Manoj Luthra v. New India Assurance Co. and Anr

JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (Oral)

1.k    The  petitioner  through  instant  petition  under  Articles 226/227  of  the  Constitution  of  India  is  seeking  direction  to  the respondents  to  correctly  fix  pay  of  the  petitioner  by  removing  the anomaly  on  account  of  which  petitioner  remained  underpaid  despite appointed on the higher position.

2.k    The  brief  facts  of  the  case  which  are  necessary  for adjudication of the present petition are that the petitioner through proper channel on 25.07.1990 entered into service of respondent as Assistant (Technical).  On  07.10.1993,  the  petitioner  was  posted  as  Data  Entry Operator. On 08.11.2000, the petitioner, on the basis of merit determined among  Class-III  employees,  was  chosen  and  thereafter  posted  as Development  Officer  (for  short  'DO')  on  probation.  The  petitioner remained on probation from 15.11.2000 to 14.11.2001. The petitioner was  confirmed  as  DO  on  07.12.2001.  The  pay  of  the  petitioner  was

protected while appointing him as DO on probation. The petitioner was granted increment which accrued on 01.01.2001 as Clerk, however, he was  not  granted  increment  which  would  have  accrued  as  Clerk  on

01.01.2002. As a DO, increment accrued to the petitioner on 01.04.2002, however, he was not granted because he had not completed 12 months' service as DO. The grievance of the petitioner is that he was granted increment on 01.01.2001 but no increment was granted on 01.01.2002 because  he  was  serving  as  DO  at  that  point of  time  and  he  was  not granted increment on 01.04.2002 because had not complete 12 months' as DO. Thus, petitioner on 01.01.2002 as well as 01.04.2002 did not get increment either as Clerk or as DO.

3.k    Mr.  Sameer  Sachdeva,  learned  counsel  for  the  petitioner inter  alia  contends  that  petitioner  was  neither  granted  increment  on

01.01.2002  nor  on  01.04.2002  which  has  resulted  into  anomaly.  The petitioner  was  appointed  as  DO  which  is  a  Grade-II  post,  whereas 'Clerk'  falls  in  Class-III  post.  Appointment  as  DO  was  certainly  a promotional post thus, object of seeking promotion stood defeated by not granting increment either as Clerk or DO.

4.k    In  support  of  his  contention,  learned  counsel  for  the petitioner  relies  upon  a  Division  Bench  judgment  dated  12.10.1994 passed by this Court in Sunder Lal Jain and Others Versus State of Haryana  and  Others;  CWP  No.4176  of  1988  and  Single  Bench judgment  dated  19.08.2010  passed  by  this  Court  in  Satish  Kumar

Versus  The  Haryana  State  Federation  of  Consumers  Cooperative Wholesale Stores Ltd. and Others; CWP No.4980 of 2009.

5.k    Per contra, Mr. Talwar, learned counsel for the respondents submits  that  appointment  of  petitioner  as  DO  was  not  a  promotional post. It was mere conversion of clerical staff to development staff. The respondent-corporation vide letter dated 29.09.1998 had framed policy for  conversion  of  clerical  staff  into  development  staff.  As  a  DO,  an employee gets number of emoluments/incentives which are not available to clerical staff.  The question of remuneration on account of conversion from  Clerical  Cadre  to  Development  Officer  was  duly  addressed  in Paragraph 6 of the communication dated 29.09.1998. The petitioner had accepted terms and conditions of communication dated 29.09.1998, thus, he  cannot  claim  benefit  of  both  streams  i.e.  Clerical  as  well  as Development  cadre.  The  petitioner  was  rightly  denied  benefit  of increment  on  01.04.2002  because  he  has  not  completed  12  months' period  for  getting  increment.  Paragraph  13  of  notification  dated

29.04.1976 as amended, issued by Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs clearly provides that Development Officers would be stentitled  to  increment  on  1   day  of  April  of  each  other  subject  to completion of 12 months service.

6.k    I  have  heard  the  arguments  of  learned  counsels  for  the parties and perused the record with their able assistance.

