Jasvir Singh v. M/S Indusind Bank Limited

ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo-o1-oooooooooooooooooo INoTHEoHIGHoCOURToOFoPUNJABo&oHARYANA AToCHANDIGARH ooooooCRM-M-24838-2025 Dateoofodecision:o08.05.2025 JASVIRoSINGH oooooooo....Petitioner Versuso M/SoINDUSINDoBANKoLIMITED oooo o...Respondent CORAM: HON'BLEoMR.oJUSTICEoSANJAYoVASHISTH Presento: Mr.oParminderoSinghla,oAdvocateowitho Mr.oDineshoKumar,oAdvocate forotheopetitioner. SANJAYoVASHISTH.oJ.(Oral)

¶1PrayeroinotheopresentopetitionofiledounderoSectiono528oofoBNSS,o2023, isoforoquashingoofotheoimpugnedoorderodatedo30.11.2024o(AnnexureoP-2),opassed by o learned o ADJ, o Ludhiana, o in o case o i.e. o CRA-13994-2024, o registered o on

29.11.2024,ofiledoagainstotheojudgmentodatedo24.10.2024,opassedoinocomplaint No.9935/2020ofiledoono27.11.2020oandoregisteredoono01.12.2020,otitledoasoM/s IndusindoBankoLimitedoVs.oJasviroSinghoandoforostayingotheooperationoand implementationoofoorderodatedo30.11.2024o(AnnexureoP-2)opassedobyolearnedoADJ, Ludhiana.

2.o Learnedocounseloforotheopetitionerohasostatedothatopetitionerowas prosecutedoinoaocomplaintounderoSectiono138oofotheoNegotiableoInstrumentsoAct, 1881o(foroshort,o'theoAct')oandoheowasoconvictedobyolearnedoJudicialoMagistrate FirstoClass,oLudhiana,ounderoSectiono138oofotheoAct,ovideojudgmentoofoconviction andoorderoofosentenceodatedo24.10.2024o(P-1)oandosentencedotooundergoosimple imprisonmentoforoaoperiodoofotwooyearsoandowasoalsooorderedotoopayocompensation ofoequivalentotootheochequeoamountotootheocomplainant.o o o o o o o o o oCounselofurtherosubmitsothatochallengingotheojudgmentodated

24.10.2024o(P-1),opetitionerofiledoanoappealobeforeotheoCourtoofolearnedoAdditional Sessions o Judge, o Ludhiana o and o thereupon o learned o Appellate o Court o vide o its impugnedoorderodatedo30.11.2024o(AnnexureoP-2)osuspendedotheoorderoofosentence ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo-o2-oooooooooooooooooo quaopetitioner,osubjectotootheodeposito20%oofotheocompensationoamount.ooDueotoothe financialoconstraints,opetitionerofailedotoocomplyowithotheoorderodatedo30.11.2024 (AnnexureoP-2),ohoweverocounselosubmitsothatoevenootherwiseoalso,oimpugned orderodatedo30.11.2024o(AnnexureoP-2)opassedobyotheolearnedoAppellateoCourtois inoviolationoofotheolawosettledobyoHon'bleoSupremeoCourtoinoJamboooBhandariov. M.P.oStateoIndustrialoDevelopmentoCorporationoLtd.oandoothers,o2024(1)oSCC

(Cri)o90,owhereinoitohasobeenoheldothatowhileoconsideringotheoprayerounderoSection 389oofotheoCr.P.C.oofoanoappellantowhoohasobeenoconvictedoforooffenceounder Sectiono138oofotheoAct,oitoisoalwaysoopenoforotheoAppellateoCourtotooconsider, whetherotheoappealobeforeoit,oisoanoexceptionalocaseooronot,owhichowarrantsograntoof suspensionoofosentence,obutowithoutoimposingotheoconditionotoodeposito20%oofothe fine/compensationoamount.oAnd,oifotheoAppellateoCourtocomesotootheoconclusion thatoitoisoanoexceptionalocase,otheoreasonsoforocomingotootheosaidoconclusionomust beorecorded,owhichoisomissingoinotheopresentocase.oItoisosubmittedothatolearned Courtobelowohasonotoappreciatedotheofactsoofotheocaseoandootherocircumstancesoof theo petitioner,o aso pero mandateo ofo the oHon'bleoSupremeo Court oin oJamboo Bhandari'socaseo(supra).

