Deepak Bhatia v. Virender Singh

ASHUTOSH KUMAR, J.

¶1The revisionist has challenged the judgment and order of conviction dated 20.5.2014/28.5.2014passed by the Metropolitan Magistratewhereby he has been convictedunder Section 138 ofthe Negotiable Instruments Act and has been sentenced to undergo RigorousImprisonmentfor four months and has been directedto pay compensation under Section 357(3) of Cr.P.C amounting to Rs.2,35,050/- to the respondent and in default of payment of compensation, to suffer Simple Imprisonment of 15 days. The . petitionerhas also assailed the judgmentand order passed in C.A. No.42/14passedby the ASJ-01,PatialaHouse Courts,New Delhi by whichtheTrialCourtJudgmenthasbeenconfirmedandupheld. Page 1of19

¶2The respondenthas filed as many as 23 complaintcases against the petitionerfor his prosecutionfor the offenceunderSection138 of the NegotiableInstrumentAct. In the aforesaid 23 complaintcases various cheques were said to have been issued which were dishonouredon presentation.They are extractedas hereunder;- Cheque No. Date of Cheque Amount (in Rs.) 000048

10.12.2008 10,000/- 000047

14.12.2008 1,10,000/- 002375

01.09.2008 42,000/- 000001

09.08.2008 30,000/- 000002

08.09.2008 18,000/- 000003

10.09.2008 18,000/- 002423

24.09.2008 44,000/- 007582

24.09.2008 24,000/- 120184

26.11.2008 6,667/- 000032

14.11.2008 7,500/- 000050

26.12.2008 10,000/- 121334 Q6.01.2009 10,000/- 121335

10.01.2009 10,000/- 121336

14.01.2009 10,000/- 121340

02.01.2009 1,00,000/- 207659

05.10.2008 26,700/- 000039

08.11.2008 1,00,000/- 000041

02.12.2008 10,000/- 000049

18.10.2008 10,000/- 000033 •21.11.2008 7,500/- 000034

28.11.2008 7,500/- 000036

11.11.2008 7,500/-' 000038

26.11.2008 7,500/- 002419

16.09.2008 12,000/- 000044

21.11.2008 1,00,000/- 000045

28.11.2008 1,00,000/- 000046

07.12.2008 ^ 1,00,000/- 007583

25.09.2008 24,000/- 007584

29.09.2008 48,000/- J, 007585

27.09.2008 30,000/- 002412

04.09.2008 40,000/- 002413

05.09.2008 40,000/- 002414

05.09.2008 40,000/- 000007

12.09.2008 48,000/- 000008

13.09.2008 12,000/- 000009

17.09.2008 12,000/- 207697

15.12.2008 10,000/- 207698

25.12.2008 10,000/-: 007581

23.09.2008 36,000/-: 000004

09.09.2008 48,000/- 000005

10.09.2008 48,000/- 000006

11.09.2008 36,000/-: 000025

03.10.2008 7,500/- 000042

07.11.2008 1,00,000/- 000043

14.11.2008 1,00,000/- 002424

25.09.2008 40,000/- 207677

24.10.2008 16,500/- 207696

28.12.2008 10,000/- 000018

28.10.2008 7,500/- 000026

11.10.2008 7,500/- 000027

20.10.2008 7,500/- , 000037

20.11.2008 7,500/- 000010

18.09.2008 18,000/- 000012

25.10.2008 11,000/- 000014

26.10.2008 14,000/- 002418

15.09.2008 12,000/. 002422

23.09.2008 40,000/- 002420

19.09.2008 24,000/- 007591

20.09.2008 10,000/- 007593

02.10.2008 40,000/- 007594

02.10.2008 40,000/- 007586

28.09.2008 30,000/-: 007587

09.09.2008 42,000/- 007588

01.10.2008 30,000/- 000019

30.10.2008 30,000/- 000021

03.11.2008 16,500/- 000023

08.10.2008 1,00,000/- .-y V Jk 007595

01.10.2008 40,000/-. 216765

04.10.2008 21,000/- 216776

11.10.2008 10,500/- 008778

26.09.2008 24,000/- \J

¶3In all such complaints, the petitioner was earlier acquitted by the MetropolitanMagistrateon the ground that the respondentwas in the business of money lending when he did not possess any license for the same. It was thus held by the Metropolitan Magistrate that the complaints were barred under Section 3 of the Punjab Money Lenders Act, 1938 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1938).

