Sonu @ Tashi v. State of HP and Others

THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.MMO No. 744 of 2024 Reserved on   : 06.10.2025 Decided on   : 23.12.2025 Sonu @ Tashi …Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Ors. …Respondents Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1   Yes. For the petitioner : Mr. H.R. Jhingta, Advocate. For the respondents   : Mr. H.S. Rawat, Additional A.G., for respondent No.1­State. None   for   respondents   No.   2 and 3. Virender Singh, Judge Petitioner Sonu @ Tashi, has filed the present petition   under   Section   528   of   the   Bharatiya   Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'BNSS'), for   quashing   of   FIR   No.   135/2017,   dated   27.11.2017, (hereinafter referred to as "FIR in question") registered with Police Station Shimla East, District Shimla, H.P., under 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. Sections 341, 307, 323, 325, read with Section 34 of IPC, as well as, the proceedings resultant thereto, which are pending in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge – 1, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as "the trial Court").

¶2The relief, as claimed in the petition, has been sought, on the ground, that at the instance of respondent No. 2, police of Police Station Shimla East, registered the FIR in question, in which, the police has conducted the investigation   and   submitted   the   charge­sheet.     On   the basis of the said charge­sheet, the learned trial Court has taken the cognizance and charges have been framed.

¶3It is the further case of the petitioner that in the FIR in question, the name of the petitioner has not been mentioned, as, it has been referred that Leky Dorje and five other students of APG University have beaten respondent No.   3   Munanizi.     The   statement   of   respondent   No.   3 Munanizi (injured), is stated to have been recorded much after the incident i.e. after ten days of the alleged incident, whereas, he has been discharged from the hospital within four days of the incident.  The name of the petitioner has been added on the basis of statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.   and   police   could   not   collect   any   evidence   to connect the petitioner with the crime in question.

¶4According   to   the   petitioner,   if   the   entire material, collected during the investigation, is read as a whole, then, no case is made out, against the petitioner. The sole injury inflicted on the person of respondent No. 3, has been attributed to Leky Dorje, who has yet not been arrested, in this case.

¶5It is the case of the petitioner that injured, as well as, the complainant, when appeared in the witness box, have not deposed anything against the accused.

¶6It  is   his   further   case   that   the   FIR   has   been registered on 27.11.2017, and cognizance has been taken by the learned trial Court on 18.06.2022 and till date, the prosecution could not conclude the trial against him, in the present case.

¶7On the basis of the above facts, the relief of quashing   of   the   FIR   in   question,   as   well   as,   resultant proceedings thereto, has been sought.

¶8When, put to notice, respondent No. 2 appeared before this Court on 11.09.2024, and deposed that he does not want to engage any counsel and has also deposed that he is merely an informant and has no personal interest in the   matter,   whereas,   respondent   No.   3   has   not   put appearance, before this Court.

¶9Respondent   No.   1­State   has   filed   the   status report,   disclosing   therein,   that   on   26.11.2017,   an information   was   received   in   Police   Post   Kasumpti, regarding   a   quarrel,   which   had   taken   place   in   APG University.   ASI   Dalip   Chand   along   with   other   police officials, reached at the campus of APG University, where it has been informed to the police that one person Munanizi, has   been   taken   for   treatment   to   IGMC   Shimla,   where respondent No. 2, Rajesh Kumar, who at the relevant time was posted as Assistant Sports Officer, in APG University, got   recorded   his   statement,   under   Section   154   Cr.P.C., disclosing therein, that he is working as Assistant Sports Officer in APG University, in August, 2017 and in addition to this, charge of boys hostel has been given to him.

