitioners either tampering with evidence. It was further contended that this fact is fortified by the fact that even the CBI did not have any objection for the grant of bail to the present petitioners in respect of the aroresaid offences and yet this plea of CBI was not accepted. It is contended that learned Special Judge has erroneously observed that the petitioners are highly placed and influential persons, and therefore, there is a likelihood of their influencing witnesses, while as there was absolutely no prima facie evidence or much less likelihood in this regard. BA Nos. 1565-1568/2011 Page13 of39 'V

¶12Lastly, Mr.Ahmed, the learned senior counsel, has contended that the Apex Court has granted bail to the five accused persons in this very FIR taking cognizance of the fact that the accused are charged of economic offence of huge magnitude if proved, it may jeopardize economy of the country, yet at the same time, the Court observed that it cannot lose the sight of the fact that the charge sheet has already been filed and charges have been framed and keeping in view the voluminous nature of documents and the number of witnesses, which are to be examined by prosecution, it will not be conducive to keep the accused persons incarcerated indefinitely during period of trial, when there is no serious challenge to their fleeing from processes of law or tampering with evidence or not subjecting themselves to such orders as Court may pass from time to time. It was also contended that the Supreme Court has reiterated BA Nos. 1565-1568/2011 Page14 of39 •--J Qjy' denial of bail to an accused has to be done as an exception for cogent sound reasons, as it affects his right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

¶13While going througli the order of the Supreme Court in Sanjay Chandra's case (Supra), it was pointed out by the learned senior counsel Mr.Ahnned that there was no mention of Section 409 IPC in para 13, which carries life imprisonment. It was said that it was an inadvertent omission. Similarly, in para 25 of the order also, maximum punishment shown is seven years, while as Section 409 IPC simpliciter or conspiracy to commit the said offence under Section IPC carries imprisonment for the principal offence, which would be life. It was asked from learned senior counsel whether this Court notwithstanding this fact could proceed ahead with the decision on the bail applications BA Nos. 1565-1568/2011 Page 15 of39 of the petitioners on the assumption that the Supreme Court has taken into consideration offence under Section IPG independently or read with Section 120B IPG as one of the offences with which co-accused Sanjay Ghandra and others were charged, yet granted them bail?

¶14The learned senior counsel contended that the Supreme Gourt has dealt with the applications of Sanjay Ghandra and others as a whole while considering the enormity of charges and the magnitude of the alleged scam and yet granted bail to accused. Therefore, this Gourt cannot assume or presume that Section 409 IPG was not in the knowledge of the Gourt yet bail was granted. The learned senior counsel did not attach any significance to this omission and wanted the Gourt to take note of the charges against the accused persons read as a whole since the Apex Gourt has dealt with the charges as a whole and not Individual charges of the accused.

¶15It was in this background, the learned senior counsel placed reliance in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal \/s. Dunlop India Ltd. & Ors., (1985) 1 see 260 and M/s.Bayer India Ltd. & ^ Ors. Vs. StateofMaharashtra&Ors., (1993) 3 See 29 to contend that by virtue of Article of Constitution, the orders and the directions, which were passed by the Apex Court in Sanjay Chandra's case (supra) are binding, on this Court in order to maintain 'hierarchical system of Courts'.

¶16So far as, Kanimozhi's case is concerned, it was also argued by Mr. Ahmed, the learned senior counsel that in ^ her case by virtue of Proviso to Section 437, if the accused is a woman, she is entitled to a bail even if the offence, which is alleged to have been committed by her BANos. 1565-1568/2011 Page17 of39 carries life imprisonment, as this is the mandate of the legislature, a woman, a sick person and a person under the age of 16 has been treated as a separate Class in itself given special treatment. It is further contended that if this limitation has been removed in case Magistrate, obviously, this Court being a ^ Superior Court does not suffer from any such limitation also and it has much wider powers.