7.k    Before adverting with the issue involved and arguments of both sides, it would be profitable to look at the provisions governing the

issue. The respondents vide order dated 29.09.1998 introduced scheme of conversion of clerical staff to DO. The relevant extracts of the order read as:- "Re:  Conversion of clerical staff to development staff. As you are aware there has been practically no recruitment in  Development  Officers  cadre  during  the  last  4-5  years. There have also been some pockets of surplus clerical staff. Moreover, representations were also received from Class III employees for conversion as Development Officer. Taking all these into account, it was considered reasonable to convert surplus clerical staff having marketing flair to development side whom we can optimally use for tapping the insurance business. The matter was also discussed with the CMD's in ICCC  as  well  as  in  GMs(P)  meetings  and  our  proposal based on the views of the companies, to convert Class III employees in clerical cadre to development staff was placed before the Board at its meeting held on 2.9.1998. XXXX    XXXX          XXXX                   XXXX

(5)  Lien: Selected employees will have no lien on service. However, those who fail to meet the premium targets and are found to be  unsuitable  for  any  reason  such  as  not  meeting  the requirements  of  the  General  Insurance  (Rationalization  of Pay Scales and Other Conditions of Service of Development Staff) Scheme, 1976 as amended from time to time, will be reverted  back  to  clerical  side  on  the  expiry  of  the  initial probation period/extended probation period. Selected employees will be initially placed on probation for a period of one year which may be extended by another year 2023.08.02 17:32 maximum  and  the  minimum  stipulated  premium  targets

should  be  met  by  them  during  the  probation/extended probation period. After confirmation on the Development side the employees shall be governed by the Rules and Regulations applicable, from time to time, to the development staff.

(6)  Remuneration during the period probation: During the period of probation the employee may continue to  receive  the  same  emoluments  he  was  receiving  in  the clerical cadre from the date of his transfer to development side.  However,  the  normal  grade  increment  falling  due during the probationary period can be allowed; but revision in  Dearness  Allowance  falling  due  in  the  clerical  cadres should  not  be  allowed.  Other  allowance  like  Conveyance Allowances  as  applicable  to  other  probationary Development  Officers  Grade  II  may  be  paid.  Initial appointment  at  the  time  of  conversion  would  be  as Development Officer, Grade II. Hence, such employees who are already drawing more basic salary than the maximum of Development  Officer  Grade  II's  scale  may  be  paid  the difference between their salary in Class III scale applicable as explained above and the maximum applicable in the scale of Development Officer Grade II as a Personal Allowance."

8.k    The question of increment of DOs is governed by General Insurance (Rationalisation of Pay Scales and Other Conditions of Service of  Development  Staff)  Scheme,  1976  (for  short  the  '1976  Scheme'). Paragraph  13  of  the  1976  Scheme  provides  for  increments  which  is reproduced as below:- "13.  Increments:

(1)  A Development Officer who was in services on stthe 1  day of April and had completed 12 months of continuous service in the month of April, 1990 or earlier shall be granted an increment in the stscale of pay from 1  day of April, 1990. st(2)    A Development Officer with effect from the 1 day  of  April,  1991  shall  be  granted  on  the appraisal date an increment provided that he has completed twelve  months of continuous service from the date of his appointment or from the last appraisal date as the case may be, provided that no increment shall be granted to a development officer  who  is  liable  to  decrement  from  the relevant  appraisal  date  in  terms  of  paragraph

¶11Explanation:  For  the  purpose  of  this  paragraph "twelve months of continuous service means a period of duty equal to twelve months excluding the period of extraordinary leave"."

9.k   From  the  perusal  of  aforesaid  order  dated  29.09.1998,  it comes out that respondent has framed policy of converting clerical staff into DO staff. A DO is entitled to different set of emoluments than a clerk. DO is governed by 1976 Scheme. It is a case of opting a stream out of two available streams. It is not a case of vertical movement from one post to another post i.e. promotional post. It is actually a case of shifting from one stream to another stream. Anyone who opts one stream leaving behind other is bound to enjoy its merits as well as face demerits. Once an employee or an assessee/dealer under any system opts for one MOHIT KUMARparticular scheme, he cannot claim benefit of another scheme because he

