Gurjit Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr

ANOOP CHITKARA, J. FIR No. Dated Police Sta!on Sec!ons 018 22.02.2022 Khamano, District 323, 324, 506 IPC (Sec!on 325, 326 Fatehgarh Sahib IPC added later on) The pe!!oner, arraigned as accused in the above cap!oned FIR, has come up before this Court under Sec!on 482 CrPC for quashing of the FIR and all consequen!al proceedings based on the compromise with the aggrieved person(s).

¶2During the pendency of the criminal proceedings, the accused and the aggrieved person(s) have compromised the maIer, and its copy is annexed with this pe!!on as Annexure P-3.

¶3ANer that, the pe!!oner(s) came up before this Court to quash the FIR, impleading the aggrieved persons as respondent no.2.

¶4Pursuant to order of this Court dated 10.07.2024, the aggrieved person(s) (Respondent no.2), appeared before the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Khamanon and stated that there would be no objec!on if the Court quashes this FIR and consequent proceedings. As per the concerned court's report dated 05.11.2024, the par!es consented to the quashing of FIR and consequent proceedings without any High Court, Sector 1, Chandigarh 1

ANALYSIS & REASONING:

¶5Despite the severe opposi!on of the State's counsel to this compromise, the following aspects would be relevant to conclude this pe!!on: - a) The accused and the private respondent have amicably seIled the maIer between them in terms of the compromise deed and the statements recorded before the concerned Court; b) A perusal of the documents reveal that the seIlement has not been secured through coercion, threats, social boycoIs, bribes, or other dubious means; c) The aggrieved person has willingly consented to the nullifica!on of criminal proceedings; d) There is no objec!on from the private respondent in case present FIR and consequent proceedings are quashed; e) In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or tranquillity, moral turpitude or harm the social and moral fabric of the society or involve maIers concerning public policy; f) The rejec!on of compromise may also lead to ill will. The pendency of trial affects career and happiness; g) There is nothing on the record to prima facie consider the accused as an unscrupulous, incorrigible, or professional offender; h) The purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work to bring peace to family, community, and society;

i) The exercise of the inherent power for quashing FIR and all consequen!al proceedings is jus!fied to secure the ends of jus!ce.

¶6The injured and all the accused had appeared before the Court of SDJM and had stated that they had entered into a compromise. The par!es were having in a truck unions and had business rivalry. Since the par!es have buried their hatchets, the con!nua!on of criminal proceedings will not advance the reforma!ve purposes of jurisprudence just for the sake of deterrence.

¶7In the present case, the offences under sec!ons 326, 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 are not compoundable under Sec!on 320 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(CrPC). However, in the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the prosecu!on qua the non-compoundable offences can be closed by quashing the FIR and consequent High Court, Sector 1, Chandigarh 2

¶8In Y. Suresh Babu v State of A.P., (2005) 1 SCC 347, Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with sec!on 326 of IPC, which was non-compoundable offence, permiIed the par!es to compound the offence.

¶9In Yogendra Yadav v State of Jharkhand, 2014:INSC:496 [Para 4], 21.7.2014, Supreme Court holds, [4]. Now, the ques!on before this Court is whether this Court can compound the offences under Sec!ons 326 and 307 of the IPC which are non-compoundable. Needless to say that offences which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Sec!on 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 2012(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 543 : 2012(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 549 : (2012)10 SCC 303). However, in a given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under sec!on 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the par!es have amicably seIled their disputes and the vic!m has no objec!on, even though the offences are non-compoundable. In which cases the High Court can exercise its discre!on to quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are en!rely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of jus!ce, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the prosecu!on becomes a lame prosecu!on. Pursuing such a lame prosecu!on would be waste of !me and energy. That will also unseIle the compromise and obstruct restora!on of peace.

¶10In Shiji @ Pappu v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [13]. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under Sec!on 320 Indian Penal Code is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Sec!on 482 Criminal Procedure Code That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a convic!on against the accused and the en!re exercise of a trial is des!ned to be an exercise in fu!lity. There is a subtle dis!nc!on between compounding of offences by the par!es before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecu!on under Sec!on 482 Criminal Procedure Code on the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against convic!on, may not be competent to permit High Court, Sector 1, Chandigarh 3

compounding of an offence based on a seIlement arrived at between the par!es in cases where the offences are not compoundable under Sec!on 320, the High Court may quash the prosecu!on even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Sec!on 482 Criminal Procedure Code are not for that purpose controlled by Sec!on 320 Criminal Procedure Code Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Sec!on 482 Criminal Procedure Code by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and cau!on. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that con!nuance of the prosecu!on would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situa!ons in which the exercise of power under Sec!on 482 may be jus!fied. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of jus!ce and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High court may be jus!fied in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a pe!!on under Sec!on 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.