9.1 On   26.11.2017,   at   about   9:30   pm,   the complainant was standing on the road, after having dinner in the mess.   Then, he noticed that Munanizi, student of B.Arct. 3rd  year, who has come there to meet his friend, had a scuffle with Leky Dorje and five­six other persons. The above persons have beaten him with fist blows and Leky has inflicted the injury with the sharp edged weapon, on   the   head   of   the   Munanizi.     Due   to   the   beatings, Munanizi   sustained   injuries   over   his   head   and   all   over body.  Munanizi was saved by the complainant and Chief Warden Robin Mahajan.  After first aid, he was brought to IGMC Shimla.

9.2 Lastly, he deposed that Leky and his friends, without   any   cause,   had   obstructed   the   movement   of Munanizi and beaten him, as such, he has prayed that action   be   taken   against   them,   upon   which,   police registered the case under Sections 341, 147, 149, 323 of IPC.

9.3 Thereafter,   the   injured   was   medico   legally examined.     The   statements   of   witnesses   were   recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.  On the basis of the statements of the witnesses and complainant, Section 307 of IPC was added.

9.4 On 29.11.2017, accused Leky Dorje Bangche, Kinjang   Thinle,   Funthsho   Choopel,   Sonu   @   Tashi (applicant),   were   associated   in   the   investigation   and arrested at 6:30 pm, on that day.   The information was, thereafter,   given   to   their   guardians,   as   well   as,   to   the Embassy of Bhutan.

9.5 On   the   basis   of   the   statements   of   Munanizi, Sections 147 and 149 of IPC were deleted and Section 34 of IPC was added.  Later on, on the basis of the opinion of the Medical Officer, Section 325 of IPC was added.   Accused Leky Dorje, Kinjang Thinle and Funthsho, were declared as proclaimed offenders, by the Court of learned ACJM Court No. 2, Shimla.

9.6 Lastly, it has been submitted that charge­sheet has been filed on 11.05.2018, before the learned trial Court and six PWs have been examined, in the present case.

¶10On   the   basis   of   the   above   facts,   Dr.   H.R. Jhingta, Advocate, appearing for the petitioner, has made two folded arguments, firstly, that no case is made out against the petitioner, on the basis of the allegations as levelled   against   him,   in   the   statements   made   by   the complainant and witnesses and relief of quashing has also been sought, on account of the undue delay in the trial.

¶11The   petitioner   is   before   this   Court   under Section   528   of   BNSS   (Section   482   Cr.P.C.).     The jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (528 of BNSS), has elaborately been discussed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the year  1992, in the case titled as  State  of Haryana Vs. Chaudhary Bhajan Lal & Others, reported as 1992 CrLJ, 527, in which, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has formulated  the guidelines  for  exercising  the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Relevant paragraph 107 of the judgment is reproduced, as under:­ "107. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant  provisions  of the Code under Chapter   XIV   and   of   the   principles   of   law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating   to   the   exercise   of   the   extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code which we have extracted   and   reproduced   above,   we   give   the following   categories   of   cases   by   way   of illustration   wherein   such   power   could   be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,   though   it   may   not   be   possible   to   lay down   any   precise,   clearly   defined   and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad   kinds   of   cases   wherein   such   power should be exercised.

¶1  Where   the   allegations   made   in   the   First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report   and   other   materials,   if   any, accompanying   the   FIR.   do   not   disclose   a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate with the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in   support   of   the   same   do   not   disclose   the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

¶4  Where,   the   allegations   in   the   FLR   do   not constitute   a   cognizable   offence   but   constitute only. a non­cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

¶5  Where   the   allegations   made   in   the   FIR   or complaint   are   so   absurd   and   inherently improbable  on the  basis  of  which no  prudent person   can   ever   reach   a   just   conclusion   that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in   any   of   the   provisions   of   the   Code   or   the concerned   Act   (under   which   a   criminal proceeding is instituted)  to  the  institution and continuance   of   the   proceedings   and/or   where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

¶7  Where   a   criminal   proceeding   is   manifestly attended   with   mala   fide   and/or   where   the proceeding   is   maliciously   instituted   with   an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

