- Court
- High Court of Punjab and Haryana
- Decided
- 29 October 2025
- Bench
- Mandeep Pannu
- Case no.
- RSA 1211/1996
Judgment
IN T
Ranjit Kaur The Life Insuran
CORAM : HO
Present: Ms
Mr
Ser
vid
Res
vid MANDEEP PA
1.
Thi Ranjit Kaur aga lower Appellate 1st Class, Samr dismissed. Brief Facts
2.
widow of Keha Insurance Corp (defendants No. THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJ AT CHANDIGA -.-
RS
Re Da
VERSUS nce Corporation of India and Oth ON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MAND s. R.K.Grewal, Advocate for the r. Rajiv Sharma, Advocate for res rvice of respondents No.5 to 7 di de order dated 20.09.1996. spondent No.6 proceeded agains de order dated 20.09.1996 -.-
ANNU, J. is Regular Second Appeal has b inst the judgment and decree dat e Court whereby the judgment an rala dated 4.8.1994 was set asid e brief facts giving rise to the p ar Singh, filed a suit for reco oration of India (LIC) through .1 to 4) and defendants No.5 to
JAB AND HARYANA ARH SA-1211-1996 (O&M) served on:-28.10.2025 ate of Decision : 29.10.2025
....Appellant hers
....Respondents DEEP PANNU appellant. spondents No.1 to 4. ispensed with st ex-parte been filed by the appellant–plain ted 2.11.1995 passed by the learn nd decree of the learned Sub Ju de and the suit of the plaintiff w present appeal are that Ranjit Ka overy of ₹73,500 against the L h its Chairman and other offic 7 being the legal representatives
- ntiff ned dge was aur, Life ials
the deceased K ₹50,000 under
28.6.1988 to 29 pleaded that the under the Punja Samrala, Distric policy with th completing all authorised medi 160102143 was authorised doct medically fit at regularly until nominee under documents to th LIC vide lette fraudulent conc policy. It was s years and hyper that the repudia contract. Conseq
3.
the claim had a the Insurance A material facts re Kehar Singh. The amount claim Policy No. 160102143, togeth
9.5.1992, along with bonus and o e husband of the plaintiff, Keha ab Government and was a resid ct Ludhiana. During his servic he defendant Corporation thro necessary formalities, includi ical officer of the LIC, the prop s issued on 27.12.1987 for a tor of LIC had found Kehar t the time of issuance. Kehar his death on 28.6.1988. Upon the policy, submitted the clai he defendant Corporation. How er dated 1.6.1989, alleging su cealment of illness by the dece stated that the deceased had be rtension for two years prior to t ation was wholly illegal, false, f quently, the present suit was file e defendants contested the suit, already been duly investigated a Act. It was alleged that the dec egarding his health condition. A
med comprised the assured sum her with ₹23,500 as interest fr other consequential benefits. It w ar Singh, was serving as Kanun dent of village Sehjomajra, Teh ce, he applied for a life insura ough its Samrala Branch. A ing medical examination by posal was accepted and Policy N an assured sum of ₹50,000. T Singh to be in sound health Singh paid the requisite premi his death, the plaintiff, being im along with the original pol wever, the claim was repudiated uppression of material facts eased at the time of obtaining een suffering from diabetes for the proposal. The plaintiff asser flimsy and against the terms of d. raising preliminary objections t and repudiated under Section 45 ceased had fraudulently suppres As per the defendants, Kehar Sin
- m of rom was ngo hsil ance After No. and ium licy d by and rted that 5 of ssed
was a known di and insulin trea
27.12.1987. It w issuance of the p true facts. Relia (Ex.D2/A) and taken on accoun
4.
and reiterated he
5.
Fro following issues
¶1clai
¶2inte
3.
4.
6.
In PW2 Sanjiv Ku Taranjit Singh.