¶11In Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat, 2017:INSC:1003 [Para 15], (2017) 9 SCC 641, a three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for quashing of FIR, which are reproduced as follows: - [16]. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarized in the following proposi!ons: 16 (i) Sec!on 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of jus!ce. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court; 16 (ii) The invoca!on of the jurisdic!on of the High Court to quash a First Informa!on Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a seIlement has been arrived at between the offender and the vic!m is not the same as the invoca!on of jurisdic!on for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of sec!on 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Sec!on 482 is aIracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. 16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdic!on under Sec!on 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of jus!ce would jus!fy the exercise of the inherent power; High Court, Sector 1, Chandigarh 4

16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of jus!ce or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; 16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Informa!on Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and vic!m have seIled the dispute, revolves ul!mately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaus!ve elabora!on of principles can be formulated; 16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under Sec!on 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been seIled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the vic!m or the family of the vic!m have seIled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to con!nue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences; 16 (vii) As dis!nguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a dis!nct foo!ng in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned; 16 (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercan!le, partnership or similar transac!ons with an essen!ally civil flavour may in appropriate situa!ons fall for quashing where par!es have seIled the dispute; 16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a convic!on is remote and the con!nua!on of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16 (x) There is yet an excep!on to the principle set out in proposi!ons (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implica!ons which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be jus!fied in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an ac!vity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.

¶12In Ramgopal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Cr.A 1489 of 2012, decided on

29.09.2021, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [11]. True it is that offences which are 'non-compoundable' cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its powers under Sec!on 320 Cr.P.C. Any such aIempt by the court would amount to altera!on, addi!on and modifica!on of Sec!on 320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Sec!on 320 Cr.P.C., which may jus!fy its High Court, Sector 1, Chandigarh 5

wider interpreta!on and include such offences in the docket of 'compoundable' offences which have been consciously kept out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdic!on to compound an offence within the framework of Sec!on 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under Sec!on 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for jus!fiable reasons can press Sec!on 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of jus!ce. [12]. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that par!es have amicably seIled their dispute and the vic!m has willingly consented to the nullifica!on of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Sec!on 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non-compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequen!al effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereaNer adopt a pragma!c approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not !nker with or paralyze the very object of the administra!on of criminal jus!ce system. [13]. It appears to us those criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a private nature, can be annulled irrespec!ve of the fact that trial has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against convic!on. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering jus!ce. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful excep!ons. It goes without saying, that the cases where compromise is struck postconvic!on, the High Court ought to exercise such discre!on with rec!tude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and aNer the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the extraordinary power under Sec!on 482 Cr.P.C. would be to secure the ends of jus!ce. There can be no hard and fast line constric!ng the power of the High Court to do substan!al jus!ce. A restric!ve construc!on of inherent powers under Sec!on 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious jus!ce, which in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injus!ce. On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as cau!ously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh &Ors. vs. State of Punjab &Ors. [(2014) 6 SCC 466, 29], and Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688, 15]. [14]. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moral fabric of the society or involve maIers concerning public policy, cannot be construed between two individuals or groups only, for such offences have the poten!al to impact the society at large. Effacing abominable offences through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can High Court, Sector 1, Chandigarh 6

secure a 'seIlement' through duress, threats, social boycoIs, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that "let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided."

¶13In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of Jus!ce arises propi!ously when par!es, who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.

¶14In the light of the judicial precedents referred to above, given the terms of compromise, placement of par!es, and other factors peculiar to the case, the contents of the compromise deed and its objec!ves point towards its acceptance.

¶15In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Associa!on v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018:INSC:1039 [Para 47], 2018 (4) Crimes 324, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds "[47]. As far as Writ Pe!!on (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the order of cognizance only because of the reason that maIer was already pending as the appellants had filed the Special Leave Pe!!ons against the order of the High Court rejec!ng their pe!!on for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these peculiar facts, writ pe!!on has also been entertained. In any case, once we hold that FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would automa!cally stands vi!ated."

¶16Considering the en!re facts, compromise, and in the light of the above-men!oned judicial precedents, I believe that con!nuing these proceedings will not suffice any fruiSul purpose whatsoever.

¶17In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the Court invokes the inherent jurisdic!on under sec!on 482 CrPC/528 BNSS, 2023 and quashes the FIR and all subsequent proceedings qua the pe!!oner(s). The bail bonds of the pe!!oners are accordingly discharged. Petition allowed in the terms mentioned above. All pending applica!on(s), if any, stand closed. (ANOOP CHITKARA) JUDGE

13.12.2024 Jyo! Sharma High Court, Sector 1, Chandigarh 7

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CRM-M-32125-2024 (O&M) Reserved on: 04.12.2024 Pronounced on: 13.12.2024 Gurjit Singh ... Pe!!oner Versus State of Punjab and another …Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA Present:- Mr. Balwant Singh, Advocate for the pe!!oner (through V.C.). Mr. Akshay Kumar, A.A.G., Punjab. Mr. Bharat Kumar, Advocate for Mr. Baljinder Singh Singhvi, Advocate for respondent no.2. ***