3.o Afterohearingolearnedocounseloforotheopetitioneroandoperusingothe record,oitoisoapparentothatosentenceoofotheopetitionerowasosuspendedobyolearned AppellateoCourtosubjectotootheodepositoofo20%oofotheocompensationoamount awardedobyolearnedotrialoCourt.oHowever,opetitionerodidonotocomplyowithotheosame. ThisoCourtoisoofotheoviewothatodisputeoraisedothroughotheopresent petitionocanobeodecidedoinolimineoandowithoutocallingotheootherosideohere,obecause theowayothisoCourtointendsotoodisposeoofotheopresentopetition,onooprejudiceowould beosufferedobyotheocomplainantoquaohisorights.o

¶4ThisoCourtofindsothatotheopleaoofotheopetitioneroisothatoimpugnedoorder datedo30.11.2024o(AnnexureoP-2),opassedobyolearnedoAdditionaloSessionsoJudge, Ludhiana,oisowithoutoadheringotootheodirectionsoissuedobyotheoHon'bleoApexoCourt inoJamboooBhandari'socaseo(supra),oasoalsooinotheocaseoofoMuskanoEnterprises andoanotherov.oTheoStateoofoPunjaboandoanother,o2024oSCCoOnlineoSCo4107o: LawoFinderoDocoIdo#2680202'.o

¶5TheoHon'bleoApexoCourtoin oJamboooBahndariocaseo (Supra)o and ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo-o1-oooooooooooooooooo Mus&ano'nterpriseso%aseo Supra"o $!so%!idodo)no(ert!inop!r!"eterso)$i%e (onsiderin#oSe(tiono13/oo+ot$eoA(to+orot$eop*rposeoo+ointerpret!tion.oIto$!so8een $e%dot$!tot$eoo8;e(too+oSe(tiono13/oo+ot$eoA(toisonoto"!nd!tori%,otoo8eo+o%%o)ed r!t$er&oitoisodire(ti'eo!ndot$eodire(tionotoop!,oorodeposito.0Aoo+ot$eo(o"pens!tion !"o*nt&o)$i($oiso"!5i"*"&oisotoo8eop!ssedo8,ot$eo(on(ernedo9o*rto!+ter e5!"inin#ot$eo+!(tso!ndo(ir(*"st!n(esoo+ot$eo(!seo8e+oreoit.o

¶2InoJamboooBhandari$so%aseo supra",ot$eo'ie)ot!=eno8,ot$eoHon?8%e Ape5o9o*rtoino!noe!r%iero(!se&oi.e.oSurinderoSin3hoDes.alov.o4irendero5andhi, 20!#"o!!oSCCo Cri"o41!$&o$!so!%soo8eenodis(*ssed&o)$erein&ot$eoo8;e(to!ndore!son o+ot$eo!"end"entoinoSe(tiono13/oo+ot$eoA(to)!sodis(*ssed.oT$eoo8ser'!tionso"!de inop!r!oNos.o-otoo1.oo+ot$eo;*d#"entoinoJ!"8oooB$!nd!ri?so(!seo4s*pr!7o!re reprod*(edo$ere8e%o) "5. The paragraph `8' of the decision of this Court in the case of Surinder Singh Deswal Alias Colonel S.S. Deswal and Others (2019) 11 SCC 341 reads thus: ' "8. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellants that even considering the language used in section 148 of the NI Act as amended, the appellate court "may" order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20% of the 1ne or compensation awarded by the trial court and the word used is not "shall" and therefore the discretion is vested with the 1rst appellate court has construed it as mandatory, which according to the learned Senior Advocate for the appellants would be contrary to the provisions of section 148 of the NI Act as amended is concerned, considering the amended section 148 of the NI Act as a whole to be read with the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amending section 148 of the NI Act, the word used is "may", it is generally to be construed as a "rule" or "shall" and not to direct to deposit by the appellate court is an exception for which special reasons are to be assigned. Therefore amended section 148 of the NI Act confers power upon the appellate court to pass an order pending appeal to direct the appellant'accused to deposit the sum which shall not be less than 20% of the 1ne or compensation either on an application 1led by the original complainant or even on the application 1led by the appellant'accused under section 389 Cr.P.C., 1973 to suspend the sentence. The aforesaid is required to be construed considering the fact that as per the amended section 148 of the NI Act, a minimum of 20% of the 1ne court is directedor compensation awarded by the trial ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo-o3-oooooooooooooooooo to be deposited and that such amount is to be deposited within a period of 60 days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding 30 days as may be directed by the appellate court for su9cient cause shown by the appellant. Therefore, if amended section 148 of the NI Act is purposively interpreted in section 148 of the NI Act, but also section 138 of the NI Act. The Negotiable Instruments Act has been amended from time to time so as to provide, inter alia, speedy disposal of cases relating to the o:ence of the dishonour of cheques. So as to see that due to delay tactics by the unscrupulous drawers of the dishonoured cheques due to easy 1ling of the appeals and obtaining stay in the proceedings, an injustice was caused to the payee of a dishonoured cheque, who has to spend considerable time and resources in the court proceedings to realise the value of the cheque and having observed that such delay has compromised the sanctity of the cheque transactions. Parliament has thought it 1t to amend section 148 of the NI Act. Therefore, such a purposive interpretation would be in furtherance of the Objects and Reasons of the amendment in section 148 of the NI Act and also section 138 of the NI Act.