7.
and DW3 Labh material facts.
abetic and hypertensive patient w atment, and this was not disc was further averred that the dece policy and died within six month ance was placed on the report certain leave applications (Ex nt of illness. Hence, the suit was e plaintiff filed replication deny er original stand. om the pleadings of the parties, s: Whether the plaintiff is en imed in the suit from defendant N Whether the plaintiff is en erest and future interest, and if so Whether the plaintiff has no Relief. support of her case, the plaintif Kumar, Assistant in the LIC B e defendants examined DW1 D h Singh, Bill Clerk, to substan
who was under oral hypoglycaem losed in the proposal form da eased fell ill within a month of hs, which indicated concealmen of the C.M.C. Hospital, Ludhi .D3/1 to D3/6) said to have b prayed to be dismissed with cost ying all allegations of concealm , the learned trial court framed ntitled to recover the amount No.1 to 7? ntitled to recover any amount o, to what extent? locus standi to file the present su ff appeared as PW1 and examin Branch Office, Samrala, and PW Dr. A. Manni, DW2 T.R. Girdh ntiate their plea of suppression
- mic ated nt of iana een ts. ment as t of uit? ned W3 har,
Findings of the
8.
Aft evidence on rec The LIC's autho policy and foun repudiate the cl relied upon by th (Ex.D3/1–D3/6) they pertained to Manni itself sup diabetic person
9.
Sim without examini the policy bin conducted inqui There was no co fraud or concea held that the re amount of ₹50,0 due, along with
4.8.1994. Findings of the
10.
Fee Life Insurance C e Trial Court ter hearing the learned counsel ord, the learned Sub Judge 1st C orised medical officer had exami nd him normal and medically fit laim later on the ground of alle he defendants, the hospital recor ), did not prove any suppression o the period after issuance of the pported the plaintiff, as she ad could live a normal life till natur milarly, DW2 T.R. Girdhar admi ing the insured through its autho nds the Corporation. The inv iry for LIC was not examined, w ogent evidence on record to prov aled any material fact from the C epudiation was illegal, and the p 000 with 12% per annum interes bonus and costs. The suit was d e Lower Appellate Court eling aggrieved by the decree of Corporation of India (LIC) thro
for the parties and examining Class, Samrala (Sh. P.S. Virk), h ined Kehar Singh before issuing t. Hence, the Corporation could eged concealment. The docume rd (Ex.D2/A) and leave applicati n of material fact or prior illness e policy. The evidence of DW1 dmitted in cross-examination tha ral death. itted that LIC never issues a pol orised doctor, and that once issu vestigating officer who allege which further weakened the defen ve that the deceased had played Corporation. Accordingly, the co plaintiff was entitled to the pol st from the date the amount beca decreed in favour of the plaintiff f the trial court dated 4.8.1994, ough its Senior Divisional Mana
- held not ents ions s, as Dr. at a licy ued, edly nce. any ourt licy ame f on
preferred an ap Appellate Cour reversed the jud
11.
husband of the practicing fraud record of the C Reader in the D known diabetic for the last two by the said doc failure, diabetic receiving treatm Despite these se
27.12.1987, ans suffering from d concealing his tr
12.
deliberate suppr of insurance. Th the principle of the proposer to of entering into the basis of the therein renders ppeal before the learned Dist rt, after reappraising the entire dgment of the trial court and dism e Appellate Court observed e plaintiff, had obtained the d and misrepresentation upon th C.M.C. Hospital, Ludhiana, an Department of Medicine, clearl for the last fifteen years and had years prior to obtaining the poli ctor further revealed that he was nephropathy, retinopathy and n ment and was on insulin at the erious ailments, Kehar Singh, wh swered all relevant queries in th diabetes, hypertension, kidney tr rue state of health. e lower Appellate Court found th ression of material facts, which w he court observed that the contr uberrima fides, that is, utmost g make a full and honest disclosu the contract. The declaration ma policy and, therefore, any untru the contract voidable at the o
trict Judge, Ludhiana. The low evidence and hearing both sid missed the plaintiff's suit. that Kehar Singh, the decea insurance policy in question he Corporation. It was held that nd the evidence of Dr. A. Man ly proved that Kehar Singh wa d been suffering from hypertens icy. The certificate Ex.D3/A issu s also suffering from chronic re neuropathy, for which he had b e time of effecting the insuran hile filling up the proposal form he negative and specifically den rouble or any other disease, ther hat such false answers amounted went to the very root of the contr ract of life insurance is based up good faith, and it is incumbent up ure of his state of health at the ti ade in the proposal form constitu ue statement or material suppress option of the insurer. The learn
- wer des, ased by nni, as a sion ued enal een nce. m on nied eby d to ract pon pon ime utes sion
District Judge f Ludhiana on 24 remained under to the court, cl chronic and pre-
13.
