Ramesh Kumar Khanna v. Allahabad Bank and Ors

INoTHEoHIGHoCOURToOFoPUNJABoANDoHARYANA AToCHANDIGARH o oCWP-17357-2015 DateoofoDecision:09.10.2023 RAMESHoKUMARoKHANNAoooooo oooooooooooooo.........oPetitioner Versus ALLAHABADoBANKoANDoORS. oooo.....oRespondents CORAM:oooHON'BLEoMR.oJUSTICEooJAGMOHANoBANSAL Presento: Mr.oJ.S.oMaanipur,oAdvocateowitho Ms.oHarpreetoKaur,oAdvocateo forotheopetitioner. Mr.oVikasoChatrath,oAdvocateowitho Mr.oAbhishekoSingla,oAdvocate Mr.oB.P.S.oThakur,oAdvocateoando Mr.oRajbiroSingh,oAdvocateo forotheorespondent-Bank. **** oJAGMOHANoBANSALoo,oJ.o(Oral)o

¶1TheopetitionerothroughoinstantopetitionounderoArticleo226oof the o Constitution o of o India o is o seeking o setting o aside o of o order o dated

06.04.2015o(AnnexureoP-12)owherebyoclaimoofotheopetitionerowithorespect toosalaryoforotheosuspensionoperiodoi.e.o27.04.2010otoo30.04.2014ohasobeen declinedotreatingotheosuspensionoperiodoaso'notoonoduty'.oTheopetitionerohas beenofurtherodeniedobenefitoofopension.

¶2The o petitioner o joined o respondent-Bank o as o Clerk o on

16.12.1978.oTheorespondent-BankohasoamalgamatedowithoIndianoBank. TheopetitionerowasopromotedotootheopostoofoScale-1oofficeroono27.10.1986. Timeotootime,oheowasofurtheropromoted.oTheopetitionerowasoimplicatedoin FIRoNo.7odatedo27.04.2010ounderoSectiono7oando13o(2)oofoPreventionoof CorruptionoAct,oregisteredoatoPoliceoStationoVigilanceoBureau,oAmritsar. Theopetitionerowasoarrestedoono27.04.2010oandoheoremainedoinocustodyotill

14.05.2010. o The o respondent-Bank o vide o order o dated o 30.04.2010 (AnnexureoP-1)osuspendedotheopetitionerow.e.fo27.04.2010.oItoisoaptoto noticeothatotheopetitionerowasosuspendedoinotermsoofoRegulationo12(2)(a) of o Allahabad o Bank o Officer o Employees o (Discipline o & o Appeal) Regulations,o1976o(foroshorto'1976oRegulations').oTheopetitioneroonobeing released o on o bail o preferred o representation o dated o 15.05.2010 o before respondent-Bankoseekingoreinstatementoandorecallingoofosuspensionoorder. Theorespondent-Bankooptedotooremainosilentoonotheosaidorepresentation andoextendedobenefitoofosubsistenceoallowanceotootheopetitioner.oThe petitioneroattainedoageoofosuperannuationoono30.04.2014.oTheopetitioner furtherocameotoobeoacquittedovideojudgmentodatedo08.12.2014opassedoby theoTrialoCourt.oTheojudgmentoofoacquittalowasoneverochallengedoand respondent-Bank,othoughoputotheopetitionerounderosuspension,oyetodidonot initiateodisciplinaryoproceedingsoagainstotheopetitioner.oTheopetitioner afteroacquittal,orequestedotheorespondentotoograntohimosalaryoforothe suspensionoperiod.oTheopetitioneroduringotheosaidoperiodowasogranted subsistenceoallowance.oTheorespondent-Bankovideoimpugnedoorderodated

06.04.2015o(AnnexureoP-12)odeclinedorequestoofotheopetitioneroonothe groundothatosuspensionoperiodowaso'notoonoduty'operiod,othus,opetitionerois notoentitledotoosalaryoforotheosaidoperiod.oInootherowords,otheosoleoground oforejectionoofoclaimoofotheopetitioneroisothatopetitionerodidonotowork duringo27.04.2010otoo30.04.2010,othus,oheoisonotoentitledotoosalary.oThe petitionerohasobeenofurtherodeniedobenefitoofopensionothoughoheofiled optionoformoono01.11.2010o(AnnexureoP-23).o

¶3Learnedocounseloforotheopetitionerointeroaliaocontendsothat petitionerowasoputounderosuspension,ohowever,orespondent-Bankooptedonot tooinitiateodisciplinaryoproceedingsoagainstotheopetitioner.oTheopetitioner wasosuspendedounderoRegulationo12o(2)(a)oofo1976oRegulations.oThe petitionerowasoentitledotoosalaryoandonotosubsistenceoallowanceobecause respondentocouldopayosubsistenceoallowanceoforofirsto3omonthsoand thereafteroinotheoabsenceoofoanyoinquiry,otheorespondent-Bankohadono authorityotoowithholdosalaryoofotheopetitioner.oTheorespondent-Bankowas quite o competent o to o modify o or o revoke o suspension o order, o however, respondent-Bankooptedonototoopassoanyoorderoonotheoapplicationoofothe petitioner.oTheopetitionerowasoalwaysoreadyoandowillingotoowork.oThe petitioneroduringotheoperiodoinoquestionodidonotoworkoatoanyootheroplace andoheosurvivedoonosubsistenceoallowance.oThereowasonoofaultoonotheopart ofotheopetitionerowhichoisoevidentofromotheojudgmentoofoacquittaloasowell as o absence o of o disciplinary o proceedings o against o the o petitioner. o The petitioneroisoentitledotoopensionobecauseovideoapplicationoformodated

01.11.2010o(AnnexureoP-23),oheoappliedoforotheopension.oTheoapplication formo(AnnexureoP-23)owasodulyoreceivedobyotheoBankoandoBankoManager videoletterodatedo11.11.2010o(AnnexureoP-10/A)orecommendedocaseoof theopetitioneroforopension.o Theopetitioneroinosupportoofohisocontentionoreliesoupon judgmentoofoDivisionoBenchoofothisoCourtoinoUttaroHaryanaoBijlioVitran NigamoLtd.oandoothersoVs.oJagdishoLalo2023o(2)oSLRo772.o

¶4Perocontra,olearnedocounseloforotheorespondent-Bankosubmits thatopetitionerowasosuspendedoinotermsoofoRegulationo12o(2)(a)oofo1976 Regulationsoandohisosuspensionocontinuedotillohisoretirementothoughono order o to o continue o his o suspension o or o on o the o representation o dated

15.05.2010oofotheopetitionerowasopassed.oTheoBankowasonotosupposedoto passoorderowithorespectotoocontinuationoofosuspensionoandoitoautomatically continuedoupotootheodateooforetirement.oTheopetitionerowasosubjectedotooan inquiryobyooutsideoagency,othus,oheowasoentitledotooonlyosubsistence allowanceoinotermsoofoRegulationo14oofo1976oRegulations.o

