Taru Pant v. Secretary General, Supreme Court of India (W.P.(C) 11067/2025)

Court: High Court of Delhi
Decided: 29 August 2025
Bench: Prateek Jalanauthor
Case no.: W.P.(C) 11067/2025

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Judgment

J U D G M E N T

¶1The petitioners in these writ petitions are al candidates for appointment to the post of Junio respondent - Supreme Court of India, pursuant to an advertisement dated

04.02.2025. They are agrieved by a notification dated 14.07.2025 , by which result s of the Typing Sped Test stage of the recruitment proces were declared. The petitioners' gr from the next stage of recruitment [Descriptive Test], despite having ben declared as qualified in the Typing Sped Test .

¶2As the petitions are predicated on virtualy identical ground s , they were taken up for hearing together. W.P.(C) 107/2025 was treated as the lead case . W ith the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the pleadings filed therein have ben considered in respect of al the petitions.

3 of

A. F ACTS :

¶3The respondent advertised 241 vacancies for the post of JCA on

04.02.2025. The present dispute concerns the —Scheme of Examination " provided in the advertisement , which is reproduced below:

—Scheme of Examination

The eligible candidates wil have to apear in the tests in the folowing subject: -

¶1Objective Type Question paper with multiple choice answers containing 10 questions (consisting of 50 General English questions including comprehension, 25 General Aptitude questions and 25 General Knowledge questions) . 2 hours

¶2Objective Type Computer Knowledge Test (25 questions)

¶3Typing (English) test on Computer with minimum sped 35 w.p.m. (mistakes alowed upto 3% of total words to be typed)

minutes

¶4Descriptive Test (in English Language) consisting of Comprehension pasage, Precis Writing and Esay Writing

2 hours

The candidates who qualify in the Objective Type Writen Test and Objective Type Computer Knowledge Test wil only be caled for Typing Sped Test on Computer and Descriptive Test and those who qualify the said tests wil be required to apear for an Interview before an Interview Board and qualify the Interview by securing minimum qualifying marks. Number of candidates to be caled for Interview shal not exced the ratio of 1:3 i.e. 3 candidates against 1 vacancy subject to availability of candidates who would be qualified on the basis of above Tests. After qualifying in prescribed tests and Interview, the selected candidates wil be empaneled in the order of merit for apointment as Junior Court Asistant. The candidates may note that mere placement in panel does not confer any right on the candidates to claim apointment for the post of Junior Court Asistant. "

1 Emphasis suplied.

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¶4The petitioners w ere sucesful in the first two stages of the examination , which comprised of Objective Type Question Paper and the

Objective Type Computer Knowledge Test. They were therefore caled for a Typing Test on computer. The admit card s for the Typing Sped Test contained several — Instructions to Candidate s ", of which the folowing are relevant:

—Instruction to Candidates : English Typing test of SCI wil be conducted in folowing maner.

Exam

Typing Pasage

Exam Structure

Exam Duration

English Typing

350 Words

Mock Test (5 mins) + Break (10 mins) + English Typing (10 mins)

25 mins

¶310 minutes wil be given for actual Typing Test (English)

¶4Candidates wil be able to do a practice typing test for 5 minutes before the actual typing test

¶5There wil also be a break of 10 minutes betwen Mock / Practice and the Actual Typing Test.

Marking Formula for Typing Sped Test on Computer

No. of mistakes

Marks to be awarded out of maximum 50 marks

50.0

47.73

45.45

43.18

40.91

38.64

36.36

34.09

31.82

29.5

27.27

¶25"

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¶5By the impugned notification dated 14.07.2025, the respondent declared the result of the Typing Sped Test held on 04.06.2025 for , 28 1 candidates. The opening paragraph of the notification and first

rows, by way of example, are reproduced below:

—Result of Typing Sped Test on Computer in respect of 10281

candidates for the post of Junior Court Asistant held on June 04, 2025

The candidates who have qualified Typing Sped Test on Computer and secured 43.18 marks or more marks out of 50 marks in said test

along with 10 candidates of PwD category who have ben exempted from the said test are required to apear in Descriptive Test (in English) to be conducted tentatively on 01.08.2025 in Delhi/NCR.

S l .No.

Name

Rol No.

Qualified/Not Qualified

Marks Scored

10290189

Not Qualified

N/A

Sanehu Kumari

103020

Not Qualified

N/A

Anupam Kumar Jha

10350178

Qualified

27.27

x " 2

2 Emphasis suplied.

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¶6As far as the five petitioners are concerned, their results were as folows:

S l .No.

Name

Rol No.

Qualified/Not Qualified

Marks Scored

Saurabh Nishad

27210491010

Qualified

40.91

1956

Pramiti Basu

1361010306

Qualified

38.64

4713

Anuj Chauhan

268104840252

Qualified

40.91

Shahid Ahmed

15810162040

Qualified

38.64

9075

Taru Pant

14510130201

Qualified

38.64

¶7It is evident from the above that , although the petitioners were declared — Qualified ", they did not achieve the score of 43.18 , as

required to apear in the Descriptive Test .

B. M ATERIAL PLACED ON RECORD BY THE RESPONDENT

¶8The respondent filed a counter afidavit dated 08.08.2025, and an aditional afidavit dated 14.08.2025 3 . T he respondent also produced before the Court its record relating to the impugned recruitment. A copy of the record was handed up to the Court at the hearing on 18.08.2025. Although the extracts of the record have not ben anexed to the afidavit filed by the respondent, learned counsel for the petitioners were permited to inspect the record, and make their submisions thereupon. The order of the Court dated 18.08.2025 records that this procedure was adopted with the consent of learned counsel for the parties. A p hotocopy of the relevant Note from the respondent's record has ben placed in a sealed cover with the Registry.