1938, observing of its issuance if suppressed mate was material to the Life Insuran producing med knowingly supp on behalf of th examination of was rejected. Th the proposer on expected to dis conceals. Thus, absolve Kehar health.
14.
Brahm Dutt Sh Allahabad 474) of India (AIR further noted that Kehar Singh
4.1.1988, barely a month after treatment till his death on 28.6. learly indicated that the ailmen -existing. e Appellate Court also referred g that an insurer is entitled to rep f it is established that the policyh erial facts knowing the same to the risk undertaken. In the opi nce Corporation of India had suc dical and documentary evide pressed vital information regardin he plaintiff that the Life Insu the insured prior to issuance o he court held that the authorised the basis of answers given by h scover latent or internal ailmen the medical examination condu Singh of his duty to disclose e learned Appellate Court relie harma versus Life Insurance and Smt. Krishna Wanti Puri v 1975 Delhi 19), to hold that w
was admitted in C.M.C. Hospi r the issuance of the policy, a 1988. This circumstance, accord nts were not of recent origin to Section 45 of the Insurance A pudiate the policy within two ye holder had made false statements be false, and that such suppress inion of the learned District Jud ccessfully discharged this burden ence showing that Kehar Sin ng his health. The contention rai urance Corporation's own med of the policy precluded repudiat doctor of the Corporation exami him in the proposal form and is nts which the insured deliberat ucted by the Corporation could true and complete facts about ed upon the authorities reported Corporation of India (AIR 19 versus Life Insurance Corporat when an insured person knowin
- ital, and ding but Act, ears s or sion dge, n by ngh ised ical tion ines not tely not his d as tion
makes false dec justified in avo taken several m of the policy, as further proved t while submitting disclosure of su failure could n suppression of f
15.
It w wilfully suppres and therefore, repudiating the c observed that misrepresentatio nominee, could allowed the app dismissed the su
16.
Fee District Judge, L been filed by the Submissions of
17.
It h that the impugn illegal, perverse clarations relating to material fac oiding the contract. The court a medical leaves on account of illn evidenced from leave applicatio that he was aware of his condit g the proposal. The lower Appe uch serious ailments as diabete ot be regarded as trivial omis facts which went to the foundatio was accordingly held that Keha ssed the true facts regarding his the Life Insurance Corporatio claim made by the plaintiff, Ranj the insurance contract stood on practiced by the insured, a not claim any benefit under the peal, set aside the judgment a uit of the plaintiff. eling aggrieved by the judgmen Ludhiana, dated 2.11.1995, the p e plaintiff–appellant Ranjit Kaur f learned counsel for the appell has been vehemently argued by th ned judgment and decree of the e, and contrary to the evidence o
cts affecting the risk, the insure also noticed that Kehar Singh h ness immediately after the issua ons Ex.DW3/1 to Ex.DW3/6, wh tion but chose to conceal the sa ellate Court concluded that the n es, hypertension, and chronic re sions but amounted to a mate on of the contract. ar Singh made false statements s health while obtaining the poli n of India was fully justified njit Kaur. The learned District Ju vitiated by reason of fraud and hence, the plaintiff, being e policy. The Appellate Court t and decree of the trial court, nt of reversal passed by the learn present Regular Second Appeal r. lant he learned counsel for the appell lower Appellate Court are who on record. It was contended that
- er is had ance hich ame non-enal erial and icy, d in dge and his thus and ned has lant
learned Appella well-reasoned a submitted that governing contr suppression of m Life Insurance C with it, particu Singh at the tim and sound. It w report the Corpo report produced evidence.
18.