¶6What is held by this Court is that a purposive interpretation should be made of section 148 of the N.I. Act. Hence, normally, Appellate Court will be justi1ed in imposing the condition of deposit as provided in Section 148. However, in a case where the Appellate Court is satis1ed that the condition of deposit of 20% will be unjust or imposing such a condition will amount to deprivation of the right of appeal of the appellant, exception can be made for the reasons speci1cally recorded.

¶7Therefore, when Appellate Court considers the prayer under section 389 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 of an accused who has been convicted for o:ence under section 138 of the N.I. Act, it is always open for the Appellate Court to consider whether it is an exceptional case which warrants grant of suspension of sentence without imposing the condition of deposit of 20% of the 1ne/compensation amount. As stated earlier, if the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that it is an exceptional case, the reasons for coming to the said conclusion must be recorded.

¶8The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the original complainant is that neither before the Sessions Court nor before the High Court , there was a plea made by the appellants that an exception may be made in these cases and the requirement of deposit or minimum 20% of the amount be dispensed with. He submits that if such a prayer was not made by the appellants, there were no reasons for the Courts to consider the said plea.

¶9We disagree with the above submission. When an accused applies under section 389 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 for suspension of ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo-o--oooooooooooooooooo sentence, he normally applies for grant of relief of suspension of sentence without any condition. Therefore, when a blanket order is sought by the appellants, the Court has to consider whether the case falls in exception or not.

¶10In these cases, both the Sessions Courts and the High Court have proceeded on the erroneous premise that deposit of minimum 20% amount is an absolute rule which does not accommodate any exception.

¶11The learned counsel appearing for the appellants, at this stage, states that the appellants have deposited 20% of the compensation amount. However, this is the matter to be examined by the High Court .