¶17So far as Karim Morani's case is concerned, Mr.Luthra, learned senior counsel has adopted arguments urged by Mr.Ahmed, learned senior counsel and added further that so far as Karim Morani (A-15) is concerned, he is also seeking ball on the medical grounds. He has contended that applicant/Karim Morani (A-15) has a history of coronary disease and has stated to be suffering from a condition called Ecstasia. It is alleged to be a condition because of ' Page18 of39 V <V which the applicant is stated to have undergone three Angioplasties in the year 1993, 1997 and 1998 and an open heart surgery in the year 2007, wherein he has received 6 bypass grafts as well as re-boring of two major vessels. It has been further stated that his heart only pumps 45% to 50% of blood as compared to a healthy person. Apart from this, there are number of other diseases like Arthritis in knees, lumber spondylitis, cervical spondylitis etc., which, in my view, are not very serious life threatening but the condition of the heart although presently is stable is not an immediate cause of concern, however, it is certainly a condition which can get out of control because of stress and lack of proper medical care, if the petitioner is kept incarcerated during the period of trial which is likely to be fairly long, keeping in view the voluminous record and the number of witnesses to be examined. BANos.1565-1568/2011 Page19 of39 V

¶18Mr.N.K.Kaul, learned senior counsel, who appeared for the petitioner, Rajiv Agarwal, has also supplemented submissions made by Mr.Ahmed, learned senior counsel and contended that so far as the CBI is concerned, as it did not have any apprehension regarding the tampering of evidence or the accused persons fleeing fi-om the processes of law, continued incarceration of the petitioner was tantamountlng to denial the benefit of bail by way of punishment for the offences of which he was charged, though they are yet to be proved against the petitioner. It was contended that the Apex Court has clearly in Sanjay Chandra's case (supra) observed that nobody should be deprived of his liberty only on the belief that he will tamper with the evidence, if left at liberty except in "most extraordinary circumstances". He has also drawn attention of the Court to the various paras in the order of the Apex Court observed that though the discretion to grant bail is with Page 20 of39 Court but it has been observed that it has to be exercised with a great care and caution by balancing the valuable right to liberty of an individual and the interest of the society in general.

¶19Mr.Vijay Aggarwal, learned counsel, who is appearing for Asif Balwa (A-13), has also adopted ^ arguments of the previous learned senior counsel and also cited couple of orders passed by the Apex Court in matter of bail. These are Utsav Bhasin Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) passed in SLP(Crl.) No.524/2009 Kamaljit Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Anr., (2005) 7 see 226. Since these orders are not giving the facts of the case and they are very short orders, I do not feel that the learned counsel can get any help by referring to ^7 the said two orders.

¶20I have carefully gone through the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners as well as BANos.1565-1568/2011 Page21 of39 the order of the Supreme Court in Sanjay Chandra's case (supra).

¶21At the outset, the order of the Supreme Court has dealt with previous judgments on subject reiterated the principles of law, which the Court has to bear in mind, while dealing with the application for grant of bail. One principle feature of this order, which is noticeable, is that it has put a great deal of emphasis on the personal liberty of the under trial, while considering the bail applications, which principle seem to have been obscured by the passage of time by Courts. To sum, these principles are reiterated as under:-

(a) There is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused till he is found to be guilty.

(b) The bail is the rule denial thereof is the exception. For the purpose of denial of the bail there must be extraordinary circumstances necessarily meaning that bail ought not to be Page22 of39 denied to an accused only on ground of general sentiments of the community as it impairs the right to liberty guaranteed to an accused.

(c) While considering grant of bail, both factors, namely, the seriousness of charges severity of punishment which offence carries must taken into consideration. ^

(d) The bail ought to be granted in a case where there are no chances of the accused fleeing away from processes of law or in other words, accused, who is released on bail must be readily willingly available to submit himself to the custody of the Court at any given point of time.

(e) The grant of bail ought not to be denied only on the perceived apprehension by the Court that the petitioner, if restored to a liberty, he will tamper with evidence. There must be some prima facie evidence on record or reasonable justifiable grounds to believe that in case benefit of bail is extended to an accused he is going to misuse his liberty or so as to create / BANos.1565-1568/2011 > » Page 23 of39 V / o\^ conditions whicli are not conducive to Inold a fair trial.

