Mohd Saleem Khan v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

J U D G M E N T INDEX THE BRIEF FACTUAL MATRIX: DELHI RIOTS ............................................................... 10 DELAY AND LONG PERIOD OF INCARCERATION ........................................................... 14 BAR UNDER SECTION 43D OF THE UA(P) ACT ............................................................. 20 CONSPIRACY-THE LEGAL POSITION ............................................................................. 28 RIGHT TO PROTEST VIS-À-VIS RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH & EXPRESSION ....... 35 CRL.A. 184/2022 AND CRL.A. 631/2024: SHARJEEL IMAM AND UMAR KHALID ...... 39 SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS ............................................................................ 48 SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE ................................................................... 56 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 64 CRL.A. 677/2022, 600/2022, 210/2022 AND 233/2022: ATHAR KHAN, SHADAB AHMED, ABDUL KHALID SAIFI AND MOHD. SALEEM KHAN ...................................................... 73 SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS ............................................................................ 79 SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE ................................................................... 87 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS ............................................................................................ 92 CRL. A. 271/2022 AND 1149/2024: SHIFA-UR-REHMAN AND MEERAN HAIDER ..... 100 SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS .......................................................................... 106 SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE .................................................................. 111 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS .......................................................................................... 116 CRL.A. 211/2022: GULFISHA FATIMA......................................................................... 120 SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT ........................................................................... 123 SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE ................................................................. 126 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS .......................................................................................... 129

SHALINDER KAUR, J.

¶1These Criminal Appeals have been filed by the Appellants under Section 21 (4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, challenging the respective Orders passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ-03), Shahdara District, Karkadooma Courts, (Delhi) (hereinafter UHIHUUHG WR DV WK H µ Trial Court¶), whereby the learned Trial Court dismissed the Bail Applications filed by the Appellants seeking grant of Regular Bail in connection with FIR No. 59/2020 dated 06.03.2020, originally registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in VK RUW µ IPC¶), at the Police Station Crime Branch, Delhi. Thereafter, offences under Sections 109, 114, 124A, 153A, 186, 201, 212, 295, 302, 307, 341, 353, 395, 419, 420, 427, 435, 436, 452, 454, 468, 471, and 34 of the IPC; Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property $FW   L Q VK RUW µ3'33¶

 6HFWL RQ VK RUW µ$UPV $FW¶

 DQG 6HFWL RQV  $FWL YL WL HV 3UHYHQWL RQ  $FW   L Q subject FIR.

¶2As the present batch of Appeals arise out of similar set of facts, though outlining different alleged roles of the Appellants in the purported larger conspiracy, and involve an interwoven set of legal propositions, we deem it appropriate to adjudicate these appeals by way of this common Judgement.

THE BRIEF FACTUAL MATRIX: DELHI RIOTS: -

¶3The factual narrative in the present matter emanates from the case of the prosecution, being one of a deep-rooted criminal conspiracy allegedly hatched by several accused persons and individuals, including the present Appellants, to commit large-scale riots in the National Capital Territory of Delhi, in protest against the enactment of the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 (µCAA¶) and the National Register of Citizens (µNRC¶). These riots were allegedly carried out by inciting widespread communal violence on and around the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th of February, 2020, which resulted in the loss of 54 lives, including the death of a Senior Police Officer and an Intelligence Bureau Official, grievous injuries to several Police officers and members of the public, damage to more than 1,500 public and private properties, etc, apart from the other intangible harm caused to the Nation as a consequence.

¶4As per the prosecution, the entire conspiracy of which the Appellants as well as other co-accused persons are alleged to be a part of, that ultimately led to the violent riots, can be categorized into the following phases, which also overlap with one another: x First Phase (December 2019): Initiation, formation, and inclusion of WhatsApp Groups such as Muslim Student of JNU

(MSJ), Delhi Protest Support Group (DPSG), JMI Coordination Committee (JCC), Jamia Awareness Campaign Team (JACT), and Student of Jamia (SOJ); with an intent to create multiple 24x7 sit-in protests across Delhi.

x Second Phase (December 2019-February 2020): Early meetings and strategic mobilization by indulging participation from Student bodies and individuals, who also coordinated amongst themselves; development of the protest sites; circulation of inciteful pamphlets in Muslim-dominated areas; delivery of inflammatory speeches in various parts in India; and instilling the misleading propaganda to the masses from the Muslim Community against the CAA and NRC. This phase is also alleged to have included riots in JMI, Shaheen Bagh, and North-East Delhi, resulting in injuries to Police Officers and numerous members of the public. x Third Phase (January 2020-February 2020): Escalation: This phase allegedly included holding of conspiratorial meetings, stockpiling of firearms, acid and petrol bombs, rods, stones, chilli powder, sticks, and other such items to be used in escalating the protest into riots, along with preparations for carrying out violence in the riots in a coordinated manner. x Fourth Phase (February 2020): Implementation: This phase involved holding of disruptive Chakka-Jaams aiming at disruption of essential supplies in Delhi, using aforementioned items for weapons and dislocation of the public CCTVs in the adjoining areas for further escalation of confrontations and physical altercations with law enforcement agencies. This phase is alleged to have culminated in the February 2020 riots.

¶5The Prosecution has claimed that these four phases indicate that the incidents were no ordinary protests, but were rather premeditated and well-orchestrated riots, planned out by the masterminds on a mass scale, intended to have nationwide implications, and to undermine the secular fabric of the nation. The motive of the key conspirators was allegedly to propagate their ulterior agenda of inciting communal tensions under the facade of opposition to the CAA/NRC.

¶6The aforementioned four phases shall be discussed in detail, while analyzing the role of each of the Appellants in the alleged large-scale / deep-rooted Conspiracy, in their respective Appeals.

¶7Relevantly, the investigation in the present case ensued on

06.03.2020, when the Subject FIR was registered at the P.S. Crime Branch on the basis of a complaint lodged by a Sub-Inspector (S.I.) Arvind Kumar, who had received information through a secret informer that the Delhi Riots, which took place in February 2020, were the result of a pre-planned conspiracy. Further investigation in the matter led to include other offences under the IPC as well as UA(P) Act, as noted hereinbefore.

¶8The Prosecution filed the First Chargesheet on 16.09.2020, arraying 15 accused persons. On 17.09.2020, the learned Trial Court took cognizance of the matter and issued process against those 15 charge-sheeted accused persons.