¶12In these circumstances, we set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and restore the revision petitions 1led by the appellants before the High Court . We direct the parties to appear before the roster Bench of the High Court on 09.10.2023 in the morning to enable the High Court to 1x a date for hearing of the revision petitions. As the contesting parties are before the Court , it will not be necessary for the High Court to issue a notice of the date 1xed for hearing. The High Court , after hearing the parties, will consider whether 20% of the amount is already deposited or not. If the Court comes to the conclusion that 20% of the amount is not deposited, the Court will re'examine the Revision Petitions in the light of what we have observed in this judgment. Till the disposal of the restored Revision Petitions, the interim order passed by this Court ordering suspension of sentence will continue to operate. 3( A#!in&oinot$eo(!seoo+oMus&ano'nterprises$so%aseo supra",oHon?8%e t$eoApe5o9o*rto$!sonoti(edo(ert!ino!ddition!%op!r!"eters&o)$i($o!reore2*iredotoo8e %oo=edointooinos*($o%i=eo(!ses&o)$i($ore!dsot$*s "2,. We may take the discussion a little forward to emphasize our point of view. There could arise a case before the AppellateoCourtowhere suchocourtois capable of forming an opinion, even in course of considering as to what would be the appropriate quantum of fine or compensation to be kept in deposit, that the impugned conviction and the consequent sentence recorded/imposed by the trialocourtois so wholly incorrect and erroneous that it is only a matter of time for the same to be set aside and that ordering a deposit would be unnecessarily burdensome for the appellant. Such firm opinion could be formed on a plain reading of the order, such as, the conviction might have been recorded and sentence imposed without adherence to the mandatory procedural requirements of the N.I. Act prior to/at the time lodging of the complaint by the complainant rendering the proceedings vitiated, or the trialocourtomight have rejected admissible evidence from being led and/or ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo-oB-oooooooooooooooooo relied on inadmissible evidence which was permitted to be led, or the trialocourtomight have recorded an order of conviction which is its ipse dixit, without any assessment/analysis of the evidence and/or totally mis( appreciating the evidence on record, or the trialocourtomight have passed an order failing to disclose application of mind and/or sufficient reasons thereby establishing the link between the appellant and the offence, alleged and found to be proved, or that the compensation awarded is so excessive and outrageous that it fails to meet the proportionality test : all that, which would evince an order to be in defiance of the applicable law and, thus, liable to be labelled as perverse. These instances, which are merely illustrative and not exhaustive, may not arise too frequently but its possibility cannot be completely ruled out. It would amount to a travesty of justice if exercise of discretion, which is permitted by the legislature and could indeed be called for in situations such as these pointed out above, or in any other appropriate situation, is not permitted to be exercised by the AppellateoCourtoby a judicial interpretation of 'may' being read as 'shall' in sub(section (1) of Section 148 and the aggrieved appellant is compelled to make a deposit of minimum 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trialocourto, notwithstanding any opinion that the AppellateoCourtomight have formed at the stage of ordering deposit as regards invalidity of the conviction and sentence under challenge on any valid ground. Reading 'may' as 'may' leads to the text matching the context and, therefore, it seems to be just and proper not to denude the AppellateoCourtoof a limited discretion conferred by the legislature and that is, exercise of the power of not ordering deposit altogether albeit in a rare, fit and appropriate case which commends to the AppellateoCourtoas exceptional. While there can be no gainsaying that normally the discretion of the AppellateoCourtoshould lean towards requiring a deposit to be made with the quantum of such deposit depending upon the factual situation in every individual case, more so because an order under challenge does not bear the mark of invalidity on its forehead, retention of the power of suchocourtonot to order any deposit in a given case (which in its view and for the recorded reasons is exceptional) and calling for exercise of the discretion to not order deposit, has to be conceded. If indeed the legislative intent were not to leave any discretion to the AppellateoCourto, there is little reason as to why the legislature did not also use 'shall' instead of 'may' in sub(section

(1). Since the self(same section, read as a whole, reveals that 'may' has ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo-o<-oooooooooooooooooo been used twice and 'shall' thrice, it must be presumed that the legislature was well and truly aware of the words used which form the skin of the language. Reading and understanding the words used by the legislature in the literal sense does not also result in manifest absurdity and hence tinkering with the same ought to be avoided at all costs. We would, therefore, read 'may' as 'may' and 'shall' as 'shall', wherever they are used in Section 148. This is because, the words mean what they say.

¶22In such view of the matter and for the foregoing reasons,owe are unhesitatingly of the view thatothe impugned order of the HighoCourtodeclining to entertain the subsequent petition under Section 482, Cr. PC of the appellants is unsustainable in law. However, we do not consider the need to remit the matter to the HighoCourtofor consideration of the subsequent petition under Section 482, Cr. PC; instead,oin our view, justiceowouldobe sufficiently served if the SessionsoCourtore( examines the issue of deposit being required to be made by the appellants in the light of the law laid down in Jamboo Bhandari (supra) and the observations made hereinabove. 2#. Consequently, the impugned order of the HighoCourtodated 18th May, 2024 and the Sessions Court's order dated 17th October, 2022, stand set aside. The matter is remitted to the SessionsoCourtoto re(examine the issue of ordering deposit. Whether sufficient ground has been made out by the appellants to persuade the SessionsoCourtonot to order any deposit is left entirely to its discretion and satisfaction. We do not express any opinion on the plea that the appellants have sought to advance before us, lest any party seeks to derive any advantage. All points are left open.