¶12This view has again been reiterated by a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Versus  State of Maharashtra &   Others,  reported   as  2021   SCC   Online   SC   315. Relevant paragraph 38 of the judgment is reproduced, as under:­

38. In the case of Golconda Lingaswamy (supra), after considering the decisions of this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra)  and  other decisions  on the exercise of inherent powers by the High Court under Section 482  Cr.P.C.,   in   paragraphs   5,   7   and   8,   it   is observed and held as under: "5. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the  Code  in a case  of  this nature  is  the exception and not the rule. The section does not   confer   any   new   powers   on   the   High Court.   It   only   saves   the   inherent   power which   the   Court   possessed   before   the enactment  of the Code. It envisages three circumstances   under   which   the   inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and

(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down   any   inflexible   rule   which   would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No   legislative   enactment   dealing   with procedure   can   provide   for   all   cases   that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent   powers   apart   from   express provisions of law which are necessary for proper   discharge   of   functions   and   duties imposed   upon   them   by   law.   That   is   the doctrine   which   finds   expression   in   the section   which   merely   recognises   and preserves   inherent   powers   of   the   High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess   in   the   absence   of   any   express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right   and   to   undo   a   wrong   in   course   of administration   of   justice   on   the   principle quando   lex   aliquid   alique   concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest   (when   the   law   gives   a   person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot   exist).   While   exercising   powers under   the   section,   the   Court   does   not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent   jurisdiction   under   the   section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such   exercise   is   justified   by   the   tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real   and   substantial   justice   for   the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority   of   the   court   exists   for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of   the   process   of   the   court   to   allow   any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the   powers   court   would   be   justified   to quash   any   proceeding   if   it   finds   that initiation  or  continuance   of  it   amounts   to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these   proceedings   would   otherwise   serve the   ends   of   justice.   When   no   offence   is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine   the   question   of   fact.   When   a complaint   is   sought   to   be   quashed,   it   is permissible   to   look   into   the   materials   to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.

7. In dealing with the last category, it is important   to  bear   in  mind  the  distinction between   a   case   where   there   is   no   legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made,   and   a   case   where   there   is   legal evidence   which,   on   appreciation,   may   or may   not   support   the   accusations.   When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the   Code,   the   High   Court   would   not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the   function   of   the   trial   Judge.   Judicial process,   no   doubt   should   not   be   an instrument   of   oppression,   or,   needless harassment.   Court  should  be  circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should   take   all   relevant   facts   and circumstances   into   consideration   before issuing   process,   lest   it   would   be   an instrument   in   the   hands   of   a   private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the   section   is   not   an   instrument   handed over   to   an   accused   to   short­circuit   a prosecution   and   bring   about   its   sudden death…..

8. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its   decision   in   exercise   of   this   power   is based   on   sound   principles.   The   inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest   court   of   a   State   should   normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court   and   the   issues   involved,   whether factual   or   legal,   are   of   magnitude   and cannot   be   seen   in   their   true   perspective without   sufficient   material.   Of   course,   no hard­and­fast   rule   can   be   laid   down   in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise   its   extraordinary   jurisdiction   of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata  Dal   v. H.S. Chowdhary  [(1992)  4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892] and  Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1] .] It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light   of   all   probabilities   in   order   to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of   the   inherent   powers   to   quash   the proceedings   is   called   for   only   in   a   case where the complaint does not disclose any offence   or   is   frivolous,   vexatious   or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognisance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end   in   conviction   or   acquittal.   The complaint/FIR has to be read as a whole. If it   appears   that   on   consideration   of   the allegations   in   the   light   of   the   statement made   on   oath   of   the   complainant   or disclosed in the FIR that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there   is   no   material   to   show   that   the complaint/FIR   is   mala   fide,   frivolous   or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification   for   interference   by   the   High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be   of   secondary   importance.   It   is   the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceeding."