¶22Seen in tlie aforesaid bacl<drop, tlie question whicli arises for consideration is as to wlnether the petitioners who are charged for an offence of conspiracy under Section 120B IPG read with Section 409 IPG apart from other offences etc., which carry life imprisonment ought to be released on bail notwithstanding the fact that the order of Apex Gourt is silent about life imprisonment which the offence carries. In this regard, I feel merit in the contention of Mr. Ahmed, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that although the Apex Gourt order does not find the mention of the word 409 IPG or the factum of life imprisonment which could be imposed for the said offence in the order, but it was cognizant of the fact that the all co-accused persons in the bail applications which were under its consideration were charged so. In addition to this, while dealing with the facts of the case in the batch of applications of Sanjay Chandra's case (supra) it had taken the charges against all the co-accused as a whole and not individual charges, therefore, if that be the position, this Court ought not to deny the bail to the petitioners on account of the omission, though inadvertent, in the order of the Apex Court. I am of the view that when the Supreme Court has reproduced the facts of the case, given the magnitude of offence, severity of punishment which it entails, it has taken into note of the fact of the accused persons in general being charged for an offence under Section IPC or the conspiracy thereof which carry life imprisonment. If despite aforesaid facts, the. Supreme Court has released the co-accused persons Sanjay Chandra's case (Supra) on bail, the said benefit cannot be denied to the petitioners on the grounds of parity. Moreover, the offences of which the petitioners in general have been charged, carries a Page25 of39 • punishment of five years under Prevention of Corruption Act or the IPG in comparison to the accused persons in Sanjay Chandra's case (supra) where it carried 7 years. So in a way petitioners stand is on better footing, therefore, they ought not to be denied the benefit of bail. Moreover, the Supreme Court order, which is ^ passed in Sanjay Chandra's case (supra) is binding on the High Court. The High Court cannot while considering the bail applications of the present accused persons do hair splitting of the order of the Supreme Court make out a distinction when there is none so as to deny benefit of said order to the petitioners by saying that petitioners are charged for offence of conspiracy under Section 120B IPC red with section 409 IPC which carries the life imprisonment. It will be also in my view would be violative of Article 141 of the Constitution, which lays down that the High Court being subordinate to Supreme court must show Page26 of39 y compliance and the respect to the orders of the Apex Court. In this regard, I am tempted to reproduce para 6 of the case titled Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal Vs. Dunlop India Ltd. & Ors., (1985) 1 see 260, wherein it has been stated as under:- " It will never be necessary for us to say so again that 'in hierarchical system of courts' which exists in our country, 'it is necessary for each lower tier', including the High Court, 'to accept loyally decisions of the High tiers'. 'It is inevitable in hierarchical system of courts that there .?re decisions of the Supreme appellate tribunal which do not attract the unanimous approval of all members of the judiciary. But the judicial system only works if someone is allowed to have last word and that last word, once spoken, is loyally accepted.' The better wisdom of the court below must yield to the higher wisdom of the court above. This is the strength of hierarchical judicial system." BA Nos. 1565-1568/2011 Page27of39 V

¶23Similarly, in case titled M/s Bayer India Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of l^aharashtra & Ors., (1993) 3 SCC 29" the Apex Court has observed as under:- "While we certainly respect independence of l-ligh Court recognize that it is a co-equal institution, we . cannot but say, at the same time, that the constitutional scheme and judicial discipline --"v requires that the High Court should give due regard to the orders of this Court which are binding on all courts within the territory of India.

¶24Mr.Altaf Ahmed, learned senior counsel has also cited number of other judgments to impress on this Court, the question that the omission to mention of Section IPC or absence of word Mife imprisonment' in the Supreme Court order cannot be interpreted in a manner which may be detrimental to the interest of the petitioners on account of Article 141 of the Constitution of India as the Supreme Court has dealt with the facts of the case as a whole and was Page 28of39 / cognizant of the fact that the charges against all the petitioners had crystallized. It was also aware that common charges with regard to commission of offence were framed against all the accused persons, which entailed imposition of life imprisonment, yet it consider the case of the co-accused Sanjay Chandra's y Case (supra) fit to grant bail. These judgments are Official Liquidator Vs. Dayanand & Ors. (2008) 10 SCC 1, State of Bihar Ks. Kalika Kuer @ Kalika Singh & Ors.

(2003) 5 SCC 448, Ajmer Singh Vs. State of Haryana,

(2010) 3 SCC 746, Izharu! Haq Abdul Hamid Shaikh & Anr. \/s. State or Gujarat,

(2009) SCC 283, Dinbandhu Sharma Vs. State, 87 (2000) DKT 149, Director of Settlements, A.P. & Ors. Vs. M. R. Apparao & Anr., (2002) 4 SCC 638, Saganthi Suresh Kumar l/s. Jagdeeshan,

(2002) 2 SCC 420 and Indian Airlines Vs. Union of India & Ors., 128 (2006) DLT 505 (DB).

¶25I do not consider it necessary to refer to these Page29 of39 judgments though, I have gone through the relevant pages cited during the course of submissions on account of the fact that I have already taken a view hereinabove that this Court being subordinate to the Supreme Court is bound by the order passed by the Apex Court in the facts of this very case. It will not be proper for this ^ ' Court to dissect the order minutely and then try to make a distinction, so far as the case of the petitioner is concerned, when on the face of it there is none.