¶5Initially,otheorespondentocontendedothatooptionoFormoofothe petitioneroisonotoavailableoinotheorecordoofotheorespondent,othus,oheoisonot entitledotoopension,ohowever,olearnedocounseloonobeingoconfrontedowith Annexureo-10/Aosubmittedothatotheopetitioneroino2014ogotohisoshareoof providentofundoandoino2015ogotobank'soshareotowardsoprovidentofund,othus, he o is o not o entitled o to o pension. o The o act o of o petitioner o amounts o to acquiescence,othus,oheocannotoatothisobelatedostage,oclaimopension.o TheorespondentsoreliedouponojudgmentoofoSupremeoCourtoino RajoNarainoVs.oUnionoofoIndia,o2019o(5)oSCCo809,oStateoBankoofoIndia Vs.oMd.oAbduloRahim,o2013o(11)oSCCo67,oPepsuoRoadoTransport Corporation,oPatialaoVs.oMangaloSingh,o2011o(11)oSCCo702,oPepsu RoadoTransportoCorporation,oPatialaoVs.oAmandeepoSingh,o2017o(2) SCCo766,oAllahabadoBankoVs.oDeepakoKumaroBhola,o1997o(4)oSCCo1 andoaoDivisionoBenchoJudgmentoofothisoCourtoinoSatoPaloDhawanoVs. StateoBankoofoPatiala,o2014o(1)oSLRo576oandoaoDivisionoBenchoJudgment ofoAllahabadoHighoCourtoino MataoBadaloSinghoVs.oAllahabadoU.P. Gramin o Bank, o 2016 o (34) o LCD o 2042o and oDilip o Kumar o Soni o Vs. AllahabadoBank,o2015o(15)oSCTo600.oo Theorelevantoextractsoof oDilipoKumaroSonioVs.oAllahabad Bank (supra) read as:

¶6Rule 12(1)(b) of the Regulations of 1976 provides that an officer/employee may be placed under suspension by the competent authority where a case against him in respect of criminal offence is under inspection, inquiry or trial. Rule 12(2) of the Regulations provides that an officer/employee shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of the competent authority w.e.f. the date of detention, if he is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise for a period exceeding 48 hours. Rule 12(5) provides that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this Regulation shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by an authority competent authority to do so. Sub-rule (b) of Rule 12(5) provides that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this Regulation may at any time be modified or revoked by the authority which made or deemed to have made the order.

¶7Initially the petitioner herein was placed under suspension vide order dated 24.12.2012 under Regulation 12(2), referred to above, on the ground of his detention exceeding 48 hours in connection with a criminal charge. By the time his application for revocation of the suspension under Regulation 12(5)(b) came up for consideration, not only the competent authority had sanctioned his prosecution under Section 19 of the Act on being satisfied that a prima facie case existed against him, but the criminal case also became pending against him before the Special Judge, Anti Corruption, C.B.I. (West), Lucknow, thereby attracting the provisions contained in Regulation 12(1)(b) allowing the suspension to continue on account of pendency of an investigation, inquiry or trial in respect of any criminal offence. In these circumstances, on a perusal of the impugned order, we find that it contains cogent reasons for declining to revoke the suspension which does not suffer from any error in the eyes of law. We do not find any valid ground for interference o in o the o matter o under o Article o 226 o of o the ConstitutionoofoIndia,ospeciallyoinoviewoofotheojudgments citedobyotheolearnedocounseloforotheooppositeopartyoand referredohereinabove.o

¶6Iohaveoheardotheoargumentsoofobothosidesoandowithotheoable assistanceoofolearnedocounselsoperusedotheorecord.

¶7Theoconcededopositionoemergingofromotheorecordoisothatothe petitionerojoinedorespondent-Bankoono16.12.1978oandoheowasosuspended videoorderodatedo30.04.2010omeaningotherebyotheopetitioneroremainedoin serviceoforo32oyears.oTheopetitioneroattainedoageoofosuperannuationoin April,o2014.oTheopetitionerowasosuspendedovideocommunicationodated

30.04.2010, o however, o respondent o never o initiated o disciplinary proceedings.oTheopetitionerowasoreleasedoonobailoono14.05.2010.oThe petitioneromadeorepresentationoono15.05.2010owhereinoheorequestedofor recallingoofosuspensionoorder.oTheorespondent-Bankodidonotodecide representationoofotheopetitionerodespiteotheofactothatonoodisciplinary proceedingsowereoinitiatedoagainstotheopetitioner.oTheopetitionerowas acquittedobyoTrialoCourtoinocriminalocaseoandonooappealowasofiledoagainst the o said o judgment. o The o petitioner o in o terms o of o Allahabad o Bank (employees')oPensionoRegulations,o1995ofiledooptionoforopensionoon

01.11.2010.oTheoSenioroManagerorecommendedocaseoofotheopetitioner videoletterodatedo11.11.2010.oTheorespondentovideoletterodatedo16.05.2014 informedotheopetitionerothatoheowouldonotobeoentitledotooretiralobenefitotill theoproceedingsoareocompleted.oTheorelevantoextractsoofotheoletteroreadoas: "However,oyouowillonotobeoentitledotooreceiveoanyopay and/ooroallowancesoafterotheodateoofosuperannuation. Youowilloalsoonotobeoentitledoforotheopaymentoof retirementobenefitsotillotheoproceedingsoareocompleted andofinaloorderoisopassedothereonoexceptoyouroownAsgar Ali contributionotooProvidentoFund."

¶8The o respondent o in o terms o of o Regulation o 12 o of o 1976 Regulationsoisoempoweredotooplaceoanoemployeeounderosuspension. Regulationo12oreadsoas: "12.oSUSPENSIONo:o

(1)o An o officer o employee o may o be o placed o under suspensionobyotheo competentoauthorityo-o

(a)o whereoaodisciplinaryoproceedingoagainsto himoisocontemplatedooroisopendingo;ooro

(b)o whereoaocaseoagainstohimoinorespectoofo any o criminal o offence o is o under o investigation,oinquiryoorotrial.o

(2)o Anoofficeroemployeeoshallobeodeemedotoohaveo beenoplacedounderosuspensionobyoanoorderoofothe competentoauthorityo-o o o(a)o withoeffectofromotheodateoofodetention,oifo heoisodetainedoinocustodyowhetheroonoao criminaloochargeoooroootherwise,ooforoao periodoexceedingofortyeightohourso;o

(b)o withoeffectofromotheodateoofoconviction,oifoi notheoeventoofoao conviction o foi o an offence,oheoisosentencedotooaotermoof o imprisonmentoexceedingofortyeightohourso andoisonotoforthwithodismissedoororemoved orocompulsorilyoretiredoconsequentoto o suchoconviction.o Explanationo:oTheoperiodoofoforty-eightohours referredotooinoClauseo(b)oofothisosuboregulation shallobeocomputedofromotheocommencementoof theoimprisonmentoafterotheoconvictionoandofor this o purpose, o intermittent o periods o of imprisonment, o if o any o shall o be o taken o into account.o o (3) o Where o a o penalty o of o dismissal, o removal o or compulsory o retirement o from o service o imposed uponoanoofficeroemployeeounderosuspensionoisoset aside o in o appeal o or o on o review o under o these regulationsoandotheocaseoisoremittedoforofurther inquiryooroactionoorowithoanyodirections,othe orderoofohisosuspensionoshallobeodeemedotoohave continuedoinoforceoonoandofromotheodateoofothe original o order o of o dismissal, o removal o or compulsoryoretirementoandoshalloremainoinoforce untilofurtheroorders. o (4) o Where o a o penalty o of o dismissal, o removal o or compulsory o retirement o from o service o imposed uponoanoofficeroemployeeounderosuspensionoisoset aside o or o declared o or o rendered o void o in consequenceoofoorobyoaodecisionoofoaocourtoof law, o and o the o disciplinary o authority, o on considerationoofotheocircumstancesoofotheocase, decidesotooholdofurtheroinquiryoagainstohimoon the o allegations o on o which o the o penalty o of dismissal, o removal o or o compulsory o retirement wasooriginallyoimposed,otheoofficeroemployee shallobeodeemedotoohaveobeenoplacedounder suspensionobyotheocompetentoauthorityofromothe dateoofotheooriginaloorderoofodismissal,oremoval orocompulsoryoretirementoandoshallocontinueoto remainounderosuspensionountilofurtheroorders,o

