Brij Mohan@ Brijesh v. State of Haryana

JASJIT SINGH BEDI, J. The prayer in the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. read with Section 427(1) Cr.P.C. is for the issuance of directions that the sentence awarded vide judgment and order dated 24.07.2006 in FIR No.422 dated 24.11.1999 registered under Sections 307, 341, 34 IPC at Police Station Sadar   Palwal,   District   Faridabad   be   ordered   to   concurrently   with   the conviction and sentence in the Trial emanating out of FIR No.376 dated

22.09.2000 registered under Sections 302, 34 IPC at Police Station Sadar Palwal, District Palwal.

¶2The petitioner was convicted and sentenced in the following cases:- Sr. FIR No. dated U/s  P.S.  Sentence  Date   of Name of Court No. sentence

¶1FIR   No.422 307, 341, Sadar 6 years 24.7.06 ASJ Faridabad dt. 24.11.99 34 IPC  Palwal

¶2FIR   No.376 302,   34 Sadar Life 1.11.06 ASJ Faridabad dt. 22.9.2000 IPC Palwal imprisonment CRM-M-9179-2020                                                                          -2-

¶3FIR   No.374 14,   149, Sadar Life 30.1.07 ASJ Faridabad dt. 1.10.01 302, 307, Palwal imprisonment 120-B IPC   and 25   Arms Act

¶3The petitioner filed an appeal No.1816-SB-2006 in FIR No.422 dated   24.11.1999   which   is   still   pending   adjudication.  As   against   the convictions   in   FIR   No.376   dated   22.09.2000   and   FIR   No.374   dated

01.10.2001,   he   filed   CRA-D-182-DB-2007   and   CRA-D-398-DB-2007 respectively which were dismissed by this Court.

¶4The sentence awarded in the Trial emanating out of FIR No.374 dated 01.10.2001 U/s 148, 149, 302 IPC, P.S. Sadar Palwal was ordered to run concurrently with the sentence awarded in the Trial emanating out of FIR No.376 dated 22.09.2000 U/s 302/34 IPC, P.S. Sadar Palwal, District Palwal vide judgment dated 12.02.2017 passed by this Court in CRWP No.1310 of 2015.

¶5Now the instant petition has been filed seeking the concurrent running of sentences in the conviction recorded in the Trial emanating out of FIR No.422 dated 24.11.1999 and that recorded in FIR No.374 dated

01.10.2001.

¶6The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in terms of Section 427(1) Cr.P.C. this Court could direct that the subsequent sentence would run concurrently with the previous sentence. In case, the discretion was not exercised by this Court, the petitioner would suffer irreparable loss and injustice. Reliance is placed on the judgments in the cases of Sher Singh V  ersus State of M.P., 1989(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 696   and Joginder Singh Versus State of Punjab, 1996(3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 74. CRM-M-9179-2020                                                                          -3-

¶7On the other hand, the learned State counsel contends that while exercising powers under Sections 427(2) Cr.P.C. this Court had already directed the concurrent running of sentences in Trials emanating out of FIR No.376 dated 22.09.2000 and FIR No.374 dated 01.10.2001. Section 427(2) Cr.P.C. was in the nature of a positive mandate where this Court had no discretion but to order concurrent running of sentences in each case of life imprisonment. On  the contrary, as regards Section  427(1) Cr.P.C., the discretion lay with the Court as to whether thought it fit to order the subsequent   sentence   to   run   concurrently   with   previous   sentence.   As convictions had been recorded for different offences by different Courts on different dates and the offences in question being under Sections 307 IPC and 302 IPC respectively which were of a heinous nature this Court ought not to exercise its discretion under Section 427(1) Cr.P.C. to order the sentences to run concurrently. Reliance is placed on the judgments in the case of Mohd. Akhtar Hussain alias Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti Versus Assistant Collector of Customs (Prevention), Ahmedabad & others, 1988(4) SCC 183.

