M/S Saptagiri Restaurant Pvt Ltd v. Airports Authority of India and Ors

VIKRAM AGGARWAL , J

¶1The petitioner assails orders dated 08.08.2023 (AnneC4/e% P-12 an2 P-13) vide which the petitioner was debarred from participating in future tenders/RFPs floated by Airports Authority of India for a period of three years and the licence awarded to it for Wellness Centre/Spa and Massage Chair Facility was terminated.   Under challenge is also an order dated

02.05.2024 (AnneC4/e P-30), passed by the Dispute Resolution Committee CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 2

(DRC) (respondent No.3), vide which the orders dated 08.08.2023 were upheld. FACTS

¶2The   petitioner-Company   claims   to   be   in   the   business   of managing restaurants and other related services for the past 23 years and states to have been running various food and beverages outlets, restaurants, Spa, Massage Chair facility etc. in airports all across the country for the last two decades.   The petitioner claims to have considerable experience in running such outlets and claims to have earned appreciation from the Airports Authority of India for the services rendered.

¶3Pursuant to E-tenders issued on 05.09.2022 by the Airports Authority of India (Airport Director, Sri Guru Ramdas Ji International Airport, Amritsar) (respondent No.2) for licence for operating wellness Centre/Spa and Massage Chair inside the domestic Security Hold Area at  Sri Guru Ramdas Ji International Airport, Amritsar and the International Security Hold Area of  Sri Guru Ramdas Ji Airport, Amritsar, the petitioner submitted its bids.

¶4Vide communication dated 30.11.2022  (AnneC4/e P-4), the petitioner was informed that certain complaints had been received against it alleging that one Karan Singh, proprietor of M/s Syona Spa is an employee of the petitioner and being a tenderer, there was a conflict of interest as per Clause 10 of RFP provisions contained in the notice inviting e-tender (DNIET) and, therefore, the explanation of the petitioner was called.

¶5It   is   the   petitioner's   case   that   the   copies   of   the   alleged complaints were not annexed with the notice which would show that the CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 3 complaints were anonymous and had been initiated at the instance of business   rivals   of   the   petitioner.    A  detailed   reply   dated   05.12.2022 (AnneC4/e P-5) was submitted denying the allegations.

¶6Finding the allegations levelled in the complaints to be baseless, the respondents awarded the tenders to the petitioner for both the domestic Security Hold Area and the International Security Hold Area on 02.02.2023 (AnneC4/e% P-6 an2 P-7) followed by execution of licence agreements on

28.07.2023  (AnneC4/e%   P-8   an2   P-9)  for   the   period   06.06.2023   to

05.06.2028.  The licence fee for the domestic area was fixed at Rs.1,60,555/- per month upto 1? year and going upto Rs.2,35,069/- after 4 ? years.  For the International area, it was fixed at Rs.1,03,555/- per month upto 1? year going upto Rs.1,51,615/- after 4? years.

¶7Prior to the execution of the licence agreements but after the award of tenders to the petitioner, show cause notice dated 05.06.2023 (AnneC4/e P-10) was issued to the petitioner.  It was alleged in the show cause notice that the petitioner had given a loan to Mr. Karan Singh, proprietor of M/s Syona Spa, which, according to the respondents, remained unpaid and that Mr. Bikram Singh, the Managing Director of the petitioner-Company, had a share holding  in M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Private Limited of which Mr. Karan Singh was an employee.  A detailed response dated 14.06.2023 (AnneC4/e P-11) to the show cause notice was submitted by the petitioner stating that Karan Singh did not have any connection with the petitioner and also that Sh. Bikram Singh, who was also a director of M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. was holding less than 10?/20? share CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 4 in the petitioner company.  Being satisfied with the reply submitted by the petitioner, the licence agreements (AnneC4/e% P-8 an2 P-9) were executed.

¶8Vide orders dated 08.08.2023 (AnneC4/e P-12 an2 P-13), the petitioner was debarred from participating in any tender floated by the Airports Authority of India for a period of 03 years alleging conflict of interest and material misrepresentation and the licences were also terminated.

¶9The orders dated 08.08.2023 were challenged by way of CWP No.17635 of 2023 but the same was withdrawn vide order dated 16.08.2023 (AnneC4/e P-14)  with liberty to the petitioner to approach the Dispute Resolution   Committee-respondent   No.3   (hereinafter   referred   to   as 'respondent No.3') in terms of the provisions of Clause 29 of the General Terms and Conditions in Appendix 1 of the licence.

¶10Vide order dated 27.01.2024 (AnneC4/e P-15), respondent No.3 upheld the orders dated 08.08.2023.  For the said order was completely non-speaking, the petitioner filed CWP No.3401 of 2024 in which an affidavit dated 23.02.2024 (AnneC4/e P-16) was filed by the Incharge (Commercial), Amritsar International Airport stating that the order dated 27.01.2024 be treated as withdrawn and that respondent No.3 would pass a fresh reasoned order within a period of 10 days.  Accordingly, vide order dated 20.04.2024 (AnneC4/e P-17), CWP No.3401 of 2024 was disposed of with a direction to respondent No.3 to pass the final order on or before 02.05.2024.

¶11Pursuant to the aforesaid directions issued by this Court, the petitioner appeared before respondent No.3 and submitted a detailed reply dated 23.04.2024  (AnneC4/e P-26)  in which, apart from other issues, reliance was placed upon the judgment dated 09.08.2023 of the Madras High CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 5 Court and the judgment dated 06.10.2023 of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir.  Reliance was also placed upon the order of the Supreme Court of India passed in SLP No.3376 of 2024, filed by the Airports Authority of India against the judgment dated 06.10.2023 of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir.  Various other documents (AnneC4/e P-18 to P-25) were annexed with the said reply.

¶12After exchange of certain further communications (AnneC4/e% P-27 to P-29), order dated 02.05.2024 (AnneC4/e P-30) was received by the petitioner much to its shock vide which respondent No.3 upheld the orders dated 08.08.2023.

¶13It is the case of the petitioner that Clauses 9 & 10 of the General Information   and   Guidelines   in   the   Detailed   Notice   Inviting   Tender (hereinafter referred to as 'the DNIET') with regard to fraud and corrupt practices & penalties and conflict of interest do not apply in the present case and no violation has been committed by the petitioner.  It has been averred that Karan Singh was working in the petitioner company for over a period of 07 years.   However, when his interest developed to start a conflicting business, the petitioner did not think it appropriate to retain him in service and accordingly his services were terminated on 08.08.2022.  It has also been averred that since Karan Singh is no longer an employee of the petitioner, it cannot refrain him from participating in some tender if he qualifies for the same.  It has also been averred that since M/s Syona Spa of which Karan Singh was the director was not eligible for further participation in the tender, it no longer remained a bidder/participant and, therefore, the petitioner could not be blamed.  A similar stand was taken as regards the allegation of conflict CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 6 of interest.  It is the case of the petitioner that no opportunity of personal hearing had ever been granted by the respondents to explain as to how the allegations were untenable and that in a great hurry, the orders dated

08.08.2023 had been passed.

¶14Referring to the commercial manual issued in 2019, it has been averred that the procedure as to how and in what manner the orders of debarment is to be passed is stipulated in the said commercial manual and since no conditions stipulated therein exists in the present case, the action of cancellation of licence and debarment is without any basis and jurisdiction.

¶15It has also been averred that the order dated 02.05.2024 had travelled beyond the purview of the show cause notice and is in grave violation of the principles of natural justice as new allegations were levelled in the order dated 02.05.2024 which were not a part of the show cause notice. It has been averred that three fresh grounds that Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Private Limited had been depositing ESI and EPF of Mr. Karan Singh ten months after his termination; that M/s Syona Spa had opted for a similar process in tenders for Raipur and Pune wherein the petitioner was also a bidder and that the address of the petitioner, M/s Syona Spa and Mahesh Sunny Enterprises was the same i.e. L-322 Mahipalpur extension, New Delhi were not a part of the show cause notice though duly stated in the order dated

02.05.2024.  It is the case of the petitioner that order dated 02.05.2024 had been passed in a casual manner and that the order is a mere reproduction of the allegations levelled in the show cause notice and the findings recorded in the earlier order passed by respondent No.3.  Various other grounds have been raised on which the impugned orders have been challenged. CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 7 REPLY

¶16The writ petition has been opposed by the respondents.  In the written statement, it has been averred that post issuance of the order dated

02.05.2024, the petitioner cannot re-agitate the orders dated 08.08.2023 by filing the instant writ petition, once the previous writ petitions have been withdrawn and that if the petitioner was not satisfied with the decision of respondent   No.3,   it   would   have   an   alternative   remedy   of   arbitration. Reference has been made to Clause 29 of the General Terms and Conditions in Appendix 1 of the licence which talks about arbitration.  It has also been averred that no prejudice had been caused to the petitioner and that the allegations of violation of the principles of natural justice were devoid of merit as the petitioner had been granted due opportunity of hearing before respondent No.3 and the petitioner had also submitted additional documents and written submissions.

