International Building and Furnishing Co Pvt Ltd v. Life Insurance Corporatio of India and Ors

\ a {< IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Date of decision: 18tl'July, 2012 + LPA No. 512/2012 o/o INTERNATIONAL BUILDING & FURNISHING CO. PVT. LTD. ....Petitioner Through: Mr. Bahal U. Barqui, Adv. Versus LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA.... Respondents Tlu'ough: Mr. Karnal Melrta with Mr. Sudeep Singh, Advs. for R-1. Ms. Sweety Manchanda, CGSC for R-2&3. AND LPA No. 513/2012 o/o INTERNATIONAL BUILDING & FURNISHING CO. PVT. LTD. ....Petitioner Jhrough: Mr'. Bahal U. Barqui, Adv. Versus LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA.... Respondents Tlu'ough: Ml. Karnal Mehta with ltft'. Sudeep Singh. Advs. for R-l. Ms. Sweety Manchanda CGSC for ' R-2&3. CORAM:- IION'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF'JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJTV SAHAI ENDLAW JfIDGNIENT RAJIV SAHAI ENDLA\ry. J.

¶1These two Intra-Court appeals irnpugn the cornnon order dated l't May, 2012 of the learned Single Judge disrnissing W.P.(C) No.l11612012 and W.P.(C) No.1200/2012 prefened by the appellant. The said wlit LPtl No' 512'13 t2ol2 Pnge I of7 { a petitions were preferred with respect to the two prernises, one ad-measuring 801 sq. ft. on the fir'st floor and the other ad-measuring 891 sq. ft. on the fiff*r floor, of Jeevan Bharti Building, 24, Connaught Circus, New Delhi of the respondent LIC in occupation of the appellant and irnpugning the notices seled b)' the respondent LIC on the appellant of tennination of tenancy of the appellant of the said two prernises.

¶2The challenge by the appellant to the notices of tennination of its tenancy of the two prernises was predicated on the following grounds:-

(i) that the notices of tennination of tenancy, with a threat, on non-cornpliance thereof, of proceedings for eviction and for recovery of darnages for use and occupation before the Estate Officer of the respondent under the provisions of The Public Prernises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, L97I arc in confiavention ofthe Guidelines notified on 30'l'Muy, 2002.

(ii) that the notices ale bad in the face of the offer of appellant to increase the rent by as rnuch as 100% of the last paid rent. Reliance in this regard was placed on the judgrnent of the Bombay High Court in Parsis I{othawala v. LIC 2004 BCR 4 614, SLP No.2290412004 whereagainst was disrnissed by the Supreme Court, Nusli Neville lItadia v New Indiu Assurance Co. Ltd. 2006 (3) MhLj 713 upheld by the Suprerne Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville llradia (2008) 3 SCC279. a I.hl it'o. 512-B nU2 a

¶3The learned Single Judge disrnissed the writ petitions holding -

(a) that as fal as the Guidelines notified on 30tr' May, 2002 are concerrred, the sarne vide judgrnent dated 23'd March, 2012 of the Division Bench of this Court h Life Insurance Corporution of Indiu v. Damyanti Verma have been held to be not of binding nature;

(b) that it is even otherwise open to the appellant to take all defences available to it in the proceedings under the PP Act.

¶4We, besides in Danryanti Vernm supr?, have also had an occasion to exhaustively deal with the subject in our judgrnent dated lltl' May, 20L2 tn LPA No.9/2012 titled Indian Institute of Public Opinion Pvt Ltd. v. Ltfe Insurance Corporation of India and in otb.er connected rnatters, one of which was of the counsel for the appellant herein. In view thereof need is not felt to burden this judgrnent with the same rnatter. Suffice it is to state that clarification to the Guidelines also carves out an exception in favour of affluent tenants and in which category thc appellant definitely falls.

¶5The counsel for the appellant contends that Special Leave Petitions to the Suprerne Court have been prefened against our judgrnent in Damysffii Verma (supra) and vide interirn order in which SLPs, dispossession has been stayed. He contends that the present appeals be entertained to await the outcorne of the decision of the Supreme Court and in the rneanwhile the respondent LIC be restrained from proceeding against the appellant before the Estate Officer. a, Lht No. 512-8 nU2 a

¶6We are unable to agree. As far as this Court is concerned, the matter is no longer res integra in view of the judgrnents supla in Damyanti Verma and Indinn Institute of Public Opinion Pvt. Ltd. Mere prefening of SLPs and issuance of notice therein does not change the position. Significantly, the interirn order of the Suprerne Court does not stay the operation of the said judgrnents. Moreovel experience has shown that such occupants of public prernises are able to keep the proceedings even before the Estate Officer pending for several years and for this reason also the contention of the counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted.