¶8The learned counsel for the State further contends that it was the duty of the Court to impose such punishment that would have the effect of deterring other potential criminals and must also be appropriate befitting the crime which in the present case is attempt to murder. Reliance is placed on the judgments in the cases of Akram Khan Versus State of West Bengal, 2012(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 168, Mulla & Another Versus State of U.P., 2010 AIR (Supreme Court) 342,  State of Rajasthan Versus Gajendra Singh, 2008(3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 943 and State of Karnataka Versus Sharanappa Basnagouda Aregoudar, 2002(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 271. CRM-M-9179-2020                                                                          -4-

¶1/ have heard the 3earned counse3 for the parties. ),. 7efore proceedin+ further in the matter, it wou3d 5e apposite to e>amine Section #%' of the &ode of &rimina3 Procedure, )1'2 and the same is reproduced hereine53ow:6 )e"t# % 427   ! t2e C .e  ! C*#3#%a4 P* "e.,*e1 1975

¶427Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence.-(1)When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence: Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under Section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately.

(2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence." )). Section #%'(%* &r.P.&. is in the nature of a positive mandate to the &ourt that it sha33 in a33 cases order sentences to run concurrent3  in a case where the first sentence is of 3ife and the second sentence is for a fi>ed term or for 3ife. As re+ards Section #%'()* &r.P.&. the discretion 3ies with the &ourt to order the sentences in two cases to run concurrent3  in those cases CRM-M-9179-2020                                                                          --- where the first conviction is for a sentence other than 3ife as in the present case. )%. As re+ards the jud+ments referred to 5  the petitioner, in Joginder Singh (supra*, the petitioner9accused therein was tried separate3  in five cases 5efore the same &ourt under Section #,1 /P& and was convicted in each of the five cases 5  a separate jud+ment on the same date and awarded a su5stantive sentence of one  ear in each case. /t was in that scenario that the &ourt he3d that the sentences in each case were to run concurrent3 . /n the case of Sher Singh (supra*, a .u33 7ench of the Madh a Pradesh Hi+h &ourt he3d that the Hi+h &ourt in e>ercise of its power under Section #$% &r.P.&. read with Section #%'()* &r.P&. cou3d at an  sta+e order sentences to run concurrent3 . )2. As a+ainst these jud+ments, the Hon@53e Supreme &ourt in the case of Mohd. %&htar 'ussain alias (!rahim %hmed )hatti (supra*, he3d as under:6 "9. Section 427 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 incorporates the principle of sentencing an offender who is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment. The relevant portion of the Section reads: "427.(1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. xx xx xx"

¶10The Section relates to administration of criminal justice and provides procedure for sentencing. The sentencing court CRM-M-9179-2020                                                                          -$- is, therefore, required to consider and make an appropriate order as to how the sentence passed in the subsequent case is to run Whether it should be concurrent or consecutive?

¶11The basic rule of thumb over the years has been the so-called single transaction rule for concurrent sentences. If a given transaction constitutes two offences under two enactments generally, it is wrong to have consecutive sentences. It is proper and legitimate to have concurrent sentences. But this rule has no application if the transaction relating to offences is not the same or the facts constituting the two offences are quite different.

¶12In this appeal, the primary challenge to the sentence is based on assumption that the two cases against the appellant, under the Gold (Control) Act, and the Customs Act pertain to the same subject matter. It is alleged that the appellant was prosecuted under the two enactments in respect of seizure of 7000 tolas of gold. On this basis, reference is also made to Section 428 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 claiming set off in regard to the period of imprisonment already undergone by the appellant.