¶17Since there is no dispute in the facts, the same have not been denied but the basic stand that has been taken in the written statement is that respondent No.3 had considered the matter in detail and had passed a speaking order which is perfectly legal and valid.  Reference has also been made to a show cause notice dated 08.06.2023 (AnneC4/e R-7) issued to the petitioner on account of collusive bidding, considering 07 different tenders floated at different airports including Amritsar International Airport to which reply dated 16.06.2023 (AnneC4/e R-8) was submitted by the petitioner.  It has further been averred that after affording an opportunity of personal hearing on 30.11.2023, the petitioner had been debarred for a period of 03 CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 8 years from participating in any AAI tender vide order dated 20.12.2023 (AnneC4/e R-9). ARGUMENTS (PETITIONER)

¶18Learned counsel for the parties were duly heard.

¶19It was strenuously urged and vehemently submitted by learned Senior counsel representing the petitioner that the orders dated 08.08.2023 vide which the licence was cancelled and the petitioner was debarred and the order dated 02.05.2024 vide which the orders dated 08.08.2023 were upheld are completely illegal and arbitrary, besides being grossly violative of the principles of natural justice and accordingly deserve to be quashed.

¶20Learned Senior counsel extensively referred to the terms and conditions of the DNIET as also the commercial manual, 2019.   It was submitted that the debarment order would apply only to the Amritsar International Airport and not to the other airports in the country for the said order had been issued by the Airport Director of the Amritsar International Airport.  It was submitted that to fill up the 1ac4na/1ac4nae, order dated

20.12.2023 was passed by the Airports Authority of India debarring the petitioner from participating in the tenders of AAI for a period of 03 years.  It was submitted that this order was challenged in the Court of Addl. District Judge  Budgam, J&K wherein order dated 21.12.2023 was passed staying the operation of the order dated 20.12.2023.  This order was challenged in the High Court of  J&K wherein it was stated  by the  Airports ,Authority of India that the said order be treated as withdrawn.  SLP No.3376 of 2024 was filed by AAI before the Supreme Court of India but the same was disposed of as not having been pressed vide order dated 16.02.2024.  It was submitted CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 9 that under the circumstances, there was no order debarring the petitioner from airports across the country.   It was also submitted that despite this, the petitioner had been held to be technically non-responsive in a number of tenders pertaining to different airports by placing reliance upon the orders of debarment passed on 08.08.2023.  It was further submitted by the learned Senior counsel that the show cause notice should have provided for a punishment.  For no punishment was mentioned in the show cause notice, the principles of natural justice had been violated and, therefore, the impugned orders would not be sustainable.  Reliance was placed upon an order dated

16.10.2024, passed by this Court in  ��������������������  titled as Rajen2e/  Cont/acto/  3e/%4%   State   of  Ha/yana   an2   ot9e/%� and   the judgment  in the case of� ����� ����������� ������������ �������������� ���� ��������������!"��������������#��$�%�$��"����&$'�������������� ���������������������(��������������(����������)��(���)�������������� *�+�������&�+�,�#"�-��.�������%���/0'����1���"�2����(�"����2��������� ������.����#��3����4����%��������������$��#5%�"�-��.��������������$�/ in this regard.

¶21Learned Senior counsel submitted that the impugned order dated

02.05.2024 had travelled beyond the purview of the show cause notice dated

05.06.2023 and was, therefore, against the settled proposition of law.

¶22It was submitted by learned Senior Counsel that though a show cause notice for disqualification had been issued, no show cause notice for debarment had been issued and that the debarment order dated 08.08.2023 was passed prior to the order vide which the licence was terminated whereas CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 10 normally order of termination of licence would be issued prior to an order of debarment.

¶23Reference was made to Clause 10 of the DNIET which deals with conflict of interest.  Reference was also made to Clause 9 of the DNIET which deals with debarment and it was submitted that there was a gross violation of these provisions.

¶24Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that licence to the petitioner had been granted after the complaints were filed against the petitioner and reply was submitted meaning thereby that the complaints had been considered and consigned to record and, therefore, there was no occasion for the respondents to issue further show cause notices and even thereafter execute the agreements.  Reference was made to the orders dated

29.08.2023 and 13.10.2023 passed by the Court of the Addl. District Judge at Budgam and the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir respectively wherein it was held that the debarment at Amritsar would pertain only to Amritsar. Reference was further made to the order dated 20.12.2023 passed by the Airports Authority of India, the order dated 21.12.2023 passed by the Court of the Addl. District Judge, Budgam, the order dated 22.07.2024 passed by the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir, the statement given by AAI that the order dated 20.12.2023 be treated as withdrawn and the order passed by the Supreme Court of India.

¶25It was submitted by learned Senior counsel that the impugned orders are, therefore, completely illegal and arbitrary and deserve to be set CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 11 ARGUMENTS (RESPONDENTS)

¶26Per contra, learned Senior counsel representing the respondents, defended the impugned orders with equal vehemence and submitted that the petitioner was raising technical grounds for it had committed an illegality on account of which the licence was cancelled and the petitioner was debarred. Reference was made to Clause 9(b) of the  DNIET  and it was submitted that debarment had already been provided for in the said provision and that the show cause notice talked of action under the provisions of the DNIET and not only about annulment.  Reference was made to the order passed by this Court in CWP No.3401 of 2024 wherein it had been observed that the petitioner would have the liberty to appear before respondent No.3 pursuant to which the petitioner did appear before respondent No.3 and submitted various documents.  It was submitted that since the order dated 02.05.2024 was passed by respondent No.3 after hearing the petitioner in detail, the argument of violation of principles of natural justice does not survive.  It was submitted that even on merits, the entire controversy was fully considered and examined by respondent No.3 and a detailed order was passed.

¶27Learned Senior Counsel submitted that factual aspects and disputed questions of facts could not in any case, be gone into under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that for the said purpose, the petitioner would have to invoke arbitration.   It was submitted that merely because licence was issued to the petitioner would not mean that the complaints had been considered and consigned to record and that even during the pendency of the complaints, nothing stopped the respondents from proceeding further while still examining the complaints. CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 12

¶28As regards the judgment of the Madras High Court, it was submitted that the writ petition had been dismissed on 30.12.2024.  With regard to the order dated 20.12.2023, it was submitted that a review application had been filed by AAI of the order dated 22.02.2024 and vide order dated 18.09.2024, the order dated 22.02.2024 had been stayed.  As regards the previous round of litigation in the Jammu & Kashmir High Court, it was submitted that the Supreme Court of India had left the question open and had not conclusively decided that the debarment order would not apply to the other airports.

¶29It was submitted by learned Senior Counsel that the violation of principles of natural justice could be cured if the appellate/higher body had granted a fair opportunity before deciding the appeal.  Reliance in this regard was placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in ����������� +6����(��������"������������(�������������������������#�%�4�7���0�and the judgment of the Delhi High Court in  � +�������!��2����8�������� ��.��������������..���������#9:2���%'�9��������.����������:��(�3�:���� ���������$5�"���;������4���$�$���

¶30It was further submitted that once the petitioner had chosen to avail the alternative remedy before respondent No.3 wherein all contentions were   raised   and   it   was   duly   granted   an   opportunity   of   hearing   and opportunity to submit fresh documents, the doctrine of election would come into play and the petitioner cannot, in this writ petition, plead about violation of the principles of natural justice.  Reliance was placed upon the judgments of the Supreme Court of India in 7�(��������,����2�����"��������,������ !��1��������������;������#$55�%�5�"�-��.���������������/�'��<��;��1 CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 13 =����������,�����������������.�������������������,���6�(�������� ���� 3�����.����-����������.�������$��"���;������4���//�0�����"�����!��1 �����������������������������"���"���.��#$55�%�&�"�-��.������������� &��.