cannot claim )enefits of )oth the schemes unless and until scheme itself is h')rid. %f there are two specific options and a person opts for one particular option, he cannot )e permitted to den' demerits arising out of opted option and he cannot claim )enefit of option which he has left. 1,.    >on6)le Supreme $ourt in CC* '. Venus Castin+s ,P- Ltd.. ,)(((- 4 SCC )(6 had occasion to deal with vires of Section 1A of the $entral 3(cise Act, 1-77 and =ule -!?0 made thereunder. The >on6)le Supreme $ourt has also considered conse:uences of availing option of pa'ment of dut' under compounded lev' scheme. The >on6)le Supreme $ourt upheld validit' of the provision and further held that once option to pa' compounded dut' is availed, an assessee cannot as& to determine dut' on actual )asis. An assesee cannot as& for h')rid s'stem. The court has held: "10. The schemes contained in Section 3-A(4) of the Act and Rule 96-ZO(3) or Rule 96-ZP(3) of the Excise Rules are two alternative procedures to be adopted at the option of the assessee. Thus the two procedures do not clash with each other. If the assessee opts for the procedure under Rule 96-ZO(1) he may opt out of the procedure under Rule 96-ZO(3) for a subsequent period and seek the determination of the annual capacity of production. An assessee cannot have a hybrid procedure of combining (sic) the procedure under Rule 96-ZO(1) to which Section 3-A(4) of the Act is attracted. The claim by the respondents is a hybrid procedure of taking advantage of the payment of lump sum on the basis of the total furnace capacity and not on the basis of the actual capacity of production. Such a procedure cannot be adopted at all, for the two procedures are

¶11The learned counsel for the respondent contended that Rule 96-ZO(3) is contrary to Section 3-A(4) of the Act and, therefore, should be held to be ultra vires or the relevant rules should be read in such a manner so as to allow the procedure prescribed under the provisions of Section 3-A(4) to be followed. Section 3-A of the Act provides for levy and collection of the tax arising under the Act in such manner and at such rate as may be prescribed by the Rules. Section 3-A provides a special procedure in respect of the power of the Central Government to charge excise duty on the basis of capacity of production in respect of notified goods. If such interpretation is not accepted, it is contended, that the levy of tax is in the nature of a licence fee and not on the production of goods at all. Schemes of composition are available in several other enactments including the Sales Tax Act and the Entertainment Tax. (See State of Kerala v. Builders Assn. of India [(1997) 2 SCC 183]). In this context, the learned counsel for the respondents referred to several decisions. However, in our opinion, all these decisions either arising under the Income Tax Act in relation to special mode of collection of tax or excise duty on timber dealers or other enactments have no relevance. What can be seen is that the charge under the section is clearly on production of goods but the measure of tax is dependent on either actual production of goods or on some other basis. The incidence of tax is, therefore, on the production of goods. It cannot be said that collection of tax based on the annual furnace capacity is not relatable to the production of goods and does not carry the purpose of the Act. In holding a relevant rule to be ultra vires it becomes necessary to take into consideration the purpose of the enactment as a whole, starting from the preamble to the last provision thereto. If the entire enactment read as a whole indicates the purpose and that purpose is carried out by the rules, the same cannot be stated to be ultra vires of the provisions of the enactment. Therefore, it is made clear that the manufacturers, if they have availed of the procedure under Rule 96-ZO(3) at their option, cannot claim the

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benefit of determination of production capacity under Section 3-A(4) of the Act which is specifically excluded. We find that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sathavahana Steels & Alloys (P) Ltd. v. Govt. of India [(1999) 114 ELT 787

(AP)] and a similar view expressed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 1127 of 1999 Jalan Castings (P) Ltd. v. CCE [ CMWP No. 1127 of 1999 (All)] disposed of on 28-2-2000 is reasonable and correct. We overrule the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Pravesh Castings (P) Ltd. v. CCE [(2000) 36 RLT 239 (All)] "

¶11   A  2ivision  9ench  of  Andhra  Pradesh  >igh  $ourt  in  S. Chala&athi  '.  Vi/e  Chair#anti/u#01ana+in+  2ire/tor.  3PS42CL5 )(() SCC OnLine 3P 1(61  adverted with :uestion of permission to withdraw option of @=S. The $ourt re*ecting claim of the petitioners has held that once an option of @=S is availed and acted upon, an emplo'ee cannot ta&e somersault. The court noticed its precedent and held: "10. In similar circumstances a Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 912/1999 dated 14.7.1999, held at paragraph No. 4 as under:— …. once the voluntary retirement has been accepted and the appellants by their own act and conduct ratified the same up to 2.3.1999 the appellants cannot be permitted to reprobate and resile from their offer. Since funds have not been released the appellants have not yet been relieved from service. They have not suffered any prejudice either. Thus, in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, the State is directed to release the funds within two months to the Corporation. On receipt of funds from the Government the retiral benefits be given to the appellants and in terms of the offer for voluntary retirement, the

Corporation  will  be  at  liberty  to  relieve  the  appellants from service.

11.    Similar view was expressed by an earlier Division Bench of  this  Court  in  W.A.  No.  243/1999  dated  24.2.1999  and following  the  same  my  learned  brother  Justice Bilal Nazki disposed of WP No. 11085/1999 dated 11-6-1999 in the same terms.