3 Filed pursuant to permision granted by order dated 12.08.2025.

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¶9In the afidavits filed by the respondent, they have traced the power to shortlist candidates, to Clause 18 of the Advertisement, which reads as folows:

—18.

The Registry reserves its right to short - list candidates in any maner as may be considered apropriate with the aproval of Competent Authority.

The Registry reserves the right to cancel/restrict/enlarge/modify/alter the recruitment proces, if neded, without isuing any notice . "

10.

The respondent has also relied upon the Supreme Court Oficers & Servants (Conditions of Service an specificaly Rule 47, which reads as folows:

—47. Residuary Powers - Nothing in these Rules shal be demed to afect the power of the Chief Justice to make such - orders, from time to time, as he may dem fit in regard to al maters incidental or ancilary to these rules not specificaly provided for herein or in regard to maters as have not ben suficiently provided for:

Provided that if any such order relates to salaries, alowances, leave or pensions of Court servants, the same shal be made with the aproval of the President. "

In the respondent's counter aff the folowing data has ben provided with regard to the recruitment in question:

—5. That the complete data of candidates participated for the notified post of 241 are as under:

Sr. No.

Particulars

Figures

i. Total Number of aplications received for the post of Junior Court Asistant

1,34,608

Number of candidates apeared in MCQ Test (Writen Test)

76,749

Number of candidates qualified in MCQ Test (Writen Test)

61,561

iv.

Number of candidates shortlisted for typing sped test on computer 10,93

4 Emphasis suplied.

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shortlisted on the basis of 10 or more marks out of 125 marks in MCQ Test (Writen Test)

v. Number of candidates apeared for Typing Sped Test on Computer

10,281

vi.

Number of candidates qualified for Typing Sped Test on computer having secured minimum qualified 25 marks or more

3731

vi.

Number of candidates shortlisted for apearing in Descriptive Test out of candidates who qualified Typing Sped exempted from Test on Computer (Criteria aplied œ ratio of 1:10) candidates securing marks

43.18 or more were shortlisted

2651+10 PwD Candidates exempted from Typing Test

vi.

Number of candidates apeared in Descriptive Test

2547 "

12.

The justification for the benchmark of 43.18 marks is provided in the fo l lowing extracts of the counter afidavit:

—8. That the benchmark of 43.18 marks (i.e., candidates comiting up to 3 mistakes in the Typing Test) was fixed by the Registry with the aproval of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India (hereinafter refered to as the "Competent Authority ') , taking into acount the limited number of 241 vacancies and the requirement to maintain a 1:10 ratio of candidates for the next stage. Acordingly, only candidates who secured 43.18 marks or more were shortlisted. This administrative decision was based on performance merit and was consistent with the shortlisting principle aplied in the earlier stage of recruitment.

That it is relevant to note that shortlisting on the basis of a benchmark was also aplied at the earlier stage. Out of 61,561 candidates who qualified in the Writen Test, only 10,93 candidates scoring 10 marks or more out of 125 were shortlisted for the Typing Sped Test. This demonstrates that benchmarking has ben a consistent feature of the entire recruitment proces and was aplied transparently and objectively at every stage and the petitioners were wel aware of the same.

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12.

That the benchmark of 43.18 marks was finalized upon the submision of a note dated 09.07.2025 and aproved by the Competent Authority on 18.07.2025, in consultation with the Hon'ble Judge nominated to overse the conduct of the examination. Pursuant to this, a total of 2,651 candidates, who secured 43.18 marks or more, and 10 PwD candidates (exempted from the Typing Test) were shortlisted for the Descriptive Test.

13.

That the decision to aply the said benchmark is further suported and validated by Rule 4(2)(c) and Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Oficers & Servants (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1961, as wel as Article 146 of the Constitution of India, which vests the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India with absolute discretion in maters of apointment and conduct of recruitment in the Supreme Court.

14.

In view of the above, it is submited that the fixation of the

43.18 benchmark is neither arbitrary nor retrospective, but rather a lawful, consistent, and rational exercise of administrative discretion. The same was necesary to ensure eficient procesing of candidates for the limited vacancies and is fuly in line with the terms of the recruitment notification, service rules, and constitutional scheme. The Petitioner's chalenge to the shortlisting proces is, therefore, unfounded and liable to be rejected. "

13.

In the aditional afidavit dated 14.08.2025 , paragraph 12 of the count er afidavit dated 08.08.2025 has ben clarified, to the extent that the R egistry N ote dated 09.07.2025 was aproved by the Hon'ble Ch Justice of India [— Competent Authority "] on

10.07.2025 , in consultation with the Hon'ble Judge nominate d to overse the conduct of the examination [—Nominated Authority "] . The date of —18.07.2025 " refered to in paragraph 12 , was in fact the date of aproval of a modification/corigend um, which was aproved by the Nominated

Authority .

C. S UBMISIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONERS

14.

Dr. Amit George, who apears for the petitioner in W.P. (C) 6 7/2025 , advance d arguments on her behalf. Mr. Shubham Prajapati,

learned counsel for the petitioners in the other four writ petitions , suplemented Dr. George's argument s .

15.

The principal submision of Dr. George was that the imposition of a cut - of of 43.18 marks in the Typing Test , to proced to the Descriptive Test stage , was not provided in the advertisement and was , therefore , tantamount to — changing rules of the game mid - way ". He submited that a plain reading of the —Scheme of Examination " provide d the criteria for qualification in the Typing Test, both in terms of minimum sped (35 words per minute) and maximum eror count ( 3% of the total words to be typed ) . In fact, it was submited that the petitioners have rightly ben declared as qualified, on the basis of these very criteria. Once these conditions were met, they were entitled to participate in the Descriptive Test without any further condition, but have ben excluded , for which there is no justification. There was neither any ambiguity in the advertisement , nor any statutory rule , which permited such a condition.