¶9As the investigation was still underway, the prosecution later filed the first Supplementary Chargesheet on 22.11.2020, arraying three additional accused persons.

¶10The Tabular Chart below outlines the persons arrayed as accused in the Chargesheets filed by the Investigating Agency so far: CHARGESHEET NAME OF THE ACCUSED

Main Chargesheet filed on 16.09.2020 Abdul Khalid Saifi (A-1) Ishrat Jahan @ Pinki (A-2) Meeran Haider (A-3) Tahir Hussain (A-4) Gulfisha Khatoon @ Gul (A-5) Safoora Zargar (A-6) Shafa-Ur-Rehman (A-7) Asif Iqbal Tanha (A-8) Shadab Ahmad (A-9) Natasha Narwal (A-10) DevanganaKalita (A-11) Taslim Ahmad (A-12) Salim Malik @ Munna (A-13) Mohd. Salim Khan (A-14) Athar Khan (A-15) FirstSupplementary Chargesheet filed on 22.11.2020 Faizan Khan (A-16) Sharjeel Imam (A-17) Umar Khalid (A-18)

(Emphasis supplied on the present Appellants)

¶11On 24.11.2020, the learned Trial Court took Cognizance of the Supplementary Chargesheets for the offences mentioned hereinbefore, except for those under Sections 124A, 153A, 109, and 120B of the IPC, on account of pending Sanction in respect of these offences.

¶12The Second and Third Supplementary Chargesheets were filed on

23.02.2021 and 02.03.2022, respectively, to bring on record further evidence collected by the Investigation Agency and invoking further

offences. Notably, the Prosecution also filed a Fourth Supplementary Chargesheet on 07.06.2023.

¶13The Appellants had moved separate Bail Applications before the learned Trial Court, at different points in time, and some had also moved second Bail Applications, which were dismissed vide the respective Impugned Orders, leading to the filing of the present Appeals.

DELAY AND LONG PERIOD OF INCARCERATION: -

¶14Having noted the brief factual matrix, and before we delve into the aspect of Conspiracy for setting the stage for adjudication of the present appeals, we may, at this stage itself, note that the common argument raised and emphasized throughout these Criminal Appeals seeking Regular Bail, is on the point of delay in trial and the period of incarceration already undergone by the Appellants as undertrials.

¶15Relevantly, it merits mention that the grant of bail is not a mechanical exercise, nor can it rest upon a superficial appraisal of prosHFXWL RQ¶V PDWHUL DO RU HYL GHQFH 7K H jurisprudence is firmly rooted on many pillars, inclusive of which is the fair investigation and a fair trial, more so, the constitutional values underlying personal liberty cannot be set at naught by keeping an accused incarcerated. The Courts have to remain alive to both the ends of spectrum, on one hand, safeguarding the liberty of an accused, while on the other, ensuring the right of the prosecution to establish its case. The assessment of grant or refusal of bail, therefore, is also guided by a judicious balance between

these two considerations, so that the enforcement of criminal law is neither diluted nor diminished. Needless to say, it is an arduous task that rests upon the shoulders of the Court, to strike a balance between the two in the facts and circumstances of each of the case.

¶16The learned counsels for the Appellants submitted that the undertrials have a right to a speedy trial, and any delay caused therein would violate the fundamental right to liberty of the accused persons as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is contended that the Appellants have been languishing in custody for a long period since the date of their respective arrests. Moreso, it was submitted that, looking at the present pace of the proceedings before the learned Trial Court and the Prosecution¶V intention to examine 800-900 witnesses, there is no likelihood of the conclusion of the trial in the foreseeable future. Thus, continued detention of the Appellants in the judicial custody, merely on the ground that the offences for which the accused persons have been booked under are serious in nature, would not be justified.

¶17The learned Senior Counsel and other learned counsels for the Appellants had collectively also placed reliance on the following decisions in support of their contentions: x Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713 x Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 8 SCC 293 x Ashim Alias Asim Kumar Haranath Bhattacharya Alias Asim Bhattacharya Alias Aseem Kumar Bhattacharya v. National Investigation Agency, (2022) 1 SCC 695. x Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2024) 9 SCC

813.

x Mukesh Salam v. State of Chattisgarh & Anr., SLP (Crl.) No. 3655/2024, Date of Decision 30.08.2024. x Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2024) SCC OnLine SC 1920. x Vijay Nair v. Directorate of Enforcement, SLP(Criminal) Diary No. 22317/2024, dated 02.09.2024. x Javed Ali @ Javed v. National Investigation Agency, 2024:DHC:8797-DB. x In re: Manirul Islam @ Doctor C.R.M. (DB) No. 667/2023, Order dated

20.03.2023 (Calcutta High Court). x Padam Singhee v. Directorate of Enforcement, Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 32236/2024, dated 14.11.2024. x Jalauddin Khan v. Union of India, Crl.A. 2787/2024 dated 03.07.2024. x Prem Prakash v. Union of India, SLP (Crl.) No.5416/2024 decided on

28.08.2024. x V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement 2024 INSC 739. x SaumyaChaurasia v. Directorate of Enforcement, SLP(Crl.) No. 12492/2024 dated 25.09.2024. x Padam Chand Jain v. Enforcement Directorate, SLP(Crl.) No. 17476/2024, dated 16.01.2025. x Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi, Advocate v. Jitendra BhimrajBijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76. x Mohd. Hakim v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4623. x A. Ramachandran @ Raman v. CBI & Anr., 2015 SCC OnLine Ker 17832. x Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhatisgarh, Crl.A. No. 738/2025; Supreme Court. x NIA vs. Areeb Ejaz Majeed, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 239. x Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India (2021) SCC OnLine SC 1000 x Sidhique Kappan v. State of U.P. (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1195 x NIA vs Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, 2019 5 SCC 1 x Gurwinder Singh vs State of Punjab and Another (2024) 5 SCC 403 x Shaheen Welfare Assn.v.Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 x Rona Jacob Wilson vs the State of Maharashtra, Crl.A. No. 848 of 2024; High Court of Judicature at Bombay.