(5)ooo(a)o Anoorderoofosuspensionomadeoorodeemedotoo haveobeenomadeounderothisoregulationoshall continueotooremainoinoforceountiloitois o modified o or o revoked o by o the o authority o competentotoodooso.o

(b)o Anoorderoofosuspensionomadeoorodeemedo toohaveobeenomadeounderothisoregulationo mayoatoanyotimeobeomodifiedoororevokedo haveomadeotheoorder." FromotheoperusaloofoaboveoquotedoRegulation,oitocomesoout thatoanoemployeeomayobeoplacedounderosuspensionobyoanoorderooroheomay beodeemedotoohaveobeenoplacedounderosuspension.oTheorespondentoinothe presentocaseoinvokedoSub-regulationo(2)oofoRegulationo12owhichoisoa deemingoprovision.oInootherowords,otheopetitionerowasoplacedounder suspensionoinvokingodeemingoprovision.oSub-regulationo(5)o(a)oofotheosaid Regulationoprovidesothatoanoorderoofosuspensionoshallocontinueotooremain inoforceountiloitoisomodifiedoororevokedobyotheoauthorityocompetentotoodo so.oClauseo(b)oofoSub-regulationo(5)ofurtheroprovidesothatoorderoof suspensionomayoatoanyotimeobeomodifiedoororevokedobyotheoauthority whichomadeoorodeemedotoohaveomadeotheoorder.o Theopetitioneromadeorepresentationoono15.05.2010oseeking recalling o of o suspension o order. o The o respondent o neither o initiated disciplinaryoproceedingsonoropassedoanyoorderoonotheorepresentationodated

15.05.2010oofotheopetitioner.oTheorespondentoisocorrectowhileoclaiming thatoaosuspensionoorderoremainsoinoforceountiloitoisomodifiedoororevokedoby theoauthority,ohowever,otheorespondentohasofailedotooconsiderothatoanoorder ofosuspensionomayobeorevokedooromodifiedobyotheoauthorityowhichomade theoorder.o

¶9Inotheocaseoinohand,otheopetitionerohadomadeorepresentation seekingorecallingoofosuspensionoorder.oTheorespondentohadonotoinitiated disciplinary o proceedings o against o the o petitioner o and o he o was o paid subsistenceoallowance,othus,otheorespondentowasodutyoboundotooconsider representationoofotheopetitioner.oTheorespondentohadoauthorityotooreject representationoofotheopetitionerobutotheorespondentodidonotocarryoabsolute authorityotookeeposuspensionoinocontinuanceoespeciallyowhenothereowasAsgar Ali representationoofotheoemployeeoandonoodepartmentaloproceedingsowere pending.o

¶10Regulationo14oofo1976oRegulationsoprovidesothatoforotheofirst 3omonths,oanoemployeeowouldobeoentitledotoo1/3oofobasicopayoas subsistenceoallowanceoandosubsequentotoo3omonths,owhereoenquiryoisoheld departmentallyobyotheoBank,ohalfoofobasicopayoandowhereoenquiryoisoheld byoanooutsideoagencyo1/3oofobasicopayoforotheonexto3omonthsoandohalfoof basicopayofororemainingoperiodoofosuspension.oRegulationo14oofo1976 Regulationsoisoreproducedoasobelow: "14.SUBSISTENCEALLOWANCEDURING SUSPENSIONo:o

(1)o Anoofficeroemployeeowhooisoplacedounder suspension oshall,o during otheo periodo ofo such suspensionoandosubjectotoosub-regulationso(2)oto

(4)obeoentitledotooreceiveopaymentofromotheobank by o way o of o subsistence o allowance o on o the followingoscaleonamely;o

(a)oBasicoPay:o o o(i)ooForotheofirstothreeomonthsoofosuspension 1/3 o of o basic o pay o which o the o officer employeeowasoreceivingoonotheodateoprior tootheodateoofosuspensionoirrespectiveoof theonatureoofoenquiry.o ooo(ii)oForotheosubsequentoperiodoaftero3omonths fromotheodateoofosuspensiono

(1) o Where o the o enquiry o is o held departmentallyobyotheobank,o1/2oofothe basic o pay, o the o officer o employee o was drawingoonotheodateopriorotootheodateoof suspension,oando

(2)o Whereotheoenquiryoisoheldobyoanooutsideo agencyo1/3oofotheobasicopayowhichothe o officeroemployeeowasodrawingoonotheodate priorotootheodateoofosuspensionoforotheonext threeomonthsoando1/2oofotheobasicopay o whichotheoofficeroemployeeowasodrawingo onotheodateopriorotootheodateoofosuspension forotheoremainingoperiodoofosuspension." [EmphasisoSupplied]

¶11FromotheoperusaloofoaboveoquotedoRegulation,oitoisoclearothat anoemployeeoisoentitledotoo1/3oofobasicopayoforotheofirsto3omonthsoof suspensionoandothereafteroheoisoentitledotoohalfoofobasicopayoprovidedoan enquiryoisoheldobyodepartmentoorobyoanooutsideoagency.o Inotheocaseoinohand,otheopetitionerowasosuspendedoonoaccount ofohisoarrest.oTheorespondentodidonotoinitiateoenquiryoagainstotheopetitioner despiteoexpiry oofo3omonths.oAocriminal otrial owasopendingoagainst petitioner,ohowever,onoootheroenquiryoeitherobyodepartmentoorooutside agencyowasopendingoagainstotheopetitioneroaftero3omonthsoofosuspension. Thus,oSub-Clauseo(ii)oofoClauseo(a)oofoSub-Regulationo(1)oofoRegulation 14oisonotoapplicableoinotheocaseoinohand.oTheorespondentoonotheoexpiryoofo3 monthsofromotheodateoofosuspension,oinotheoabsenceoofopendingoenquiry wasodutyoboundotooconsiderorepresentationoofotheopetitioner.