16.

Dr. George submited that , in the fact s of the present case, Clause 18 could not have ben used to insert a further qualification requirement

to the criteria already mentioned in the advertisement. In circumstances when the benchmark has ben set in the advertisement , it was submited that the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Tej Prakash Pathak & Ors. v. Rajasthan High Court & Ors 5 precludes seting of an aditional merit - based benchmark 6 , in the maner indicated in paragraph 1 of the respondent 's aditional afidavit . Dr. George argued that the efect of permiting such a broad interpretation of Clause 18 would , in fact,

5 ( 2025) 2 SCC 1 [hereinafter, — Tej Prakash Pathak "].

6 Ibid , paragraph 52.

diminish the central ratio of the Constitution Bench decision , that — rules of the game ought not to be changed mid - way ".

17.

Dr. George urged that shortlisting based on a multiple of the number of vacancies , canot be permited at the D escriptive T est stage . I n the advertisement , such a proces was expresly aplicable only at the I nterview s tage , for which a maximum of thre candidates were to be caled for each vacancy. He argued that, p rior to the I nterview stage, the minimum qualifications prescribed ought themselves to have ben employed for the purposes of shortlisting.

18.

It was further submited that , to the extent that Tej Prakash Pathak permits seting of benchmark at diferent stages of the recruitment proces, it requires this to be done before the stage in question is reached. In the present case, Dr. George submited that the benchmark was set only after the Typing Test had ben concluded. He argued aditionaly that the Typing Test and Descriptive Test are, in terms of the advertisement, a single stage of recruitment , and no filtering of candidates wa s permisible , other than by aplication of the qualifying criteria .

19.

In adition to Tej Prakash Pathak , Dr. George cited the judgements of the Supreme Court in Manoj Kumar v. Union of India 7 and Hemani Malhotra v. High Court of Delhi 8 , in suport of the above

contentions. He also refered to an article by Profesor C.H. Powel in the Constitutional Court Review 9 , to submit that the respondent , being the

7 (2024) 3 SC 563 [hereinafter, — Manoj Kumar "] . 8 (208) 7 SC 1 [hereinafter, — Hemani Malhotra "].

9 C H Powell, "Judicial Independence and the Offi Constitutional Court Review

497.

highest Court of the land , must not only lay dow but be constituted and maintained by it ".

20.

With regard to the scope of Rule 47 of the Rules, Dr. George submited that it confers only a —residuary power ", which ca exercised in maters incidental or ancilary to the Rules, or those which have ben inadequately provided for . Rule 4 of the Rules, on the other hand, confers a specific power with regard to recruitment, including the power to direct the maner in which recruitment shal be made in a case of direct recruitment, thus denuding Rule 47 of aplicability.

21.

Dr. George's next argument was centered around the requirement that an exercise of shortlisting, even if permited by the rules and/or advertisement, canot be arbitrary. He submited that no reasons are given in the Noting of the respondent, which was ultimately aproved by the Nominated Authority and the Competent Authority, as to why such shortlisting was required. The only observation was with regard to caling an — apropriate number of candidates " for interview , but no further elaboration was

provided. Dr. George submited that no such administrative exigency ocurs in the present case, so as to justify the implementation of a cut of of 43.18 marks. Out of the total number of 1,34,608 candidates who had aplied, 76,749 candidates participated in the first stage of the examination, and the number of candidates had already ben reduced to 10,281 at the stage of participation in the Typing Test. 3 , 731 candidates qualified in the Typing Test, out of which 2 , 61 candidates 10 , were caled for the Descriptive Test. The total number of

10 Including 10 candidates in the Persons with Disability category, who were exempted in the Typing Test.

qualified candidates was 3 , 731, which would have led to an adition of only 1 , 080 candidates. He submited that the participation of a large number of candidates was entirely foreseable and could not lay the foundation for a claim of administrative necesity.

Dr. George lastly submited that the suply of aditional grounds or reasoning in the afidavit of the respondent canot be used to justify the order, relying upon Mohinder Singh Gil v. Chief Election Comr. 1 . He also refer red to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramjit Singh Kardam v. Sanjev Kumar 12 , to argue that decision s canot be suported by undisclosed — administrative reasons ".

D . S UBMISIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

23.

Mr. Chetan Sharma , learned Aditional Solicitor General [—ASG"] , and Ms. Pratima N. Lakra , learned c ounsel , advanced arguments on behalf of the respondent.

24.

Learned ASG submited that C lause 18 of the advertisement , specificaly permit ted shortlisting of candidates in any maner considered apropriate, with the aproval of the Competent Authority . He contended that such a reserved power was consistent with the Constitution Bench decision in Tej Prakash Pathak , as also the earlier decision of the S upreme C ourt in Yogesh Yadav v. Union of India 13 .

25.

Relying upon the material placed on record by the respondent, learned ASG contended that the benchmark of 43.18 marks was aplied on the basis of a ratio of 10 candidates for every vacancy. This exercise

1 (1978) 1 SC 405 [hereinafter, — Mohinder Singh Gil "].

12 (2020) 20 SC 209 [hereinafter, — Ramjit Singh Kardam "].

was aproved by the Competent Authority in exercise of powers specificaly reserved in C lause 18 of the advertisement, and was aplied uniformly to al candidates. He also submited that the petitioners participated in the selection proces, and must therefore live with the consequences of Clause 18, which was known to them from the very begining of the recruitment proces. Specificaly, he drew my atention to the counter afidavit dated 08.08.2025 14 , which shows that an exercise of shortlisting was conducted even at an earlier stage of the recruitment, i.e. after the Objective Test (Writen Test). The afidavit states that 61,561 candidates qualified in the Writen Test (Multiple Choice Question), out of which 10,93 were shortlisted for Typing Sped Test, including the petitioners herein. This shortlisting was also caried out , not on the basis of any expres criteria in the advertisement, but in exercise of power under Clause 18.