¶13The submission, in our opinion, appears to be misconceived. The material produced by the State unmistakably indicates that the two offences for which the appellant was prosecuted are quite distinct and different. The case under the Customs Act may, to some extent, overlap the case under the Gold (Control) Act, but it is evidently on different transactions. The complaint under the Gold (Control) Act relates to possession of 7000 tolas of primary gold prohibited under Section 8 of the said Act. The complaint under the Customs Act is with regard to smuggling of Gold worth Rs. 12.5 crores and export of silver worth Rs. 11.5 crores. On these facts, the Courts are not unjustified in directing that the sentences should be CRM-M-9179-2020                                                                          - - (emphasis supp3ied* )#. As re+ards imposition of sentence the Hon@53e Supreme &ourt has he3d as under:6 /n %&ram -han (supra* it was he3d as under:6 A20. Now, we have to see whether the sentence imposed by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court is appropriate or not? We have already extracted Section 364A in the earlier paras which stipulates that if the prosecution establishes beyond doubt that the kidnapping was for ransom, the sentence provided in this Section is death or imprisonment for life and also be liable to fine.

¶21In Mulla and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2010(2) RCR (Criminal) 176 : 2010(2) RAJ (R.A.J.) 54 : (2010) 3 SCC 508, after considering various earlier decisions, this Court held as under:- "67. It is settled legal position that the punishment must fit the crime. It is the duty of the court to impose proper punishment depending upon the degree of criminality and desirability to impose such punishment. As a measure of social necessity and also as a means of deterring other potential offenders, the sentence should be appropriate befitting the crime." We fully endorse the above view once again. (emphasis supp3ied* /n    Mulla , %nother (supra* it was he3d as under:6 A42. It is settled legal position that the punishment must fit the crime. It is the duty of the Court to impose proper punishment depending upon the decree of criminality and desirability to impose such punishment. As a measure of social necessity and also as a means of deterring other potential offenders, the sentence should be appropriate befitting the crime. (emphasis supp3ied* CRM-M-9179-2020                                                                          -.- /n  State of Ra asthan (supra* it was he3d as under:6

¶13Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1991(2) RCR (Criminal) 427 .

¶14The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpability of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows some significant discretion to the Judge in arriving at a sentence in each case, presumably to permit sentences that reflect more subtle considerations of culpability that are raised by the special facts of each case. Judges in essence affirm that punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice sentences are determined largely by other considerations. Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that are offered to justify a sentence. Sometimes the desirability of keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic results of his crime. Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from just desert as the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are serious and widespread.

¶15Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains a strong influence in the determination of sentences. Even now for a single grave infraction drastic sentences are imposed. Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity for any serious crime is thought then to be a measure of toleration that is unwarranted and unwise. But in fact, quite CRM-M-9179-2020                                                                          -9-apart from those considerations that make punishment unjustifiable when it is out of proportion to the crime, uniformly disproportionate punishment has some very undesirable practical consequences.

¶16After giving due consideration to the facts and circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the Court. Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been very aptly indicated in Dennis Councle Mc Gautha v. State of California, 402 US 183 : 28 L.D. 2d 711 that no formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would provide a reasonable criterion in determining a just and appropriate punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof formula which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess various circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment may be equitably distinguished.

¶17The object should be to protect the society and to deter the criminal in achieving the avowed object to law by imposing appropriate sentence. It is expected that the Courts would operate the sentencing system so as to impose such sentence which reflects the conscience of the society and the sentencing process has to be stern where it should be.

¶18Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile exercise. The social impact of the crime, e.g. where it relates to offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropriation of public money, treason and other offences involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency CRM-M-9179-2020                                                                          -10-which have great impact on social order, and public interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing meager sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be result7wise counter productive in the long run and against societal interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system. /em+0as(s su++"(ed1 /n State of -arnata&a (supra* it was he3d as under:6