¶12Theorespondentohasorejectedoclaimoofotheopetitioneroquaofull wagesoinotermsoofoRegulationo15oofo1976oRegulations.oTheorespondentohas heldothatoperiodoofosuspensionowasonooworkoperiod,othus,opetitioneroisonot entitledotoowagesoforotheosuspensionoperiod.oRegulationo15oofo1976 Regulationsoisoreproducedoasobelow: "15. o PAY, o ALLOWANCES o AND TREATMENT o OF o SERVICE o ON TERMINATIONoOFoSUSPENSION:

(1)oWhereotheocompetentoauthorityoholdsothatotheAsgar Ali officeroemployeeohasobeenofullyoexoneratedoor thatotheosuspensionowasounjustifiable,otheoofficer employeeoconcernedoshallobeograntedotheofull payotoowhichoheowouldohaveobeenoentitled,ohad he o not o been o suspended o together o with o any allowance o of o which o he o was o in o receipt immediatelyopriorotoohisosuspensionooromayohave sanctionedosubsequentlyoandomadeoapplicableoto alloofficeroemployees.

(2)oInoallocasesootherothanothoseoreferredotooin Sub-regulationo(1)otheoofficeroemployeeoshallobe grantedosuchoproportionoofopayoandoallowances asotheoCompetentoAuthorityomayodirecto: Providedothatotheopaymentoofoallowancesounder thisosub-regulationoshallobeosubjectotooalloother conditionsotoowhichoallowancesoareoadmissibleo; Providedofurtherothatotheopayoandoallowances grantedounderothisosub-regulationoshallonotobe lessothanotheosubsistenceoandootheroallowances admissibleounderoRegulationo1.o

(3)o (a)oInoaocaseofallingounderosub-regulation

(1)otheoperiodoofoabsenceofromodutyoshall,oforoall purposes,obeotreatedoasoaoperiodospentoonoduty;

(b)oInoaocaseofallingounderosub-regulationo(2) theoperiodoofoabsenceoofromodutyoshallonotobe treatedoasoaoperiodospentoonodutyounlessothe Competent o Authority o specifically o directs, o for reasonsotoobeorecordedoinowritingothatoitoshallobe sootreatedoforoanyospecificopurpose."

¶13Fromotheoperusaloofoimpugnedoorderodatedo06.04.2015,oit comesooutothatosoleogroundooforejectionoofoclaimoofotheopetitioneroforofull wagesoisothatopetitionerowasoabsentofromoduty.oSub-regulationo(1)oof Regulationo15oprovidesothatowhereocompetentoauthorityoholdsothatothe employee o has o been o fully o exonerated o or o that o the o suspension o wereAsgar Ali unjustified,otheoemployeeoshallobeoentitledotoofullopay. In o the o case o in o hand, o the o petitioner o vide o letter o dated

15.05.2010ospecificallyorequestedofororecallingoofosuspensionoorderoand expressedohisowillingnessotoowork.oThereoisonothingoonorecordotooshow thatopetitionerowasonotowillingotoowork.oTheorespondentohasonotopassed anyoorderowithorespectotoorequestoofotheopetitionerotoorecallosuspension order.oTheopetitionerohasobeenoexoneratedoinocriminalotrialoandorespondent neveroinitiatedodepartmentaloproceedingsowhichoshouldobeoconsequentoto suspension.oByonotoinitiatingodisciplinary/departmentaloproceedings,othe respondentoacceptedothatosuspensionowasoonoaccountoofopendingocriminal caseoandotheyohaveonoogrievanceowithotheoconductoofotheopetitioner.oInothe absenceoofodepartmentaloproceedingsoandodroppingoofocriminalotrial,othe respondent-Bankowasonotojustifiedotoorejectoclaimoofofullopayoofothe petitioner. o Regulation o 15 o specifically o permits o full o pay o in o case o of exonerationooroholdingoofosuspensionounjustified.oTheopetitionerowasonot subjectedotooenquiryoandoheostandsoexoneratedofromocriminalotrial,othus, heowasoentitledotoofullopayoandocouldonotobeoheldoabsentofromodutyowhen heowasoreadyoandowillingotoowork.o

13.1. Theorespondentoinosupportoofohisocontentionowithorespectoto backowagesohasoreliedouponojudgmentoofoSupremeoCourtoinoRajoNarain (supra).oTheorelevantoparagraphsoofotheojudgmentoreadoas: "6.oTheodecisionoofoRanchhodjioChaturjioThakore (supra)owasofollowedobyothisoCourtoinoUnionoofoIndia andoOthersov.oJaipaloSingho (supra)otoorefuseoback wagesotooanoemployeeowhoowasoinitiallyoconvictedofor anooffenceounderoSectiono302oreadowithoSectiono34oIPC andolateroacquittedobyotheoHighoCourtoinoaocriminal appeal.oWhileorefusingotoograntoreliefotootheoPetitioner therein, this Court held that subsequent acquittal would not entitle an employee to seek back wages. However, this Court was of the opinion that if the prosecution is launched at the behest of the department and the employee is acquitted, different considerations may arise. The learned counsel for the Appellant endeavored to distinguish the prosecution launched by the police for involvement of an employee in a criminal case and the criminal proceedings initiated at the behest of the employer. The observation made in the judgment in Union of India and Others v. Jaipal Singh (supra) has to be understood in a manner in which the department would become liable for back wages in the event of a finding that the initiation of the criminal proceedings was mala fide or with vexatious intent. In all other cases, we do not see any difference between initiation of the criminal proceedings by the department vis-a-vis a criminal case lodged by the police. For example, if an employee is involved in embezzlement of funds or is found indulging in demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the employer cannot be mulcted with full back wages on the acquittal of the person by a criminal Court, unless it is found that the prosecution is malicious.

¶7The point that remains to be considered is whether the Appellant is entitled to payment of full wages between 1979 and 1987. The Appellant was placed under suspension on 23.10.1979 and his suspension was revoked on 21.10.1987. An interesting development took place during the interregnum by which the disciplinary proceedings were dropped on

21.03.1983. It is clear from the record that the Appellant was the one who was seeking postponement of the departmental inquiry in view of the pendency of criminal case. The order of suspension was in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. By virtue of the disciplinary proceedings being dropped, the Appellant becomes entitled to claim full salary for the period from the date of his suspension till the date of closure of the departmental inquiry. Thereafter, the Respondents took four years to reinstate him by revoking his suspension. The order of suspension dated 23.10.1979 came to an end on 21.03.1983 which is the date on which disciplinary proceedings were dropped. The Appellant ought to have been reinstated immediately thereafter unless a fresh order was passed, placing him under suspension during the pendency of the criminal trial which did not happen. Ultimately, the Appellant was reinstated by an order dated 21.10.1987 by revocation of the order of suspension. Though, technically, the learned Additional Solicitor General is right in submitting that the impugned judgment does not even refer to the I.A., we are not inclined to remit the matter to the High Court at this stage for fresh consideration of this point. We hold that the Appellant is entitled for full wages from 23.10.1979 to 21.10.1987 after adjustment of the amounts already paid towards subsistence allowance. $heorespondentohasopointedooutoParao*oofotheoaforesaid %ud!3ent,ohowever,operusa"oofoParao4oofotheoafore&citedo%ud!3ent disc"osesothatoApetioCourtohasoetitendedo enefitoofofu""owa!esoforothe suspensionoperiodowhereosuspensionohaso eenoreca""ed.oHon@ "eoSupre3e Courtohasoetitendedo enefitoofofu""owa!esonotofro3otheodateooforeca""in!oof suspensiono utofro3otheodateoofosuspension.o +notheocaseoinohand,otheopetitionerowasosuspended,ohowever, nooen?uir2owasoconducted,o3eanin!othere 2,otheorespondentooptedotoore"2Asgar Ali uponooutco3eoofocri3ina"otria".o$heopetitionerowasoetioneratedoinocri3ina" proceedin!,othus,orespondent&#ankowaso oundotoore"2ouponooutco3eoof cri3ina"oproceedin!s.o$heo%ud!3entocitedo 2orespondentosupportsocaseoof theopetitioneroratherothanorespondent.o$heoPetitioneroisoentit"edotoofu"" wa!esofro3otheodateoofohisoapp"icationoseekin!oreca""in!oofosuspension order.ooo (5.). $heorespondentohasofurtherore"iedoupono%ud!3entoofoSupre3e Courtoino*d.o+,d-loRahimo/supra1.oThe relevant extracts of the judgment read as:

