The Executive Engineer and Another v. Jeet Bahadur and Another

227 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH 0000 CWP-3025-2016 (O&M) thDate of Decision: 04  January, 2024 The Executive Engineer, Water Supply and Sanitation (RWS) and another ..... Petitioners Versus Jeet Bahadaur and another ..... Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARSH BUNGER Present: Mr. Vipin Pal Yadav Addl. A.G., Punjab for the petitioners/State. Mr. Amarjit Singh, Advocate for respondent No.1. ***** HARSH BUNGER J.

¶1Petitioners have filed the instant writ petition  under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of impugned award dated 05.10.2015 (Annexure P-5) passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Amritsar (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Tribunal), whereby the industrial dispute raised by respondent No.1 (Jeet Bahadur) regarding termination of his services has been answered in his favour.

¶2Briefly, respondent No.1-workman (Jeet Bahadur) raised an industrial dispute regarding termination of his services by the petitioner-Department,   which   was   subsequently   referred   for   adjudication   to   the

¶3In the claim statement, it was stated by respondent No.1-workman that he was employed against a permanent post as Mali-cum-Chowkidar and deputed  at Patti where he continuously worked from

01.06.1992 up to 30.03.1995, when he was retrenched. It was the categoric case of respondent No.1 that after his retrenchment, new Chowkidars-cum-Malis were engaged. Respondent No.1-workman stated that his services have been terminated in violation of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the 1947 Act'), therefore, he prayed that appropriate order be passed for re-employing him from the date when new watchmen-cum-Chowkidars/Malis were appointed.

¶4The   aforesaid   claim   of   respondent   No.1-workman   was contested   by   the   petitioner-Department   by   denying   the   averments   of respondent No.1-workman that he was appointed as a permanent employee on 01.06.1992. It was stated that respondent No.1 was appointed as a daily wager in the year 1994 and he did not complete 240 days in a year. It was next submitted that respondent No.1 was engaged in Sub Division Patti in the month of May, 1994 and worked as daily wager from July, 1994 till February, 1995; and thereafter, he abandoned his job and remained absent. It was also stated that claim of respondent No.1 was time barred inasmuch as that respondent No.1 claimed that he had worked from 01.06.1992 till

30.03.1995 whereas the demand notice was served only in March, 2009.

¶5From the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the Tribunal:- "(i) Whether the services of the workman have been terminated illegally and against rules. If so, its effect and whether he is entitled to any consequential benefits? OPW

(ii) Whether the reference is not maintainable? OPM

(iii) Relief "

¶6Thereafter, both the parties led evidence in support of their case. The workman examined Gurpreet Singh, Clerk Water Supply, Patti as WW-1 and also examined himself as WW-2. On the other hand, the Managements examined Sh. Gurpreet Singh as MW-1.

¶7The Tribunal below, vide its impugned award dated 05.10.2015 (Annexure P-5), granted the following relief to respondent No.1-workman:-

15. In view of the discussion, made on the above issues, the reference is answered in favour of workman and against the managements and  the award  is passed accordingly. The workman is ordered to be reinstated at the post of Mali-cum-Chowkidar from the date he was retrenched with back wages for three years and he will also be regularized from the date he was retrenched. The managements directed to reinstate him within two months of the publication of this award and pay him his 9% per annum interest from the date he was removed till payment is made. The workman shall report for duty within thirty days after publication of the award. Reader of this Tribunal is directed to forward three copies of this Award to Assistant Labour Commissioner/ Labour-cum-Reconciliation Officer, Amritsar as required under Section 15 of the I.D. Act read with Notification No.S.0.66/C.A.14/1947/S.17/2008 dated

1.10.2008."

¶8Being aggrieved with the aforesaid award dated 05.10.2015 (Annexure P-5), the petitioners have filed the instant writ petition before this Court.

¶9I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the paper book with their able assistance.

¶10After going through the impugned award dated 05.10.2015 (Annexure P-5), it is observed that the Tribunal has not returned any finding under Issue No.1. After referring to the depositions of workman in paragraph No.11 and the documentary evidence placed on record, the Tribunal in paragraph No.13 has only observed as under:-"13. Admittedly, after retrenchment of Jeet Bahadur round about   15   to   20   persons   were   employed   as   Mali   cum Chowkidars by the managements, but no opportunity was given to the workman. Section 25-H of the I.D. Act reads as under: "Re-employment of retrenched workman- where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to take into his employee any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, given an opportunity to the retrenched workmen, who are citizens of India to offer themselves for re-employment   and   such   retrenched   workmen   who   offer themselves for re- employment shall have preference over other persons." So, it is clear that managements violated the provisions of have Section 25-H of the I.D Act. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case Gauri Shanker Vs. State of Rajasthan (Supra), which was decided on 16.4.2015, that where there is non-compliance of section 25-F, 25- G or 25-H of the I.D. Act, the termination of the services of the workman can be void ab-initio and the workman has to be reinstated. This fact has been admitted by WW1 Gurpreet Singh, official of the managements. It is admitted that after retrenchment of Jeet Bahadur, about 15 to 20 persons were employed by the Managements, but no opportunity was given to him. The law of limitation will not be applicable in this case as the management of official of the managements. It is admitted that after-retrenchment of Jeet Bahadur, about 15 to 20 persons were employed by the managements, but no opportunity was given to him. The law of limitation will not be applicable in this case as the managements have violated the mandatory provisions of Section 25-H of the I. D. Act. So, it is clear that in view of the latest law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Gauri Shanker's case  (Supra), the workman is entitled to be reinstated alongwith back wages for three years and he will also be regulari)ed from the date he was retrenched. /o, issue 1o.# is held in favour of the workman and against the managements.8 $ perusal o( the a'ove extracted (indings 5ould *ani(est that the Tri'unal has not dealt 5ith o'&ections o( the petitioners that the clai* o( respondent +o.,85or3*an 5as a stale clai* and 'arred 'y gross delay and laches. Tri'unal 'elo5 has si*ply o'served that la5 o( li*itation 5ill not 'e applica'le. Tri'unal 'elo5 has lost sight o( settled position in la5 that even in cases 5here Ei*itation $ct is not applica'le, the litigant)aggrieved party *ust approach the 1ourt 5ithin a reasona'le ti*e. ,,. 2n "Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department" 2015(4) SCT 493, Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the plea of a stale claim, made the following observation: -