¶8T$iso9o*rto$!so!%re!d,o(onsideredot$eosi"i%!rop%e!oinoC6M7M7821!7 2029&otit%edo!s&oCM:soDev3ano6i%eoando5eneraloMillso v. oM:soJasbiroBhullar (radin3oCompan;oandoanother' D.+.D.-o22.0!.2029"&o)$ereinot$eonon6spe!=in# order&o)it$o*tonoti(in#ot$eodire(tionsop!ssedoinoJamboooBhandari$so%aseo supra" !ndoMus&ano'nterprises$so%aseo supra",o)!so!ss!i%edo!ndos!"eo$!so8eenop!rt%, !%%o)edo8,oiss*in#odire(tionsotoore6de(ideot$eos!idoiss*eo!#!inoino!((ord!n(eo)it$ t$eo%!)o%!idodo)no8,ot$eoHon?8%eoApe5o9o*rt.o

¶4A+teroe5!"inin#ot$eoi"p*#nedoorderod!tedo10.11..0.3o4Anne5*reoP6 .7o !ndoino'ie)oo+ot$eo;*di(i!%opre(edentsosett%edo8,oHon?8%eoApe5o9o*rtoin Jamboo oBhandari$so%aseo supra"o !nd oMus&ano'nterprises$s o%aseo supra"& ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo-o8-oooooooooooooooooo withoutocommentingoanythingoonotheomeritsoofotheocase,otheopresentopetitionois disposedoofoandolearnedoloweroCourto(AppellateoCourt)oisodirectedotoore-examine theocaseoinoviewoofolawolaidodownobyotheoHon'bleoApexoCourtoin oJamboo Bhandari'socaseo (supra)o and oMuskanoEnterprises'socaseo (supra) oandoafter grantingoanoopportunityotootheopetitionerotoomakeosubmissionsoregardingothe exceptionalocircumstances,odecideoafreshowhetheroitoisoanoappropriateocaseothat warrantsowaiveroofotheorequirementoofodepositoofo20%oofotheocompensation awardedobyolearnedotrialoCourt. Theodirectionsogivenoinotheoorderodatedo30.11.2024o(AnnexureoP-2)oby learnedoAppellateoCourtotootheoextentoofodepositingo20%oofocompensation,oisoset asideoandoitoisoalsooclarifiedothatotheoorderoofosuspensionoofosentenceowouldonotobe disturbedoinoanyomanneroandosameowouldobeosubjectotootheoobservations,owhichoare yetotoobeomadeobyotheoAppellateoCourtowhileodealingowithotheoprovisionsoofoSection 148oofotheoAct.

¶10Asofaroasotheosustainabilityoofotheoorderodatedo30.11.2024o(Annexure P-2),ovideowhich,osentenceoofotheopetitionerowasosuspendedobyolearnedoAppellate Courtosubjectotootheodepositoofo20%oofotheocompensationoamountoawardedoby learnedotrialoCourt,oisoconcerned,oitoisoobservedothatothisoissueoisoalreadyoreferredoto theoLargeroBenchobyothisoCourt,ovideoitsoorderodatedo08.04.2025,opassedoinoCRM-M-779-2025oandoCRM-M-8498-2025. Untilotheseotwoopetitionsoareofinallyodecidedoinopursuanceotoothe referraloorder,ooperationoofotheoimpugnedoorderodatedo30.11.2024o(AnnexureoP-2) wouldobeokeptoinoabeyanceoandowouldobeothusosubjectotootheofinalodecision,owhich isoyetotoobeotakenobyothisoCourtoinotheoaforementionedotwoopetitions. With o the o aforementioned o observations, opresent o petition o stands disposedoof. LetocopyoofothisoorderobeosentotootheoLoweroCourt,oforoinformationoand necessaryocompliance. ooooooooooooooooooooooo oo(SANJAYoVASHISTH)

08.05.2025oooooooooooooooooooooo oooooo oo oooooJUDGE amandeep Whetherospeaking/reasoned. : Yes/No WhetheroReportable. : Yes/No