Nishan Pal v. State of HP

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 1704 of 2026 Reserved on: 28.9.2026 Decided on: 6.10.2026 Nishan Pal …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent Coram Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr

Peeyush

Dhanotia,

Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Tarun Pathak, Deputy

Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking regular bail in FIR No. 58, dated 09.04.2026 registered at Police Station, Bhawarna, District Kangra, HP, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 109(1), 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 118(2), 351(2) and 352 read with Section 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023, Sections 25 of Indian Arms Act and Sections Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 22 and 29 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short "NDPS Act").

¶2It has been asserted that as per the prosecution, a private bus bearing registration No. HP-01K-2597, being driven by Raj Kumar, was going from Bir to Delhi on 08.04.2026. The informant, Avinash, was a conductor in the bus. A Mahindra Thar was being driven erratically in front of the bus, blocking its path. The Thar stopped in the middle of the road, and when the bus stopped, the driver of the Thar reversed it and switched off the ignition. Raj Kumar and Avinash enquired as to why the Thar was stopped. The driver of the Thar, Balwinder Singh, came out and stabbed Raj Kumar with a knife. Two other persons also came out of the Thar. One person, subsequently identified as Nishan (the present petitioner), started quarrelling with Raj Kumar. The buses coming behind the Volvo stopped. Their drivers and conductors came out. Balwinder attacked them with a knife. The petitioner took out a gun from the Thar and brandished it in the air. He threatened to shoot everyone. The third occupant, subsequently identified as Ashish, hurled abuses. The police came to the spot and apprehended the petitioner and the co-accused. The police registered the FIR and arrested the petitioner and the co-accused. A hostile mob had also gathered on the spot. The tyres of the Thar were deflated, and its front windshield and rear/side window panes were damaged. The team from SFSL arrived on the spot the next day and recovered 3.030 grams of Alprazolam tablets and

79.200 grams of Clonazepam tablets.

¶3The allegations against the petitioner are false. The FIR does not attribute any specific role to the petitioner. The forensic report shows that the weapon used by the petitioner was a carbon dioxide air gun used for sports practice, which is not a firearm under the Arms Act. The police had also dropped Section 25 of the Arms Act after the receipt of the report. The Thar did not belong to the petitioner, and there is no material to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. The police have completed the investigation, and the petitioner's custodial interrogation is not required. No fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

¶4The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police had received secret information that the driver of the Thar had inflicted knife injuries to the driver of the Volvo and two-three persons. The police reached the spot where Raj Kumar, Vijay Kumar and Ram Dalal were found injured. They were shifted to the hospital. The informant Avinash made a statement that the bus bearing registration No. HP-01K-2597 was going from Bir to Delhi on 08.04.2026. Raj Kumar was driving the bus. Two other Volvo buses were also moving behind the bus being driven by Raj Kumar. A Thar bearing the mark AF was moving ahead of the bus. The driver of the Thar was driving it in a zigzag manner and was not allowing the Volvo buses to cross the Thar. The driver of the Thar stopped it at Bair Ghatta at about 09:00 p.m. in the middle of the road. Raj Kumar also stopped the bus because there was no space to move. The driver of the Thar reversed it and hit it against the bus. The informant and Raj Kumar got down from the bus and inquired as to why the driver of the Thar had stopped it in the middle of the road. The driver of the Thar got down from the vehicle and inflicted a blow on the stomach of Raj Kumar with a knife. Two other persons came out of the Thar. They started beating Raj Kumar. Another bus also reached the spot. Parvesh Kumar came to the spot, and the driver of the Thar also inflicted an injury by means of a knife on Parvesh. Vijay Kumar and Sunder Singh also tried to intervene, and the driver of the Thar inflicted injuries on the back of Vijay Kumar and the chest of Sunder Singh. The petitioner took out a pistol from the Thar and threatened to kill everybody. The driver of the Thar also waved the knife and threatened to kill the persons present on the spot. The police reached the spot in the meantime. The driver of the Thar revealed his name as Balvinder Singh. The petitioner revealed his name as Nishan Pal, and the third person revealed his name as Aleesh. The injured were taken to the hospital. People gathered on the spot. They beat the occupants of the Thar and damaged the Thar on the spot. Thar was parked on the spot. Subsequently, experts from RFSL reached the spot and searched the Thar. They recovered 1 knife, 1 revolver, 6 cartridges and other material objects. They also found 15 tablets of Alprazolam and Sertraline hydrochloride, 15 tablets of Clonazepam, 70 tablets of Sertraline, 140 tablets of Sertraline hydrochloride, 150 tablets of Bromocriptine Mesylate, 1 capsule, and 675 capsules without any name. The police seized the drugs. The drugs were sent to the FSL, and an intermediate quantity of Alprazolam and Clonazepam was found after the analysis. The revolver was found to be an air revolver, which does not fall within the definition of the Indian Arms Act. The injury sustained by Raj Kumar was grievous and dangerous to life. Similarly, the injury sustained by Vijay Kumar was grievous and dangerous to life, and the injuries sustained by Sunder Singh, Balvinder Singh and Aleesh were found to be simple. Phencyclidine and Methadone were found in the petitioner's blood sample. The DNA profile of victims Vijay and Raj Kumar was found on the knife. The charge sheet was prepared and filed before the Court. The charges were framed on 18.08.2026. The prosecution has cited 59 witnesses, and the matter is listed for recording the statements of witnesses from 25th to 27.11.2026. Hence, the status report.