¶31We have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the paper book. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

¶32Before adverting to the merits of the controversy, it would be apposite to refer to the relevant terms and conditions of the DNIET.  Clause 9 of the DNIET  deals with fraud and corrupt practices and penalties whereas Clause 10 of the DNIET  deals with conflict of interest;

9. F/a42 & Co//4At P/actice% an2 Pena1ty a) E3en if t9e bi22e/ %ati%fie% e3e/y c/ite/ion a% Ae/ t9e g4i2e1ine% %et fo/t9 abo3e, b4t at any %tage 24/ing t9e ten2e/ A/oce%%, o/ afte/ t9e i%%4ance of LOIA to t9e %4cce%%f41 bi22e/, o/ afte/ t9e eCec4tion of conce%%ion ag/ee:ent o/ 24/ing t9e %4b%i%tence t9e/eof, AA1 at it% 2i%c/etion can 2i%>4a1ify t9e bi22e/ o/ te/:inate t9e conce%%ion (a% t9e ca%e :aybe), If t9e bi22e//1icen%ee: i.   9a%   been   2eba//e2   by   any   %tate   o/   cent/a1 go3e/n:ent o/ go3e/n:ent agency In In2ia an2 t9e %a:e i% %4b%i%te2 at t9e ti:e of NIET? o/

ii) 9a% :a2e :i%1ea2ing o/ fa1%e /eA/e%entation in t9e fo/:%, %tate:ent% an2 attac9:ent% %4b:itte2? o/ iii.   t9e   aAA1icant   2oe%   not   /e%Aon2   A/o:At1y   an2 t9o/o4g91y to /e>4e%t% fo/ %4AA1e:enta/y Info/:ation /e>4e%te2 by AAI fo/ t9e e3a14ation of t9e P/oAo%a1? o/ CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 14 i3. One o/ :o/e of t9e e1igibi1ity c/ite/ion 9a3e not been :et by t9e AAA1icant?o/

¶3  T9e   AAA1icant   9a%   :a2e   a   :ate/ia1 :i%/eA/e%entation? o/ 3i. T9e AAA1icant 9a% engage2 in a co//4At, f/a4241ent, coe/ci3e, 4n2e%i/ab1e o/ /e%t/icti3e A/actice, 3ii. T9e aAA1icant o/ it% Affi1iate% o/ a Ae/%on o/ entity 9a3ing 1ega1 /e1ation%9iA Eit9 aAA1icant co::itte2 any f/a42 o/ fo/ge/y by Eay of %4b:i%%ion of any =in2 of 2oc4:ent%/   ban=   g4a/antee/   Sec4/ity   DeAo%it   etc (24/ing t9e ten2e/ A/oce%% an2 t9e/eafte/) Eit9 t9i% o/ any ot9e/ ten2e// cont/act Eit9 Ai/Ao/t% A4t9o/ity of In2ia o/ any PSU o/ Go3e/n:ent DeAa/t:ent% 24/ing t9e 1a%t fi3e (5) yea/%? b) T9en t9e LOIA o/ t9e 2/aft Ag/ee:ent a% t9e ca%e :ay be, %9a11, notEit9%tan2ing anyt9ing to t9e cont/a/y containe2 t9e/ein o/ in t9i% NIET Doc4:ent, be 1iab1e to be te/:inate2 by a co::4nication in E/iting by AAI to t9e agency Eit9o4t AAI being 1iab1e in any :anne/ E9at%oe3e/ to t9e agency. In %4c9 an e3ent, AAI %9a11 fo/feit an2 aAA/oA/iate t9e EMD an2 Pe/fo/:ance Sec4/ity an2 2eba/ t9e agency f/o: AAI ten2e/%-fo/-any-Ae/io2 not %4ccee2ing %4bject to :ini:4: of t9/ee (3) yea/%, a% t9e ca%e :ay be Eit9o4t A/ej42ice to any ot9e/ /ig9t o/ /e:e2y t9at :ay be a3a11ab1e to AAI in t9i% /ega/2. c) If %4c9 an e3ent occ4/% afte/ t9e i%%4ance of LOIA an2 24/ing t9e cont/act Ae/io2, t9en AAI /e%e/3e% t9e /ig9t to CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 15 ta=e any %4c9 :ea%4/e a% :ay be 2ee:e2 fit in t9e %o1e 2i%c/etion of AAI, Inc142ing ann41:ent of t9e cont/act an2 fo/feit4/e of t9e Pe/fo/:ance Sec4/ity a:o4nt. 2) P/oAo%a1% %9a11 be 2ee:e2 to be 4n2e/ con%i2e/ation i::e2iate1y afte/ t9ey a/e oAene2 4nti1 %4c9 ti:e t9at AAI :a=e%   an   officia1   Inti:ation   of   aEa/2//ejection   to   t9e AAA1icant%. W9i1e t9e P/oAo%a1% a/e 4n2e/ con%i2e/ation, AAA1icant% an2/o/ t9ei/ /eA/e%entati3e% o/ ot9e/ inte/e%te2 Aa/tie% a/e a23i%e2 to /ef/ain f/o: contacting, by any :ean%, AAI   an2/o/   t9ei/   e:A1oyee%//eA/e%entati3e%   on   :atte/% /e1ating to t9e P/oAo%a1% 4n2e/ con%i2e/ation.

10. Conf1ict of Inte/e%t: A Bi22e/ %9a11 not 9a3e a conf1ict of inte/e%t (t9e ?Conf1ict of Inte/e%t?) t9at affect t9e Bi22ing A/oce%%. Any Bi22e/ fo4n2 to 9a3e a conf1ict of Inte/e%t %9a11 be 2i%>4a1ifie2. A Bi22e/ %9a11 be 2ee:e2 to 9a3e a Conf1ict of Inte/e%t affecting t9e Bi22ing A/oce%%, if:

¶1 T9e   bi22e/,   o/  it%  Affi1iate  (o/  any   con%tit4ent t9e/eof) an2 any ot9e/ Bi22e/ o/ any Affi11ate t9e/eof (o/ any Con%tit4ent t9e/eof) 9a3e co::on cont/o11ing %9a/e9o12e/% o/ ot9e/ oEne/%9iA inte/e%t: P/o3i2e2 t9at t9i% 2i%>4a1ification %9a11 not aAA1y in ca%e% E9e/e t9e 2i/ect o/ In2i/ect %9a/e9o12ing of a Bi22e/, It% Me:be/ o/ an Affi1iate t9e/eof (o/ any %9a/e9o12e/ t9e/eof) 9a3ing a %9a/e9o12ing of :o/e t9an 20? (tEenty Ae/cent) of t9e agg/egate i%%4e2, %4b%c/ibe2 an2 Aai2 4A %9a/e caAita1 of %4c9 Bi22e/, Me:be/ o/ Affi1iate, (a% t9e ca%e :ay be) in t9e ot9e/ Bi22e/, it% Me:be/ o/ an Affi1iate i% 1e%% t9an 20? CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 16 (tEenty Ae/cent) of t9e agg/egate i%%4e2, %4b%c/ibe2 an2 Aai2 4A e>4ity %9a/e caAita1 t9e/eof, A/o3i2e2 f4/t9e/ t9at t9i% 2i%>4a1ification %9a11 not aAA1y to any oEne/%9iA   by   t9e   A4t9o/ity,   a   ban=,   in%4/ance co:Aany, Aen%ion f4n2 o/ a A4b1ic financia1 in%tit4tion /efe//e2 to in %ection 2(72) of t9e Co:Aanie% Act, 2013? Fo/ t9e A4/Ao%e% of t9i% c1a4%e, In2i/ect %9a/e9o12ing 9e12 t9/o4g9 01(One) a/ :o/e inte/:e2iate Ae/%on% %9a11 be co:A4te2 a% fo11oE%:

(A) E9e/e any inte/:e2ia/y i% cont/o11e2 by a Ae/%on t9/o4g9 :anage:ent cont/o1 o/ ot9e/Ei%e, t9e enti/e %9a/e9o12ing 9e12 by %4c9 cont/o11e2 inte/:e2ia/y in any ot9e/ Ae/%on (t9e ?S4bject Ae/%on?) %9a11 ba ta=en in to acco4nt fo/ co:A4ting t9e %9a/e9o12ing of %4c9 cont/o11ing Ae/%on in t9e %4bject Ae/%on? an2