¶18The learned Solicitor General, Mr. Tushar Mehta, the learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. Chetan Sharma, and Mr. Amit Prasad, learned Special Public Prosecutor µ SPP¶

, vehemently contended that

although a long period of incarceration may, in certain circumstances, be a ground entitling an accused to the grant of bail, it is by no means a universally applicable rule. They submitted that the grant of bail must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

¶19In this regard, we may note the position of law as laid in Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1, wherein the Supreme Court held that the power to grant bail to an accused is a discretionary relief available to the Courts, and that no hard and fast rule could be prescribed governing the exercise of the such discretion under Section 437 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, µCr.PC¶). It was observed as under: ³  In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v.State of Punjab [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565: 1980 SCC (Cri) 465], the purpose of granting bail is set out with great felicity as follows: (SCC pp. 586-88, paras 27-30) ³«««« L W ZD s observed, while dealing with Section 498 which corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code, that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which corresponds to the present Section 437. It was observed by the Court that there was no hard-and-fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 498 and that the only principle which was established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously. In Emperorv. H.L. Hutchinson [Emperorv.H.L. Hutchinson, 1931 SCC OnLine All 14 : AIR 1931 All 356 : 1931 Cri LJ 1271] , AIR p. 358 it was said that it was very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any

particular rules which will bind the High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the court unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes a bail may be granted but not in other classes. It was observed that the principle to be deduced from the various sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. An accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody. As a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case. A presumably innocent person must have his freedom to enable him to establish his innocence. *****

¶28Coming nearer home, it was observed by Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhuluv. State [Gudikanti Narasimhuluv. State, (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115] that : (SCC p. 242, para 1) µ « WK H L VVXH >RI EDL O@ L V RQH public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitised judicial SURFHVV « $IWHU DOO SHUVRQDO accused or convict is fundamental, suffering ODZIXO HFOL SVH RQO\ L Q WHUPV R HVWDEOL VK HG E\ ODZ´ 7K H ODVW I ArticlH  DUH WK H OL IH RI WK DW K XPDQ

¶29In Gurcharan Singh v. State (UT of Delhi)[Gurcharan Singhv.State (UT of Delhi),

(1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] it was observed by Goswami, J., who spoke for the Court, that : (SCC p. 129, para 29) µ  « There cannot be an inexorable formula in the matter of granting bail. The facts and circumstances of each case will govern the

exercise of judicial discretion in granting or cancelling bail.¶

¶30In AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (2nd, Vol. 8, p. 806, para 39), it is stated: µ:K HUH WK H JUDQWL QJ RI EDL O OL discretion of the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect WK DW HQG¶

It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of bail´

(Emphasis supplied)

¶20It is WUL WH ODZ WK DW µ grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception¶, however, the exercise of such discretion will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no single circumstance alone can serve as a universal yardstick to grant or refuse bail to an individual.

¶21When it comes to the Special Statutes, such as the UA(P) Act, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (L Q VK RUW µ PMLA¶), and the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (in short, µMCOCA¶), etc., the Courts, while adjudicating the bail applications for offences under such Special Statutes, are required to take into consideration the specific provisions governing bail thereunder. Relevantly, we may note from the decision in Union of India v. Rattan Mallik, (2009) 2 SCC 624, as under:

³9. The broad principles which should weigh with the court in granting bail in a non-bailable offence have been enumerated in a catena of decisions of this Court and, therefore, for the sake of brevity, we do not propose to reiterate the same. However, when a prosecution/conviction is for offence(s) under a special statute and that statute contains specific provisions for dealing with matters arising thereunder, including an application for grant of bail, these provisions cannot be ignored while GHDOL QJ ZL WK  VXFK  DQ DSSOL FDWL RQ´

¶22Further, the Supreme Court in Gautam Kundu v. Directorate of Enforcement (Prevention of Money-Laundering Act), (2015) 16 SCC 1, observed as below: ³28. Before dealing with the application for bail on merit, it is to be considered whether the provisions of Section 45 of PMLA are binding on the High Court while considering the application for bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal 3URFHGXUH««30/$ L V D VSHFL DO V by Parliament for dealing with money-laundering. Section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 clearly lays down that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure will not affect any special statute or any local law. In other words, the provisions of any special statute will prevail over the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in case of any conflict.´ (Emphasis supplied)

BAR UNDER SECTION 43D OF THE UA(P) ACT: -

¶23Before we discuss this contention further, it would be appropriate to also note the statutory embargo placed upon the Courts under Section 43D of the UA(P) Act. The relevant provisions thereof are reproduced below: ³43D. Modified application of certain provisions of

the Code xxxxxxxxxxxx

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release: Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.

(6) The restrictions on granting of bail specified in subsection (5) is in addition to the restrictions under the Code or any other law for the time being in force RQ JUDQWL QJ RI EDL O´

¶24From a reading of the above L W L V FOHDU WK DW WK H grant bail is circumscribed by virtue of Section 43D(5) of the UA (P) Act. The proviso itself states WK DW WK H DFFXVHG SHUVRQ VK D bail if the Court, upon perusal of the case diary or the final report submitted by the Investigation Agency, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accusations against the accused are prima facie true.

¶25Relevantly, the Supreme Court in the case of Gurwinder Singh (supra), had encapsulated the guidelines for adjudicating bail applications under the UA(P) Act, as laid down by it in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (supra), in the following words: ³7HVW IRU 5HM HFWL RQ RI %DL O  *XL down by Supreme Court in Watali's Case

¶23In the previous section, based on a textual reading, we have discussed the broad inquiry which Courts seized of bail applications under Section

43D(5) UAP Act r/w Section 439 CrPC must indulge in. Setting out the framework of the law seems rather easy, yet the application of it, presents its own complexities. For greater clarity in the application of the test set out above, it would be helpful to seek guidance from binding precedents. In this regard, we need to look no further than Watali's case which has laid down elaborate guidelines on the approach that Courts must partake in, in their application of the bail limitations under the UAP Act. On a perusal of paragraphs 23 to 29 and 32, the following 8-point propositions emerge and they are summarised as follows: ‡ 0HDQL QJ RI µ3UL PD IDFL H WUXH¶ [para 23] : On the face of it, the materials must show the complicity of the accused in commission of the offence. The materials/evidence must be good and sufficient to establish a given fact or chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted by other evidence. ‡Degree of Satisfaction at Pre-Chargesheet, Post Chargesheet and Post-Charges Compared [para 23] : Once charges are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion was founded upon the materials before the Court, which prompted the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused, to justify the framing of charge. In that situation, the accused may have to undertake an arduous task to satisfy the Court that despite the framing of charge, the materials presented along with the charge-sheet (report under Section 173 CrPC), do not make out reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against him is prima facie true. Similar opinion is required to be formed by the Court whilst considering the prayer for bail, made after filing of the first report made under Section 173 of the Code, as in the present case. ‡Reasoning, necessary but no detailed evaluation of evidence [para 24] : The exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this stage²of giving

reasons for grant or non-grant of bail²is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage. ‡Record a finding on broad probabilities, not based on proof beyond doubt >SDUD @ ³7K H &RXUW is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or RWK HUZL VH´