¶13It is no longer  res integra  that at the time of deciding the petition, under Section 482 Cr.PC, this Court cannot   assume   the   powers   of   the   appellate/revisional Court, nor, this Court can act as trial Court.  While holding so, the view of this Court is being guided by the decision of Hon'ble

Supreme

Court

in Chilakamarthi Venkateswarlu   &   Another   versus   State   of   Andhra Pradesh & Another, reported as (2019) 10 SCALE 239. Relevant paragraph 15 of the judgment is reproduced, as under:­ "15. In exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it were a trial Court. The Court is only to be prima facie   satisfied   about   existence   of   sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. For that   limited   purpose,   the   Court   can   evaluate materials   and   documents   on   record,   but   it cannot   appreciate   the   evidence   to   conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused."

¶14Similar view has also been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme   Court   in  S.W.   Palanitkar   &   Others   versus State   of   Bihar   &   Another,  reported   as  (2002)   1 Supreme Court Cases 241.

¶15Being   guided   by   the   decision   of   Hon'ble Supreme Court, as referred above, now this Court would proceed further to determine as to whether the arguments of learned Counsel for the petitioner, that no case is made out against the petitioner, can be accepted, at this stage.

¶16As per the record, the police has recorded the statement   of   one   Vikram   Singh,   who   has   specifically named Sonu @ Tashi, along with three other persons, who had allegedly beaten Munanizi.   Even, injured Munanizi, also named the petitioner, as one of the assailants.   His statement was recorded on 06.12.2017.

¶17In   such   situation,   when   the   petitioner   has specifically been named by the prosecution witnesses, in their statements, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., it cannot be held, at this stage, that no case is made out against him, from the report under Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C. As such, the arguments of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, qua the fact that no case is made out against   the   petitioner,   are   liable   not   to   be   accepted. Consequently, the same are rejected.  Moreover, the stand of the petitioner that PWs, who have been examined by the learned trial Court, have not supported the case of the prosecution,   is   not   liable   to   be   accepted,   as,   the evidenciary value of statements of PWs is to be considered by   the   learned   trial   Court   and   said   power   can   not   be snatched away by this Court, that too, under Section 528 BNSS, where the scope of interference is very limited.

¶18The perusal of the record shows that there are, as many as, 13 witnesses, out of which, six PWs have been examined.   The charge­sheet was submitted in the Court on   02.02.2018,   and   three   accused   namely   Leky   Dorje, Kinjong   Thinley   and   Phuntsho   Chhophel,   have   already been   declared   proclaimed   offenders,   vide   orders   dated

11.02.2022   &   01.04.2022.     The   charges   against   the petitioner were framed on 18.06.2022.

¶19In   this   background,   the   learned   Counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in case titled as "Santosh De Vs Archna Guha & Anr., reported as AIR 1994 SC 1229", wherein, the relief of quashing was granted on the ground of   unexplained   delay   of   eight   years   in   commencing   the trial. Relevant paragraph 12 of the judgment is reproduced as under:­ "12. We are not satisfied that there are any valid grounds for interference with the order of the High Court.  The most glaring circumstance in the case is the delay in commencing the trial.   The case was committed to sessions court on July 15, 1974 and the charges came to be framed by the sessions court only on  April 13, 1983 i.e., after a lapse of about eight years.   The appellant is not in a position to explain   the   reasons   for   this   delay.     In   the   order under appeal, the High Court has stated that this delay  is  entirely  on   account   of  the   default  of   the prosecution.   This is not a case of what is called 'systemic delays' ­ as explained in A.R. Antulay, (AIR 1992  SC 1701).   In our opinion, this unexplained delay of eight years in commencing the trial by itself infringes the right of the accused to speedy trial.  In the   absence   of   any   material   to   the   contrary,   we accept the finding of the High Court that this delay of eight years is entirely and exclusively on account of the default of the prosecution.  Once that is so there is no occasion for interference in this appeal.   It is accordingly dismissed."     (Self emphasis supplied).