the Corporation the confidential intentionally wi witnesses gave Act that, had th case of the Corp respondents, wa after the policy further urged th diabetic person thereby destroy counsel contend ate Court misdirected itself in and justified findings of the the lower Appellate Court h racts of insurance and failed to material facts or fraud was upon Corporation had not produced th larly the authorised doctor wh me of issuance of the policy and was further contended that even oration had repudiated the claim d through DW2 T.R. Girdhar c e learned counsel further pointe n, who had given a clean certifi report of the agent, were both in ithheld from the court. It was s rise to an adverse inference und hey been examined, their testim rporation. The medical report of as argued to be merely based on a had already been issued and wa hat even Dr. Manni herself admit could live a normal and natu ying the very basis of LIC's ple ded that the reliance of the low
law and facts while reversing trial court. The learned coun had ignored the settled princip o appreciate that the onus to pr n the insurer. It was urged that he best possible evidence availa ho had medically examined Ke d had found him to be medically the investigating officer on wh was not examined in court, and could not be treated as substant ed out that the authorised doctor cate of health to Kehar Singh, n possession of the Corporation submitted that the absence of th der Section 114(g) of the Evide mony would have gone against f Dr. A. Manni, relied upon by a hospital admission history writ as, at best, hearsay evidence. It w tted in her cross-examination tha ural life if given proper treatme ea of fraudulent concealment. T wer Appellate Court on such po
-nsel ples ove able ehar y fit hose tive r of and but hese ence tten was at a ent, ost-
policy hospital Singh had conce
19.
It w relied upon by t except one whic no connection w could have bee rightly held tha insured, as the competent docto and insurability certified him fit basis of subsequ
20.
It w at the time of iss as a Kanungo, p sick leave for o was urged, had assumptions rat ailments and de The learned cou from diabetes, affects life expe such a conditio lower Appellate records was misplaced because ealed any illness known to him a was also argued that the leave a the Corporation related to perio ch was on account of the marriag whatsoever with illness. Hence, n en drawn. The learned counsel at there was no material suppre LIC itself, after conducting it or, had issued the policy having b of Kehar Singh. Therefore, once , the Corporation could not later uent illness or conjectures. was further argued that the Appe suance of the policy, Kehar Sing performing field duties in Kham one year prior to obtaining the d completely misread the eviden ther than proof. The finding th eliberately suppressed them was unsel maintained that even ass the same cannot be termed a ectancy or was known to be fat n cannot be treated as fraudule e Court's findings were not on
e there was no evidence that Ke at the time of proposal. applications (Ex.DW3/1 to DW3 ods after the issuance of the poli ge of the insured's daughter and h no inference of pre-existing dise submitted that the trial court h ession or fraud on the part of ts medical examination through been fully satisfied about the hea e the Corporation's own doctor h r repudiate the policy merely on ellate Court had failed to notice t gh was in active government serv mano Circle, and had not taken insurance. The Appellate Court nce and had based its findings hat Kehar Singh was aware of s wholly unsupported by eviden uming Kehar Singh was suffer material ailment unless it direc tal, and therefore non-disclosure ent. It was thus contended that nly contrary to evidence but a
- ehar 3/6) icy, had ease had h a alth had that vice any t, it on his nce. ring ctly e of
against settled p the trial court da Submissions of
21.
On the judgment of were urged befo by the Life Insu his true state of learned counsel good faith, any policy voidable had been a kno hospital records were within his Life Insurance C of the Insurance Findings of this
22.
I ha
23.
dated 2.11.1995 the learned tria follow. In arrivi in a careful and of the Insuranc material placed principles of insurance law, and ated 4.8.1994 deserved to be rest f learned counsel for responden n the other hand, the learned cou f the learned lower Appellate Co ore it. It was submitted that the urance Corporation on the groun f health and had made false sta contended that the contract of y suppression or misrepresentat at the instance of the insurer. It wn diabetic and hypertensive fo s, and the lower Appellate Cour knowledge but were not disclos Corporation was justified in repu e Act, 1938. s Court ave heard learned counsel for the e judgment and decree of the 5 cannot be sustained and must b al court dated 4.8.1994 should ing at this conclusion the Court h d structured manner, assessed the ce Act, and weighed the credi before both courts. It is axioma
hence, the well-reasoned decree tored. nts No.1 to 4 unsel for the respondents suppor ourt and argued on the same lines policy had been rightly repudia nd that the insured had suppres atements in the proposal form. T life insurance being one of utm ation of material facts renders t was pointed out that Kehar Sin for many years, as proved from rt had rightly found that such fa sed in the proposal form. Hence, udiating the claim under Section e parties and perused the record. learned District Judge, Ludhi be set aside, and that the decree be restored for the reasons wh has applied its mind to the evide e burden of proof under Section ibility and probative value of atic that a contract of life insura
- e of rted s as ated ssed most ngh his acts n 45
ana e of hich ence n 45
is founded on t repudiate a claim the proposer kn were within his proof and it imp and the materia Corporation did necessary to dis who examined medical note th officer who pre the claim produc of the Corpora circumstances a had it been pro significant is the notably the hos issuance of the p at the time of respondents, per marriage of a d material and lon
25.