(B) %4bject a1Eay% to %4b-c1a4%e (A) abo3e, E9e/e a Ae/%on 2oe% not eCe/ci%e cont/o1 o3e/ an Inte/:e2ia/y, E9ic9 9a% %9a/e9o12ing in t9e %4bject Ae/%on, t9e co:A4tation of in2i/ect %9a/e9o12ing of %4c9 Ae/%on in t9e   %4bject   Ae/%on   %9a11   be   4n2e/ta=en   on   a A/oAo/tionate ba%i%, A/o3i2e2, 9oEe3e/, t9at no %4c9 %9a/e9o12ing %9a11 be /ec=one2 4n2e/ t9i% %4b-c1a4%e if t9e %9a/e9o12ing of %4c9 Ae/%on in t9e Inte/:e2ia/y i% 1e%% t9an 26? (tEenty-%iC Ae/cent) of t9e agg/egate i%%4e2, %4b%c/ibe2 an2 Aai2 4A e>4ity %9a/e9o12ing of %4c9 inte/:e2ia/y? o/ ii. a Bi22e//No:inate2 Entity 9a% no:inate2 t9e %a:e No:inate2 Entity o/ No:inate2 Ae/%onne1 a% anot9e/ Bi22e/? o/ CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 17 iii. a con%tit4ent of %4c9 Bi22e/ i% a1%o a con%tit4ent of anot9e/ Bi22e/? o/ i3. %4c9 Bi22e/ o/ any Affi1iate/ t9e/eof /ecei3e%, 9a% /ecei3e2, o/ 9a% ente/e2 into an ag/ee:ent to /ecei3e, any 2i/ect o/ in2i/ect %4b%i2y, g/ant, conce%%iona1 1oan, o/ %4bo/2inate2 2ebt f/o: any ot9e/ Bi22e/, o/ any Affi1iate t9e/eof o/ 9a% A/o3i2e2 o/ 9a% ente/e2 into an ag/ee:ent   to   A/o3i2e   any   %4c9   %4b%i2y,   g/ant, conce%%iona1 1oan o/ %4bo/2inate2 2ebt to any ot9e/ Bi22e/, it% Me:be/ o/ any Affi1iate t9e/eof? o/

3. %4c9 Bi22e/ 9a% t9e %a:e 1ega1 /eA/e%entati3e fo/ A4/Ao%e% of a Bi2 a% any ot9e/ Bi22e/? o/ 3i.   %4c9   Bi22e/   o/   any   Affi1iate   t9e/eof,   9a%   a /e1ation%9iA   Eit9   anot9e/   Bi22e/   o/   any  Affi1iate t9e/eof, 2i/ect1y o/ in2i/ect1y o/ t9/o4g9 a co::on t9i/2 Aa/ty/ Aa/tie%, t9at A4t% eit9e/ o/ bot9 of t9e: in a Ao%ition to 9a3e acce%% to eac9 ot9e/'% Info/:ation, o/ to inf14ence t9e Bi2 of eit9e/ o/ eac9 ot9e/? o/ %4c9 Bi22e/ o/ any Affi1iate t9e/eof, 9a% Aa/ticiAate2 a% a con%41tant to t9e A4t9o/ity in t9e A/eAa/ation of any 2oc4:ent%, 2e%ign o/ tec9nica1 %Aecification% of t9e A/oject. ECA1anation: In ca%e a Bi22e/ i% a Con%o/ti4:, t9en t9e te/: Bi22e/ a% 4%e2 in t9i% C1a4%e %9a11 inc142e eac9 Me:be/ of %4c9 Con%o/ti4: an2 t9e te/: Affi1iate Eit9 /e%Aect to CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 18 a Bi22e/ %9a11 inc142e an Affi1iate of eac9 Me:be/ of t9at Con%o/ti4:. Note: Rega/2ing conf1ict of inte/e%t, AAI %9a11 A1ace /e1iance 4Aon   t9e   2ec1a/ation   to   be   %4b:itte2   by   t9e bi22e//aAA1icant in t9e fo/: of acceAtance of AAI'% ten2e/ con2ition%/ot9e/ 2oc4:ent% fo/:ing Aa/t of tec9nica1 bi2%. In   t9e   e3ent,   t9e   2ec1a/ation   %4b:itte2   by   t9e bi22e//aAA1icant toEa/2% t9e/e being no conf1ict o/ inte/e%t,   i%   fo4n2   inco//ect/fa1%e,   %4c9   inco//ect 2ec1a/ation   Eo412   be   t/eate2   a%   %4b:i%%ion   of fa1%e/inco//ect   2oc4:ent   an2   it   Eo412   a:o4nt   to :ate/ia1   :i%/eA/e%entation   :a2e   by   t9e bi22e//aAA1icant.  In %4c9 e3ent, A4niti3e action% %9a11 be   ta=en   by   AAI   a%   Ae/   A/o3i%ion   of   ten2e/ 2oc4:ent%/1icence ag/ee:ent.? A perusal of Clause 9 (b) of the DNIET  shows that the letter of intent or the agreement would be liable to be terminated in terms of the provisions of Clause 9 (a) of the DNIET and in such an event, the EMD and performance security would be liable to be forfeited and the agency would be liable to be debarred from AAI tenders for a period of minimum of three years. Clause 10 of the DNIET which deals with conflict of interest lays down that a bidder shall not have a conflict of interest that affects the bidding process and that any bidder found to have a conflict of interest would be disqualified.  The CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 19 clause then goes on to explain as to when a bidder would be deemed to have a conflict of interest.

¶33Clause 29 of the Terms & Conditions in Appendix 1 of the licence deals with Dispute Resolution; "(29) A11 2i%A4te% an2 2iffe/ence% a/i%ing o4t of o/ in any Eay to4c9ing o/ conce/ning t9i% Ag/ee:ent (eCceAt t9e%e t9e 2eci%ion   E9e/eof   i%   ot9e/Ei%e   9e/ein   befo/e   eCA/e%%1y A/o3i2e2 fo/ o/ to E9ic9 t9e AAI ACT, 1994 an2 t9e /41e% f/a:e2 t9e/e-4n2e/ E9ic9 a/e noE enfo/ce o/ E9ic9 :ay 9e/e-afte/ co:e into fo/ce a/e aAA1icab1e), %9a11, in t9e fi/%t in%tance, be /efe//e2 to a Di%A4te Re%o14tion Co::ittee

(DRC) %et4A at t9e ai/Ao/t%, fo/ E9ic9 a E/itten aAA1ication %9o412 be obtaine2 f/o: t9e Aa/ty an2 t9e Aoint% c1ea/1y %Ae1t o4t. In ca%e t9e 2i%A4te i% not /e%o13e2 Eit9in 45 2ay% of /efe/ence,   t9en   t9e   ca%e   %9a11   be   /efe//e2   to   t9e   %o1e a/bit/ation of a Ae/%on to be aAAointe2 by t9e C9ai/:an / Me:be// RED of t9e A4t9o/ity. T9e aEa/2 of t9e a/bit/ato/ %o aAAointe2 %9a11 be fina1 an2 bin2ing on t9e Aa/tie%. T9e A/bit/ation & Conci1iation Act 1996 a% a:en2e2 4A to 2ate %9a11 be aAA1icab1e. Once t9e a/bit/ation c1a4%e 9a% been in3o=e2, t9e DRC A/oce%% Ei11 cea%e to be oAe/ati3e. It Ei11 be no ba/ t9at t9e A/bit/ato/ aAAointe2 a% afo/e%ai2 i% o/ 9a% been an e:A1oyee of t9e A4t9o/ity an2 t9e aAAoint:ent of t9e A/bit/ato/ Ei11 not be c9a11enge2 o/ be oAen to >4e%tion in any Co4/t of LaE, on t9i% acco4nt. Befo/e :a=ing a /efe/ence to Di%A4te Re%o14tion Co::ittee, t9e 1icen%ee Ei11 9a3e to fi/%t 2eAo%it 50? of t9e 2i%A4te2 a:o4nt in t9e fo/: of BG (a22itiona1 Ban= G4a/antee Eit9 3a1i2ity of :ini:4: tEo (2) yea/% f/o: t9e 2ate of :a=ing /efe/ence to DRC, an2 f4/t9e/ eCten2ab1e) /DD/PO/NEFT Eit9 AAI an2 t9e con%ent %9a11 be gi3en by t9e 1icen%ee fo/ CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 20 acceAtance   of   t9e   /eco::en2ation%   of   t9e   Di%A4te Re%o14tion Co::ittee. T9e ca%e %9a11 be /efe//e2 to t9e %o1e A/bit/ato/ by t9e C9ai/:an / Me:be/ / RED of t9e A4t9o/ity, %4bject to t9e con2ition t9at t9e 1icen%ee %9a11 9a3e to 2eAo%it 50? of t9e 2i%A4te2   a:o4nt   in   t9e   fo/:   of   BG   (a22itiona1   Ban= G4a/antee Eit9 3a1i2ity of :ini:4: tEo (2) yea/% f/o: t9e 2ate of :a=ing %4c9 /efe/ence, an2 f4/t9e/ eCten2ab1e) / DD/PO/RTGS/NEFT Eit9 AAI a% con2ition A/ece2ent befo/e :a=ing /efe/ence to t9e A/bit/ation fo/ a2j42ication of 2i%A4te.?