¶6We are of the view that having regard to the serious nature of the accident, which resulted in the death of four persons, the learned Single Judge should not have interfered with the sentence imposed by the court below. It may create and set an unhealthy precedent and send wrong signals to the courts which have to deal with several such accident cases. If the accused are found guilty of rash and negligent driving, courts have to be on guard to ensure that they do not escape the clutches of law very lightly. The sentence imposed by the courts should have deterrent effect on potential wrong-doers and it should commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. Of course, the Courts are given discretion in the matter of sentence to take stock of the wide and varying range of facts that might be relevant for fixing the quantum of sentence, but the discretion shall be exercised with due regard to larger interest of the society and it is needless to add that passing of sentence on the offender is probably the most public face of the criminal justice system. (emphasis supp3ied* );. &omin+ 5ac< to the facts of the instant case, it is apparent that the petitioner was initia33  convicted in ./R 0o.#%% dated %#.)).)111 under Sections 2,', 2#), 2# /P& Po3ice Station Sadar Pa3wa3, 4istrict .arida5ad for CRM-M-9179-2020                                                                          -11-a period of six years by the Court of Addl. Sessions Judge, Faridabad. Thereafter, he was convicted in FIR No.376 dated 22.09.2000 U/s 302/34 IPC, P.S. Sadar Palwal, District Palwal. Subsequently, he was convicted in FIR No.374 dated 01.10.2001 U/s 148, 149, 302 IPC, P.S. Sadar Palwal. As FIR Nos.376 and 374 were cases in which he was sentenced to imprisonment for life this Court had exercised its powers in terms of Section 427(2) Cr.P.C. and had ordered that the sentences would run concurrently. However, in the instant case, the petitioner seeks the concurrent running of sentences in terms of Section 427(1) Cr.P.C. The exercise of powers under Section 427(1) Cr.P.C.   are   the   subjective   satisfaction   of   the   Court   based   on   certain parameters. In the case of Joginder Singh  (supra), the power was exercised as the accused therein had been convicted for the same offence in five different cases by separate judgments on the same day and by the same Court. It was in that situation that the power had been exercised to order the concurrent running of sentences. However, the instant case is distinguishable on facts and the judgment in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain alias Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti (supra) would apply on all fours as each case is totally distinct and the offences do not arise out of the same transaction. Apparently, in FIR No.422 dated 24.11.1999 the conviction was recorded on 19.07.2006/24.07.2006 by the Court of Addl. Sessions Judge, Faridabad. The subsequent FIR Nos.376 and 374 were both under Section 302 IPC and lead to separate convictions by separate Courts of Addl. Sessions Judge, Faridabad. There is absolutely no justifiable reason for this Court to exercise its discretionary power under Section 427(1) Cr.P.C. as the offences in question in each case are completely different do not arise out of the same transaction and are otherwise heinous CRM-M-9179-2020                                                                          -12-offences. In fact, if the argument was to be accepted that in every case the Court ought to exercise its powers under Section 427(1) Cr.P.C. then there would be multiple convictions for varying periods of time by different Courts for different offences and the Courts would be obligated to order concurrent running of sentences which defeats the very purpose of imposition of a sentence which must be not only deterrent in nature but must be befitting the crime. A sentencing policy which is unusually mild and sympathetic in its operation would have a disastrous effect on society and would do more harm than good to public confidence in the efficacy of law. It is therefore, the duty of every Court to award appropriate sentence having regard to the nature of the offence. Therefore, in cases where a person is a serial offender and that too for committing heinous crimes, the Courts would do well in not wanting to exercise their powers under Section 427(1) Cr.P.C. to order concurrent running of sentences.

¶16In view of the above discussion, I find no merit in the present petition. Therefore, the same stands dismissed. (JASJIT SINGH BEDI) JUDGE

15.04.2024 JITESH  Whether speaking/reasoned:-  Yes/No Whether reportable:-          Yes/No

CRM-M-9179-2020 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CRM-M-9179-2020 Date of Decision: 15.04.2024 BRIJ MOHAN @ BRIJESH ... Petitioner Versus STATE OF HARYANA ...Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASJIT SINGH BEDI Present: Mr. V.S. Rana, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Kanwar Sanjiv Kumar, Asstt. A.G., Haryana. ****