26.

Learned ASG further submited that such a decision was not arbitrary or unreasonable , but was justified by requirements of administrative exigency . He argued that such an administrative decision was also not contrary to any statutory rule , and in fact was authorised by Rule 47 of the Rules .

27.

It was , therefore , submited that the decision was not open to chalenge within the limited jurisdiction available under Article 26 of the Constitution. Learned ASG aditionaly cited West Bengal Central

13 (2013) 14 SC 623 [hereinafter, — Yogesh Yadav "].

14 Paragraphs 5 & 7.

Schol Service Comision & Ors. v. Abdul Halim & Ors. 15 in suport of his submisions.

E. A NALYSIS : i. Constitution Bench judgment in Tej Prakash Pathak

28.

T he recent Constitution Bench decision in Tej Prakash Pathak lays

down the legal pr inciple s which govern the doctrine against —changing the rules of the game mid - way ". As learned counsel on both sides placed considerable emphasis on the said judgment, a detailed analysis thereof is required .

29.

The isue in that case concern ed recruitment to the post of Translator from amongst Judicial Asistant s and Junior Judicial Asistant s in the Rajasthan High Court. The recruitment was held under Staf Service Rules framed by the Rajasthan High Court in the year 202. candidates participated in the examination, and thre were declared s elected , on the basis of a decision of the Hon'ble Chief Justice , that only those candidates who secured a minimum of 75% of the marks would be selected. A writ petition filed on behalf of unsucesful candidates was dismised by the Rajasthan High Court. The chalenge to the Rajasthan High Court decision was refered to a Constitution Bench , questioning the judgment in K. Manjusre v. State of Andhra Pradesh 16 , on the ground that it failed to consider an earlier decision in State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwah a 17 .

15 (2019) 18 SC 39 [hereinafter, — West Bengal Central Schol Service Comision "].

16 ( 208 ) 3 SC 512 [hereinafter, —K. Manjusre "].

17 ( 1974 ) 3 SCC 220 [hereinafter, — Subhash Chander Marwaha "].

30.

The Constitution Bench has described the basis of the doctrine as folows:

—25. Candidates participating in a recruitment proces have legitimate expectation that the proces of selection wil be fair and non - arbitrary. The basis of doctrine of legitimate expectation in public law is founded on the principles of fairnes and non - arbitrarines in government dealings with individuals. It recognises that a public authority's promise or past conduct wil give rise to a legitimate expectation. This doctrine is premised on the notion that public authorities, while performing their public duties, ought to honour their promises or past practices. The legitimacy of an expectation can be infered if it is roted in law, custom, or established procedure.

¶26However, the doctrine of legitimate expectation does not impede or hinder the power of the public authorities to lay down a policy or withdraw it. The public authority has the discretion to exercise the ful range of choices available within its executive power. The public authority often has to take into consideration diverse factors, concerns, and interests before ariving at a particular policy decision. The courts are generaly cautious in interfering with a bona fide decision of public authorities which denies legitimate expectation provided such a decision is taken in the larger public interest. Thus, public interest serves as a limitation on the aplication of the doctrine of legitimate expectation.

¶27Courts have to determine whether the public interest is compeling and suficient to outweigh the legitimate expectation of the claimant. While performing a balancing exercise, courts have to often graple with the isues of burden and standard of prof required to dislodge the claim of legitimate expectation. "

31.

The Court reconciled the decision s in Subhash Chander Marwaha

and K. Manjusre , and also considered the judgments in K .H. S iraj v. High Court of Kerala 18 and He mani Malhotra , as folows:

—42.

A close reading of the judgment in Subash Chander Marwaha would disclose that there was no change in the rules of the game qua eligibility for placement in the select list. There the select list was prepared in acordance with the extant rules. But, since the extant rules did not create any obligation on the part of the State Government

18 ( 206) 6 SC 395.

to make apointments against al notified vacancies, this Court opined that the State could take a policy decision not to apoint candidates securing les than 5% marks. With that reasoning and by taking into acount that apointments made were of top seven candidates in the select list, who had secured 5% or higher marks, this Court found no merit in the petition of the writ petitioners.

¶43On the other hand, in K. Manjusre, the eligibility criteria for placement in the select list was changed after interviews were held which had a material bearing on the select list. Thus, Subash Chander dealt with the right to be apointed from the select list whereas K. Manjusre dealt with the right to be placed in the select list. The two cases therefore dealt with altogether diferent isues. For the foregoing reasons, in our view, K. Manjusre could not have ben doubted for having failed to consider Subash Chander Marwaha . x

¶47The decision in K.H. Siraj makes it clear that if the rules governing recruitment provides latitude to the competent authority to devise its procedure for selection it may do so subject to the rule against arbitrarines enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. Even K. Manjusre does not proscribe fixing minimum marks for either the writen test, or the interview, as an eligibility criterion for selection. What K. Manjusre does is to regulate the stage at which it could be done. This is clear from the decision of this Court in Hemani Malhotra v. High Court of Delhi.

¶52Thus, in our view, the apointing authority/recruiting authority/competent authority, in absence of rules to the contrary, can devise a procedure for selection of a candidate suitable to the post and while doing so it may also set benchmarks for diferent stages of the recruitment proces including writen examination and interview. However, if any such benchmark is set, the same should be stipulated before the comencement of the recruitment proces. But if the extant Rules or the advertisement inviting aplications empower the competent authority to set benchmarks at diferent stages of the recruitment proces, then such benchmarks may be set any time before that stage is reached so that neither the candidate nor the evaluator/examiner/interviewer is taken by surprise.