¶4The aforesaid judgment and orders of acquittal were challenged by the respondent by preferring separate sets of appeal before the High Court of Delhi. All such leave of appeals were granted and there v/as a direction for registration of the Criminal Appeals Nos.461 to 483/2013. Thereafter, analysing Section 3 of the Act of 1938 this Court held that the learned Metropolitan Magistrate was in error in holding that the complaints were barred under the provisions of the Act of 1938. Thus all the cases were remanded to the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate for writing out a fresh judgment in accordance with law.

¶5The aforesaid orders of this Court in Crl.L.P. No.491 to 513/2011 were challenged by the petitioner before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court gave the liberty to the petitioner to raise all such issues before the Trial Court. Cii.Rev.P.400/2015 Paae 4 ot ! 9 b

¶6After the remand, no evidencewas led by the respondent.The petitionerexaminedtwo witnessesapart from himselfas DW-2 and DW-2A (himselfbeing DW-1). By separatejudgmentsthe petitioner was convicted and sentencedunder Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

¶7Thus 23 appealscame to be filed beforethe SessionsCourtby the petitioner,all of which were dismissed and the judgment and sentence of the Trial Court was confirmed.

¶8Thishas givenriseto 23 revisionpetitionswhichare beingdealt withseparatelyin 23 revisionpetitions.

¶9The respondent(complainant)lodged a complaintagainst the petitionerallegingthatthe petitionerapproachedhim sometimesin the year2006 and soughtfinancialassistancefor runninghis business.An agreementwas enteredinto betweenthe petitionerand the respondent thatthe respondentwouldprovidefinancialassistanceto the petitioner for which he would charge interest at the rate of 20% per month. Petitioneragreed and acceptedmoney from the complainanttime to time and also issued chequestowardsrepayment.For some time, the cheques were honoured but later, the petitioner failed to make payments. When confronted by the respondent (complainant),the petitionerpromisedto pay the entire balance amount by December, 2008. A request was made to the respondent(complainant)that the chequeswhichwere givento him be not presentedbeforethe banktill

25.12.2008. The cheques were later presented which were dishonoured. After complying with the requirements/formalities Page5of19 j under Section138 underthe NegotiableInstrumentsAct, acomplaint was lodgedwithrespectto threechequesnamely.- Cheque no. Drawn on fBank) Dated Amount 121334 Centurion Bank of Punjab Limited

06.01.2009 10,000/- 121335 Centurion Bank of Punjab Limited

10.01.2009 10,000/- 121336 Centurion Bank of Punjab Limited

14.01.2009 10,000/- 121340 Centurion Bank of Punjab Limited

02.01.2009 1,00,000/- 207659 Centurion Bank of Punjab Limited

05.10.2008 26,700/-

¶10At the trial the respondent(complainant)examinedhimselfas CW-1.The statementofthe petitionerwas recordedunderSection313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petitioner also examined AshvinDwivediofHDFC Bank as DW-2 and anotherwitnessby the name ofMahesh Kumar from Indian OverseasBank (DW-2A). The petitionerhas examinedhimselfas DW-1 and has filed his affidavit (Ex.D-1).

¶11The respondent (complainant), at the trial proved the acknowledgementof the petitioner dated 12.9.208 whereby the petitioneracceptedhis existingliabilityand assuredthat the money would be paid by December, 2008. In his cross-examination,the respondent(complainant)deposed that he owns two firms namely M/s.V.N.Tradersand M/s.ShivamCapitals.He also admittedthat the loan amountwhich was given to the petitionercarriedinterestat the [y rate of 20% per month. There was aspecificdenialthat Ex.CW-1/1, the undertakingreferredto above was ablank documentwhich was signedby thepetitioner(accused)atthe time oftakingofthe loan.He has also deniedthatthe chequeswereacceptedas security.Therewas aspecificdenialofhis havingtakenRs.65 lakhs approximatelyfrom the accused.

¶12The petitioner in his 313 statement has admitted of taking financial help from the respondent (complainant) and has also acceptedthat chequeswere issuedby him. However,it was clarified thatthe chequeswere towardssecurityand insteadofbemg returned, the same were presentedin the bank. He has categoricallystatedthat the loans which he had taken from the complainanthad been repaid andmorethanRs.65 lakhswaspaidto therespondent(complainant).