‡ Duration of the limitation under Section 43D(5) [para 26] : The special provision, Section 43-D of the 1967 Act, applies right from the stage of registration of FIR for the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act until the conclusion of the trial thereof. ‡Material on record must be analysed as a µZK ROH¶  QR SL HFHPHDO DQDO\VL V [para 27] : The totality of the material gathered by the investigating agency and presented along with the report and including the case diary, is required to be reckoned and not by analysing individual pieces of evidence or circumstance. ‡&RQWHQWV RI GRFXPHQWV WR EH SUHV

[para 27] : The Court must look at the contents of the document and take such document into account as it is. ‡Admissibility of documents relied upon by Prosecution cannot be questioned [para 27]. The materials/evidence collected by the investigation agency in support of the accusation against the accused in the first information report must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by RWK HU HYL GHQFH««,Q DQ\ FDVH WK H discarding the document at this stage, on the ground of being inadmissible in evidence, is not SHUPL VVL EOH´

¶26A review petition was also filed against Gurwinder (supra), being Review Petition (CRL.) NO.299/2024, and the Supreme Court, while dismissing the same vide its Order dated 16.07.2024, observed as under: ³1) This Review Petition has been filed seeking to review Judgment dated 07.02.2024 both on facts and law. As facts have been duly taken note of, we do not find any reason to interfere with the Judgment passed. On the question of law, reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court in KA Najeeb v. Union of India, (2021) 3 SCC 713 and Vernon v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 885 and our decision is based on the facts and circumstances unfolded. 2) Accordingly, the Review Petition stands GL VPL VVHG´

(Emphasis Supplied)

¶27Thus, the position of law is no longer res integra as to the guidelines that the Courts should generally adhere to while deciding the grant or refusal of bail to an accused booked for offences under the UA (P) Act. The Court has to examine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe the allegations against an accused to be prima facie true, considering the material collected by the investigating agency presented alongwith the final report. The admissibility and credibility of the evidence cannot be examined at the stage of bail, and such material must be presumed to be true.

¶28However, we may also remind ourselves that the Courts are expected WR PDN H D µ surface analysis¶ RI WK H HYL GHQFH E\ DQDO as a whole and record a finding on broad probabilities, without there being a piecemeal analysis or dissection of evidence or circumstance in isolation as

well as satisfy itself of the probative value of the evidence, not being weak. However, in the present appeals, both the sides have gone into scrutinizing the evidence in minute detail, by adverting to it piece by piece. Further, the µWZL Q -SURQJ WHVW¶ is also required to be satisfied by the accused, demonstrating that he does not pose a flight risk and has no intention of tampering with evidence or influencing any of the witnesses connected to the case.

¶29Proceeding further, we would like to note that there has been much deliberation on the point of delay in trial and the period of custody suffered by an accused awaiting trial, even in offences under the Special Statutes. It has been held by the Supreme Court that though the rigorous provisions laid down by such Special Statutes place an embargo on the Courts, ordinarily leading to the rejection of bail to an accused, the same does not denude the ³discretion´ of the Constitutional Courts to grant bail. It would be apposite to refer to the various decisions of the Supreme Court, as well as this Court in this regard.

¶30The Supreme Court, in the case of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (supra), while referring to the provision under Section 43-D of the UA(P) Act, observed as under: ³17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA per se does not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a statute as well as the powers exercisable under constitutional jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of

proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of FRQVWL WXWL RQDO UL JK W WR VSHHG\ WUL

¶31The Supreme Court in Sheikh Javed Iqbal (supra), while referring to Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra), Shaheen Welfare Assn. (supra) and several of its other decisions, observed as under: ³24. It is trite law that an accused is entitled to a speedy trial. This Court in a catena of judgments has held that an accused or an undertrial has a fundamental right to speedy trial which is traceable to Article 21 of the Constitution of India. If the alleged offence is a serious one, it is all the more necessary for the prosecution to ensure that the trial is concluded expeditiously. When a trial gets prolonged, it is not open to the prosecution to oppose bail of the accused-undertrial on the ground that the charges are very serious. Bail cannot be denied only on the ground that the charges are very serious though there is no end in sight for the trial to conclude. xxx

¶28Similarly, in Shaheen Welfare Assn.v.Union of India[Shaheen Welfare Assn.v.Union of India,

(1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 366] , this Court was considering a public interest litigation wherein certain reliefs were sought for undertrial prisoners charged with offences under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987

³WK H 7$'$ $FW´  ODQJXL VK L QJ L Q considerable periods of time. This Court observed

that while liberty of a citizen must be zealously safeguarded by the courts but, at the same time, in the context of stringent laws like the TADA Act, the interest of the victims and the collective interest of the community should also not be lost sight of. While balancing the competing interest, this Court observed that the ultimate justification for deprivation of liberty of an undertrial can only be on account of the accused-undertrial being found guilty of the offences for which he is charged and is being tried. If such a finding is not likely to be arrived at within a reasonable time, some relief(s) becomes necessary. Therefore, a pragmatic approach is required.´

¶32This Court also had an occasion to examine the issue of striking a balance between a long period of incarceration and the delay in trial vis-à-vis the right of an accused to a speedy trial and liberty. This Court had scrutinized several judgments of the Supreme Court as well as this Court, and after analyzing the same, held in Naval Kishore Kapoor v. NIA, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 1561, as under: ³71. In this background, the position of law stands re-affirmed that an accused is entitled to the speedy trial as he has a Fundamental Right to the same as well as right to life and personal liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the Court is not deprived of the power to grant bail even in special enactments. If the alleged offence is a serious one, it is all the more necessary that the Prosecution should ensure that the trial is expedited and concluded at the earliest. Also, when a trial is prolonged, it is not open to the Prosecution to oppose the bail application. However, in particular facts of a given case, the Constitutional Court may also decline to grant bail.