¶28In this process, let us first examine as to what would constitute 'industrial dispute' because of the simple reason that the appropriate Government has power to refer what is known as an 'industrial dispute' and likewise the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide if there is an industrial dispute. We are not going into the entire gamut of what constitutes 'industrial dispute' within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act. Our focus is only on the aspect that what can be referred should be the dispute which is existing and in praesenti when the reference is sought. To put it otherwise, if it no longer remains an industrial dispute or industrial dispute 'does not exist' at that time, there would not be any question on making reference or adjudicating the matter as it is not an industrial dispute.

¶29Section 2(k) of the IDA defines 'industrial dispute' and it reads as under : "'industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers APURVA and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any persons;"

¶30As per Section 2A dispute relating to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of an individual are also deemed as industrial dispute and, therefore, an individual is given right to raise these disputes.

¶31The term 'industrial dispute' connotes a real and substantial difference having some element of persistency, and likely, if not adjusted, to endanger the industrial peace of the community. The expression 'dispute or difference' as used in the definition, therefore, means a controversy fairly definite and of real substance, connected with the employment or non-employment or with the terms of employment or the conditions of labour of any person, and is one in which the contesting parties are directly interested in maintaining the respective contentions.

¶32To understand the meaning of the word 'dispute', it would be appropriate to start with the grammatical or dictionary meaning of the term : 'Dispute': "to argue about, to contend for, to oppose by argument' to call in question - to argue or debate (with about or over), - a contest with words; an argument; a debate; a quarrel;

¶33Blacks law dictionary, 5th Edition, page 424 defines 'dispute' as under : " A conflict or controversy; a conflict of claims or rights; an assertion of a right, claim or demand on one side, met by contrary claims or allegations on the other. The subject of litigation; the matter for which a suit is brought and upon which issue is joined, and in relation to which jurors are called and witnesses examined."

¶34Thus, a dispute or difference arises when demand is made by one side (i.e. workmen) and rejected by the other side (i.e. the employer) and vice versa. Hence an 'industrial dispute' cannot be said to exist until and unless the demand is made by the workmen and it has been rejected by the employer. How such demand should be raised and at what stage may also be relevant but we are not concerned with this aspect in the instant case. Therefore, what would happen if no demand is made at all at the time when the cause of action arises? In other words, like in the instant case, what would be the consequence if after the termination of the services of petitioner on April 01, 1985, the petitioner does not dispute his termination as wrongful and does not make any demand for reinstatement for number of years? Can it still be said that there is a dispute? Or can it be said that workmen can make such demand after lapse of several years and on making such demand dispute would come into existence at that time. It can always be pleaded by the employer in such a case that after the termination of the services when the workmen did not raise any protest and did not demand his reinstatement, the employer presumed that the workmen has accepted his termination and, therefore, he did not raise any dispute about his termination. It can be said that workmen, in such a case, acquiesced into the act of the employer in terminating his services and, therefore, accepted his termination. He cannot after a lapse of several years make a demand and then convert it into a 'dispute' what had otherwise become a buried issue…" ,.. 2n the instant case, a 'are perusal o( the paper 'oo3 5ould suggest that even as per the pleaded case o( respondent +o.,, he 5or3ed only (ro* 6,.6/.,==. to <6.6<.,==7A and concededly, he raised a de*and notice only in "arch, .66=, i.e. a(ter al*ost (ourteen years. There is no *aterial on record to sho5 as to 5hether any grievance 5as raised or any action 5as ta3en 'y respondent +o., during this long period o( (ourteen years, 'e(ore su'*ission o( the de*and notice 'y hi*. Respondent +o., hasAPURVA only claimed the violation of provisions of Section 25-H of the 1947 Act. It cannot be countenanced that a workman who has slept for long fourteen years would suddenly wake up after a long slumber and take plea that new persons have been appointed after his retrenchment. Moreover, it cannot be expected from any establishment to wait endlessly for a workman.

¶13Further, a perusal of the impugned award  dated 05.10.2015 (Annexure P-5)  would suggest that the Tribunal has not only granted reinstatement to respondent No.1-workman but also issued a direction that respondent No.1-workman would be regularized from the date he was retrenched, however, it is observed that neither in the demand notice nor in the   claim   statement,   any   relief   of   regularization   was   prayed   for   by respondent No.1-workman; and in the absence of any such prayer, there was no occasion for the Tribunal to issue a direction to regularize the services of respondent No.1-workman.

¶14Keeping in view the above discussion, I am of the considered view   that   impugned   award   dated   05.10.2015   (Annexure   P-5)   is unsustainable in the eyes of law and claim made by respondent No.1-workman was a stale claim barred by gross delay and laches. Resultantly, the impugned award dated 05.10.2015 (Annexure P-5) is set aside and claim of respondent No.1-Jeet Bahadur is rejected.

¶15The present writ petition is accordingly disposed of.

¶16All pending application(s), if any, shall also stand closed. th04  January, 2024   (HARSH BUNGER) Apurva              JUDGE