¶20Learned   Counsel   for   the   petitioner   has   also relied upon another decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Pankaj Kumar Vs State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 3077", wherein holding the speedy trial to be the fundamental   right,   proceedings   were   ordered   to   be quashed.     Relevant   paragraph   18,   of   the   judgment,   is reproduced, as under:­ "18. Tested on the touchstone of the broad principles, enumerated above, we are of the opinion that in the instant   case,   appellant's   constitutional   right recognised   under  Article   21  of   the   Constitution stands violated. It is common ground that the First Information Report was recorded on 12th May, 1987 for   the   offences   allegedly   committed   in   the   year 1981,

and

after unwarranted

prolonged investigations, involving afore­stated three financial irregularities;   the   chargesheet   was   submitted   in Court on 22nd February, 1991. Nothing happened till April,  1999, when the appellant and his deceased mother filed criminal writ petition seeking quashing of proceedings before the trial court. Though, it is true that the plea with regard to inordinate delay in investigations and trial has been raised before us for the first time but we feel that at this distant point of time, it would be unfair to the appellant to remit the matter back to the High Court for examining the said plea   of   the   appellant.   Apart   from   the   fact   that   it would further protract the already delayed trial, no fruitful purpose would be served as learned Counsel for the State very fairly stated before us that he had no explanation to offer for the delay in investigations and the reason why the trial did not commence for eight   long   years.   Nothing,   whatsoever,   could   be pointed out, far from being established, to show that the   delay   was   in   any   way   attributable   to   the appellant. Moreover, having regard to the nature of the   accusations   against   the   appellant,   briefly referred to above, who was a young boy of about eighteen years of age in the year 1981, when the acts   of   omission   and   commission   were   allegedly committed by the concerns managed by his parents, who have since died, we feel that the extreme mental stress and strain of prolonged investigation by the Anti Corruption Bureau and the sword of damocles hanging   perilously   over   his   head   for   over   fifteen years must have wrecked his entire career. Be that as it may, the prosecution has failed to show any exceptional   circumstance,   which   could   possibly   be taken   into   consideration   for   condoning   the prolongation   of   investigation   and   the   trial.   The lackadaisical manner of investigation spread over a period   of   four   years   in   a   case   of   this   type   and inordinate delay of over eight years (excluding the period when the record of the trial court was in the High Court), is manifestly clear. Thus, on facts in hand, we are convinced that the appellant has been denied his valuable constitutional right to a speedy investigation   and   trial   and,   therefore,   criminal proceedings initiated against him in the year 1987 and pending in the court of Special Judge, Latur, deserve to be quashed on this short ground alone."

¶21Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has also relied on the judgment of Karnataka High Court in "K.E.   Mahabaleshwara   Vs   State   of   Karnataka, reported   as   1999   Cr.L.J.   2412",   wherein,   after considering the progress of the trial, relief was granted to the   petitioner   before   it,   who   had   sought   the   relief   of quashing,   on   the   basis   of   delay   in   the   trial.     Relevant paragraph 9, of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:­ "9. For more than eleven years the trial is pending without  any progress  for no  fault  of the accused­ petitioner.   On the basis of a domestic enquiry the petitioner was removed from service.  The petitioner has been undergoing ordeal of attending the Court on the dates of trial without any progress.  Although it has taken eleven years not a single witness has been examined by the Court.   Such an inordinate delay will be a violation of Art. 21 of the Constitution. Every   accused   is   entitled   to   a   speedy   trial. Unexplained and inordinate delay of the trial for no fault of the accused is clearly in violation of Art. 12 of the Constitution.  Expeditious trial is a basic right to an accused which cannot be trampled upon unless it can be shown that the accused was to blame for the delay in the trial.  No such material is placed before the Court to show that the petitioner­accused was responsible   for   the   unreasonable   delay   in commencing the trial. "