¶5I have heard Mr Piyush Dhanotia, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State.

¶6Mr Piyush Dhanotia, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. There is no material to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. The police have completed the investigation, and the petitioner's custodial interrogation is not required. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

¶7Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner had come out of the Thar brandishing a weapon and threatening to kill the persons present on the spot. As per the report of the analysis, the pistol used by the petitioner could have been used to cause serious injuries. The petitioner was also found in possession of an intermediate quantity of drugs. The petitioner and the co-accused had taken the law into their own hands and had inflicted injuries to the informants and the victim. The offences alleged are heinous; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

¶8I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

¶9The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:

(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail

¶56In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) "7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

¶8Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, "The Criminal Prosecution in England" (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

¶9Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance." (emphasis supplied)

¶57In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) "8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words "reasonable grounds for believing" instead of "the evidence" which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge." (emphasis supplied)

¶58This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,

(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) "3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter." (emphasis supplied)

¶59In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

¶60In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) "9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail." (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx

¶62One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :

(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :

(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) "35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time, while considering an application for bail, courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused." (emphasis supplied)

¶10Hon'ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308:

¶2The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.

¶3It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime…."

¶11The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

¶12The status report mentions that the petitioner was travelling in the vehicle from which the team of RFSL had recovered an intermediate quantity of Alprazolam and Clonazepam. It was submitted that the petitioner was not found in possession of the narcotics and there is no material to connect him to the commission of the crime. This submission cannot be accepted. The recovery was effected from the Thar and, prima facie, all the persons would be deemed to be in possession. In Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664: 2003 SCC OnLineSC 874, the contraband was recovered from a vehicle, and it was held that all the occupants of the vehicle would be in conscious possession of the contraband. It was observed: "19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were known to each other, and it has not been explained or shown as to how they travelled together from the same destination in a vehicle which was not a public vehicle.

¶20Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It is submitted that to make the possession illicit, there must be conscious possession.

¶21It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled with the requisite mental element, i.e., conscious possession and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted.

¶22The expression "possession" is a polymorphous term that assumes different colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings in contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja[(1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC

(Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC 52] to work out a completely logical and precise definition of "possession" uniformly applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes.

¶23The word "conscious" means awareness of a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.

¶24As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC 194: 1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756], possession in a given case need not be physical possession but can be constructive, having power and control over the article in the case in question, while the person to whom physical possession is given holds it subject to that power or control.

¶25The word "possession" means the legal right to possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC 498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his mother's flat, which is safer than his own home, he must be considered to be in possession of the same. (See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB 966: (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)].)

¶26Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54, where a presumption is also available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles.

¶27In the factual scenario of the present case, not only possession but conscious possession has been established. It has not been shown by the accused-appellants that the possession was not conscious in the logical background of Sections 35 and 54 of the Act."

¶13Therefore, prima facie, the petitioner was found in possession of an intermediate quantity of Alprazolam and Clonazepam.

¶14The status report also shows that the main accused, Balwinder, came out of the vehicle and inflicted injuries on the informant Raj Kumar, Vijay Kumar, and Sunder Singh. The petitioner took out a pistol and threatened to kill everyone present on the spot. The act of the petitioner of taking out the pistol and threatening to shoot everyone prima facie showed that he shared a common intention with the co-accused.

¶15In Sanjay Singh (supra), the co-accused had visited the spot subsequent to the principal accused and after the shot had been fired. It was held that he could not be held liable for the commission of an offence by invoking Section 34 of the IPC. In the present case, the petitioner was travelling with the principal accused. The petitioner also came out with the principal accused and brandished the pistol in the air by threatening to shoot everyone present on the spot. These circumstances distinguish the petitioner's case from Sanjay Singh (supra).

¶16The offence alleged against the petitioner is heinous, and the punishment is severe. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327that when the punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was observed at page 244: "6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of, and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51] "I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because of his guilt, but because there are sufficient probable grounds for the charge against him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary to ensure his appearance at trial .... It is a very important element in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and I think that in coming to a determination on that point, three elements will generally be found the most important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, and the punishment to which the party would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law, death."

¶7It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

¶17Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to bail considering the severity of the punishment.

¶18It was submitted that the prosecution has cited 59 witnesses and the trial is not likely to conclude soon. It is premature to say at this stage that the trial is not likely to conclude soon. The learned Trial Court has listed the matter on three consecutive dates, which shows the concern of the learned Trial Court to expeditiously conduct the trial. Hence, the petitioner cannot be released on bail on the ground that his trial is not likely to conclude soon.

¶19No other point was urged.

¶20In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed.

¶21The observation made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 6th October, 2026

(Chander)