12.    In view of the above, we do not find any merit in the writ petitions and the same are accordingly dismissed. No costs."

12.k    The petitioner consciously opted for DO stream from clerical stream.  The  petitioner  has  availed  benefits  attached  to  the  post  of development  officer.  The  petitioner  as  per  terms  and  conditions  of appointment to the post of DO was entitled to increment on completion of  12  months.  The  petitioner  on  01.04.2002  had  not  completed  12 months as DO, thus, he was not entitled to increment. The petitioner has ignored the benefits accruing from the post of DO, however, is claiming benefit of increment on the sole ground that clerical staff has availed increment  on  01.01.2002  whereas  he  has  not  been  granted  increment either as clerk or as DO which is anomaly and should be removed. The petitioner cannot claim benefit of previous stream i.e. clerical as well as new stream i.e. DO. Claim of the petitioner is contrary to 'principle of estoppel' as well as 'approbate and reprobate'. The petitioner cannot be permitted to avail benefits of both the cadres. The judgments cited by the petitioner are applicable where a person is promoted in vertical stream whereas present case is of opting one out of two streams.

¶11   >on6)le  Supreme  $ourt  in  5nion  of  4ndia  '.  N. 1uru+esan; ,)())- ) SCC )6 has e(plained concept and principle of appro)ate and repro)ate. The relevant e(tracts read as: "Approbate and reprobate

¶26These phrases are borrowed from the Scots law. They would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The principle behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate. Once again, it is a principle of equity coming under the contours of common law. Therefore, he who knows that if he objects to an instrument, he will not get the benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the fruits. One cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the rest. A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an instrument while questioning the same. Such a party either has to affirm or disaffirm the transaction. This principle has to be applied with more vigour as a common law principle, if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully and on near completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter questions the other part. An element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle. It is also a species of estoppel dealing with the conduct of a party. We have already dealt with the provisions of the Contract Act concerning the conduct of a party, and his presumption of knowledge while confirming an offer through his acceptance unconditionally.

¶27We would like to quote the following judgments for better appreciation and understanding of the said principle:

27.1. Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao [Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, 1956 SCR 451]:

"23. But it is argued by Sri Krishnaswami Ayyangar that as the proceedings in OS. No. 92 of 1938-39 are relied on as barring the plea that the decree and sale in OS. No. 100 of 1919-20 are not collusive, not on the ground of res judicata or estoppel but on the principle that a person cannot both approbate and reprobate. It is immaterial that the present appellants were not parties thereto, and the decision in Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull & Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd. [Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull & Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd., (1921) 2 KB 608 (CA)] , and in particular, the observations of Scrutton, LJ., at p. 611 were quoted in support of this position. There, the facts were that an agent delivered goods to the customer contrary to the instructions of the principal, who thereafter filed a suit against the purchaser for price of goods and obtained a decree. Not having obtained satisfaction, the principal next filed a suit against the agent for damages on the ground of negligence and breach of duty. It was held that such an action was barred. The ground of the decision is that when on the same facts, a person has the right to claim one of two reliefs and with full knowledge he elects to claim one and obtains it, it is not open to him thereafter to go back on his election and claim the alternative relief. The principle was thus stated by Bankes, L.J. : (Verschures Creameries Ltd. case [Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull & Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd.,

(1921) 2 KB 608 (CA)] , KB p. 611) '… Having elected to treat the delivery to him as an authorised delivery they cannot treat the same act as

a misdelivery. To do so would be to approbate and reprobate the same act.' The observations of Scrutton, L.J. on which the appellants rely are as follows : (Verschures Creameries Ltd. case [Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull & Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd.,

(1921) 2 KB 608 (CA)] , KB pp. 611-12) '… A plaintiff is not permitted to "approbate and reprobate". The phrase is apparently borrowed from the Scotch law, where it is used to express the principle embodied in our doctrine of election — namely, that no party can accept and reject the same instrument : Ker v. Wauchope [Ker v. Wauchope,

(1819) 1 Bligh PC 1 at p. 21 : 4 ER 1 at p. 8] : Douglas-Menzies v. Umphelby [Douglas-Menzies v. Umphelby, 1908 AC 224 at p. 232 (PC)]. The doctrine of election is not however confined to instruments. A person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage. That is to approbate and reprobate the transaction.' It is clear from the above observations that the maxim that a person cannot "approbate and reprobate" is only one application of the doctrine of election, and that its operation must be confined to reliefs claimed in respect of the same transaction and to the persons who are parties thereto. The law is thus stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. XIII, p. 464, para 512: 'On the principle that a person may not approbate I attest to the accuracy and and reprobate, a species of estoppel has arisen

which seems to be intermediate between estoppel by record and estoppel in pais, and may conveniently be referred to here. Thus a party cannot, after taking advantage under an order (e.g. payment of costs), be heard to say that it is invalid and ask to set it aside, or to set up to the prejudice of persons who have relied upon it a case inconsistent with that upon which it was founded; nor will he be allowed to go behind an order made in ignorance of the true facts to the prejudice of third parties who have acted on it.'