¶72The position is also settled that the person accused of offences under UA(P) Act shall not be

released on bail if it appears that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the allegations against an accused are prima facie true. Specifically, in cases where the Charges have already been framed, the rigours are stricter. As far as the twin prong test is concerned, the first prong pertains to whether the test for rejection of bail are sufficient and satisfied. The other prong being the satisfaction of the triple test, on the factors such as flight risk, influencing of witness and tampering of evidence.´

¶33From a perusal of the aforementioned extracts, it emerges that the Constitutional Courts are well within their powers to grant bail to an undertrial who has suffered a long period of incarceration pending trial, thereby, setting him at liberty. The Courts are also to secure the right to a speedy trial of an accused, flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. However, the grant of bail on the sole ground of long incarceration and delay in trial is not a universally applicable rule in all the cases. The discretion to grant or deny bail vests with the Constitutional Court, depending upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each of the case. The Supreme Court in Sheikh Javed Iqbal (supra), also noted that ³L Q WK H given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline to grant bail´. Further, the interest and safety of the society at large, apart from the victims and their families, is also a factor to be taken into consideration by the Courts while adjudicating bail applications.

CONSPIRACY-THE LEGAL POSITION: -

¶34The crux of the arguments raised on behalf of the learned Senior counsels and counsels for the Appellants is that none of the Appellants

were part of the conspiracy as alleged by the prosecution, and their role was limited to only being a part of a peaceful protest to voice their resentment against the CAA/NRC, to carry out the protests, to involve members of the public, and that for the same, they may have participated in meetings and delivered speeches. It was contended that since a large number of the public had gathered, perhaps out of curiosity, to be a part of the protests, it could not be concluded that the appellants had conspired to carry out unlawful or illegal activities.

¶35It was further submitted that due to the large public gathering and subsequent police action to control the crowd, spontaneous riots erupted in which the appellants had no role to play. They have jointly submitted that the prosecution has no evidence to establish that the Appellants had conspired to incite riots so as to cause violence, damage public property, or create fear amongst the masses. It was submitted that the peaceful protests, unfortunately, turned violent, which was never the intent of the Appellants.

¶36Mr. Tushar Mehta, the learned Solicitor General raised strong objection to the aforesaid submissions, by contending that these were not ordinary riots, rather, they were well-orchestrated, and strategically planned and devised to coincide with the State visit of the President of the USA. He further submitted that it was the intention of the Appellants-Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid, to globally defame the Nation and to divide the Country at its heart on religious lines. He vociferously contended that a movement of students does not start with the creation of a communal group, which was part of the larger conspiracy. Therefore, this matter could

not be treated on the same parameters as a normal riot that may have suddenly erupted from a peaceful protest and turned ugly.

¶37It was also contended by Mr. Tushar Mehta that each of the conspirators had played a vital role in the planning, strategizing, and execution of the criminal conspiracy, all under the guise of protest against the CAA/NRC. The masterminds/top conspirators, he submitted, disseminated their messages through various speeches, pamphlets, WhatsApp Groups, etc., and their instructions were carried out by the foot soldiers. He contended that keeping in view the large-scale violence that was sought to be undertaken, and which eventually took place in late February of 2020, resulting in the loss of 53 lives, causing injuries to numerous members of the public, Police Officers and causing damage to the public properties, the Appellants are not entitled to bail.

¶38The learned Senior Counsels and Counsels for the parties have collectively relied upon the following decisions: x Kehar Singh & Others v. State (Delhi Administration), (1988) 3 SCC 609 x Firozuddin Basheeruddin v. State of Kerala, (2001) 7 SCC 596 x Param Hans Yadav and Sadanand Tripathi v. State of Bihar, (1987) 2 SCC

¶197x State v. Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 253. x State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600. x Devender Gupta v. NIA, (2014) SCC Online AP 192. x State of M.P. v. Sheetla Sahai, (2009) 8 SCC 617. x Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, (1954) 2 SCC 826.

¶39To address the underlying narrative, it would be relevant to note that one of the important facts of the case of the Prosecution against the Appellants and other accused persons, is the allegation of Conspiracy.

Therefore, we may refer to some of the decisions of the Supreme Court as well as this Court in this regard.

¶40In Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 540, the Supreme Court discussed the offence of Criminal Conspiracy under Sections 120A and 120B of the IPC by holding as under: ³8. Besides, the other charges levelled against the alleged co-conspirators also throw sufficient light on the object of the conspiracy and it is not necessary that the appellant should figure or for the matter of that all accused should figure in all the charges.

¶9The offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-A is a distinct offence introduced for the first time in 1913 in Chapter V-A of the Penal Code. The very agreement, concert or league is the ingredient of the offence. It is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of the conspiracy as long as they are co-participators in the main object of the conspiracy. There may be so many devices and techniques adopted to achieve the common goal of the conspiracy and there may be division of performances in the chain of actions with one object to achieve the real end of which every collaborator must be aware and in which each one of them must be interested. There must be unity of object or purpose but there may be plurality of means sometimes even unknown to one another, amongst the conspirators. In achieving the goal several offences may be committed by some of the conspirators even unknown to the others. The only relevant factor is that all means adopted and illegal acts done must be and purported to be in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy even though there may be sometimes mis-fire or over-shooting by some of the conspirators. Even if some steps are resorted to by one or two of the conspirators without the knowledge of the others it will not affect the culpability of those others when

they are associated with the object of the conspiracy. The significance of criminal conspiracy, under Section 120-A is brought out pithily by this Court in Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay [AIR 1961 SC 1762 : (1962) 2 SCR 195, 228 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 828] thus: ³7K H JL VW RI WK H RIIHQFH L V DQ DJ the law. The parties to such an agreement will be guilty of criminal conspiracy, though the illegal act agreed to be done has not been done. So too, it is not an ingredient of the offence that all the parties should agree to do a single illegal act. It may comprise the commission of a number of acts. Under Section 43 of the Penal Code, 1860, an act would be illegal if it is an offence or if it is prohibited by law.´

