Baldeo Singh and Others v. The State of Bihar and Others

S. K. Dar J. Code with imprisonment of either description for a

term of three years or upwards; or

(ii) has been previously fined for theft by any bench of the Gram Cutcherry ; or

(iii) is a registered member of a criminal tribe under section 4 of the Criminal Tribes Act, 1924 ; or

(iv) has been bound over to be of good behaviour in proceedings instituted under section 109 or 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898."

It is worthy of note that the section contains two important qualifications : one is contained in the non-obstante clause with which the section begins and the other is contained in the expression 'subject to the prqvisions of this Act.' The importance of this second qualification will be apparent when some of the other provisions of the Act are set out. Subject to the two qualifications mentioned above, s. 62 gives a bench of the Gram Cutcherry jurisdiction concurrent with that of the ordinary criminal . Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the bench is situate for the trial of the offences mentioned therein. Section 63 vests the bench with the powers of a Magistrate of the third class. Section 64 is not relevant for our purpose and need not be read. Section 65 provides for exclusive civil jurisdiction of a bench of the Gram Cutcherry in certain classes of suits, subject to certain provisos. Section 66 says that certain suits shall not be heard by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry. Section 67 provides for appeals. Then comes s. 68, which is very important for our purpose and must be quoted in extenso--

"No court shall take cognizance of any case or suit which is cognizable under the Act by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry unless an order to the contrary has been passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif concerned under the provisions of the Act 1957 or any other law for the time being in force."

Section 69 gives the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Ba/deo Singh Munsif power to transfer a case or suit pending before ~and Others a Magisuate or a MunsiJ to a bench of the Gram v. Cutchen1' having jurisdiction to try it. Section 70 The State o gives the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif Bihar and Othm power to withdraw any case or suit pending before a S. K. Das]. bench of the Gram Cutcherry and transfer the same to the ordinary Courts. Section 71 provides, inter alia, that no legal practitioner shall appear, plead or act on behalf of any party in any suit or case before the Gram Cutcherry. Section 73 gives power to the Sub-Divi-sional Magistrate and the Munsif to take necessary action when there has been a miscarriage of justice or there is an apprehension of a miscarriage of justice.

Sub-section (2) of s. 73 says that when an order under sub-s. ( 1) has been made in respect of any suit or case, the complainant or the plaintiff, as the case may be, may institute the case or suit afresh in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Munsif of competent jurisdiction.

The argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that inasmuch as s. 62 gives only concurrent jurisdic-tion, it leaves it open to a party to go either to the ordinarv criminal Courts or to a bench of the Gram Cutche;ry. According to him, this opens the door for discrimination, because the procedure followed in the ordinary criminal Courts is substantially different from tliat followed by a Gram Cutcherry. The procedure to be followed by the latter is indicated in s. 60 which states :

"Subject to the provisions of this Act and to am rules or directions that mav be made or issued bv the Government in this behalf, the procedure to be f~l!ow­ ed by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry shall be such as it rn~ty co!1sidcr just and convenient and the bc:Kh shall not be bound to fol\mv anv laws of evidence o;:

procedure other than the procedure prescribed bv or under tliis Act."

This argument as to cfocriminaiion fails to take note of the other pro·:isions 0£ the Act which we have set 4--61 S. C. Indi:\/59 1957 out above. Section 62 is. in express terms, subject to

other provisions of the Act ; therefore, it is subject to Baldeo Singh s. 68 which states that no Court shall take cognizance and Others of any case or suit which is cognizable under the Act

v. by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry, unless an order to The:s1ate of the contrary bas been passed by the Sub-Divisional Bi~ar and Others

Magistrate or the Munsif concerned under the provisions S. K. Das]. of the Act or any other law for the time being in

force. On a proper construction of s. 62 and s. 68. it is clear that there is really no discrimination and a case cognizable by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry must be tried there. unless there bas been an order to the contrary in the exercise of his judicial discretion by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif con-cerned as contemplated by the latter part of s. 68. The provisions of the Act under which such an order can be passed are contained in the succeeding sections already referred to by us. The whole scheme of Cb. VII of the Act is that a case or suit cognizable under the Act by a Gram Cutcberrv should be tried by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry save in those exceptional cases which are provided for in ss. 70 and 73. The reference to concurrent jurisdiction in s. 62 is explainable by reason of the provisions in ss. 69, 70 and 73, so that on the transfer or withdrawal of a case from the Gram Cutcberry or the cancellation of the jurisdiction of the y bench, it may not be said that the ordinary criminal Courts also have no jurisdiction to try it.

For these reasons, we are nf the view that tk impugned provisions of the Act are not discriminatory in nature, and there is no merit in the first contention pressed before us.

Secondly, learned counsel for the appellants has referred us to rr. 60 and 61 of the Bibar Gram Cutcberry Rules, 1949. Rule 60(2) requires that the decision of the full bench shall be signed by the members and where a dissentient judgment has been delivered, the minute of dissent shall also be recorded under the signatures of the dissenting members. These r requirements were fulfilled in the present case, and no materials have been placed before us which may lead to the conclusion that rr. 60 and 61 have been violated.

The third and last cor1tention on behalf of the 1957 appellants is that the conviction of t;vo of the appel-lants, Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh, is bad, Ba/deo Singh because there was no evidence at all against them. The and Others two witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution v. definitely said that they saw Baldeo Singh (appellant) The Stalt of Bihar and Others and two other named persons who have been acquitted, but <lid not identify the rcmaiuing persons who aho S. K. Das]. forcibly cut an,! removed the crops. Oa this evidence, there was no legal basis for the conviction of Ramdeo SinglL and Shcodhar Singh. Our attention bas been drawn to Ramdeo Singh's own statement in which he said that he had removed the crops of his own field That statement, standing by itself. is not an admission of guilt. We agree with learned counsel for the appel-lants that there was no evidence whatever to sustain the conviction of Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh.

Their conviction was manifestiv, and on the face of the record, erroneous. ,

The High Court was moved for the exerme of its power of superi1m:ndence under Art. 227, and it is open to us in this appeal to exercise the same power.

We would accordingly allow this appeal so far as Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh are concerned and set aside their conviction and sentence. They will now be discharged from bail. So far as Bakko Singh is concerned, he was rightly convicted. We do not, however, think that any useful purpose will be served by sending him to jail for a short period. We would accordingly reduce his sentence to a fine· of Rs. 30/- only or in default imprisonment as directed by the full bench of the Gram Cutcherry. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

Appeal disposed of accordingly.