53.

The decision in K. Manjusre does not proscribe seting of benchmarks for various stages of the recruitment proces but mandates that it should not be set after the stage is over, in other words after the game has already ben played. This view is in consonance with the rule against arbitrarines enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution

and mets the legitimate expectation of the candidates as also the requirement of transparency in recruitment to public services and thereby obviates malpractices in preparation of select list.

¶54As already noticed in Section (A), a recruitment proces inter alia comprises of various steps like inviting aplications, scrutiny of aplications, rejection of defective aplications or elimination of ineligible candidates, conducting examinations, caling for interview or viva voce and preparation of list of sucesful candidates for apointment. Subject to the rule against arbitrarines, how tests or viva voce are to be conducted, what questions are to be put, in what maner evaluation is to be done, whether a shortlisting exercise is neded are al maters of procedure which, in absence of rules to the contrary, may be devised by the competent authority. Often advertisement(s) inviting aplications are open - ended in terms of these steps and leave it to the discretion of the competent authority to adopt such steps as may be considered necesary in the circumstances albeit subject to the overarching principle of rule against arbitrarines enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution . x

¶57Likewise in Union of India v. T. Sundararaman 19 where the eligibility conditions refered to a minimum of 5 years' experience, the selection comite was held justified in shortlisting those candidates with more than 7 years' experience having regard to the large number of aplicants compared to the vacancies to be filed. The relevant observations are being extracted below:

—4. … Note 21 to the advertiseme that if a large number of aplications are received the Comision may shortlist candidates for interview on the basis of higher qualifications although al aplicants may poses the requisite minimum qualifications. In M.P. Public Service Comision v. Navnit Kumar Potdar 20 this Court has upheld shortlisting of candidates on some rational and reasonable basis. In that case, for the purpose of shortlisting, a longer period of experience than the minimum prescribed was used as a criterion by the Public Service Comision for caling candidates for an interview. This was upheld by this Court . I n State of A.P. v. P. Dilip Kumar 21 also this Court said that it is always open to the recruiting agency to scren candidates due for

19 (197) 4 SC 64 . 20 (194) 6 SC 293 . 21 (193) 2 SC 310 .

consideration at the threshold of the proces of selection by prescribing higher eligibility qualification so that the field of selection can be narowed down with the ultimate objective of promoting candidates with higher qualifications to enter the zone of consideration. The procedure, therefore, adopted in the present case by the Commission was legitimate."

¶58Similarly, in Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B. 2 it was held that shortlisting is permisible on the basis of administrative instructions provided the action is bona fide and reasonable. The relevant observations in the judgment are extracted below:

—38. … The contention on behalf o that writen examination was for shortlisting the candidates and was in the nature no doubt substance in it in view of the fact that the records disclose that there were about 80 posts of Medical Technologists and a huge number of candidates, aproximately 40 aplied for apointment. The State authorities had, therefore, no ot candidates by holding writen examination. It was observed that no recruitment rules were framed in exercise of the power under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and hence no such action could be taken. In our opinion, however, even in absence of statutory provision, such an action can always be taken on the basis of administrative instructions –for the purpose of —elimination" and —shortlisting" candidates provided the action is otherwise bona fide and reasonable ."

¶59Another example is in respect of fixing diferent cut - ofs for diferent subjects having regard to the relative importance of the subjects and their degre of relevance. These instances make it clear that this Court has ben lenient in leting recruiting bodies devise an apropriate procedure for sucesfuly concluding the recruitment proces provided the procedure adopted has ben transparent, non - discriminatory/non - arbitrary and having a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. "

32.

On the basis of the above discusion, the Constitution Bench came

to the folowing conclusion s :

2 (209) 1 SC 768.

23 Emphasis suplied.

—Conclusions

¶65We, therefore, answer the reference in the folowing terms:

65.1. Recruitment proces comences from the isuance of the advertisement caling for aplications and ends with filing up of vacancies;

65.2. Eligibility criteria for being placed in the select list, notified at the comencement of the recruitment proces, canot be changed midway through the recruitment proces unles the extant Rules so permit, or the advertisement, which is not contrary to the extant Rules, so permit. Even if such change is permisible under the extant Rules or the advertisement, the change would have to met the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution and satisfy the test of non - arbitrarines;

65.3. The decision in K. Manjusre v. State of A.P. lays down god law and is not in conflict with the decision in State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha. Subash Chander Marwaha deals with the right to be apointed from the select list whereas K. Manjusre deals with the right to be placed in the select list. The two cases therefore deal with altogether diferent isues;

65.4. Recruiting bodies, subject to the extant Rules, may devise apropriate procedure for bringing the recruitment proces to its logical end provided the procedure so adopted is transparent, non - discriminatory/non - arbitrary and has a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved;

65.5. Extant Rules having statutory force are binding on the recruiting body both in terms of procedure and eligibility. However, where the rules are non - existent, or silent, administrative instructions may fil in the gaps;

65.6. Placement in the select list gives no indefeasible right to apointment. The State or its instrumentality for bona fide reasons may chose not to fil up the vacancies. However, if vacancies exist, the State or its instrumentality canot arbitrarily deny apointment to a person within the zone of consideration in the select list. "

i. Aplying the principles to the present case

Aplying the judgment of the C onstitution B ench , I am of the view that t he key to this case lies in a cohesive interpretation of both, Clause of the advertisement, and of the —Scheme of Examination " provided

therein . The —Scheme of Examination " provides for four stages of examination, prior to an interview. Clause 18 expresly reserves a right of shortlisting in the employer , and no statutory r u le to the contrary has ben cited. Such a provision would therefore fal within the permisible discretion to the employer, as provided in paragraph 52 of Tej Prakash Pathak , subject to the test of Article 14 of the Constitution.