¶34Coming to the communication dated 30.11.2022 (AnneC4/e P-4) only a reply dated 05.12.2022 (AnneC4/e P-5) was submitted on account of the receipt of complaints against the petitioner and clarification was sought on five issues.   After the award of the licence, show cause notice dated

05.06.2023 (AnneC4/e P-10) was issued wherein the petitioner was called upon to explain as to why action should not be taken against it on the grounds of conflict of interest and material representation.  It would be relevant to mention here that the action referred to in Clause 9 (b) of the  DNIET was of termination of the licence and debarment.  It is, therefore, difficult to accept that there was no show cause notice as regards debarment.  Be that as it may, orders dated 08.08.2023 were initially challenged by way of CWP No. 17635 of 2023 which was eventually withdrawn on 16.08.2023 with liberty to approach respondent No.3 in terms of Clause 29 of the Terms & Conditions in Appendix 1 of the licence; "Lea/ne2 Senio/ co4n%e1 fo/ t9e Aetitione/, afte/ a/g4ing at 1engt9, A/ay% fo/ an2 i% Ae/:itte2 to Eit92/aE t9e Aetition CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 21 Eit9   1ibe/ty   to   t9e   Aetitione/  to   aAA/oac9   t9e   Di%A4te Re%o14tion Co::ittee (DRC) 4n2e/ c1a4%e 29 of t9e Gene/a1 Te/:% an2 Con2ition% of t9e ag/ee:ent. Lea/ne2 %enio/ co4n%e1, ente/ing aAAea/ance on be9a1f of t9e /e%Aon2ent%, on a23ance coAy, %4b:it% t9at in ca%e, t9e Aetitione/ 2oe% %o, t9e Co::ittee %9a11 1oo= into t9e :atte/ an2 ta=e a 2eci%ion t9e/ein eCAe2itio4%1y. Di%:i%%e2 a% Eit92/aEn Eit9 t9e 1ibe/ty A/aye2 fo/.?

¶35Pursuant   to   this,   order   dated   27.01.2024   was   passed   by respondent No.3 vide which the orders dated 08.08.2023 were upheld.  For this order was non-speaking, CWP No.3401 of 2024 was filed by the petitioner wherein a statement was given by the respondents that the order be treated as withdrawn and that a fresh order would be passed after hearing the petitioner; "A ce/tio/a/i i% A/aye2 fo/, to >4a%9 t9e o/2e/ 2ate2

08.08.2023 (P-1), 3i2e E9ic9 t9e Aetitione/ (M/% SaAtagi/i Re%ta4/ant P3t. Lt2.) 9a% been 2eba//e2 f/o: Aa/ticiAating in t9e ten2e/% f1oate2 by t9e Ai/Ao/t% A4t9o/ity of In2ia (/e%Aon2ent No.1), fo/ a Ae/io2 of t9/ee (03) yea/%. An2 a1%o t9e o/2e/ of an e3en 2ate (P-2) by E9ic9 1icence fo/ We11ne%% Cent/e/SAa  an2 Ma%%age  C9ai/ Faci1ity  in%i2e Do:e%tic Sec4/ity Ho12 A/ea a% a1%o t9e Inte/nationa1 Sec4/ity Ho12 A/ea   at   SGRDJI   Ai/Ao/t,   A:/it%a/,   9a%   %ince   been te/:inate2, Eit9 i::e2iate effect. T9e   Aetitione/   being   agg/ie3e2   9a2   e3en   ea/1ie/ aAA/oac9e2 t9i% Co4/t 3i2e CWP No.17635 of 2023, E9ic9 Ea% 2i%Ao%e2 of on A4g4%t 16, 2023, to enab1e t9e Aetitione/ to in3o=e t9e 2i%A4te /e%o14tion :ec9ani%: en3i%age2 4n2e/ c1a4%e 29 of t9e  Gene/a1  Te/:%  an2 Con2ition% of t9e Cont/act. W9e/eafte/, t9e a4t9o/itie% 9a3e Aa%%e2 a f/e%9 CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 22 o/2e/ 2ate2 Jan4a/y 27, 2024 (P-4), affi/:ing t9e ea/1ie/ o/2e/% 2ate2 08.08.2023 (ibi2). T94%, t9i% Aetition. Afte/ Ee 9a2 i%%4e2 notice to t9e /e%Aon2ent%, an affi2a3it 2ate2 23.02.2024 9a% been fi1e2 by M%. Ha/:anjote 5a4/,   In-c9a/ge   (Co::1.),   S/i   G4/4   Ra:   Da%%   Jee Inte/nationa1 Ai/Ao/t, A:/it%a/. An2, t9e a3e/:ent% %et o4t in Aa/a 4 /ea2% a% t94%: "T9at  t9e   i:A4gne2  o/2e/  Aa%%e2   by   DRC  2ate2

27.01.2024 (AnneC4/e P-4) be t/eate2 a% Eit92/aEn an2 t9e 2i%A4te Re%o14tion Co::ittee (Re%Aon2ent No.3) Eo412 Aa%% a f/e%9 /ea%one2 o/2e/ afte/ ta=ing into con%i2e/ation a11 t9e /e1e3ant 2oc4:ent% Eit9in a Ae/io2 of 10 2ay%.? Acco/2ing1y,   1ea/ne2   Senio/   co4n%e1   fo/   t9e /e%Aon2ent% %4b:it%, fo/ t9e i:A4gne2 o/2e/ 2ate2 Jan4a/y 27, 2024 (P-4) %tan2% Eit92/aEn, t9e Di%A4te Re%o14tion Co::ittee (DRC), afte/ t9e Aetitione/ i% 9ea/2, %9a11 Aa%% t9e   o/2e/%   af/e%9.   T9e/efo/e,   9e   %4b:it%   t9at   1et   t9e Aetitione/ aAAea/ befo/e t9e Co::ittee (/e%Aon2ent No.3) on

23.04.2024 ? 11:00 a: at t9e Ai/Ao/t it%e1f.  F4/t9e/, t9e Aetitione/ %9a11 a1%o be at 1ibe/ty to %4AAo/t/%4AA1e:ent it% c1ai: by f4/ni%9ing any f/e%9 :ate/ia1/2oc4:ent%, inc142ing t9e 2eci%ion% /en2e/e2 by t9e Hon'b1e Ma2/a% Hig9 Co4/t, 2ate2 09.08.2023 (P-20) a% a1%o by Hon'b1e Hig9 Co4/t of Ja::4   an2   5a%9:i/   an2   La2a=9   at   S/inaga/,   2ate2

13.10.2023 (P-22), on t9e aAAointe2 2ate it%e1f, if %o a23i%e2. W9ic9 %9a11 be ta=en cogni?ance of by t9e DRC befo/e Aa%%ing aAA/oA/iate o/2e/%, a% in2icate2 abo3e. T9at being %o, 1ea/ne2 Senio/ co4n%e1 fo/ t9e Aetitione/ %4b:it% t9at 1et t9i% Aetition be 2i%Ao%e2 of in t9e Ea=e of t9e affi2a3it, /efe//e2 to abo3e, an2 t9e %tate:ent :a2e by 1ea/ne2 Senio/ co4n%e1 fo/ t9e /e%Aon2ent%. HoEe3e/, 9e CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 23 %4b:it% t9at t9e :atte/ being ti:e %en%iti3e, t9e a4t9o/itie% be 2i/ecte2 to Aa%% t9e fo/:a1 o/2e/% Eit9in a %Aecifie2 ti:e. To E9ic9, 1ea/ne2 Senio/ co4n%e1 fo/ t9e /e%Aon2ent% fai/1y %4b:it%, an2 a% in2icate2 in t9e affi2a3it it%e1f, t9e DRC %9a11 Aa%% t9e fina1 o/2e/%, afte/ t9e Aetitione/ aAAea/% befo/e t9e Co::ittee on 23.04.2024, Eit9in a Ae/io2 of 10 2ay%, i.e. on o/ befo/e 02.05.2024.? In t9e Ea=e of t9e Ao%ition %=etc9e2 o4t abo3e, an2 in te/:% of t9e %tate:ent% :a2e by 1ea/ne2 co4n%e1 fo/ t9e Aa/tie%, t9e Aetition %tan2% 2i%Ao%e2 of. T9i%   Co4/t   i%   %ang4ine   t9at   t9e   Co::ittee   %9a11 con%i2e/ t9e :atte/ in t9e /ig9t ea/ne%t. An2 Aa%% t9e nece%%a/y o/2e/% Eit9in t9e ti:e in2icate2 by 1ea/ne2 Senio/ co4n%e1 fo/ t9e /e%Aon2ent%. Nee21e%% to a%%e/t t9at t9i% o/2e/ %9a11 not con%tit4te any eCA/e%%ion of oAinion on t9e :e/it% of t9e ca%e of eit9e/ Aa/ty,  fo/, a% in2icate2 abo3e, t9e Co::ittee %9a11 eCa:ine t9e   conce/n%/g/ie3ance%   of   t9e   Aetitione/,   %t/ict1y   in acco/2ance Eit9 1aE.?