¶8Before delving into the contentious issues arising from the arguments advanced, the issue with regard to the applicability of the provisions of the Sastry Award may be dealt with in the first instance. According to us, the said provisions do not have any special significance inasmuch as there can be no doubt on the proposition that on the very same facts that give rise to a criminal offence it is always open to the employer to initiate a departmental proceeding which option the employer may or may not exercise. In the event the employer chooses to initiate a departmental proceeding, it would be open for such an employer to take disciplinary action against the erring employee if the charges levelled are found to be substantiated notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee in the criminal case that may have been lodged against him. This is on the principle that standard of proof in a criminal case and a departmental proceeding is different. However, in a case where the employer chooses not to initiate a departmental proceeding and acts only on the basis of the conviction in the criminal prosecution, he would be bound by the final verdict in the same, i.e., in case of a reversal. The provisions of the Sastry Award, relied upon on behalf of the respondent, therefore, does not in any manner alter the basic principles surrounding the initiation of a criminal action and a departmental enquiry on the same set of facts and the consequences thereof.

¶9xxx xxx xxx xxx

¶10The issue relating to entitlement to back wages, however, stands on a somewhat different footing. While in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh (supra) and Baldev Singh (supra), the basis of refusal of back wages by this Court would appear to be the inability of the employer to avail of the service of the employee due to his incarceration in jail, in Banshi Dhar (supra), the refusal of back wages by this Court was in a situation largely similar to the case before us, namely, where the employee was all along on bail and was thus available for work. In Banshi Dhar (supra), this Court answered the question against the employee by holding that grant of back wages is not automatic and such an entitlement has to be judged in the context of the totality of the facts of a given case. It is on such consideration that back wages was declined. In the present case, it will not even be necessary for the Court to perform the said exercise and delve into the surrounding facts and circumstances for the purpose of adjudication of the entitlement of the respondent to back wages in view of the provisions of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Act. The said provisions impose a clear bar on a banking company from employing or continuing to employ a person who has been convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude. No discussion as to the meaning of the expression `moral turpitude' is necessary having regard to the nature of the offences alleged against the respondent, namely, under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. No doubt, the respondent was not in custody during the period for which he has been denied back wages in as much as the sentence imposed on him was suspended during the pendency of the appeal. But what cannot be lost sight of is that the conviction of the respondent continued to remain on record until it was reversed by the appellate court on 22.02.2002. During the aforesaid period there was, therefore, a prohibition in law on the appellant-bank from employing him. If the respondent could not have remained employed with the appellant-bank during the said period on account of the provisions of the Act, it is difficult to visualise as to how he would be entitled to payment of salary during that period. His subsequent acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not operate to retrospectively wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act. The entitlement of the respondent to back wages has to be judged on the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement, undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and the same have been granted by the appellant bank. The respondent has relied upon Para 10 of the afore-cited judgment. In Para 8 of the judgment, the Court has held that if department opts not to initiate a departmental proceeding, the department is bound to rely upon outcome of criminal prosecution. The Court has declined claim of the respondent therein relying upon Section 10 (1) of Banking Regulation Act, 1949 which imposes a clear bar on a banking company from employing or continuing to employ a person who has been convicted by criminal Court of an offence involving moral turpitude. In the case in hand, Regulation 12(5) empowers respondent to recall or revoke suspension order, thus, Regulation 12(5) provides for altogether different than Section 10 (1) of Banking Regulation Act. The petitioner was neither held guilty in departmental proceedings nor he has been convicted by criminal Court. The petitioner was acquitted by Trial Court. The department has not even initiated departmental proceedings and criminal trial was dropped, thus, Regulation 12 read with 15 of 1976 Regulations comes for the rescue of the petitioner. (5.5. The relevant extracts of Division Bench Judgment of Allahabad High Court in Mata Badal Singh Vs. Allahabad U.P. Gramin Bank (supra) cited by respondent read as:

¶16Thus, when the proceedings against the petitioner have been initiated under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act and in context of discharge of his official function/duties and in case the petitioner is allowed to discharge his duties, it shall not be in the interest of the equity rather shall be repugnant to the context. Hence, there is no justification to set aside the suspension order, because Apex Court in the case of Secretary to Govt., Prohibition and Excise Department Vs. L. Srinivasan,

(1996) 3 SCC 157, observed that even if a criminal trial or enquiry takes a long time, it is ordinarily not open to the Court to interfere in case of suspension as it is in the exclusive domain of the competent authority who can always review its order of suspension being an inherent power conferred upon him to place an employee under suspension and while exercising such a power, the authority can consider the case of an employee for revoking the suspension order if satisfied that the criminal case pending would be concluded after an unusual delay for no fault of the employee concerned. (See also: U.P. Rajya KrishiAsgar Ali Utpadan Mandi Parishad Vs. Sanjeev Ranjan (1993) Supp. (3) SCC 483; and State of Rajasthan Vs. B.K. Meena and others (1996) 6 SCC 417. The Allahabad High Court has held that suspension order cannot be quashed by Court on the ground that criminal trial is going to take long time, however, it is open to competent authority to review its order of suspension being an inherent power conferred upon him. In the case in hand, the respondent carries expressed power to consider application seeking recalling of suspension order. The respondent did not pass any order on the application of the petitioner seeking recalling of suspension. The respondent did not think it appropriate to reconsider suspension order especially when no departmental proceeding was initiated and petitioner was willing to work. The respondent was bound to pass an appropriate order in terms of Regulation 12 when there was specific request on the part of petitioner. (-. Ao=ivisiono#enchoofothisoCourtoafterodiscussin!op"ethoraoof %ud!3entsoofoHon6 "eoSupre3eoCourtoinoJagdishoLalo/supra1ohasohe"dothat anoe3p"o2eeoisoentit"edotoofu""owa!esoforotheosuspensionoperiodoif discip"inar2oproceedin!soasowe""oasocri3ina"oproceedin!soareodropped. $heore"evantoetitractsoofotheo%ud!3entoreadoas: C$7.o&operusaloofotheosaidoauthorityowouldogooonoto showothatotheodisciplinaryoproceedingsowereodropped and o the o employee o was o ultimately o reinstated o and accordinglyoitowasoheldothatotheoappellantowasoentitled forotheofullowagesoforotheoperiodofromo*/.$8.$9:9oto *$.$8.$9":,oafteroad3ustmentoofotheoamountsoalready paid,owhichosupportsotheocaseoofotheorespondent'

17.oInoBrahmaoChandraoGuptao(supra)otheoApexoCourt noticed o that o the o employee o was o never o proceeded againstoonotheodepartmentalosideoandoupheldotheoorder ofotheotrialoCourtothatofulloamountoofosalaryobeopaidoto the o employee o on o his o reinstatement o for o the o entire period,owhichowasoheldotoobeotheocorrectoapproach.