34.

Dr. George , however, urged that such a procedure canot be adopted as far as the Descriptive Test stage of the examination is concerned, as the advertisement expresly provides for the criteria required for the preceding stage of Typing Test. While this argument is atractive at first blush, it does not withstand deper scrutiny. A distinction must be made betwen qualifying or eligibility criteria provided in the advertisement, and a shortlisting benchmark , which can be suplied later, if the rules and/or the advertisement so permit. A limited reading of C lause 18, which mandates aplication of the same criteria as stated in the advertisement, for the purposes of shortlisting, denudes the Registry of the power expresly reserve d by Clause 18. Such an analysis, which conflates qualification or eligibility criteria, with shortlisting or selection benchmarks, is in my view not consistent with Tej Prakash Pathak .

35.

Dr. George raised an ancilary textual argument, that the —Scheme of Examination " required the Typing Test and Descriptive Test to be considered as a single stage , without any shortlisting permisible betwen the two sub - stages . He clarified that the advertised criteria for the Typing Test could be used to wed out candidates at that stage, but submited that

24 Emphasis suplied.

no other benchmark could have ben employed. I am unable to acept this submision. The Typing Test and Descriptive Test were clearly enumerated as the third and fourth stage of the recruitment proces. The very fact that separate criteria have ben laid down for the Typing Test, implies that they were separate and distinct stages. That t hey have ben dealt with conjointly in the narative below the tabular — Scheme of Examination " canot , by itself , be determinative . The petitioners acept that every candidate, who was permited to participate in the Typing Test, ned not also be caled for the Descriptive Test , but sugest that the disqualification should be limited to those who did not fulfil the minimum criteria laid down in the advertisement itself [sped of 35 words per minute and maximum 3% mistakes]. I am of the view that, to the contrary, permiting such an exercise implies that the two are diferent stages, in which case, both qualification and shortlisting benchmarks could have ben aplied.

36.

Dr. George next pointed out that, in Tej Prakash Pathak 25 , the Constitution Bench has held that a shortlisting benchmark must be set before the relevant stage is reached, so that neither the candidate, nor the evaluator/examiner/interviewer is taken by surprise. The procedure adopted in the present case does not, in my view, violate the intention of the observation of the Supreme Court. Shortlisting was being conducted, in the present case, at an intermediate stage of the recruitment, on the basis of a multiple of the number of vacancies. The marking scheme for T yping T est was known to candidates al along; they were wel aware that they would be asesed on the basis of sped and acuracy. There was no

change in these parameters of asesment. Consequently, the case does not raise any question of being taken by surprise, because the very same marking scheme was adopted.

37.

Dr. George's submission , that such an interpretation of Tej Prakash Pathak permits the exception to govern , rather than the rule, does not comend to me. The Constitution Bench has itself characteri s ed the exercise as one of balancing legitimate expectations with public interest. The objectives of a selection proces have ben identified as selection of the most suitable person , based on impartial and objective merit - based selection , avoiding patronage and favouritism. There is no alegation in the present case, that these fundamental atributes have ben breached. The balance struck by the Constitution Bench must, therefore, be observed , to the fulest extent posible . Aplication of the doctrine against change of rules midway, even in a case where such a — change " is permited by the judgment, would disturb the balance.

38.

This aproach is also, in my view, suported by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Yogesh Yadav, cited by the learned ASG . In that case , the employer had fixed a minimum benchmark for selection of candidates after the writen test and interview proces . The number of available vacancies was not filed , only on the ground that suficient number of candidates did not met the benchmark imposed later . The Supreme Court refered to the judgments in Subhash Chander Marwaha

and Hemani Malhotra , both of which have ben considered in Tej Prakash Pathak , and held as folows:

25 Paragraph 52.

26 Paragraph 27, Tej Prakash Pathak .

—13. The instant case is not a case where no minimum marks are prescribed for viva voce and this is sought to be done after the writen test. As noted above, the instructions to the examines provided that writen test wil cary 80% marks and 20% marks were asigned for the interview. It was also provided that candidates who secured minimum 50% marks in the general category and minimum 40% marks in the reserved categories in the writen test would qualify for the interview. The entire selection was undertaken in acordance with the aforesaid criterion which was laid down at the time of recruitment proces. After conducting the interview, marks of the writen test and viva voce were to be aded. However, since a benchmark was not stipulated for giving the apointment. What is done in the instant case is that a decision is taken to give apointments only to those persons who have secured 70% marks or above marks in the unreserved category and 65% or above marks in the reserved category. In the absence of any rule on this aspect in the first instance, this does not am game". The High Court has rightly held that it is not a situation where securing of minimum marks was introduced which was not stipulated in the advertisement, standard was fixed for the purpose of selection. Therefore, it is not a case of changing the rules of the game. On the contrary in the instant case a decision is taken to give apointment to only those who fulfiled the benchmark prescribed. The fixation of such a benchmark is permisible in law. This is an altogether diferent situation not covered by Hemani Malhotra case.