¶13In his depositionbeforethe Court as DW-1, he has statedthat he first took loan from the respondent(complainant)in September, 2006 for runningbusinessof electronicequipmentafter enteringinto an agreementwithhim. The copyofthe agreement,it has beenstated, was never given to the petitioner. The petitioner is said to have continuouslypaid the loan till July, 2008 through cash and cheque both. He has also admittedthat many atimes,he returnedthe loan at the rate of 20% in cash. It was also statedby the petitionerthat the respondent(complainant)has fioatedtwo companieswhichdeal with illegalmoneylendingactivities.

¶14AshwinDiwedi,BranchManager,HDFCBankappearedbefore the Court as DW-2 with the statementof accountofthe accused.He has deposedthatthere are no restrictionsas per RBI guidelineson the numberofaccountapersoncan hold in aparticularbranch.Usually,if a customerwouldlike to open anotheraccountin the same name, it is discouragedunlesstheneedis expressed.

¶15MaheshKumar, record clerk of Indian OverseasBank, Greater Kailash Part-II did not know anything about the case and only producedthe documentsfromthe bankrecords.

¶16The learnedMagistrateconvictedthe petitionerunder Section 138 ofthe NegotiableInstrumentsAct and sentencedhim to undergo Rigorous Imprisonmentfor four months and a compensationunder Section357(3) Cr.P.C to the tune of Rs.3,11,250/-and in defaultof paymentof compensationa Simple Imprisonmentof 15 days. In the appealfiledby the petitioner,the convictionand sentencewas upheld.

¶17The petitionersubmits that from the evidence on record, the respondent(complainant)has not been able to make out the existence ofa legal liabilityindischargeofwhichthe chequeswere issued.That being the basic requirementof law, and the same not having been done by the respondent(complainant),the convictionofthe petitioner is unwarranted. It has been submitted, on the other hand, that the petitionerhas been successfulin negativingthe existenceof any such liabilityfor which chequeshad been issued. The other groundurged by the petitioner is that the undertaking (Ex.CW-l/Al) dated

12.9.2008 is for a consolidated amount of Rs.24 lakhs and odd. But the cheques in question are all of subsequentdates and of smaller amounts.It was arguedthatsuchsmalleramountofcheques,issuedby Page8of 19 J the petitioner,defythe naturalcourseofconduct.It is not expectedof anybodyto issue many chequesof such amount especiallywhen the outstandingloan amount is as high as 24 lakhs and odd. This only implies, that no such transaction as stated in the notice or the complaintevertookplace.

¶18Agrievancehas been laid that in the complaint,the exactloan amounthas notbeenstated.The figureof24,73,867/-has beenarrived at only on the basisofan undertakingand by calculatingthe amounts in differentchequeswhich were purportedlyissuedby the petitioner. Thereis no mentionofsuchamountsin the IncomeTax returnsofthe complainant.In thatviewofthe matter,it was argued,the case ofthe respondent(complainant)becomes highly doubtful and ambiguous . and is not fit to be accepted.

¶19The petitionerin his 313 statementhas admitted issuance of chequesand its subsequentdishonouron presentationin the bank for insufficiency of funds.

¶20The groundofthe respondent(complainant)indulgingin money lendingwithoutalicensedoes not come handy and beneficialto the petitioner.Any repaymentofloanby chequewouldnot be coveredby PunjabRegistrationofMoneyLendingAct, 1938.

¶21The statementofaccountsfurnishedby DW-2 and DW-2Aalso do not show that the respondent(complainant)was lendingmoney to various people. Otherwise dso the bar of Section 3 of the Punjab RegistrationofMoneyLendingAct, 1938 wouldnot be applicablein caseofreturnofany loanthroughanegotiableinstrumentlike cheque. Crl.Rev.P.406/2015 9of19 "O I «5. Suits and applications by money-lenders barred, unless money-lender is registered and licensed. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactmentfor the time being inforce, a suit by a money lenderfor the recoveryofa loan, or an applicationby a money-lenderfor the executionofa decree relatingto a loan, shall after the commencement of this act, be dismissed, unless the money-lender-

(a)At the time ofthe institutionofthe suitorpresentation ofthe applicationfor execution-