¶22Reliance has also been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, upon the decision of a Division Bench   of   Delhi   High   Court   in   case   reported   as   "P.D. Sharma Vs Union of India & Anr., reported as 2000 STPL 9336 Delhi", wherein, the relief of quashing of FIR has been granted, on the basis of delay in trial, in which, the   accused   has   not   attributed   for   the   delay.   Relevant paragraph 8, of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:­ "8. We   had   the   opportunity   to   peruse   the   Trial Court record as well and on perusal found that the delay   of   the   proceedings   couldn't   cannot   be attributed to the petitioner/accused.  Mr. Ahluwalia, counsel for the State on the other hand contended that   the   delay   of   proceedings   could   also   not   be attributed   solely   to   the   State. State   took adjournments only on two to three occasions.   We find no force in this submission of Mr. Ahluwalia. Admittedly it is not the case of the prosecution that delay was on account of any default of the accused nor the accused was responsible for the delay of the proceedings,   therefore,   it   cannot   be   said   that   the petitioner is taking advantage of his own wrong.  The fact remains that the prosecution was fully aware of the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge   dated  9th  September,  1994   thereby  holding that   no   case   under   Section   7   of   the   Essential Commodities Act was made out.  Learned Additional Sessions  Judge   found  prima   facie   case   made  out under   Section   120­B   read   with   Section   407   IPC against one set of accused and against other set of accused under Section 407 IPC only.  Learned ACMM after   receipt   of   the   file   from   Additional   Sessions Judge was only to frame the charge which was a mere   formality,   inspire   of   the   same   the   Public Prosecutor did not care to point out to the learned ACMM   to   complete   the   ormality   by   framing   the charge   and   fix   the   date   of   evidence.     Why   the prosecutor did not point out to the learned ACMM that Additional Sessions Judge has already prima facie given decision for framing of charge? Why he could   not   get   the   charges   framed   in   September, 1994?  Public Prosecutor took it leisurely that is why it took nearly six years to formally frame the charge. The   proceedings   thus   dragged   on   because   of   the indifferent  attitude of the prosecution, therefore, it cannot   be   said   that   the   prosecution   is   not   to   be blamed for this delay, may be part of the delay was on   account   of   the   system   itself. In   such circumstances, the delay cannot be attributed to the accused, the petitioner herein.  In the absence of any Explanation   it   shows   laxity   on   the   part   of   the prosecution in proceeding with the case for which the petitioner cannot be blamed."

¶23In view of the above legal position, now, this Court would proceed further to ascertain the fact as to whether   there   is   undue   delay,   in   this   case.     As   stated above,   charges   were   framed   way   back   on   18.06.2022. Thereafter, 20 effective opportunities have been granted to the prosecution to lead evidence. However, after framing the charges, on 20.12.2023, I.O. of the case was present, but, in view of the request made by learned Counsel for the accused, the witness was discharged, as prayer, was made to   examine   this   witness,   after   the   examination   of   eye witnesses.

¶24Thereafter,   on   06.03.2024,   I.O.   was   present, but, was  not examined, on account of the  objection  as raised   earlier. From   19.02.2025   to   22.02.2025, proceedings were held up, on account of non appearance of the petitioner.

¶25Considering the factual position of the present case, in the light of the decisions, as referred to above, this Court is of the view that the petitioner is not able to make out a case for quashing the FIR.  However, considering the number   of   opportunities   given   to   the   prosecution,   this Court is of the view that a direction can be issued to the learned trial Court, to decide the trial against the petitioner within a period of five months, from today, i.e. on or before

31.05.2026.   In order to achieve the said target, learned trial Court is at liberty, even to take coercive action to secure the presence of the witnesses.

¶26The petition is disposed of, in the above terms.

¶27Petitioner­accused   is   directed   to   put appearance before the learned trial Court on 02.01.2026.

¶28Record be sent back forthwith.

( Virender Singh ) Judge 23rd December, 2025 (Pramod Kumar)