. The decision taken in the instant case amounts to shortlisting of candidates for the purpose of selection/apointment which is always permisible. For this course of action of CI, justification is found by the High Court noticing the judgment of this Court in State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha . In that case, Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Service Rules was the subject - mater of interpretation. This Rule stipulated consideration of candidates who secured 45% marks in agregate. Notwithstanding the same, the High Court recomended the names of candidates who had secured 5% marks and the Government acepted the same. However, later on it changed its mind and the High Court isued mandamus directing apointment to be given to those who had secured 45% and above marks instead of 5% marks. In apeal, the judgment of the High Court was set aside holding as under:

—12. … It is contended that the acted arbitrarily in fixing 5% as the minimum for selection and this is contrary to the rule refered to above. The argument has no force. Rule 8 is a step in the

preparation of a list of eligible candidates with minimum qualifications who may be considered for apointment. The list is prepared in order of merit. The one higher in rank is demed to be more meritorious than the one who is lower in rank. It could never be said that one who tops the list is equal in merit to the one who is at the botom of the list. Except that they are al mentioned in one list, each one of them stands on a separate level of competence as compared with another. That is why Rule 10(i), Part C speaks of "selection for appointm constraint on the State Government in respect of the number of apointment to be made, there is no constraint on the State Government in respect of the number of apointments to be made, there is no constraint on the Government fixing a higher score of marks for the purpose of selection. In a case where apointments are made by selection from a number of eligible candidates it is open to the Government with a view to maintain high standards of competence to fix a score which is much higher than the one required for mere eligibility

¶15Another weighty reason given by the High Court in the instant case, while aproving the aforesaid action of CI is that the intention of CI was to get more meritorious candidates. There was no change of norm or procedure and no mandate was fixed that a candidate should secure minimum marks in the interview. In order to have meritorious persons for those posts, fixation of minimum 65% marks for selecting a person from the OBC category and minimum 70% for general category, was legitimate giving a demarcating choice to the employer. In the words of the High Court:

—In the case at hand, as we perce Comision was to get more meritorious candidates. There has ben no change of norm or procedure. No mandate was fixed that a candidate should secure minimum marks in the interview. Obtaining of 65% marks was thought as a guideline for selecting the candidate from the OBC category. The objective is to have the best hands in the field of law. Acording to us, fixation of such marks is legitimate and gives a demarcating choice to the employer. It has to be borne in mind that the requirement of the job in a Competition Comision demands a wel - structured selection proces. Such a selection would advance the cause of eficiency. Thus scrutinised, we do not perceive any eror in the fixation of marks at 65% by

the Comision which has ben uniformly aplied. The said action of the Comision canot be treated to be illegal, irrational or illegitima

¶16It is stated at the cost of repetition that there is no change in the criteria of selection which remained of 80 marks for writen test and 20 marks for interview without any subsequent introduction of minimum cut - of marks in the interview. It is the shortlisting which is done by fixing the benchmark, to recruit best candidates on rational and reasonable basis. That is clearly permisible under the law . "

39.

Thus, in Yogesh Yadav , the minimum benchmark for selection was not provided at al, but was permited to be fixed later. This is also in line with the decision of the Constitution Bench in Tej Prakash Pathak . In the present case also, there is a diference betwen the qualification criteria laid down in the advertisement , and the shortlisting criteria aplied while isuing the impugned notification date 14.07.2025. This is also thus a case of shortlisting , similar to that in Yogesh Yadav , although aplied at an intermediate stage of the recruitment proces , rather than at the final stage of selection .

40.

I am, therefore, of the view that the impugned action of shortlisting was permisible under Clause 18 of the a dvertisement.

41.

It may be noted that learned ASG raised an alternative submision, that the respondent's action in th of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Tej Prakash Pathak , even in the absence of Clause 18. I do not consider it necesary to enter into this contention at al as , in my view , Clause 18 expresly provides the answer . For the same reason, it is not necesary to examine whether the

respondent's actions were also be justified by Clause 47 of the Rules.

27 Emphasis suplied.

Judgments cited by the petitioner

42.

The judgments in Manoj Kumar and Hemani Malhotra , cited to support the petitioners' contenti shortlisting benchmark, do not persuade me to a contrary conclusion.

43.

Manoj Kumar predates the judgment in Tej Prakash Pathak. The employer had reserved the right to shortlist candidates at diferent stages of recruitment. The vacancy circular provided the basic qualification criteria and selection was to be made after conducting interview of qualified candidates. The employer, however, later isued a notification dispensing with the interview, and instead alocating aditional marks for esential qualifications, esential experience, and a writen test. One of the candidates chalenged the selection, on the ground that he posesed an aditional post - graduate qualification, but it was ignored on the ground that it was not in the relevant subject. The variation in the selection procedure was not chalenged.

Dr. George, however, relied upon the folowing observations of the Supreme Court:

—12. The standard argument made consistently and sucesfuly before the Single Judge and the Division Bench must fail before us. Clauses 14 and 19 of the vacancy circular do nothing more than reserving flexibility in the selection proces. They canot be read to invest the Institute with unbridled discretion to pick and chose candidates by suplying new criteria to the prescribed qualification. This is a clasic case of arbitrary action. The submision based on Clauses 14 and 19 must fail here and now.

¶13The other submission of the respon Degree" to a —PG Degree in relevant The ilegality in adopting and aplying such an interpretation is evident from a simple reading of the Notification dated 27 - 4 - 2016 providing for aditional qualifications. The aditional qualifications

provided under Clauses "a' to "d' ar "b' and "d' relating to PG Diploma, qualifications providing for 5, 6 and 10 marks, respectively, the category under "c' relates to profes This is where specialisation is prescribed. If we ad the requirement of specialisation to category "b' i. becomes redundant. The whole purpose of providing PG Degre independently and alocating a leser quantum of 6 marks wil be completely lost if such an interpretation is adopted. This can never be the purpose of prescribing distinct categories. No further analysis is necesary. We reject this submision also.

¶14The Single Judge as wel as the Division Bench did not realy analyse the prescription of aditional qualifications and the distinct marks alocated to each of them, but confined their decision to restraint in judicial review and dismised the apelant's prayer. When a citizen aleges arbitrarines in executive action, the High Court must examine the isue, of course, within the context of judicial restraint in academic maters. While respecting flexibility in executive functioning, courts must not let arbitrary action pas through. For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the decisions of the Single Judge and the Division Bench are not sustainable, and we hereby set aside their judgments. "

45.