(i) is registered;and

(ii) holds a validlicence, in suchform and manneras may beprescribed; or

(Hi) holds a certificatefrom a Commissionergranted under section 11, specifyingthe loan in respectof which the suit is instituted, or the decree in respect ofwhich the applicationfor executionispresented; or

(iv) ifhe is nota registeredandlicensedmoney-lender, satisfies the Court that he has applied to the Collector to be registeredand licensedand that such applicationis pending;providedthat in such a case, the suit or applicationshall not befinally disposed of until the application of the money lenderfor registrationandgrantoflicensepending beforethe Collectorisfinallydisposedof "

¶22The contentionofthe petitionerthatthe chequeswereofferedas securitywhichwas meantto be returnedafterthe loan was repaid,is not acceptable.The depositionofthe petitioneris categoricalthat he met the respondent(complainant)in the year 2006 and had taken a loan from him. The loans were being repaid, according to the petitioner,till 2008. Thus,the acknowledgementcontainedin Ex.CW-1/lA which the petitioner made on 12.9.2008, thereby admitting Page 10 of19 .J J receiptofRs.24lakhsandodddemonstratesthatthe loanwastakenby the petitioner.The aforesaidacknowledgementalso admitsofthe fact that many chequesof differentamountswere issuedon variousdates and an assurancewas givenvide that acknowledgementhat the total amountwouldbe paidby the lastweekofDecember,2008.

¶23The appellantas DW-1 has admittedthat each of the cheque was of differentamount which includedthe amount of interest.The fact that cheques were issued for the amount which included the interest clearly demonstrates that the cheques were not security cheques.It is not expectedthatpaymentofthe dueswouldbe madeby anybodywithouttakingthe chequesbackfromthe party.

¶24Though interest at the rate of 20% per month, (240% per annum) on the face of it, appearsto be unconscionable,but, when there is extreme/urgentneed of money and loan is taken for a short period, it is not unknownin the mercantileworld that biggerrate of interestis charged. In such an event, higher rate of interestcannot, ipso facto, leadto the conclusionthat the chequeswere only security cheques and not issued in dischargeof any existingliabilityof the payer.The revisionisthas admittedthatsuchamountswerebeingpaid regularlyi.e. principalamountalong with 20% interestfrom 2006 to 2008. The petitionerwould, therefore,be estoppedfrom raisingthe pleathat suchrate ofinterestwas on the excessiveside, and therefore the prosecutioncase is doubtful.

¶25In the cross examination,the petitionerhas admittedthat the chequeswere filledup by him in his own handwriting.The dates also 11 of19 were filledby him. Onlythe nameofthe drawerwas leftblank.

¶26Thus the argumentthat the cheques being of smalleramounts and for a short period oftime is reflectiveofthe same being in the nature of security is untenable.

¶27The appellate Court, therefore, upheld the conviction and sentence of the petitioner.

¶28This Court finds no fault with both the orders of the Courts below.

¶29An alternativeplea has been taken by the petitionerthat in 23 complaints,separatesentencesand compensationhas been awardedto the petitionerand there is no stipulationthat those sentenceswill run concurrently.

¶30It is submittedthat sincethe transactionwas betweenthe same parties, though each loan transactionwas separate and distinct,the sentences should have been directed to run concurrently. It was suggestedby the petitionerthat the legalpositionfavoursthe exercise of discretionfor the benefit of an accusedin cases where prosecution is based on a single transactioneven if differentcomplaintsthereof may have been filed for dishonour of different cheques. The transactionsformingthe basisofprosecutionrelateto the same parties i.e the petitionerand the respondentand thereforethe sentencesought to have been ordered to run concurrently.

¶31In Mohd.Akhtar Hussain vs. Assistant Collector of Customs

(1988) 4 see 183, the Supreme Court recognizedand justifiedthe of19 principleof concurrentrunningof sentences.It has been held by the SupremeCourtthat "the basic rule ofthumb over the years has been the so called single transactionrule for concurrentsentences. If a given transaction constitutes two offences under two enactments generally,it is wrong to have consecutivesentences.It is properand legitimate to have concurrent sentences. But this rule has no applicationifthe transactionrelatesto offenceswhichare not same or the facts constitutingthetwooffencesarequitedifferent."

¶32In State of Punjab vs. Madan Lai, 2009 (5) SCC 238, the Supreme Court relied upon the aforementioneddecision in Akhtar Hussain'scase (Supra) and affirmedthe directionof the High Court for sentences to run concurrently.