18.oInoNathuoRamo(supra)owhileoreferringotoothe relevantorules,otheoviewsoofotheolearnedoSingleoJudge andotheoDivisionoBencho ofotheoHighoCourtowere upheld,okeepingoinoviewotheoregulationsoandowhile notingothatofullopayohadobeenograntedofromotheodateoof suspensionotillotheodateoofodismissal.

19.oThus,oweoareoofotheoconsideredoopinionothatoonce theowritopetitionerohasoearnedohisoexoneration,obothoon theocriminalosideoandoonotheodepartmentaloside,onow theoNigamoisonotojustifiedoinoagitatingothatoheoisotoobe denied o pay o and o allowances o for o the o intervening period."

14.1 AoDivisionoBenchoofothisoCourtoinoShashioKumaroVs.oUttar HaryanaoBijlioVitranoNigamoandoanothero2004oSCCoOnLineoP&Ho1159 hasoheldothatoonceoanoemployeeoisoacquittedobyotheoTrialoCourt,oheois entitledotoofullosalary.oThereoisonooconceptoofo'honourableoacquittal'oor 'fullyoexonerated'oinocriminalolaw.oTheorelevantoextractsoofotheojudgment readoas: "7.o Inoanyoevent,otheotermso"honourableoacquittal"oor "fullyoexonerated"oareounknownoinotheoCodeoofoCriminal ProcedureooroinoCriminaloJurisprudence.oTheseotermsocame upoforoconsiderationobeforeoaoDivisionoBenchoofotheoMadras HighoCourtoinotheocaseoofoUnionoofoIndiaov.oJayaramo[A.I.R. 1960oMad.o325].oRajamannar,oC.J.odeliveringotheojudgment ofotheoDivisionoBenchoobservedoasounder:— "Thereoisonooconceptionolikeo"honourableoacquittal" inoCriminaloP.C.oTheoonusoofoestablishingotheoguiltoof accusedoisoonotheo prosecution, o and o if o it o fails o to establish o the o guilt o beyond o reasonable o doubt, o the accusedoisoentitledotoobeoacquitted. Clause o (b) o of o Article o 193 o of o the o Civil o Service Regulations o which o says o that o when o a o Government servantowhoo wasounder osuspension ois ohonourably acquitted,oheomayobeogivenotheofullosalaryotoowhichohe wouldohaveobeenoentitledoifoheohadonotobeenosuspended appliesoonlyotootheocaseoofodepartmentaloinquiry. Whereotheoservantowasosuspendedobecauseothereowasoa criminal o prosecution o against o him, o and o he o was acquittedotherein,oandoreinstatedoheoisoentitledounder theogeneralolaw,otootheofullopayoduringotheoperiodoofohis suspension.oToosuchoaocaseoArticleo193(b)odoesonot apply".

8.oTheoaforesaidojudgmentoofotheoMadrasoHighoCourtowas consideredo and o followed o byothiso Courto in o theo caseoof JagmohanoLalov.oStateoofoPunjabothroughoSecretaryoto PunjaboGovt.oIrrigationo[AIRo(54)o1967oPb.o&oHy.o422 (Punjab)].oInothatocase,oonoacquittal,otheopetitionerowas reinstatedoinoservice,obutohisoperiodoofosuspensionowasonot treatedoasotheoperiodospentoonoduty.oHeohad,otherefore,ofiled writopetitionounderoArticleso226/227oofotheoConstitutionoof India o claiming o that o he o was o entitled o to o full o pay o and allowancesoforotheoperiodoofohisosuspension.oConsideringothe impactoofoRuleso7.3,o7.5oando7.6oofotheoPunjaboCiviloServices RulesoVol.oI,oPartoI,oitowasoobservedoasofollows:—

(2) xxx xxx xxx xxx The o interpretation o which o has o been o put o by o the Governmentoonotheoruleoisoincorrect.oTheoblameowhich attached o to o the o petitioner o was o that o there o was o a criminalochargeoagainstohimounderowhichoheowas standingohisotrial.oTheomomentoheoisoacquittedoofothe charge,oheoisoacquittedoofotheoblame.oInocriminalolaw, Asgar Ali theoCourtsoareocalledouponotoodecideowhetherothe prosecutionohasosucceededoinobringingohomeotheoguilt tootheoaccused.oTheomomentotheoCourtoisonotosatisfied regardingotheoguiltoofotheoaccused,oheoisoacquitted. Whetheroaopersonoisoacquittedoafterobeingogivenoa benefitoofodoubtooroforothatoreasons,otheoresultoisothat his o guilt o is o not o proved. o The o Code o of o Criminal Procedureodoesonotocontemplateohonourableoacquittal. TheoonlyowordsoknownotootheoCodeoareo'discharged'oor 'acquitted'.oTheoeffectoofoaopersonobeingodischargedoor acquittedoisotheosameoinotheoeyesoofolaw.oSince, according o to o the o accepted o notions o of o imparting criminal o justice, o the o Court o has o to o be o satisfied regarding o the o guilt o of o the o accused o beyond o a reasonableodoubt,oitoisogenerallyoheldothatothereobeing aodoubtoinotheomindoofotheocourt,otheoaccusedois acquitted. Ioam,otherefore,oquiteoclearoinomyomindothatothe intentionounderlyingoruleo7.5ocanobeonoootheroexcept this;otheomomentotheocriminalochargeoonoaccountoof whichoanoofficerowasosuspendedofailsoinoaocourtoofolaw, heoshouldobeodeemedotoobeoacquittedoofotheoblame.oAny otherointerpretationowouldodefeatotheoveryopurposeoof theorule.oItoisofutileotooexpectoaofindingoofoeither honourable o acquittal o or o complete o innocence o in o a judgmentoofoacquittal.oTheoreasonoisoobvious;othe criminal o courts o are o not o concerned o to o find o the innocenceoofotheoaccused.oTheyoareoonlyoconcernedoto findowhetherotheoprosecutionohasosucceededoinoproving beyondoaoreasonableodoubtotheoguiltoofotheoaccused". Inotheocaseoinohand,orespondentoneveroinitiatedodepartmental proceedingsoandocriminaloproceedingsowereodropped,othus,opetitioneroin viewoofoRegulationo15oofo1976oRegulationsoreadowithojudgmentoofothis CourtoinoJagdishoLalo(supra)oandoShashioKumaro(supra)oisoentitledoto Asgar Ali salaryoforotheosuspensionoperiod.oo

