M/S Santhoshi Polymers v. M/S Konkan Specialty Poly Products

NC:(2026:KHC:2874-DB( COMAP(No.(639(of(2025( ( , ,,HC-KAR( ( (

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

THDATED THIS THE 20 DAY OF JANUARY, 2026

PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA COMMERCIAL APPEAL NO. 639 OF 2025

BETWEEN:

1. M/S SANTHOSHI POLYMERS S. NO. 372/8/8 HINGRAJ INDUSTRIAL ESTATE

ATHIYAWAD DABHEL DABHEL - 396215 REPRESENTED BY ITS

AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY.

¶2MR. DINESH ATKARE Digitally PARTNER OF M/S SANTHOSHI POLYMERS, signedtiby S.NO. 372/8/ NIRMALA HINGRAJ INDUSTRIAL ESTATE DEVI ATHIYAWAD DABHEL Location: DABHEL 396 215 HIGH0COURT OF KARNATAKA 3. MR. MADAN ATKARE PARTNER OF M/S SANTHOSHI POLYMERS, S.NO. 372/8/8, HINGRAJ INDUSTRIAL ESTATE ATHIYAWAD DABHEL DABHEL 396 215

…APPELLANTS (BY SRI. Y D HARSHA, ADVOCATE) NC:(2026:KHC:2874-DB( COMAP(No.(639(of(2025( ( , ,,HC-KAR( ( ( AND: M/S KONKAN SPECIALTY POLY PRODUCTS PRIVATE LIMITED B-129, BAIKAMPADY INDUSTRIAL ESTATE, MANGALURU -11 REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY MR. MAHESH BONDAL …RESPONDENT

THIS COMAP IS FILED UNDER SECTION 13 (1A) OF THE COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT, 2015 R/W SECTION 96 OF THE CPC PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 3.02.2024 IN COM.OS NO.413/2020 PASSED BY THE IV ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE AND COMMERCIAL COURT, D.K., MANGALURU, AND DISMISS THE SUIT OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT.

THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE and HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA

ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE)

¶1The appellant has filed the present appeal under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 impugning an order dated 03.02.2024 [impugned order] passed by the IV Additional District Judge and Commercial Court, D.K. Mangaluru, in Com.O.S.No.413/2020.

¶2The present appeal has been filed after an inordinate delay of 611 days. The appellant has also filed an application seeking

condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The only explanation provided in the affidavit supporting the said application is that concerned employee who is looking after the proceedings in the commercial suit on behalf of the appellant had resigned shortly after conclusion of the trial. Therefore, the appellant was not aware of the proceedings till receiving of notice in execution proceedings.

¶3We are not persuaded to accept that the said explanation is a credible one which provides a sufficient cause that prevented the appellant from filing the appeal within time.

¶4It is not disputed that the appellant had appointed an advocate to assist in defending the said suit. Merely because one of the officials employed in the firm resigns, it cannot be a ground for not diligently pursuing the remedies available. Appellant No.1 is a partnership firm and appellant Nos.2 and 3 are its constituent partners. It is difficult to accept that the partners of the firm were not aware of the litigation in which the firm was involved. It is also relevant to note that the suit was instituted by the plaintiff for recovery of the goods, which were admittedly received by the appellant-firm. It was the appellant's defence that the goods

provided were substandard. However, there is no dispute that the same were not returned.

¶5Given the legislative intent of providing firm timelines for proceedings in matters involving commercial disputes, condoning an inordinate delay of 611 days is against legislative intent.

¶6In Government of Maharashtra v. M/s Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd. : (2021) 6 SCC 460, the Supreme Court has observed as under:

¶55Reading the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act as a whole, it is clear that when Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is read with either Article 116 or 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, the object and context provided by the aforesaid statutes, read as a whole, is the speedy disposal of appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. To read Section 5 of the Limitation Act consistently with the aforesaid object, it is necessary to discover as to what the expression "sufficient cause" means in the context of condoning delay in filing appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.

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¶58Given the object sought to be achieved under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression "sufficient cause" is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides, the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims…. **

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¶63Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches.

¶7In view of the above, we are unable to accept that the inordinate delay in the present case is required to be condoned. The application for condonation is rejected. Consequently, the appeal is rejected as well.

¶8Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

Sd/- (VIBHU BAKHRU) CHIEF JUSTICE

Sd/- (C.M. POONACHA) JUDGE

Vmb List No.: 2 Sl No.: 13