¶33Incidentally,Madan Lai's case also was under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

¶34In V.K.Bansal vs. State of Haryana and Ors, AIR 2013 SC 3447, the SupremeCourt again took note of the aforestateddecisions and put its seal of approvaloverthe propositionof concurrentrunning of sentences in cases relating to same transaction.

¶35However, in O.M.Cherian @ Thankachan vs. State of Kerala and Ors, (2015) 2 SCC 501, the Supreme Court had the occasion to refer to the decision in Mohd.Akhtar and Madan Lai (Supra).

¶36In the aforesaid decision, a reference was made to Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which reads as hereunder:- J'. "31. Sentences in cases of conviction of several offencesat onetrial.

(1) When aperson is convictedat one trialoftwo or more offences, the Court may, subject to the provisionsofsection 71 ofthe IndianPenalCode (45 of 1860), sentence him for such offences, to the severalpunishmentsprescribedtherefor which such Court is competentto inflict;suchpunishmentswhen consistingofimprisonmentto commencethe one after the expirationofthe other in such orderas the Court may direct, unless the Court directs that such punishmentsshallrun concurrently.

(2) In the caseofconsecutivesentences,itshallnot be necessary for the Court by reason only of the aggregatepunishmentfor the several offences being in excess of the punishmentwhich it is competentto inflicton convictionofa single offence, to send the offenderfor trialbeforea higherCourt: Provided that-

(a) in no case shall such person be sentenced to imprisonmentfor longerperiodthanfourteenyears;

(b) the aggregatepunishmentshall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which the Court is competentto inflictfor a singleoffence.

(3) For the purposeofappeal by a convictedperson, the aggregate of the consecutive sentencespassed againsthim underthis sectionshallbe deemedto be a single sentence."

¶37A reading of Section 31 Cr.P.C, it was argued before the Supreme Court, would make it.obvious that the normal rule is to inflict sentences which would run consecutively and only when speciallydirected,concurrently.

¶38The SupremeCourtafteranalyzingthe provisionsofSection31 ofthe Code of CriminalProcedureclarifiedthatthe sectiondealswith Page 14 of19 quantumofpunishmentwhichmay be legallypassedwhenthereis (a) one trial; and (b) the accusedis convictedof"two or more offences." Section 31 Cr.P.C. says that subjectto the provisionsof Section71 I.P.C., the Court may pass separate sentences for two or more offences, but the aggregate punishmentmust not exceed the limits fixed in proviso (a) and (b) ofsub-section(2) of Section31 Cr.P.C. Theambitof Section31 is wide, coveringnot onlya singletransaction constitutingtwo or more offencesbut also offencesarisingout oftwo or more transactions.Thus in Mohd.AkhtarHussain and Madan Lai (Supra), the issue that fell for consideration was imposition of sentencesfor two or more offencesarisingout of singletransaction.It was in that context that sentences were directed to run concurrently.

¶39In O.M.Cherian(Supra)the Supreme Court at para 20 and 21 clearlylaidthe formulationas under:- "20. Under Section 31 Cr.P.C. it is left to the full discretion of the Court to order the sentences to run concurrently in case of convictionfor two or more offences. It is difficult to lay down any straitjacket approach in the matterof exerciseof such discretion by the courts.By andlarge, trialcourtsandappellate courts have invoked and exercised their discretion to issue directionsfor concurrent running of sentences, favouring the benefit to be given to the accused. Whether a direction for concurrent running of sentences ought to be issued in a given case would depend upon the nature of the offence or offences committed and the facts and circumstances of the case. The discretion has to be exercised along the judicial linesand not mechanically.

¶21Accordingly,we answer the Referenceby holding that Section 31 Cr.P.C. leavesfull discretion with the Court to order sentences for two or more offences at one trial to run concurrently, having regard to the nature of offences and attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstances. We do notfind any reason to hold that normal rule is to order the sentence to be consecutive and exception is to make the sentences concurrent. Of course, if the Court does not order the sentence to be concurrent, one sentence may run after the other, in such order as the Court may direct. "

¶40In the case in hand what the Trial Court and the appellate Court lost sight of was the provision of Section 31(2) of Cr.P.C and Section 71 of the IPC.