¶15Theorespondentohasonotoconsideredoclaimoofotheopetitionerofor pensionobecauseopetitionerogotoemployee'soshareoinoprovidentofundoin 2014oandothereafterobank'soemployer'soshareoino2015.oByoaccepting employer'soshare,otheopetitioneromadeohimselfodis-entitledotoopension.oAs perorespondent,otheoactoofopetitioneroamountsotooacquiescenceoandoasoper principleoofoestoppel,otheopetitioneroisonotoentitledopension.oTheopetitioner filedooptionoFormoono01.11.2010owherebyopetitionerooptedoforopension scheme.oTheoSenioroManageroofotheoBankorecommendedocaseoofothe petitioner o vide o letter o dated o 11.11.2010. o The o petitioner o vide communicationodatedo16.05.2014owasoinformedothatoheowillonotobe entitledotooretrialobenefitsotillotheoproceedingsoareocompletedoandofinal orderoisopassedothereonoexceptohisocontributionotooprovidentofund.oThe pensionoschemeowasointroducedovideocircularodatedo15.09.2010.oByothe saidocircular,oemployee'sowereogivenooptionotoooptoforopensionoor providentofund.oTheorelevantoextractsoofotheocircularoreadoas: "1.oEligibilityocriteriaoforoexercisingoanotheroOption asoenvisagedoinotheoMemorandumoofoSettlement/ JointoNoteodatedo27thoApril,o2010:

1.1o All o workmen o employees o and o officers o (hereinafteroreferredotooaso'employees'oforobotho theocategories)owhooare/wereoinotheoserviceoofo theoBankoasoonotheodateoofotheoSettlement/Jointo Note,oi.e.,o27.04.2010,oandoexerciseooptionotoo join o the o Pension o Scheme o in o terms o of o the o Settlement/JointoNoteowillocontributeofromotheiro arrearsoonoaccountoofowageorevisionoinotermsoofo theoSettlement/JointoNoteobetweenotheoparties,o anoamountoofoRs.878ocroresoandoRs.922ocroreso respectivelyotowardsotheiroshareoinotheoamounto ofoRs.1800ocroresoofferedobyoUFBUotowards o 30%oofotheoestimatedofundingogapoofoRs.6000o croreso(forotheoBankingoIndustryoasoaowhole).o Theosaidoamountoisoworkedoouto@o2.8otimesoofo theorevisedopayoforotheomonthoofoNovembero2007 foroindividualoemployees.

1.2o AnotherooptionoforojoiningotheoexistingoPensiono Schemeo(underoABEPR-1995)oshallobeoextendedo toothoseoemployeesowho:-

1.2.1o(a)owereoinotheoserviceoofotheoBankopriorotoo29th Septembero1995oandocontinueoinotheoserviceoof theoBankoonotheodateoofotheoSettlement/Joint Note;

(b)oexerciseoanooptionoinowritingowithino60odays fromotheodateoofooffer,otoobecomeoaomemberoof theoPensionoFundoand

(c)oauthoriseotheoTrustoofotheoProvidentoFundoof theoBankotootransferotheoentireocontributionoof theoBankoalongowithointerestoaccruedothereonoto theocreditoofotheoPensionoFund.

1.2.2 (a)owereoinotheoserviceoofotheoBankopriorotoo29th Septembero1995oandoretiredoafterothatodateoand priorotootheodateoofotheoSettlement/oJointoNote;

(b)oexerciseoanooptionoinowritingowithino60odays fromotheodateoofooffer,otoobecomeoaomemberoof theoPensionoFundoand

(c)orefundowithino30odaysoafteroexpiryoofotheosaid periodoofo60odays,otheoentireoamountoofothe Bank'socontributionotootheoProvidentoFundoand interest o accrued o thereon o received o by o the employeeoonoretirementotogetherowithohis/her shareoinocontributionotowardsomeetingo30%oof Rs.3115ocroreso(forotheoBankingoIndustryoasoa whole)owhichoisoestimatedoandoreckonedoasothe fundingogapoforothoseoeligibleounderoClause 2(11),o2(III)oando2(1V)oofotheoSettlementoand Clauseo(3),o(4)oando(5)oofotheoJointoNote,oasothe case o may o be. o On o an o individual o basis, o the paymentooveroandoaboveotheoBank'socontribution tooProvidentoFundoandointerestothereonohasobeen workedooutoato56%oofotheosaidoamountoofoBank's contribution otooProvidentoFund oand ointerest thereonoreceivedobyotheoemployeeoonoretirement. xxxx oooxxxx oooxxxx oooxxxxooo

3.12o Withino30odaysofromoexpiryoofooptionoperiod (i.e., o 20.09.2010 o to o 18.11.2010) o the o optees, exceptotheoexistingoemployeesowhooareoinothe serviceoofotheoBankoonotheodateoofooption,oshall refund o the o entire o amount o of o the o Bank's contributionotootheoProvidentoFundoandointerest accrued o thereon o received o on o retirement o or death,oasotheocaseomayobe.oSuchorefundoshallobe madeotogetherowitho56%oofotheosaidoamountoof Bank's o contribution o to o Provident o Fund o and interest o thereon, o towards o optee's o share o of' funding o gap' o explained o hereinabove, o except whereoanoamountoequivalentoto o2.8o timesoof revisedo'Pay'oofotheoex-employeeoforoNovember 2007ohasobeenowithheldofromohis/heroarrear salaryoonoaccountoofowageorevision.oRegarding settingooffotheocommutationovalueoagainstothe refund/contribution o and o modalities o of remittance,oseparateoinstructionsowillofollow."

¶16Fromotheoperusaloofoaboveoquotedocircular,oitocomesooutothat anoemployeeoisonotoentitledotooemployerocontributionotooprovidentofund,oif heooptsoforotheopensionoscheme.oInocaseoofoanoemployeeoinoservice,oan employeeowasosupposedotoofileooptionoandoauthorizeotrustoofotheoprovident fundotootransferotheoentireocontributionoofoBankoalongwithointerestotoothe creditoofopensionofund.oTheopetitionerofiledooptionoono01.11.2010.oHe attainedoageoofosuperannuationoono30.04.2014.oTheooptionowasosupposed toobeofiledowithino60odaysoandopetitionerofiledooptionowithinoprescribed period.oAsopetitionerohadonotoretired,othus,oasoperoaforesaidocircularoas soonoasooptionowasofiled,otheotrustowasoauthorizedotootransferocontribution ofoemployeroinoprovidentofundotootheocreditoofotheopensionofund.oTheorole ofotheopetitionerowasoconfinedotoofilingoofooption.oTheorespondentoreleased employee'socontributionoino2014oandothereafteroemployer'socontribution ino2015.oTheoinitialostandoofotheorespondent-Bankowasothatoasoperotheir record,othereoisonoooptionoform.oOnobeingoconfrontedowithovarious documents,olearnedocounselochangedohisostand.oThus,ounderowrong impression,otheoemployer'socontributionowasoreleasedoino2015.oThe petitionerohasoexpressedohisointentionotooreturnoentireofundoreceived towardsoemployer'socontributionoalongwithointerest.oTheointerestoofothe Bank o would o be o secured, o if o petitioner o is o directed o to o refund o entire employer'socontributionoalongwithointeresto@o12%operoannum.oThe respondentohasoattemptedotooallegeothatoactoandoconductoofopetitioner amountsotooacquiescenceoandoinoviewoofoprinciplesoofoestoppel,oheocannot claimopensionoatothisobelatedostage. Theopetitionerohadofiledooptionowellowithinotimeoandoheowas releasedoemployer'socontributionobecauseorespondent-Bankoatotheoinitial stageoformedoanoopinionothatopetitionerohasonotofiledooptionoForm.oInoview ofooptionoFormodatedo01.11.2010o(AnnexureoP-23)oreadowitholetterodated