27.2. State of Punjab v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu [State of Punjab v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu, (2014) 15 SCC 144]: "22. The doctrine of "approbate and reprobate" is only a species of estoppel, it implies only to the conduct of parties. As in the case of estoppel it cannot operate against the provisions of a statute. (Vide CIT v. MR. P. Firm Muar [CIT v. MR. P. Firm Muar, AIR 1965 SC 1216] .)

¶23It is settled proposition of law that once an order has been passed, it is complied with, accepted by the other party and derived the benefit out of it, he cannot challenge it on any ground. (Vide Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service [Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329] .) In R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir [R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, (1992) 4 SCC 683] this Court has observed as under : (R.N. Gosain case [R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, (1992) 4 SCC 683] , SCC pp. 687-88, para 10) '10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the MOHIT KUMAR doctrine of election which postulates that no party

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can accept and reject the same instrument and that 'a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage'.' ***

¶25The Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd. [Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 470 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 153] , made an observation that a party cannot be permitted to "blow hot and cold", "fast and loose" or "approbate and reprobate". Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance or an order, is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect on him of such contract or conveyance or order. This rule is applied to do equity, however, it must not be applied in a manner as to violate the principles of right and good conscience.

¶26It is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel, the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among the species of estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or silence when he has to speak, from asserting a right which he would have otherwise had."

27.3. Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd. [Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 470]. "I. Approbate and reprobate

¶15A party cannot be permitted to "blow hot-blow cold", "fast and loose" or "approbate and reprobate". Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract, or conveyance, or of an order, he is estopped from denying the validity of, or the binding effect of such contract, or conveyance, or order upon himself. This rule is applied to ensure equity, however, it must not be applied in such a manner so as to violate the principles of what is right and of good conscience. [Vide Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao [Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, 1956 SCR 451], CIT v. V. MR. P. Firm Muar[CIT v. MR. P. Firm Muar, AIR 1965 SC 1216], Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement [Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement, (2008) 14 SCC 58] , Pradeep Oil Corpn. v. MCD[Pradeep Oil Corpn. v. MCD, (2011) 5 SCC 270], Cauvery Coffee Traders v. Hornor Resources (International) Co. Ltd. [Cauvery Coffee Traders v. Hornor Resources (International) Co. Ltd., (2011) 10 SCC 420] and V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer [V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer, (2012) 12 SCC 133]

¶16Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel—the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is inherent in it. 2023.08.02 17:32 The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among

the  species  of estoppel  in  pais (or  equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting  a  right  which  he  would  have  otherwise had."

14.k Applying the principles laid down by afore-cited judgments to the facts of the present case, inescapable conclusion comes out that claim  of  the  petitioner  is  not  sustainable.  The  petitioner  without completing  12  months  as  Development  Officer  could  not  claim increment after joining as Development Officer. The petitioner opted for the  post  of  Development  Officer  and  left  clerical  cadre.  Till  the completion of probation period, he was entitled to emoluments accruing to  clerk,  however,  as  soon  as  probation  period  expired  and  he  was confirmed as Development Officer, he was bound to accept emoluments available  to  Development  Officer.  He  could  not  claim  emoluments accruing to a clerk simply on the ground that there is anomaly in the emoluments available to a clerk and a Development Officer.

15.k   In view of above discussions and findings, this Court is of the  considered  opinion  that  present  petition  is  devoid  of  merit  and deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly dismissed.

(JAGMOHAN BANSAL) JUDGE

02.08.2023 Mohit Kumar 2023.08.02 17:3 2

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP-8367-2012 Reserved on: 26.07.2023 Date of Decision: 02.08.2023 Manoj Luthra …Petitioner Versus New India Assurance Co. and Another …Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL Present:- Mr. Sameer Sachdeva, Advocate for the petitioner Mr. Ashwani Talwar, Advocate for the respondents ***