¶41The Supreme Court in Kehar Singh & Others v. State (Delhi Administration) (supra), has held as under: ³275. Generally, a Conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and it may be difficult to adduce direct evidence of the same. The Prosecution will often rely on evidence of acts of various parties to infer that they were done in reference to their common intention. The Prosecution will also more often rely upon circumstantial evidence. The Conspiracy can be undoubtedly proved by such evidence direct or circumstantial. But the court must enquire whether the two persons are independently pursuing the same end or they have come together in the pursuit of the unlawful object. The former does not render them conspirators, but the latter does. It is, however, essential that the offence of Conspiracy requires some kind of physical manifestation of agreement. The express agreement, however, need not be proved. Nor actual meeting of two persons is necessary. Nor it is necessary to prove the actual words of communication. The evidence as to transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful design may be sufficient. Gerald Orchard of University of Canterbury, New Zealand explains the

limited nature of this proposition: [1974 Criminal Law Review 297, 299] ³$OWK RXJK  L W L V QRW L Q GRXEW WK requires some physical manifestation of agreement, it is important to note the limited nature of this proposition. The law does not require that the act of agreement take any particular form and the fact of agreement may be communicated by words or conduct. Thus, it has been said that it is unnecessary to prove that the SDUWL HV µDFWXDOO\ FDPH WRJHWK HU ed in WHUPV¶ WR SXUVXH WK H XQODZIXO REM never have been an express verbal agreement, it EHL QJ VXIIL FL HQW WK DW WK HUH ZD understanding between conspirators as to what VK RXOG EH GRQH¶´

(Emphasis Supplied)

¶42Further, the Supreme Court has elaborated on the concept of Conspiracy in the case of Firozuddin Basheeruddin v. State of Kerala (supra), by holding as under: ³23. Like most crimes, conspiracy requires an act (actus reus) and an accompanying mental state (mens rea). The agreement constitutes the act, and the intention to achieve the unlawful objective of that agreement constitutes the required mental VWDWH«««&RQVSL UDF\ FUL PL QDOL ]HV to commit a crime. All conspirators are liable for crimes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy by any member of the group, regardless of whether liability would be established by the law of FRPSOL FL W\««« Conspiracy is a clandestine activity. Persons generally do not form illegal covenants openly. In the interests of security, a person may carry out his part of a conspiracy without even being informed of the identity of his co-conspirators. Since an agreement of this kind can rarely be shown by direct proof, it must be inferred from circumstantial evidence of

cooperation between the accused««

¶24Another major problem which arises in connection with the requirement of an agreement is that of determining the scope of a conspiracy ² who are the parties and what are their objectives. The determination is critical, since it defines the potential liability of each accused. The law has developed several different models with which to approach the question of scope. One such model is that of a chain, where each party performs a role that aids succeeding parties in accomplishing the criminal objectives of the conspiracy. No matter how diverse the goals of a large criminal organisation, there is but one objective: to promote the furtherance of the enterprise. So far as the mental state is concerned, two elements required by conspiracy are the intent to agree and the intent to promote the unlawful objective of the conspiracy. It is the intention to promote a crime that lends conspiracy its criminal cast.

¶25«7K XV RQH ZK R HQWHUV L QWR D F relationship is liable for every reasonably foreseeable crime committed by every other member of the conspiracy in furtherance of its objectives, whether or not he knew of the crimes or aided in WK HL U FRPPL VVL RQ «´

(Emphasis Supplied)

¶43What emerges from the reading of the aforesaid decisions is that there may not be direct evidence to establish a conspiracy, and the Courts may have to rely on circumstantial evidence. There is also no necessity of a formal or verbal agreement; the proof of shared intention would suffice, which can be inferred from the conduct of the accused persons. Such an inference may be drawn from their act or expression, indicating a mutual agreement or intention. Conspiracy often involves a chain of actions or a division of roles, with liability extending to all participants. The offence

lies in the agreement to commit an illegal act, or a legal act by illegal means, not necessarily in its execution. It is also not necessary for each of the conspirators to know the ultimate plan or the precise role of the other conspirators.

¶44Other decisions relied upon by the parties, re-affirm the said position of law as noted by us hereinabove. RIGHT TO PROTEST VIS-À-VIS RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH & EXPRESSION:-

¶45At this juncture, we may hasten to note that much emphasis has been laid in the submissions by the Appellants that the Appellants were acting well within the constitutional parameters, while exercising their right to protest against a piece of legislation, namely, the CAA/NRC. It was contended on behalf of the Appellants that, especially in a democratic Country like ours, the right of the people to show dissent towards the Legislative Actions is enshrined in Article 19 of the Constitution of India, which provides for the Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Association, etc., which is inclusive of the right to hold such protests.

¶46On the other hand, it was contended by the learned SPP, that the protests, in the guise of Chakka-Jaams, were well planned in advance and were violent in nature, injuring many and causing huge financial losses by damaging public and private properties, thus, the Appellants cannot now claim a right as their acts fall outside the confines of the fundamental right to Freedom of Speech and Expression.

¶47We are conscious that the right to participate in peaceful protests and to make speeches in public meetings is protected under Article 19(1)(a), and the same cannot be blatantly curtailed. Nonetheless, this right is not absolute, as it is subject to the reasonable restrictions imposed by the Constitution. If the exercise of an unfettered right to protest were permitted, it would damage the constitutional framework and impinge upon the law-and-order situation in the country. Any conspiratorial violence under the garb of protests or demonstrations by the citizens cannot be permitted. Such actions must be regulated and checked by the State Machinery, as they do not fall within the ambit of the Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Association.

¶48To build up on this context, we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India,

(2018) 17 SCC 324, wherein it has been observed as thus: ³48 « Undoubtedly, holding peaceful demonstrations by the citizenry in order to air its grievances and to ensure that these grievances are heard in the relevant quarters, is its fundamental right. This right is specifically enshrined under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India. Article 19(1)(a) confers a very valuable right on the citizens, namely, right of free speech. Likewise, Article 19(1)(b) gives the right to assemble peacefully and without arms. Together, both these rights ensure that the people of this country have the right to assemble peacefully and protest against any of the actions or the decisions taken by the Government or other governmental authorities which are not to the liking. Legitimate dissent is a distinguishable feature of any democracy. Question is not as to whether the issue raised by the

protestors is right or wrong or it is justified or unjustified. The fundamental aspect is the right which is conferred upon the affected people in a democracy to voice their grievances. Dissenters may be in minority. They have a right to express their views. A particular cause which, in the first instance, may appear to be insignificant or irrelevant may gain momentum and acceptability when it is duly voiced and debated. That is the reason that this Court has always protected the valuable right of peaceful and orderly demonstrations and protests. xxx