Mo certain clinical doctor herself h the principle of uberrima fides m only where it is shown, on ad nowingly made false statements s knowledge and material to th poses on the insurer the primary o ality of the non-disclosure. The d not adduce in evidence the best charge that onus. The authorised Kehar Singh before acceptance e policy was granted was not pr pared the report on the basis of ced for examination. Both witne ation and their absence canno an adverse inference can legitima duced, would not have supporte e fact that the documentary mate spital history and treatment re policy and therefore has limited f proposal. The leave applicat rtain mostly to the post-policy p daughter; they do not, without ngstanding ailment at the date of oreover, the evidence of Dr. A. findings on admission to hosp had not examined the deceased
s and that an insurer is entitled dmissible and reliable evidence, t or suppressed material facts wh he risk. This is a strict standard onus of establishing both the fal record before us discloses that t available witnesses and docume d medical officer of the Corporat e of the proposal and upon wh roduced. Nor was the investigat f which the Corporation repudia esses were clearly within the con ot be treated as neutral, in su ately be drawn that their testimo ed the case of the insurer. Equa erial relied upon by the responde ecords, relates to events after value in proving the state of hea tions, largely relied upon by period and one of them was for more, establish the existence o f the proposal. Manni, which on its face reco pital, must be read in context. T at any time prior to 24.1.1988
- d to that hich d of sity ents tion hose ting ated ntrol uch ony, ally nts, alth of a ords
her note is ess clinical findings deliberate false hospital admissi permit post-hoc namely, the me the insurer prod alleged conditio concluded that t The learned Dis records and on Court, was a mi event history t affirmatively an falsity and the m
26.
Cre produced by th would have bee medical officer patient receivin undermines any materially preju approach of the hearsay materia principle that d entially an admission record s s. It does not amount to direct e statements in the proposal form ion notes as conclusive proof of c inferences to override the co dical examination by the Corpo ducing that very officer to expla on, the policy was issued. Th the Corporation had failed to esta strict Judge, in reversing, relied inferences drawn therefrom. Th isapplication of the law because to supplant the evidentiary req nd by admissible evidence, both materiality of the fact suppressed edibility assessments also favo he Corporation were either not n decisive for example, the inve or, where produced, admitted, on ng regular treatment can live y assertion that diabetic statu udicial as to vitiate the cont e trial court in refusing to infer al before it was therefore not pe doubts or equivocal probabilities
supplemented by contemporane evidence that the insured had m several weeks earlier. To treat su fraudulent suppression would be ontemporaneous act of the insu oration's authorised doctor, with ain why, despite knowledge of he trial court, for these reaso ablish suppression of material fa heavily on the post-policy hosp hat approach, in the opinion of t it allowed conjecture and after-t quirement that the insurer pro h knowledge by the insured of d at the time of the proposal. our the trial court. The witnes the primary one whose evide estigating officer and the authori n cross-examination, that a diab a normal life, an admission t us alone, without more, was tract. The cautious and reason r fraud from the limited and pa erverse, it was consonant with s must be resolved against a pa
- ous made uch e to urer, hout any ons, acts. pital this the-ove, sses nce ised etic that so ned artly
who has the bes failed to dischar on insurance con Conclusion
27.
For Court misdirect decree. The im judgment and d Samrala, are res
28.
Pen
October 29, 202 tripti
Wh
Wh st means of adducing the decisi rge the heavy onus cast upon it b ntracts. r all these reasons, this Court is ted itself in allowing the appe mpugned judgment dated 2.11 decree dated 4.8.1994 passed by stored, and the plaintiff's decree nding application(s), if any, also
(M
hether speaking/non-speaking : Speaki hether reportable : Yes/No
ive proof. In short, the Corporat by Section 45 and by the settled s satisfied that the lower Appell eal and upsetting the trial cou .1995 is therefore set aside, y the learned Sub Judge 1st Cla shall stand. The appeal is allowe stands disposed of. MANDEEP PANNU) JUDGE ing o.
- tion law late urt's ass,
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