¶36Eventually, the impugned order dated 02.05.2024 was passed before which a detailed representation dated 23.04.2024 (Annexure P-26) alongwith a number of documents was submitted by the petitioner before respondent No.3.  Certain other communications (Annexures P-27 to P-29) also ensued between the parties and finally the order dated 02.05.2024 was passed by respondent No.3.  A bare perusal of this order shows that the same is a detailed order wherein the allegations, the previous proceedings, the orders passed by different High Courts, the validity of the orders dated

08.08.2023  and all other aspects were duly gone into and eventually the orders dated 08.08.2023 were upheld.  The order runs into 09 pages and is  an CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 2* extremely detailed order dealing with all relevant aspects. In the considered opinion of this Court, after the passing of this order, it would not at all be open for the petitioner to submit that there was violation of the principles of natural justice. It becomes manifestly clear that this argument is being raised since there appears to be no argument on merits. The impugned order shows a clear cut modus operandi adopted by the petitioner while participating in the tenders thereby committing fraud and corrupt practices and also having a conflict of interest as stated under Clauses 9 and 10 of the DNIET referred to in the preceding paragraphs. The petitioner committed gross illegalities and misrepresentations while participating in the tenders thereby leading to the termination of the agreement and its debarment. When one goes through the show cause notices placed on record, the response submitted by the petitioner, the orders of termination and debarment and finally the impugned order dated 02.05.2024 passed by respondent No.3, there remains not even an iota of doubt in the mind of this Court that the orders dated 08.08.2023 and the order dated 02.05.2024 are perfectly legal and valid and do no call for any interference. Though, as has been observed previously, the order dated

02.05.2024 is a detailed order running into 09 pages, it would be essential to refer to certain parts of the same. "M/s SRPL challenged the decision taken by the Committee by filing writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana by filing a Writ Petition numbered as CWP No.3041 of 2024. The Hon'ble High Court vide its order dated: 20.04.2024 disposed of the writ petition by directing the Committee (DRC) to pass a fresh order on or before 02.05.2024. M/s SRPL was directed to appear before the Committee (DRC) on 23.04.2024. M/s SRPL appeared CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 25 before the Committee (DRC) on 23.04.2024 and submitted the following documents.

1. The revised shareholding pattern of M/s  Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. as on 31.03.2023 along with other documents;   Board   of   Resolution   dated   25.05.2022,   Gift Deeds dt. 20.06.2022, Form No.SH-1 SH-4.

2. Judgement dt. 09.08.2023 of Hon'ble Madras High Court (WP No.23446/2023)

3. Judgement dt. 06.10.2023 pronounced on 13.10.2023 of FAO   No.24/2023   of   Hon'ble   High   Court   of   Jammu   & Kashmir and Ladakh upholding the Order dt. 08.09.2023 of District Court of Budgam (CNR No. JKBG020013342023).

4. Court Order 20.04.2024 of Hon'ble High Court Punjab & Haryana (CWP-3041/2024)

¶5  Copy   of   License   issued   by   Delhi   Pollution   Control Committee (DPCC)

6. Copy of letter dated 05.06.2016 issued to M/s Syona SPA

¶7  Copy   of   letter  dated   08.08.2022   for  terminating   the services   of   Sh.   Karan   Singh  from  M/s   SRP  and   other documents."

¶37It was held by the DRC that the debarment and annulment orders passed by the Airport Director, Amritsar had been passed after taking approval from the competent authority and, therefore, the same would be considered as orders passed by the Airports Authority of India.   The CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 26 submissions as regards the share holding in  M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Private Limited was also noticed; "Considering the above facts, the Committee (DRC) is of the view that the debarment and annulment order passed by the Airport Director, Amritsar Airport has been passed after taking approval from the competent authority and thus the orders  dated  08.06.2023  would  be  considered  as   orders passed Airports Authority of India, therefore, the judgments ?uoted by M/s SRPL are different. The other submission made by M/s SRPL is that its share-holding in M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. was less than the cut off as per the tender document. M/s SRPL has placed certain documents on the file along-with its written submissions. The tender was issued on 05.09.2022 and the last date for submission was 03.10.2022. It has been observed that   such   documents   regarding   change   in   shareholding pattern, gift deeds were not submitted by the party at the time   of   show   cause   notice   isued   by  AAI,  Amritsar  on

05.06.2023."

¶38As regards the issue of Karan Singh being an employee of the petitioner and  M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Private Limited as also the involvement of M/s Syona Spa, respondent No.3 held as under:- "OBSERVATIONS OF DRC: 1) The above submissions of Sh. Karan Singh read with his earlier submission made on 12.04.2023 shows that he was an employee of M/s Saptagiri Restaurant Pvt. Ltd. as well as M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. and his services were dispensed with M/s SRPL in August, 2022 and was continuing with M/s Mahesh Sunny Pvt. Ltd. but later on, CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 27 the submissions were revised/changed by Sh. Karan Singh in his letter dated 16.06.2023 stating that when he resumed his office recently, came to know that his services have also been discontinued by M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. prior to August, 2022. 2) The above, submissions shows that Sh. Karan Singh was misleading AAI by changing his submissions from time to time. 3) If the bid is visible in CPP e-tenders government portal, this means the bidder has submitted both technical and financial bids as mere submission of technical bid only will not close the bid process.  This means the party M/s Syona Spa has completed the entire bid process on CPP portal only then the bid is visible to bid manager after technical opening. 4) Funds e?uivalent to six months license fees along with 01 month advance license fees are only re?uired if the party comes as H1 i.e. after award of license.  The party has shown same intention for above 07 tenders (02 of instant tenders of Amritsar airport).  Moreover, there is an option to withdraw the bid in CPP portal and as per tender conditions also which has not been exercised by M/s Syona Spa depicting malafide/corrupt   intentions   of   the   party   in   the   tender processes.  The beneficiary of such conduct of M/s Syona Spa is M/s SRPL. 5) The fact that the services of Sh. Karan Singh were discontinued   by   M/s   SRPL   and   M/s   Mahesh   Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. but M/s Syona Spa participated in all the tenders wherein M/s SRPL was also one of the bidder during the period Mid July to October end (2022) infers that both   the   bidders   were   having   access   to   each   other CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 28 infor!ation and reply to show  auses are =ust an after thoughts.

¶39As regards the share holding of Bikram Singh, etc. and the conflict of interest issue, it was held as under:- "OBSERVATIONS OF DRC: 1) No documentary evidence on shareholding of Sh. Bikram Singh in M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. was submitted on the date of reply of show cause was provided. As per documents submitted by the party in the DRC process, it can be seen that there has been major change in the distribution of shares in M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. in respect of shares of Sh. Bikram Singh. It is the responsibility of party /Director Sh. Bikram Singh to have presented the documents related to Gift deed at the time of show-cause notice. Mere submission of statement that "it is a matter of record" cannot be taken into consideration as per records submitted at later stage the party had a major change in shareholding pattern in the months of May to July 2022. 2) Considering the fact that a mistake was done by official of M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. in depositing EPF and ESI of Sh. Karan Singh for near about 10 months i.e. from the month of termination of services prior to August 2022 till the month of June 2023 cannot be considered a mere mistake but a pre-conceived after-thought to come out of the grounds of conflict of interest. 3) Further, the statement provided by M/s SRPL that "it appears from the response dated 12.04.2023 of Sh. Karan Singh, as received now through your office that … as M/s CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 23 Syona Spa or Sh. Karan Singh cannot be said to be bidder..." false as per bid procedure of CPP portal (e-tenders), the bidders get the information automatically regarding the bids submitted along with details of bidders when the bid manager opens the technical bids of the tenders. 4) Also, only after submitting of tender fees, EMD, documents of technical bid and financial bid BOQ (rate quote), the bid gets completed and the system accepts the bids and then the further process is carried out. 5) DRC has also observed that M/s Syona Spa has opted for similar process in tenders for Raipur and Pune wherein M/s SRPL was also one of the bidder. As the information regarding bidders become visible on CPP portal instantly after opening of technical bids by bid managers, the reason that M/s SRPL has not highlighted to AAI the malafide intentions of M/s Syona Spa to affect the bidding process can be considered as the fact that both the bidders were working closely in the bid processes having the access of each other's information in respect to the bid submission. The DRC has also observed that the address of all the three firms in question is same i.e. L-322 MAHIPALPUR EXTENS, NEW DELHI 110037. It has also come to light that the address of M/s Syona SPA (L-73/L-322, Mahipalpur Extension, New Delhi) and M/s Saptagiri Restaurant Pvt. Ltd. (L-322, Mahipalpur Extension, New Delhi) are in the same premises. In this regard, the reference has been taken into the account from the letter dated 06.05.2016 issued by M/s SRPL confirming the address L-73 and L-322, Ist Floor, CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 30 Hotel Saptagiri, Mahipalpur Extn. National Highway No.08, New Delhi-110034 (unit of Satpagiri Restaurant Pvt. Ltd.)."