¶7We ale also of the opinion that writ petitions even otherwise were not rnaintainable. The respondent LIC has vide notices irnpugned only detennined the tenancy of the appellant. The appellant even otherwise adrnits the tenn of the leases in its favour to have expiled. It is not as if the respondent LIC after expiry of the tenn of the lease or detennination of the tenancy is forcibly evicting the appellant. Resort is being taken to the provisions of the PP Act which also provides for statutory appeal against the order of the Estate Officer, if at all, against the appellant. We fail to see as to how the appellan! instead of availing of the said procedure prescribed in law can jurnp the gun and challenge the notices by filing the writ petitions especially when the legal position as fal as this Court is concemed stands settled vide judgrnent Danryanti Verma and in Indian Institute of Public Opinion Pvt. Ltd. It is not as if the appellant does not otherwise want to contest the proceediogs under the PP Act and is intending to challenge the szune on these grounds only. Entertaining a challenge at this stage to the notice of tennination when the appellant does not give up the right to I'PA No' 512-8 no,2 Pnge4 of 7 a-a otherwise contest the proceedings before the Estate Officer would tantarnount to delaying the proceedings before the Estate Officer till the decision on the said aspect.

¶8The Supreme Court n D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration

(1983) 4 SCC 293 has deprecated the practice of, fu'st entertaining the challenge on prelirninary objections and held that the High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought not to stop proceedings before the Tribunal so that a prelirninary issue rnay be decided by thern. It was fiuttrer held that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of hrdia ought not to be pennitted to be so exploited. Even prior to the said judgrnent of the Apex Court, this Court in Sltops and Comntercial Workers Union v. Management of Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbia College Board MANU/DE|}I7611979 had expressed anguish at delay caused by entertaining such petitions. The Suprerne Court again in Nationul Council for Cement & Building Materials v. State of Haryana

(L996) 3 SCC 206 cornrnented upoll the appalling situation created by entertaining such petitions at interim stage and staying the proceedings before the Tribunal. It was observed that there is no justification for apuly to the proceedings to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by raising prelirninary issues.

¶9A Division Bench of this Court in Hindustan National Glass Industries v. Union of India 132 Q006) DLT 454 held that statutory proceedings pending at the stage of show cause notice ought not to be interfered with in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and which proceedings ought not to be pennitted to be 'LP'L No' sI2-13 /2012 Page 5 of7 a a bypassed by resort to writ proceedings under Article 226. Another Division bench n Pepsico Restaurants Interruationnl (I) (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1995) 35 DRJ 516 has also reiterated that the High Court should not entertain a writ petition against a mere show cause notice except in the,case of patent lack ofjurisdiction in the authority issuing the notice or violation of principles of natural justice. It was held that the High Court should leave such a hasty petitioner to pursue the rernedy of showing cause against the notice raising all his contentions for the consideration of the statutory authority and then approach the High Court in the event of the result going against hirn. The Supreme Court also in The Special Director v. Mohd. Gltulam Ghouse (2004) 3 SCC 440 has deprecated entertaining fte petition challenging the show cause notices.

¶10Notice may also be taken of Nopany Investments (P) Lt(t. v. Santokh Singh @Un (2008) 2 SCC 728 layng down that a notice to quit under Section 106 of flre Transfer of Property Act is not necessary in as tnuclt as filing of an eviction proceeciings under the general law itself is a notice to quit upon the tenant. The said reasoning was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Shri Ram Pistons & Rings Ltd. v. C.B. A g u ru a I //ry' MANU IDE I 23 B I I 2008 .

¶11As fal as the offer of the appellant to increase the rent by 100% is concetned, the appellant is an old occupant of the premises at rneager rent; even doubiing would uot bring the rent anywhere'close to prevalent rnarket rent. We have already in Indian Institute of Public Opinion Pvt. Ltd. held that when the prernises of respondent LIC can fetch a higher rent, there is no reason for LIC to, to the advantage of a particular tenant and at its own loss, I'PA No' 512-13 ro12 Poge 6 oJ7 accornmodate such tenant.

¶12Thus, whichever way we rnay look, no error can be found in the order of the learned Single Judge. The appeal is without any rnerits and is disrnissed. No costs. JULY t8,2012 p) a RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW. J LPA No. 512-8 n0D Poge 7 of 7