This judgment is of litle asistance to the petitioner in the present case. The right reserved to the employer was of shortlisting, but the entirety of the proces was amended, both in the procedure itself, and by qualifying the grant of aditional marks based on subject of study. Paragraph 12 of Manoj Kumar proscribes — suplying new criteria to the prescribed qualification ". In the present case, were suplied. Candidates were asesed against the original criteria of typing sped and number of mistakes , and candidates were shortlisted in proportion to the number of vacancies.

46.

Hemani Malhotra has ben dealt with in the Constitution Bench judgment in Tej Prakash Pathak . The Court held that imposition of a

28 Emphasis suplied.

minimum qualifying mark in a viva voce test, which was not provided for in the recruitment advertisement, by a subsequent notification, was invalid.

47.

It may further be noted that, in Hemani Malhotra , there was no rule akin to Clause 18 of the advertisement, which specificaly reserve d the right to shortlist. The judgment is, therefore, distinguishable. In any event, the Constitution Bench in Tej Prakash Pathak, laid down the principles refered to above - including paragraph 52 - after considering the judgment in Hemani Malhotra . iv.

Argument of arbitrarines

48.

This takes us to the petitioner present case, does not pas the test of arbitrarines. To establish arbitrarines to a degre caling for the interference of the writ Court, the petitioners would have to demonstrate unreasonablenes, in the sense that no reasonable decision - maker could have arived at the same conclusion , based on the material.

49.

As far as this aspect is concerned, it is evident from the Note of the Registry that the apropriatenes of the ratio of 1:10 was proposed in the context of the number of posts to be filed, and it was also mentioned that the next stage of examination is the Descriptive Test. The Note later record ed the modalities for conduct of the Descriptive Test , either through University a cademicians or o ficers of the Registry. It also propose d checking of answer shets by outside a cademics and detail ed the consequent financial outlay . This also aludes to the task becoming

more burdensome with a larger number of candidates. Read as a whole,

although the considerations have not ben articulated in detail, the context of the number of posts , and the reference to a Descriptive Test as the next stage , provide sufficient foundati apropriate ratio ". Relying upon the record produced before the Court, I find the material adequate, to resist a finding of manifest arbitrarines or unreasonablenes.

50.

The afidavits filed by the respondent, extracted above, provide further information in suport of the aforesaid decision. In the context of Dr. George's reliance upon Mohinder Singh Gil and Ramjit Singh Kardam , sufice it to state that I do not read the respondent's afidavits as suplying new reasons for the decision taken, but as ading some data and detail to the analysis. However, as noted above, I have concluded that the decision can be defended on the basis of the record alone. The Registry's Note also contains suficient detail as to the —administra reasons" which prevailed with the respondent .

51.

Dr. George's reference to the Professor Powell's article also do respondent has not claimed any imunity or relaxed standard of judicial scrutiny , in respect of its administrative decision - making. I am guided by the general principle that al administrative decision - maker s are entitled to exercise discretion in maters within their remit, in acordance with law. The writ Court examine s the decision - making proces alone, and restrains itself from imposing its prefered outcome on an otherwise lawful decision.

29 West Bengal Central Schol Service Comision .

F. C ONCLUSION

52.

For the reasons stated above, the writ petitions are dismised, but without any order as to costs.

PRATEK JALAN, J

AUGUST 29, 2025

"pv '/A inesh /

Case details

Parties and counsel

1 of P - 1 to P - 5 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Decided on: 29.08.2025 + W.P.(C) 107/2025 & CM APL. 45323/2025 PRAMITI BASU . Petitioner versus SECRETARY GENERAL SUPREME COURT OF INDIA . Respondent + W.P.(C) 108/2025 & CM APL. 45325/2025 ANUJ CHAUHAN . Petitioner versus SECRETARY GENERAL SUPREME COURT OF INDIA . Respondent + W.P.(C) 1043/2025 & CM APL. 45467/2025 SHAHID AHMED . Petitioner versus SECRETARY GENERAL SUPREME COURT OF INDIA . Respondent + W.P.(C) 1067/2025 & CM APL. 4542/2025 TARU PANT . Petitioner versus SECRETARY GENERAL, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA . Respondent + W.P.(C) 15/2025 & CM APL. 45732/2025 SAURABH NISHAD . Petitioner versus SECRETARY GENERAL SUPREME COURT OF INDIA . Respondent 2 of Apearance: Dr. Amit George, Mr. Arkaneil Bhaumik, Ms. Shivalika Rudrabatla and Mr. Kartikay Punesh, Mr. Dushyant Kaul, Ms. Rupam Jha, Ms. Medhavi Bhaila, Advocates for petitioner in W.P.(C) 1067/2025. Mr. Shubham Prajapati, Mr. Rakesh Kumar Mandal, Mr. Akash Kumar, Mr. Philip Masey, Mr. Mahipal Singh, Ms. Shrishti, Mr. Aditya Raj Marandi and Ms. Muskan Dulet, Advocates for petitioners in W.P.(C) 107/2025, W.P.(C) 108/2025, W.P.(C) 1043/2025, W.P.(C) 15/2025. Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG with M s . Pratima N. Lakra, CGSC, Mr. Amit Gupta, Mr. Chandan Prajapati, Mr. R.V. Prabhat, Mr. Vinay Yadav, Mr. Vikram Aditya, Mr. Shubham Sharma, M r . Shailendra Kumar Mishra and Mr. Naman, Advocates, with Mr. T.I. Rajput, Registrar with Ms. Netu Verma, D eputy R egistrar , Ms. Sonika Khurana, Mr. Tarun Maurya, Court Asistant, SCI. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN

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