50.In Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar [Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp (3) SCR 369 : AIR 1962 SC 1166] the Court was mainly dealing with the question whether the right to make a demonstration is protected under Articles 19(1)(a) and (b) and whether a government servant is entitled to this right. This Court held: (AIR p. 1171, para 13) ³« $ GHPRQVWUDWL RQ PL JK W WDN H assembly and even then the intention is to convey to the person or authority to whom the communication is intended the feelings of the group which assembles. It necessarily follows that there are forms of demonstration which would fall within the freedoms guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b). It is needless to add that from the very nature of things a demonstration may take various forms; it may be noisy and disorderly, for instance stone-throwing by a crowd may be cited as an example of a violent and disorderly demonstration and this would not obviously be within Article 19(1)(a) or (b). It can equally be peaceful and orderly such as happens when the members of the group merely wear some badge drawing DWWHQWL RQ WR WK HL U JUL HYDQFHV´

¶51The Supreme Court has also gone beyond upholding the right to protest as a fundamental right and has held that the State must aid the right to assembly of the citizens. In the Constitution Bench

judgment, Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commr. of Police [Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commr. of Police,

(1973) 1 SCC 227 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 280] , while dealing with the challenge to the Rules framed under the Bombay Police Act regulating public meetings on streets, held that the Government has power to regulate which includes prohibition of public meetings on streets or highways to avoid nuisance or disruption to traffic and thus, it can provide a public meeting on roads, but it does not mean that the Government can close all the streets or open areas for public meetings, thus denying the fundamental right which flows from Articles 19(1)(a) and (b). The Court held: (SCC pp. 239 & 248, paras 33 & 70) ³ This is true but nevertheless the State cannot by law abridge or take away the right of assembly by prohibiting assembly on every public street or public place. The State can only make regulations in aid of the right of assembly of each citizen and can only impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order.´ (Emphasis supplied)

¶49Recently, the Supreme Court, in Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 678, observed as under: ³14. The right to dissent in a legitimate and lawful manner is an integral part of the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). Every individual must respect the right of others to dissent. An opportunity to peacefully protest against the decisions of the Government is an essential part of democracy. The right to dissent in a lawful manner must be treated as a part of the right to lead a dignified and meaningful life guaranteed by Article 21. But the protest or dissent must be within four corners of the modes permissible in a democratic set up. It is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed in accordance with clause (2) of Article 19. In the

present case, the appellant has not at all crossed the OL QH´

(Emphasis Supplied)

¶50From the conjoint reading of the extracted observations, it emerges that certainly, the Constitution affords citizens the right to protest and carry out demonstrations or agitations, provided that they are orderly, peaceful and without arms. Moreso, the citizens have a fundamental right to voice their concerns against the legislative actions, which only fortifies the Democratic setup by indicating the participation of the citizens in governance. This right is crucial, as it enables the citizens to express their dissent, expose flaws in governance, and demand accountability from the State Authorities. However, such actions must be within the bounds of law.

¶51Learned counsels for the Appellants placed reliance on the following decisions which recapitulate this aspect, as noted above: x Manohar Damodar Patil v. Govt. of Bombay, (1950) SCC Online Bom 8. x S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574.

¶52Drawing upon the above discussion, we shall, in view of Section 43D(5) of the UA (P) Act, be subsequently examining the role of each of the Appellants in the Conspiracy as alleged by the prosecution in the facts and circumstances of the present Appeals to formulate a prima facie opinion.

CRL.A. 184/2022 AND CRL.A. 631/2024: SHARJEEL IMAM AND UMAR KHALID: -

¶53At the outset, we would like to note that EDVHG RQ WK H SURVH narrative, the Appellants-Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid have been

ascribed the role of having played a central and key part in the alleged criminal conspiracy by organizing, coordinating and inciting masses to protests, which escalated into violence and communal unrest in various places in Delhi, leading upto the large-scale February, 2020 ± Delhi Riots. Therefore, for the sake of convenience and given their attributed role, which appears to stand on the same footing, we deem it appropriate to decide their appeals together.

¶54As per the prosecution, the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam is a holder of an M.Phil and Master¶s degree from Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), and during his time as a student in JNU, he had a first registered criminal case related to seditious activities, with the Appellant-Umar Khalid as his mentor and the prime accused in the said criminal case. It is also alleged by the Prosecution that Appellant-Sharjeel Imam had also published his views on ³7K H +L QGX 5HSXEOL F

- 6HYHQ GHFDGHV RI 0XVOL P ([ ³,W¶V 7L PH ZH $EVROYH -L QQDK ´ ³5HP embering 1980:- Moradabad 0XVOL P 0DVVDFUH  $ K DUVK  L QGL FWPHQW R and ³,VODPRSK REL D L Q -18 L V DOVR UDPSDQ -wing student RUJDQL VDWL RQV FODL PL QJ WR EH VHFXODU .

¶55It is alleged that, apart from the above, the following four events also led to his emergence as a religious extremist: x Declaration of Triple Talaq as illegal; x Judgment of the Supreme Court inthe Babri Masjid case at Ayodhya; x Abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India; and x Introduction of the Citizenship Amendment Bill (CAB).

¶56As per the prosecution, the Conspiracy was set into motion by the Appellant Sharjeel Imam, who, after the passing of the Resolution by the Cabinet Committee to present the CAB in both Houses of Parliament on

04.12.2019, on the instructions of the Appellant-Umar Khalid, created a Whatsapp group called ³Muslim Students of Jamia´

MSJ) on the night of 5th ± 6th December 2019, with the Appellant-Umar Khalid added as a member a few days later. The prosecution has alleged that both of them played a major role in orchestrating the different phases of the conspiracy, being the masterminds behind the entire sequence of events.

¶57On 06.12.2019, the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam created and printed alleged inciteful pamphlets to incite communal tensions, calling the Muslim Students to join the protest by United Against Hate (UAH) on

07.12.2019 at Jantar Mantar. It is further alleged that the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam, in a Chat with Arshad Warsi of the Student of Jamia (SOJ), stated that he was planning for a mass mobilization.

¶58On the said date, both these Appellants delivered speeches at Jantar Mantar, and the Appellant-Umar Khalid instructed the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam to mobilize students of JNU, Jamia Milia Islamia (JMI), Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), and the Delhi University (DU). It was also agreed by them to utilize social media for large-scale outreach and mobilization with the aim of organize campaigns in Muslim dominated areas.