¶26Seen in the light of the observations passed by the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases, I feel that it is not open to this Court to differentiate in facts of Sanjay Chandra's case (supra) present case by invoking Section 409 IPC or Section 120 B IPC and say since said offence carries life imprisonment, therefore, the benefit of the said judgment on the basis of parity cannot be extended to the petitioners. On the contrary, I feel that the case of the petitioners stands Page30 of39 on a better footing because the offence of which they are charged carries punishment of only five years in contrast to seven years which were imposable in the case of others.

¶27The next point, which arises for consideration of the bail applications of the petitioners, is whether they will flee from the processes of law or they will be available for the purpose of facing the trial. As a matter of fact, it has never been the case of the prosecuting agency/CBI that so far as the petitioners are concerned, they are likely to flee from the processes of law. Almost all the accused persons have roots in the society, though living in different parts of the country with varied interest, therefore, there is no chances of their fleeing from the ^ processesof law. In any case, their movementscan be regulated by imposing conditions by the Supreme Court. BANos.1565-1568/2011 Page31of39

¶28So far as the next ground on which the benefit of bail could have been denied to the petitioners is on account of the likelihood of the petitioners, tampering with the evidence or creating conditions, which are not conducive to the holding of a fair trial. Every petitioner says that the grant of bail to him will not create any impediment T in the holding of a free and fair trial and that he would be available at all times to submit to the custody to the Court as and when called upon to do so. Similarly, in a given case, the prosecuting agency may not raise this objection or make a positive statement as has been done in the present case that it has no objection to the grant of bail to the accused persons.

¶29I feel that though such a concession granted by the prosecuting agency may be a very relevant important factor to grant bail but I do not feel that the Court is bound to accept such a statement blindly. The Page32of39 > & VX Court is expected to exercise its own judgment and to see if there is any lil<elihood or chances of tampering with evidence. This is because Court has a constitutional duty to uphold the 'law' it is well possible in a given case there may be various extraneous considerations, which may have prompted the prosecuting agency to give such a concession, which need not be gone into detail herein in this case. No doubt, petitioners are influential or moneyed persons having extensive clout political or otherwise but I have examined the list of witnesses qua each of the accused persons, which was supplied by each of the learned senior counsel. A perusal of the list of witnesses shows that these witnesses are generally proving documents of banking transaction or otherwise to show movement of money transactions from D.B.Reality/D.B.Dynamic to Kusegaon to Cineyug and finally to Kalaignar T.V. and reverse. Meaning BANos.1565-1568/2011 Page33of39 thereby that most of evidence against petitioners is documentary evidence and there is in my view no prima facie evidence or lil<elihood, which may persuade the Court to doubt that the petitioners have proclivities or reason to believe that they will create condition, which may not be conducive to hold the free fare trial. Further, Mr.Mohan Parasaran, learned ASG appearing for the CBI has clearly taken the stand in the Court below, as well as before this Court that they have no objection in case the petitioners are released on bail as they do not apprehend that the petitioners will tamper with evidence that they have no objection to the grant of bail to the petitioners. There for on account of this consideration, bail cannot be denied to the petitioners.

¶30So far as the Kanimozhi's case is concerned, she is entitled to invocation of additional ground of being a « Page34of39 / 7-woman as envisaged Proviso to Section 437 which lays down that in case an accused, who appears or produced before a l^agistrate is a sick, infirm or a woman or a child less than 16 years of age, he is entitled to bail notwithstanding offence of which he or she is charged may carry life imprisonment.

¶31If the legislature in its wisdom has chosen not to put any limitation on the power of the Magistrate to grant bail to a specified category of accused persons, it was incumbent to Court to consider this provision liberally in favour of the accused person Kanimozhi by the trial Court provided that there was no other factor coming against the accused to deny the grant of bail. To this extent, the order of the learned Special Judge is not sustainable.