¶41Section 71 of the IPC reads as hereunder:- "77. Limit of punishment of offence made up of several offences.—Where anything which is an offence is made up ofparts, any ofwhich parts is itself an offence, the offender shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such his offences, .unless it be so expressly provided. [Where anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, or where several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute, when combined, a different offence, the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the Court which tries him could award for any one ofsuch offences.] Illustrations

(a) A gives Z fifty strokes with a stick. Here A may have committed the offence ofvoluntarily causing hurt to Z by the whole beating, and also by each of the blows which make up the whole beating. If A were liable to punishment for every blow, he might be Page 16of 19 imprisonedforfiftyyears, onefor each blow. Buthe is liableonlyto onepunishmentfor the wholebeating.

(b) But if while A is beating Z, Yinterferes,and A intentionallystrikes Y, here, as the blow given to Yis nopart ofthe act wherebyAvoluntarilycauseshurtto Z, A is liable to one punishment for voluntarily causing hurt to Z, and to anotherfor the blowgiven to Y"

¶42The sentence of four months if added up in 23 complaints would make it 92 months which makes the sentence approximately of eightyears. In such an event,the judgmentofthe Trial Court and the appellateCourt,therefore,reflectlackofproperexerciseofdiscretion. Thoughin the operativepartofthe sentenceoftheTrialCourtthereis no reference of sentences imposed under the various complaintsto run concurrently,the Trial Court allowed the applicationunder Section 389 Cr.P.Cof the petitionerfor suspensionof sentencetill the filingof the appeal.This obviously,is lack of sighton the part of the Courtto assess that the sentences in complaints were not to run consecutively;or else the prayerunder Section389 Cr.P.C wouldnot have been allowed.

¶43The nominal roll of the petitioner shows that the sentences are to run consecutively in all the cases. This is because, there is no clarificationwith respect to whetherthe sentences in all the complaints would run consecutively or concurrently.

¶44The Appellate Court also lost sight of this fact.

¶45Thus on the basis of the aforesaid discussion, the sentences imposed upon the appellant in all the cases is directed to run Page 17of 19 concurrentlyand notconsecutively.

¶46In case the appellanthas servedthe sentenceof four monthsin all, he willbe releasedfromjailforthwith.

¶47It has been arguedthat while sentencingthe appellantthe Tnal Courtdirectedthe appellantto pay compensationunderSection357(3) Cr.P.C to the complainantto the tune of Rs.1,43,250/-and further directedthat in defaultofpaymentofcompensation,the convictshall undergoimprisonmentfor 15 days.

¶48In Ahammedkuttyvs. Abdullakoya,2009 (6) SCC 660, the Supreme Court has categoricallyheld that compensation can be directedto be paid both in terms of sub Section(1) of Section357 of Cr.P.C and under sub Section(3) thereofHowever,while exercising jurisdictionunder sub-Section(3) of Section357, no directioncould be given that in default to pay the amount of compensation,the accused shall suffer Simple Imprisonment.

¶49The SupremeCourthas heldthatsuch an ordercouldhavebeen passed only in terms of Sub Section (1) of Section 357. If the compensationdirected to be paid by the Court in exercise of its jurisdictionundersub Section(3) of Section357 is not deposited,the same can be realisedas fine in terms of Section421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

¶50Thus the default clause insertedin the sentencesrequiringthe appellantto suffer Simple Imprisonmentfor 15 days in case of non paymentofthe compensationamountcannotbe sustainedin the eyes of law andthereforethatpartofthe sentenceis setaside. Page 18 of19 IP

¶51It is made clear that no interference is being made with respect to the quantum of compensation which the petitioner has been directed to pay to the complainant.

¶52The revision petition is thus disposed of in terms of the above namely the sentences in all the complaints would run concurrently and there shall no imprisonment for non payment of the compensation amount, which amount could be realised under Section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, CrI.M.B No.7311/2015

¶1In view of the petition having been disposed of, no order is required to be passed in the instant application.

¶2Dismissed as infructuous. vi SEPTEMBERI 2015 k ASHUTOSH KUMAR, J

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + rRT..REV.P.400/2015 Date of Reserve: 07.09.2015 Date of Decision: fl09.2015 DEEPAKBHATIA Petitioner Through; Mr.RandhirJain andMr.Dhananjai Jain, Advocates. versus VIRENDERSINGH Respondent Through: Mr.MedhanshuTripathiand Mr.Satish Rana, Advocates. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR