Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Baord v. Lakhvinider Singh

order on costs.

S. RAVINDRA BHAT (JUDGE)

S.P. GARG (JUDGE) AUGUST 10, 2017

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on: 24.07.2017 Pronounced on: 10.08.2017 + FAO (OS) (COMM) 149/2017, C.M. APPL.25974/2017, 25975/2017 & 25976/2017 DELHI URBAN SHELTER IMPROVEMENT BOARD..... Appellant Through : Sh. Rajeev Sharma and Ms. Radha Lakshmi. R., Advocates. versus LAKHVINDER SINGH ..... Respondent Through : Sh. Arun Batta, Advocate. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.P. GARG MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT % 1. The Appellant (hereafter "DUSIB") is aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 04.05.2017 by which the learned Single Judge held that O.M.P (Comm.) No. 421 of 2016 filed by the Appellant was barred by limitation. The primary question for consideration in this Court is whether Section 31(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the "Act") contemplates the delivery of a copy of the award signed in original or whether a photocopy of the signed award would also suffice the requirement under Section 31(5); and whether the Single Judge was correct in holding that the petition under Section 34 of the Act fell beyond the period of limitation as specified under Section 34(3) of the Act. 2. DUSIB is a statutory body created by the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board Act, 2010 ("the DUSIB Act"). It invited tenders for allotment of parking site at West Delhi District Centre, Shivaji Place, Raja Garden, New Delhi. The Respondent (hereafter "Lakhvinder") successfully bid for the site; a license agreement dated 12.06.2013 was executed between the parties. This also provided for reference of disputes to arbitration. Lakhvinder raised certain disputes inter alia, regarding the condition of the site, which were referred for decision by a Sole Arbitrator. The Arbitrator heard arguments in the matter on 02.11.2015 and the matter was reserved for passing of an award. DUSIB submits that no award was received for nearly four months, and a letter, dated 14.03.2016 was sent to the arbitral tribunal by speed post on 15.03.2016 requesting him to pronounce the award. The tribunal passed an award dated 14.03.2016 awarding an amount of ` 1,44,28,500/- in Lakhvinder"s favour. A photocopy of the signed award was sent to one of the senior officers of DUSIB, its Director (A&M), at its office at Punarwas Bhavan, I.P Estate, New Delhi. 3. DUSIB claimed ignorance to the fact that the award had been made and by a reminder dated 24.05.2016, it requested the Arbitrator to make an award. The letter dated 24.05.2016 was received back un-served; it was sent again, on 02.06.2016. Subsequently, the arbitrator sent a photocopy of the signed award, dated 14.03.2016 to DUSIB at the address as set out in the statement of claim under cover of letter dated 26.5.2016. Thereafter, the petition under Section 34 of the Act was filed on 23.08.2016. 4. In its petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("the Act") DUSIBsubmitted that the impugned award was received by it on 26.05.2016 and on that basis it was further asserted that the petition was filed within time. However, it was argued on behalf of Lakhvinder that the letter dated 24.05.2016 was sent mischievously, as the DUSIB had already received a copy of the impugned award and the said letter was written only to extend the period of limitation. This receipt was admitted by DUSIB in the affidavit dated 07.11.2016, where it did not deny having received the award, on 22.03.2016 (this was not disclosed in the petition, however was admitted to otherwise, as noted in the decision by the learned Single Judge) as follows: "6. it seems that the said letter sent by the Arbitrator was received in the said office. The petitioner follows a system of having an e-office wherein all communications are scanned and then sent online. The said letter was received and marked to Director/Assistant Director but on account of breakdown in the computer system, the same could not be acted upon." 5. DUSIB, however, contended that the period of limitatio