¶32Mr.Luthra, Mr.Kaul, the learned senior counsel Mr.VijayAggarwal, Advocate have substantially adopted Page35 of39 1o \K the arguments of Mr.Ahmed, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners. I do not feel that, in the light of the analysis of the submissions made by Mr.Altaf Ahmed, the learned senior counsel, any separate ground urged by the remaining co-accused persons need to be dealt with separately except that in the case of Mr.Karim ^ Morani. He is admitcedlya patient, who has undergone various surgical procedures and has precarious health conditions, though for the present that has not been a cause for concern but that is certainly a ground, which has also weighed with this Court in extending benefit of grant of bail to him as has been a special ground of being woman in the case of Kanimozhi Karunanithi,

¶33In the light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I allow the bail applications of all the five accused persons and they are directed to be released on bail on their BANos. 1565-1568/2011 Page 36of39 furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs.5 lakhs each with two sureties for like amount to satisfaction of the learned trial Court, subject to the following conditions:

(a) The appellants shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts or the case so as to dissuade him to disclose such facts as may be necessary to the Court or to any other authority;

(b) They shall remain present before the trial Court on all the dates fixed for hearing of the case. If anyone of thern wants to remain absent, then they shall take prior permission of the court and in case of unavoidable circumstances for remaining present, they shall immediately give intimation to the trial Court and also to the Superintendent, CBI and seek permission of the Court that they may be BANos. 1565-1568/2011 Page37 of39 V permitted to present tinrough the counsel, and in such an event, they will not dispute their identity as the accused in the case;

(c) They shall surrender their passport, if any (if not already surrendered), and in case, they are not a holder of the same, they shall swear an affidavit. If they have already surrendered before learned Special Judge, CBI, that fact should also be supported by an affidavit;

(d) CBI will be at liberty to make an appropriate application for modification/recalling of the order passed by this Court, if for any reason, petitioners violate any of the conditions imposed by this Court or creates any condition which is not conducive to the holding of a fair trial.

¶34Expression of any opinion herein may not be treated as an expression on the merits of the case. %

¶35Copy of this order be sent to the trial Court.

¶36Dasti under the signatures of the Court l^laster. NOVEMBER^ V2011 KP V.K. SHALI, 3.

w ^ * HIGH COURT OF DELHI: NEW DELHI Date of Decision : ^ .11.2011 1. Bail AdpI. No.1565/2011 SHARAD KUMAR Petitioner Through: Mr. Altaf Ahmed, Sr. Adv. and Mr.R.Shanmugasundara, Sr.Adv. with Mr.V.G.Pragasam, Mr.S.J.Aristotle, Mr.Sudershan Rajan, Advs. Versus CBI Respondent Through: Mr. Mohan Parasaran, ASG with Ms.Sonia Mathur, Standing Counsel for CBI with 10 DSP Rajesh Chahal. 2. Bail AdpI. No.1567/2011 KANIMOZHI KARUNANITHI Petitioner Through: Mr. Altaf Ahmed, Sr. Adv. Mr.R.Shanmugasundar a, Sr.Adv. with Mr.V.G.Pragasam, Mr.S.J.Aristotle, Mr.Sudershan Rajan, Advs. Page1of39 Certify that the digital file and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. Versus CBI Respondent Through; Mr. Mohan Parasaran, ASG with Ivis.Sonia jviathur, Standing Counsel for CBI with 10 DSP Rajesh Chahal 3. Bail Appi. No.1564/2011 KARIM MORANI Petitioner Through: Mr.Siddharth Luthra, Sr. Adv. with Mr.Sandeep Kapur, Mr.Shivek Trehan Mr.Udit Mehdiratta, Ad vs. Versus CBI Respondent Through: Mr. Mohan Parasaran, ASG with Ms.Sonia Mathur, Standing Counsel for CBI with 10 DSP Rajesh Chahal. 4. Bail AppI. No.1566/2011 RAJIV AGARWAL Petitioner Through: Mr.N. K. Kaul, Sr. adv. with Mr.Gurpreet, Adv. r- CBI o Versus Respondent Through: Mr.Mohan Parasaran, ASG with Ms.Sonia Mathur, Standing Counsel for CBI with 10 DSP Rajesh Chahal 5. Bail AddI. No.1568/2011 ASIF BALWA Petitioner Through: Mr.Vijay Aggarwal & Mr. Gurpreet Advs. Versus CBI Respondent Through: Mr.Mohan Parasaran, ASG with Ms.Sonia Mathur, Standing Counsel for CBI with 10 DSP Rajesh Chahal CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI B.A.Nos. 1565-1568/2011 Page 3 of39 V.K. SHALI, 3. 1. These are five bail applications of Asif Balwa (A-13), Rajiv B.Aggarwal (A-14), Karim Morani (A-15), Sharad Kumar (A-16) Kanimozhi Karunanithi (A-17) for grant of regular bail in respect of 2G Spectrum Scam case, which were registered vide RC DAI 2009 A 0045 by the CBI. All these applications are disposed of by a common