Ishpal Singh v. Madan Mohan and Others

CR-5564-2025 (

IN

Ishpal Singh Madan Mohan (s through LRs and

CORAM : HON

Present: Mr MANDEEP PA

1.

The

29.05.2025 passe later converted i respondent No. allowed and the

2.

The decree were pas Ludhiana, where parties and in representatives o defendant No. 2 Section 152 CPC

3.

The

18.04.2024. Resp an appeal again there was a delay (O&M) THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJ AT CHANDIGA -.-

CR Dec

VERSUS since deceased) d Others

N'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANDEE . Vaibhav Sehgal, Advocate for th -.- ANNU J. e present revision petition has be ed by the learned First Appellate into Civil Appeal No. 635 of 202 1/defendant No.1 under Section appeal was entertained. e brief facts leading to the presen ssed on 09.12.2022 by the Cour eby the suit of the petitioner/plain the decree sheet, the trial Co of defendants No. 2 to 4. Conse 2, namely Pardeep Sharma, filed C on 31.01.2023, which was allow e petitioner/plaintiff thereafter pondent No.1/defendant No.1, th st the judgment and decree date y of around 305 days in filing the JAB AND HARYANA ARH R-5564-2025 (O&M) cided on :- 25.08.2025 ....Petitioner

....Respondents EP PANNU he petitioner.

een directed against the order da Court in CM No. 774 of 10.11.20 25, whereby the application filed 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 w nt petition are that the judgment rt of Civil Judge (Junior Divisio ntiff was dismissed. In the memo ourt omitted to mention the le equently, the legal representative an application for correction un wed on 17.07.2023. filed an execution petition rough his legal representatives, fi ed 09.12.2022 on 10.11.2023. Th e appeal. However, in the applicat

ated 023, d by was and on), o of egal e of nder on filed hus,

under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the respondents counted the delay only from

17.07.2023, i.e. the date when the correction application was allowed, and represented the delay to be 63 days.

4.

Learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff contended that the learned appellate Court committed a grave error in calculating the delay as 63 days instead of 305 days. The decree which was sought to be challenged was dated 09.12.2022, and the correction order dated 17.07.2023 only pertained to inserting the names of the legal representatives of defendants No. 2 to 4. That correction did not in any way hamper or bar respondent No. 1 from filing the appeal against the decree dated

09.12.2022. Therefore, the limitation period should have been reckoned from

09.12.2022.

5.

It was further argued that respondent No.1 misled the Court by depicting the delay as only 63 days, whereas in fact it was 305 days. The petitioner thus alleged fraud and contended that the application for condonation ought to have been dismissed. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff placed reliance upon a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkumar Choudhary, [202591) Indian Civil Cases 753 (S.C)].

6.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent No.1/defendant No.1 submitted that the delay was occasioned due to illness of appellant No. 1, who was pursuing the litigation. It was pleaded in the application that in the first week of September 2023, appellant No.1 fell ill with viral fever and thereafter suffered from weakness and could not recover sufficiently to attend to his affairs till the end of October 2023. Thereafter, the appeal was promptly filed on 10.11.2023. It was submitted that liberal approach should be taken in the interest of justice.

7.

I have considered the rival contentions and perused the record carefully.

8.

The first and foremost issue that arises is whether the limitation period for filing the appeal was to be reckoned from the date of the original judgment and

decree, i.e. 09.12.2022, or from the date of correction order dated 17.07.2023? This Court is of the considered view that the correction under Section 152 CPC merely inserted the names of the legal representatives of defendants Nos. 2 to 4 and did not alter the operative decree. Respondent No.1/defendant No.1 was duly named in the judgment and decree dated 09.12.2022 and could have filed the appeal against that decree. Therefore, the limitation must be counted from 09.12.2022. The appeal filed on 10.11.2023 was, thus, delayed by 305 days.

9.

The next question is whether sufficient cause was made out for condoning the said delay? It is true that no documentary medical evidence was produced to support the plea of illness. However, the fact remains that in such matters, the Court has to adopt a liberal approach. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, held that substantial justice should prevail over technical considerations and delay should be condoned where no mala fides are established. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123, the Court further held that length of delay is not decisive; what matters is the sufficiency of the cause.

10.

In the present case, the application itself disclosed that the respondents counted the delay from 17.07.2023, the date of correction, and not from 09.12.2022, the date of decree. It cannot, therefore, be said that fraud was played on the Court, as the respondents clearly disclosed their basis. However, the fact remains that there was a delay of 305 days. The respondents explained the delay on the ground of illness and inability to attend to litigation between September and October 2023. Though no medical documents were produced, in the absence of mala fides, this Court is inclined to accept that there was sufficient cause for delay.

11.

Reference may also be made to State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752, wherein the Supreme Court reiterated that liberal approach should be adopted when delay is not due to negligence or inaction. Similarly, in Improvement

Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh, (2010) 6 SCC 786, it was held that when technical delay obstructs substantial justice, delay may be condoned.

12.

So far as case law relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff is concerned, in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Chaudhary (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where delay in filing an appeal is attributable to gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or lack of bona fides, the Court should not condone such delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in that case, the State had failed to offer any plausible explanation for its prolonged inaction and sought condonation of delay as a matter of right. The Court categorically observed that liberal interpretation cannot extend to situations where the conduct of the party shows indifference or mala fides.

13.

The facts of the present case are entirely distinguishable. Here, respondent No.1/defendant No.1 did not sit idle in utter negligence or mala fide indifference. The appeal was filed after delay primarily because the appellant fell ill during September–October 2023, which explanation, though not supported by documentary medical evidence, was consistently pleaded. More importantly, the respondent No.1/defendant No.1 disclosed in the application that he was computing limitation from the date of the correction order. Thus, there was no suppression of fact or fraud. Unlike in Ramkumar Chaudhary's case (supra), the delay in the present case cannot be attributed to deliberate inaction or gross negligence. At the highest, there was a mistaken calculation of limitation, which by itself is not sufficient to deny condonation when sufficient cause has otherwise been shown. Therefore, while the case of Ramkumar Chaudhary (supra) lays down that negligence or lack of bona fides cannot be condoned, that principle has no application to the present facts, where no mala fides are established and sufficient cause has been explained.

Conclusion

14.

For the reasons recorded above, this Court does not find any ground to interfere in the impugned order dated 29.05.2025 passed by the learned First Appellate Court. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed. However, it is clarified that the delay of 305 days has been condoned subject to payment of cost of Rs.10,000/- to be paid by respondent No.1/defendant No.1 to the opposite party in the trial Court, in order to compensate the opposite party for any hardship caused to the party.

15.

Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

August 25, 2025

(MANDEEP PANNU) tripti

JUDGE

Whether speaking/non-speaking : Speaking

: Yes/No