¶40Finally it was concluded by respondent No.3-DRC as under:- "Thus in the light of facts discussed above, it can be reasonably inferred that M/s SRPL (one bidder) has relationship with M/s Syona Spa (Sh. Karan Singh-Prop.) (another bidder) directly or indirectly or through M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. (a common third party) that puts either or both of tghem in a position to have access to each other's information, or to influence the bid of either or each other which means conflict of interest as per tender conditions. DRC is of the view that the documents submitted by the party were created after participation in the tender and were presented before this forum for the purpose of misleading and to obtain a favourable order. Thus, DRC comes to the conclusion that the orders dated 08.08.2023 passed by Airport Director, Amritsar Airport by which M/s SRPL was debarred and license was annulled, would remain valid."

¶41It is, therefore, clear that respondent No.3 examined the matter from all angles after giving due opportunity of hearing to all stake holders and thereafter passed the order under challenge.

¶42Let us now examine to what extent, in exercise of the power of judicial review, this Court would interfere in the impugned order/s. CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 31

¶43It would be essential to bear in mind that challenge to policy decisions, administrative action, issuance of tenders, holding of auctions, sale of plots, resumption proceedings have all been raked up before the Courts on various occasions. The question which fell for consideration before the Supreme Court of India and various high Courts in these kind of litigations was as to whether policy decisions, administrative actions etc. can be interfered with exercising the power of judicial review or as to whether the Courts were to refrain from doing so. Though there are a catena of judgments on the subject, reference to few of them would be noteworthy. In the case of Jagdish Mandal versus State of Orissa and others 2007 (14) SCC 517, the Supreme Court of India was seized of a challenge to the award of construction contracts to one Jagdish Mandal and Laxmi Sharma. The High Court of Orissa had allowed the writ petition filed by the unsuccessful bidder after which the matter reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of India examined the scope of interference in judicial review of tender processes and award of contracts. While referring to various judgments on the subject, the Supreme Court of India held that judicial review of administration action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. It was held that its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made lawfully and not to check whether choice or decision is sound. It was held that when the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. It was held that a contract is a commercial transaction and evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. The Supreme Court of India laid down that CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 32 the principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance and that if the decision relating to the award of a contract is bona fide and is in public interest, Courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural abberation or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer is made out. It was held that the power of judicial review would not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest or to decide contractual disputes. It was held that attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade Courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review should be resisted. It was held that such interferences, whether interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. It was held that under the circumstances, before interfering in such matters in exercise of the power of judicial review, a Court should pose to itself the questions whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or is intended to favour someone and that whether the public interest is affected; "19. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and malafides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made 'lawfully' and not to check whether choice or decision is 'sound'. When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 33 contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of Page 0102 power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions :

i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone. OR Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say : 'the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached.' CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 3*

ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving black-listing or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of state largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action.

¶44In the case of Silppi Constructions Contractors versus Union of India and Anr. Etc. Etc. 2020 (16) SCC 489 also the Supreme Court of India referred to the judgments on the subject and held as under:-

¶19This Court being the guardian of fundamental rights is duty bound to interfere when there is arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides and bias. However, this Court in all the aforesaid decisions has cautioned time and again that courts should exercise a lot of restraint while exercising their powers of judicial review in contractual or commercial matters. This Court is normally loathe to interfere in contractual matters unless a clear-cut case of arbitrariness or mala fides or bias or irrationality is made out. One must remember that today many public sector undertakings compete with the private industry. The contracts entered into between private parties are not subject to scrutiny under writ jurisdiction. No doubt, the bodies which are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution are bound to act fairly and are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of superior courts but this discretionary power must be exercised with a great deal of restraint and caution. The Courts must realise their limitations and the havoc which needless interference in commercial matters can cause. In CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 3) contracts involving technical issues the courts should be even more reluctant because most of us in judges' robes do not have the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon technical issues beyond our domain. As laid down in the judgments cited above the courts should not use a magnifying glass while scanning the tenders and make every small mistake appear like a big blunder. In fact, the courts must give "fair play in the joints" to the government and public sector undertakings in matters of contract. Courts must also not interfere where such interference will cause unnecessary loss to the public exchequer.

¶20The essence of the law laid down in the judgments referred to above is the exercise of restraint and caution; the need for overwhelming public interest to justify judicial intervention in matters of contract involving the state instrumentalities; the courts should give way to the opinion of the experts unless the decision is totally arbitrary or unreasonable; the court does not sit like a court of appeal over the appropriate authority; the court must realise that the authority floating the tender is the best judge of its requirements and, therefore, the court's interference should be minimal. The authority which floats the contract or tender, and has authored the tender documents is the best judge as to how the documents have to be interpreted. If two interpretations are possible then the interpretation of the author must be accepted. The courts will only interfere to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, mala fides or perversity. With this approach in mind we shall deal with the present case. The Supreme Court of India, therefore, held that the Courts, being the guardian of fundamental rights would be duty bound to interfere when there is arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides and bias. It was held that in all the CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 3: judgments referred to by the Supreme Court of India, the Courts had been cautioned time and again that they should exercise a lot of restraint while exercising their powers of judicial review in contractual or commercial matters and that the Courts are normally loathe to interfere in contractual matters unless a clear-cut case of arbitrariness or mala fides or bias or irrationality is made out. It was held that the Courts must realize their limitations and the havoc which needless interference in commercial matters can cause. It was held that in matters involving technical issues, the Courts should be even more reluctant because most of us in Judges' robes do not have the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon technical issues beyond our domain. It was held that the Courts should not use a magnifying glass while scanning tenders and make every small mistake appear like a big blunder. It was held that infact, the Courts must give 'fair play in the joints' to the Government and public undertakings in matters of contract and must also not interfere where such interference will cause unnecessary loss to the public exchequer. It was held that the essence of the law laid down in the judgments which had been rendered from time to time is the exercise of restraint and caution; the need for overwhelming public interest to justify judicial intervention in matters of contract involving the State instrumentalities; the Courts should give way to the opinion of the experts unless the decision is totally arbitrary or unreasonable. It was held that the Court does not sit like a Court of appeal over the appropriate authority and must realize that the authority concerned is the best judge of its requirements and, therefore, interference of the Courts should be minimal. It was held that if two interpretations are possible, then the interpretation of the author must be CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 3; accepted and that the Courts will only interfere to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, mala fides or perversity.

¶45Very recently, the Supreme Court of India took a similar view in the case of State of Punjab and others versus Mehardin 2022 (5) SCC 648 and while referring to the cases of Jagdish Mandal versus State of Orissa and others and Silppi Constructions Contractors versus Union of India and Anr. Etc. Etc. (supra) as also the judgment in the case of TATA Cellular versus Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 reiterated the view.

¶46Most recently, while examining the challenge to the central vista project in the case of Rajeev Suri Versus Delhi Development Authority 2022

(11) SCC 1, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India examined the scope of judicial review of an Administrative or so to say quasi legislative action. It was held that the rule of law as accepted and settled in India, with regard to judicial interference in administrative and executive or policy matters is no more res integra. It was held that the duty enjoined upon the judiciary is to ensure checks and balances and to place itself between the Government and citizens when they come face to face in a Court of law and that it is meant to act as an equalizer and ensure that the flow of decisions from executive to citizens is overseen through the prism of well-established principles, as and when called upon to do so. It was held that the judicial organ is not meant to impose the citizens' or even its own version of good governance upon the Government in the name of Rule of Law in exercise of its power of judicial review.

¶47The Apex Court examined the issue threadbare starting from observations made by Lord Brightman in the case of Chief Constable of the CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 38 North Wales Police v. Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155 to the observations of the Supreme Court of India in the case of TATA Cellular versus Union of India (supra), the observations made by Graham Aldus and John Alder in their book 'Applications for Judicial Review, Law and Practice' and while examining the need for heightened judicial review, the Supreme Court of India declined to interfere in the Central Vista Project and held as under:- "167. To sum up the above discussion, it may be noted that judicial review primarily involves a review of State action - legislative, executive, administrative and policy. The primary examination in a review of a legislative action is the existence of power with the legislature to legislate on a particular subject matter. For this purpose, we often resort to doctrines of pith and substance, harmonious construction, territorial nexus etc. Once the existence of power is not in dispute, it is essentially an enquiry under Article 13 of the Constitution which enjoins the State to not violate any of the provisions of Part-III in a lawmaking function. The review of executive action would depend upon the precise nature of the action. For, the domain of executive is wide and is generally understood to take within its sweep all residuary functions of the State. Thus, the precise scope of review would depend on the decision and the subject matter. For instance, an action taken under a statute must be in accordance with the statute and would be checked on the anvil of ultra vires the statutory or constitutional parameters. The enquiry must also ensure that the executive action is within the scope of executive powers earmarked for State Governments and Union Government respectively in the constitutional scheme. The scope of review of a pure administrative action is well settled. Since generally individuals are directly involved in such action, the Court concerns itself with the sacred principles of natural justice - audi altrem partem, speaking orders, CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 33 absence of bias etc. The enquiry is also informed by the Wednesbury principles of unreasonableness. The review of a policy decision entails a limited enquiry. As noted above, second guessing by the Court or substitution of judicial opinion on what would constitute a better policy is strictly excluded from the purview of this enquiry. Under the constitutional scheme, the government/executive is vested with the resources to undertake necessary research, studies, dialogue and expert consultation and accordingly, a pure policy decision is not interfered with in an ordinary manner. The burden is heavy to demonstrate a manifest illegality or arbitrariness or procedural lapses in the culmination of the policy decision. However, the underlying feature of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution must inform all enquiries of State action by the constitutional Court."

