Sri Bhavanarayanaswamivari Temple v. Vadapalli Venkata Bhavanarayanacharyulu

Hegde, J.-The point in controversy in this appeal by special leave is whether the properties in dispute herein constitute a heredi-tary archakatwam service inam granted to the plaintiff's predeces-sors or whether they are the properties of the appellant temple. The High Court and the courts below have come to the conclusion that the appellant's contention that it is the owner of the suit pro-perties is barred by rts judicata. That conclusion is challenged in this appeal.

In the suit under appeal the respondent who is an archaka in the appellant temple prayed for a cieclaration that the suit pro-perties had been granted to his family as archakatwam service Inam land and that the appellant has no right therein. He has also asked for an injunction restraining the appellant from inter-fering with his pos~ession and enjoyment. The appellant denied the respondent's claim. The-High Court as well as the appellate court have upheld the respondent's claim on the ground that the appelhmt's claim is barred.hy res judicata.

In 1931 the Madras Religious Endowments. Board framed a I scheme for the better management of the appellant temple. At .. that time the question arose whether the suit properties were the . properties of the temple, The res,pondent's family put. forward the claim that those P!Operties had been grante::I to them as archakatwam service inam and c01~sequently those properties were not temple properties, That contention was accepted by the Board. It is said tha! the said decision operates as res judicata against the claim made by the appellant.

On behalf of the appellant it was urged that the proceeding before the Board under s. 57(1) of the Madras Religious&. Chari-table Endowments Act, 1927 (in short. the Act) was a summary proceeding, the question as to the title to the suit properties was not directly and substantially in issue in that proceeding and as such the decision in question does not operate as res judicata in the present suit

Section 57(1) as it stood in 1931 reads thus:

"When the Board is satisfied that in the interest of the proper administration of the endowments of a tem-ple, a scheme of administration should be settled, the Board may afttr consulting in the prescribed manlier, the trustee, the com.mittee, if a any and the persons hav-ing interest by order settle scheme of administration for the endowments of such temple".

Sub-seciion (3) of that. section says :

"Every order of the Board under this scheme shall be published in the prescribed manner. .The trustee or any person having interest may within six months of the · $~_.Qf such publication institute a suit ill the court to modify or set aside such. order. . Subject to the result of such suir every order of the Board . shall be final and binding on the. COlllmittee, the trustee and. all persons hal'ing interest." · . · . . . · · It is not disputed !Jtat the decision of the Board holding that the pt0perties ill ,question were archakatwam service inam lands was not challenged by means of a suit under s. 57(3). Therefore the said decision has become final. We have now to see what is the cflect of the finality in question. According to the appellant as the tide to the suit properties was not directly and substantially in issue in the proceeding before the Board and the. decision there-on being only incidental, the s~~cannot operate .as res judicata.

In support of the contention that the decision rendered by the Board was only an incidental one, it was urged that the essential purpose,.of framing of a scheme for the management of temple is to see that the temple's administmtion is carried on properly; and· in such a p;oceeding it is not necessary to determine what all pro· perties the temple owns. We are unable to accede to this conten· tion. A scheme framed for the better management of a temple must necessarily show therein the properties of the temple. Be· fore decidi.ng to frame a scheme the authority framing the scheme must know . the nature and extent of the trust funds. There can be no scheme of management of a temple in vacuum. As observ· ed by the Judicial Committee in Chota/a/ Lakhmiram and ors. V· Manohar .Ganesh Tambekar and ors. ") :

"Until the trust funds are ascertained, it seems im-possible that any scheme can be settled."

Varadachariar J. in (Sri Mahant) Sitaram Dass Bavaji v. Madras Religious Endowment Board, Madras and ors;( 2 ) observed that the power given by s. 63 to the Board for framing a schem< for the management of a mutt,-a power similar to that conferred on the Board under s. 57 for framing scheme for the management of a temple--<:arries with it the-. power to settle what the properties of the institution are. A scheme for proper administration of a temple must necessarily provide for the proper administration of its assets. The persons empowered to manage must know what properties are to be governed by the scheme and what the resour· ces of the temple are.

I It is not correct to say that the power conferred on the Board

under s. 57 is a summary power as urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant. A decision rendered by the Board under that r section is final subjei;t to the result of the suit contemplated in the

said section. Section 57 provides for an exhaustive enquiry in the matter of framing scheme, firstly by the Board and then by the r Court. The trial before the court has to be held in the ·same

manner as any other suit that may be instituted under the provi· sions of the Civil Procedure Code. In Arikapudi Balakotayya v. Yad/apalli Nagayya( 8 ); a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that the order made by the District Court under s. 84 ( 2) of the Act O(>Cf!ltes 118 res judicata in a subsequent proceed-ing. Under s. 84(1) the Board is given power to docide if any dispute arises as to (a) whether an institution is a math or temple as defined in the Act; (b) whether the trustee is a hereditary trustee as defined in the Act or .not and ( c) whether llllY property or money endowed is aspecific endowment • defined in the Act or not. Sub-s. (2) of that section provides that any person affected by a deci· sion under sub-s. (1) may, within six-months apply to the Court to modify or set aside that decision. Sub-s (3) thereof provides for

(1) I.LR. XXIV Born. p. SO. (2) A.I.R.1937 Mad. 106. an appeal to the High Court against the order of the District Judge. Sub-s. ( 4) of that section provides that subject to the re-sult of an application under sub-s. (2) or an appeal under sub-s. (3)~ the decision of the Board shall be final.

In Ba/akotayya's case('') while examining the effect of a deci-sion under s. 84(2), it was observed that the doctrine of res judi-cata is tilOt confined to a decision in a suit it applies to deci-sions in other proceedings as well. But how far a decision which is rendered in other proceedings win bind the parties depends upon other considerations one of which is whether that decision determines substantial rights of parties and the other is whether the parties are given adequate opportunities to establish the rights pleaded by them. The doctrine of res judicata is not confined to the limi•s prescribed in s. 11, Civil Procedure CJde. The underly-ing principle of that doctrine is that there should be finality in -litigatio11and that a person should not be vexed twice over in res-pect of the same matter.

In the proceedings ·with which we are concerned in this appeal one of the important question the Board had to deciae was whether the properties in dispute are archakatwam service inam properties; The Board's decision which was ;idverse to the tem-ple, affected the rights of the temple in a substantial manner. It was open to the temple to get its right established by means of a suit under s. 57\3). It failed to take that step. Therefore the deci-sion of the Board has become final and binding on the temple. ln State of Madras v. Kunnakudi Melamatam alias Annathana Matam( 2 ) this Cocrt held that a decision of the Board under s. 84(1) which had b•!come final in the absence of any application to the court to set aside that decision under s. 84(2), holding that the institution was outside the purview of the Act, bars the board from levying any contribution on the institution under the Act subsequently.

In our judgment the decision of the Board in 1931 that the suit properties are not temple properties operates as res judicata in the present proceeding. ·

In the result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 431 of 1967.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree date' September l, 19§6 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Seconu Appeal No. 719 of 1962.

R. Venugopal Reddy and K. Jayaram, for the appellants. B. Parthasarathy, for the respond~tit.