11.11.2010owrittenobyoSenioroManageroofotheoBank,othereoisonooscopeoof doubtothatopetitionerohadooptedoforopensionoschemeoandoBankowasounder wrongoimpressionothatoheohadonotofiledooptionoForm.oTheoBankounderothis wrongoimpressionohadoreleasedocontributionoofotheoemployer.oTheorelease ofoprovidentofundoonoaccountoofo3is&conceptionoofofactsocannotodis&entit"e petitionerofro3opensionoespecia""2oinotheowakeoofotheofactsothatopetitioner fi"edowritopetitionoino),(.oitse"fowhereinoheospecifica""2oc"ai3edofor pension.o (*.( +nosupportoofohisocontentionothatopetitioneroisonotoentit"edoto pension,otheorespondentohasore"iedoupono%ud!3entoofoSupre3eoCourtoin Pepsu Road Transport Corporation, Patiala Vs. Mangal Singh and Pepsu Road Transport Corporation, Patiala Vs. Amandeep Singh. The relevant extracts of judgment of Supreme Court in Mangal Singh (supra) read as: "22. Now we will try to explain the essential distinction between these two retirement benefits that an employee may derive at the time of his retirement from service. The C.P.F. was introduced with the object of providing social security to the employees working in factories and other establishments, after their retirement. The C.P.F. was instituted as a Compulsorily Contributory Provident Fund by the enactment of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as "the Provident Fund Act"). The employee registered under the Provident Fund Act shall be entitled to claim all benefits available under the C.P.F. Scheme framed under the Act. This CPF Scheme requires opening of the account for the employee by the employer. The Government/employer is under the continuous obligation to deposit equal or matching contribution made by the employee in his account till he retires. Once the employee is retired, then his rights qua Government/employer's contribution into his C.P.F. account finally crystallizes. After retirement, this entire C.P.F.Asgar Ali amount is paid to the employee as a retrial benefit. On the receipt of C.P.F. amount, the relationship between employee and employer ceases to exist without leaving any further legal right or obligation qua each other." The Hon'ble Court has held that on receipt of CPF amount, the relationship of employee and employer ceases to exist without leaving any further legal right or obligation qua each other. In the case in hand, the petitioner well within time had filed option for pension. The respondent in 2014 released employee's contribution and thereafter in 2015 employer's contribution. Initially, the stand of the respondent was that the petitioner had not filed option for pension, however, on being confronted with documents on record, the respondent has conceded that petitioner had filed option. The petitioner was paid employer's contribution in 2015 and in the same year he approached this Court seeking pension on the basis of option filed by him. The petitioner was released employer's contribution under wrong notion and impression of the respondent. The petitioner at the first available opportunity has approached this Court and he has expressed his willingness to return employer's contribution alongwith interest @ 12% in lieu of pension.

16.2. The respondent in support of his contention has further cited judgment of Supreme Court in Amandeep Singh (supra). The relevant extracts of said judgment read as: "23. In view of the above, it is well settled that the notice inviting option need not to be personally served to the employees unless the Regulation or any instruction so provides. The Regulations 1992 which are being considered in the present case had already been interpreted in PEPSU Road TransportAsgar Ali Corporation v. Mangal Singh as noticed above. This Court having already held that Regulations 1992 do not contemplate any personal service of notice to employees the finding in the judgment of the courts below holding otherwise for decreeing the suit of the plaintiff are unsustainable. From the facts of the present case it is clear that although Regulations were in force from 1992, plaintiff retired on 30th November, 2011 and after retirement received CPF benefits without any protest and at no point of time before retirement he has raised any grievance. The benefit which was available to him under CPF scheme was received by the plaintiff, he cannot be allowed to another benefit flowing from the pension scheme which he never opted. Extending benefit of the pension scheme to the plaintiff shall be extending double benefits-CPF benefit as well as pension scheme which was never contemplated by the Regulations. In any view of the matter, the issue in the present case is covered by the judgment in PEPSU Road Transport Corporation v. Mangal Singh (supra) and we do not propose to take any different view in the matter. Learned counsel for the respondents has also contended that in so far as the outstanding amount of CPF is concerned the said amount could have been deducted by virtue of Regulation 24 and which amount is to be adjusted against death-cum-retirement gratuity. In the present case the plaintiff having not opted for pension scheme, the requirement from refunding the advance taken from CPF within six months is not attracted. More so, in the present case as has been stated by the appellant in the written statement in the suit even after retirement an amount of L 4999/was due from the advance taken by the respondents from his CPF amount." Hon'bleoCourtohasoheldothatotheorespondentohasoavailed benefitoavailableotoohimoandoheocannotobeoallowedoanotherobenefitoflowing fromopensionoschemeowhichoheoneveroopted.o The o Supremeo Court o denied o benefit o of o pension obecause respondentothereinoavailedobenefitoofoCPFoandohadoneverooptedofor pensionoschemeowhereasoinotheocaseoinohand,otheopetitionerooptedofor pensionoandoheohasoapproachedothisoCourtoasosoonoasoemployer's contributionowasoreleasedotoohim.o

¶17Inotheowakeoofoaboveofactsoandodiscussion,othisoCourtoisoof theoconsideredoopinionothatopresentopetitionodeservesotoobeoallowedoand accordinglyoallowed.oTheopetitioneroisoentitledotoofullowagesofromotheodate of o application o seeking o recalling o of o suspension o order, o however, respondent-Bankoshallonotobeoliableotoopayointerest.oTheosubsistence allowanceoalreadyopaidoshallobeodeductedofromotheofullowagesotoobeopaid. Theorespondentoshallonotobeoliableotoopayointerestoonotheosaidoamount.oThe petitioner o shall o be o entitled o to o pension, o if o he o refunds o employer's contributionoalongwithointeresto@o12%owithino2omonthofromotoday.oThe respondent-BankohasoamalgamatedowithoIndianoBank,othusoamalgamated bankoi.e.oIndianoBankoshallocomplyowithothisoorder.

¶18Beforeopartingowithothisojudgment,othisoCourtowouldohasten tooaddothatoitohasobecomeoveryocommonoasowelloconvenientoforodisgruntled peopleotoolodgeofalse,ofabricatedoandovexatiousocomplaintsoagainstopublic servants.oIfodespiteoexonerationofromoprosecutionoasowelloasodepartmental proceedings,otheoemployeesoareodeprivedofromosalaryowhichoisotheir source o of o livelihood, o it o would o be o travesty o of o justice, o encourage disgruntled o people o and o demoralize o Government o servants o who o are honestlyoworkingoforotheopublic.oItoisopiousodutyoofoStateoasowelloasoCourts to o protect o from o such o disgruntled o people, o public o servants o who o are dischargingotheirodutiesoinoanohonestoandodedicatedomanner. (oJAGMOHANoBANSALo) ooooooJUDGE

09.10.2023 Ali Whetherospeaking/reasoned Yes/No WhetheroReportable Yes/No