¶48As regards the argument that the debarment order would apply only to the Amritsar International Airport for the same had been issued by the Airport Director of the Amritsar International Airport, it has to be noticed that respondent No.3 in its order has duly observed that the said order was passed after due approval from the competent authority. Be that as it may, we do not wish to go into the issue at this stage for wherever the petitioner is being debarred on the basis of the orders under challenge in this petition, the petitioner is invoking the jurisdiction of the Courts concerned as would be evident from the orders passed by the District Court, Budgam, the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and the High Court of Madras. This Court is essentially concerned with the legality of the orders under challenge. Still further, it has also come on record that an order dated 20.12.2023 had also been passed by the Airports Authority of India debarring the petitioner across CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) *0 the country but subsequently a statement was given before the Jammu & Kashmir High Court that the same had been withdrawn and accordingly order dated 22.02.2024 had been passed by the Jammu & Kashmir High Court. However, during the course of arguments, it was stated that a review petition had been filed against the said order dated 22.02.2024 and vide order dated

18.09.2024, the order dated 22.02.2024 had been stayed. As regards the writ petition filed in the Madras High Court, the same was stated to have been dismissed on 30.09.2024. It would be essential to state here that these facts were stated by learned counsel representing the respondents and were not denied by learned counsel representing the petitioner. Even otherwise, once the terms and conditions of the tenders being floated across the country are not before this Court, it would not be possible for this Court to lay down as to whether the petitioner is being rightly debarred at other places or not.

¶49The argument that the impugned order had travelled beyond the purview of the show cause notice dated 08.06.2023 is also devoid of merit because when the parties appeared before respondent No.3, a number of additional documents were submitted before it and respondent No.3 examined the matter threadbare and then decided the same. The petitioner was given due opportunity to present its case and to produce documents and was duly heard. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the impugned order dated 02.05.2024 has travelled beyond the purview of the show cause notice dated 08.06.2023. The argument that no show cause notice for debarment had been issued is also devoid of merit. Firstly, Clause 9(a) of the DNIET duly lays down that an order of debarment can be passed under certain conditions which have also been enumerated therein. Still CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) *1 further, as has been observed in the preceding paragraphs, the parties had been relegated to the DRC-respondent No.3 and a detailed order, as has been noticed in the preceding paragraphs also was passed by respondent No.3 after giving due opportunity of hearing and, therefore, it cannot be said that there was no show cause notice before passing of the debarment order. Infact, here, the no prejudice theory would come in and it can safely be held that once the matter was examined threadbare by respondent No.3, no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the petitioner even if there was no show cause notice before the passing of the initial debarment order dated

08.08.2024.

¶50The argument that since the licence had been granted to the petitioner after reply to the complaints had been filed meaning thereby that the complaints had not been found to be having merit by the respondents is devoid of merit and is rejected. Merely because the licence had been awarded to the petitioner does not mean that the respondents had consigned the complaints to record having found them to be devoid of merit. This argument is too far fetched to be even considered and is accordingly rejected.

¶51We have gone through the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the parties.

¶52As regards the judgments, reliance upon which was placed by learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner, the judgment in Rajender Contractor versus State of Haryana and others (supra) would not apply for in that case no show cause notice had been issued prior to the issuance of a debarment order whereas the said issue has been discussed in detail with regard to the facts of this case which are totally different. For the same CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) *2 reasons, the judgments in Kulja Industries Ltd. versus Chief General Manager W.P. Proj. BSNL and others and Gorkha Security Services versus Government (NCT of Delhi) and others (supra) would not apply. The judgment in the case of Isolaters and Isolaters versus Madhya Pradesh Madhya Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Co. Ltd. & Anr. (supra) wherein it was held that it would not be enough to put the contractor concerned only on notice of debarment without specifically putting it on notice on the issue of penalty would also not come to the aid of the petitioner for in Clause 9 of the DNIET itself, the provision of debarment has been laid down and it has been provided that the minimum debarment would be for a period of three years. In the present case, the debarment is for the minimum period of 03 years and, therefore, no prejudice can be stated to have been caused to the petitioner.

¶53As regards the judgments relied upon by learned counsel representing the respondents, in the case of Krishnadatt Awasthy versus State of Madhya Pradesh and others (supra), the Supreme Court of India, while referring to the judgment in Ashok Kumar Sonkar versus Union of India (2007) 4 SCC 54 held that the principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straitjacket formula and that its application depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It was held that to sustain a complaint of non-compliance with the principles of natural justice one must establish that he had been prejudiced thereby for non-compliance with the principles of natural justice.

¶54The Supreme Court then referred to the theory of prejudice as had been considered in the case of Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa

(1969) 3 SCC 392 whereafter, the principles on the issue of prejudice and the CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) *3 violation of the principles of natural justice were laid down. One of the principles was that while applying the rule of audi alteram partem, the Court concerned must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. Ultimately it was held that even though the appellants before the Supreme Court had not been joined at the initial stage, an opportunity to controvert the findings of the Authorities was duly afforded lateron and under the circumstances, no prejudice was said to have been caused to them. The Supreme Court held as under:- "44. In the narration of the facts as discussed above, it is clear that the appellants have emphasized on their non-joinder at the initial stage before the Collector. A bare perusal of the order passed by the Collector reflects that it is based on the counter-affidavit filed by the Janpad Panchayat whereby it is established that the appellants were related to the members of the selection committee. Subsequently, the collector held the process to be vitiated by bias by applying the test of reasonable likelihood of bias. Once again, upon challenge being made by the appellants before the revisional authority, their relationship with the members of the selection committee was not disputed yet violation of doctrine of audi altrem partem was alleged merely due to non-joinder. After hearing them, the plea of non-impleadment did not find force before the revisional authority and the challenge did not succeed. Aggrieved appellants moved a writ petition before the High Court where ample opportunity was given by learned Single Judge and they were allowed to inspect the records. Thus, an opportunity to controvert the findings of the Collector and the Commissioner and factual narration thereof was duly CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) ** afforded. After sufficient opportunities given by the Ld. Single Judge, the appellants neither denied their relationship with the members of the selection committee nor demonstrated that how the findings are perverse or contrary to record, causing any prejudice to them.

¶45In the sequel of above factual narration, first limb of natural justice that is 'rule against bias' was proved as reasonable likelihood of bias was fully established irrefutably. The violation of another limb i.e. audi alteram partem, which is procedural, has been prayed by the appellants on the pretext of their non-joinder at the initial stage; in my opinion, without showing prejudice mere non-joinder even at initial stage does not violate the natural justice doctrine in the case at hand."

¶55A similar view was taken by a constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on India in the case of Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah vs. Reserve Bank of India and Others (supra) and the High Court of Delhi in the case of Aneuser Busch Inbev India Limited versus Commissioner (Excise), Entertainment and Luxury Tax) and others. As an upshot of the aforesaid discussion, we find the writ petition to be devoid of merit and accordingly the same is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of accordingly.

(ARUN PALLI) (VIKRAM AGGARWAL) JUDGE JUDGE Reserved on : 04.11.2024 Pronounced on : 19.12.2024

CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP-11390-2024 (O&M) Reserved on : 04.11.2024 Pronounced on : 19.12.2024 M/s Saptagiri Restaurant Private Limited ...... Petitioner Versus Airports Authority of India and others ...... Respondents CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN PALLI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAM AGGARWAL *** Present : Mr. Gurminder Singh, Senior Advocate with Mr. Karmanbir Singh Kharbanda, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Chetan Mittal, Senior Advocate with Ms. Shubhra Singh, Advocate Mr. Nitin Kumar Sharma, Advocate Mr. Avichal Sharma, Advocate Mr. Vivek Singla, Advocate for the respondents. ***