¶59A meeting was held on 08.12.2019 at 6/6 Jangpura B, Delhi-14, allegedly attended by both these appellants, wherein it was decided that the

Appellant-Sharjeel Imam would mobilize and lead the students from various Universities and colleges across Delhi. Subsequently, another group, namely the CAB Team, was formed, allegedly opposing the CAA and for further mobilization.

¶60On 09.12.2019, the CAB bill was passed by the Lok Sabha. On

10.12.2019, the members of MSJ burnt a copy of the CAA on the JNU campus. Thereafter, a protest was called on the said date by the CAB Team at Jantar Mantar, allegedly attended by the Appellant-Umar Khalid and others. The Appellant-Sharjeel Imam visited Aligarh on 11.12.2019 to further propagate the idea of Chakka-Jaam.

¶61It is also alleged by the Prosecution that the conspirators had every intention to give protests a secular look by involving non-muslims, however, they also ensured that there is no over-secularisation of their movement.

¶62In the intervening night of 12th-13th December 2020, a new WhatsApp group, namely, ³Muslim students of JNU_1´, was created at the behest of the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam.

¶63Later, in the evening of 13.12.2019, the Appellants-Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid visited JMI University, where the Appellant-Umar Khalid introduced the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam and others to the crowd as his team member and explained to them the difference between Chakka-Jaam and a Dharna. Further, the Appellant-Umar Khalid had allegedly instructed the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam to start Chakka-Jaam at Shaheen Bagh and at Gate No. 7 of JMI University. It is alleged that the Appellant-

Sharjeel Imam gave a provocative speech on the said date to instigate the crowd to protests and hold chakka-jaams by inculcating the idea of disruption of essential services as a means to achieve their goals.

¶64On 13.12.2019, riots took place at Jamia gate no. 7, where civilians and 20 police personnel sustained injuries, private and public property was damaged and essential services were disrupted. It is alleged that the presence of Appellant-Sharjeel Imam in Jamia Millia Islamia is reflected by CDR location of his mobile number.

¶65It is alleged that, in the morning of 15.12.2019, the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam held a meeting with the MSJ Core Committee at Teflas, an eatery at JNU, and decided the further course of the plan, including roping in the Popular Front of India (PFI), and Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JEIH), and others, for protests against the CAA/NRC.

¶66It is further alleged that the Appellants-Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid, and others visited JMI University again later that day and gathered a number of protestors. The Appellant-Umar Khalid and others instigated the protestors, which resulted into violent riots taking place in the area of police station Jamia Nagar and New Friends Colony. In these riots, 45 Police personnel and 95 civilians were injured; two Police booths were burned; 3 Police motorcycles, QRT Gypsy were damaged; and three DTC and 8 private buses were also damaged.

¶67Thereafter, the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam, as earlier instructed to him, moved to Shaheen Bagh and blocked Road no. 13 (Kalindi Kunj road) at Shaheen Bagh. Thus, two protest sites, JMI University and Shaheen Bagh,

were created by these Appellants. It is alleged by the prosecution that the 24x7 sit in protest at Shaheen Bagh was not organic, and in fact, locals were against the same.

¶68It is claimed by the prosecution that pursuant to a direction from the Appellant-Umar Khalid and others, on 16.12.2019, at the JMI University, a coordination committee, that is, ³-DPL D &R -RUGL QDWH &RPPL WWHH´ , was constituted by the co-accused persons for an organized anti-CAA/NRC protest at JMI University. It is alleged that, resultantly, Gate No. 7 of the said University became a protest site. The purpose of this group, claimed to be the brainchild of the Appellant-Umar Khalid and one other, was to rope in different student organizations of the JMI University, which included SIO, AAJMI, SFI, JSF, and other student organizations and activists.

¶69It is also alleged that the Appellant-Umar Khalid, had a role to play in the first phase of the riots that took place in December 2019 in Delhi.

¶70The prosecution has, thus, attributed to them the role of being mobilizers, ideologues, and active participants in several violent protests, including the riots of 13th-16th December 2019 at Jamia Nagar and New Friends Colony, which involved destruction of public property and injuries to police personnel. For these incidents, two FIRs bearing No. 296/2019 and 242/2019 were registered at the respective Police Stations.

¶712Q    ³ Hum BK DUDW N H /RJ 6ZDUDM  $EK

organized a protest march from Red Fort to Shaheed Park, ITO; similarly, a protest march was organized at Mandi House. It is alleged that the permission to hold the protest was rejected and Section 144 of the Cr.P.C.

was imposed in the area, however, the protestors continued, and as a consequence, the Appellant-Umar Khalid and others were detained. The prosecution has alleged that these events were celebrated as a success, and it gave the Appellants wide publicity.

¶72It is alleged that, on 23.12.2019, at the directions of the Appellant-Umar Khalid, another WhatsApp group, namely WK H ³ Jamia Awareness Campaign Team´(JACT), was constituted. Later, a protest site at Khureji was also created for anti-CAA protests. On 24.12.2019, another protest was held at Jantar Mantar, and the Appellant-Umar Khalid also delivered a speech. It was decided between the co-conspirators that the Indian Social Institute, Lodhi Road, would be the venue for the first meeting between the organizations and individuals opposing the CAA, for the purpose of creating further protest sites.

¶73Another meeting on 26.12.2019 was held, and the Appellant-Umar Khalid and other co-accused persons and individuals attended, wherein, creation of protest sites by being women-centric near Muslim majority areas, collection of funds to sustain the sites, etc, were discussed. Thus, the WhatsApp group ³Delhi Protest Support Group´ (DPSG) came to be created on 28.12.2019, and the members who attended the said meeting were added to the same.

¶74It is alleged that, on 08.01.2020, the Appellant-Umar Khalid met with other co-accused persons at the office of the PFI at Shaheen Bagh, to discuss about funds for procuring acid, firearms, etc. Further meeting was held by the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam at Teflas, JNU, on 10±11th.01.2020.

¶75On 12.01.2020, the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam suggested the idea of raising slogans ³1DUD -e-7DN EHHU´ and ³LD L ODK DL OODOODK ´ , which were subsequently raised during the visit of Former Minister Shashi Tharoor in JMI University.

¶76The Appellant-Sharjeel Imam is also alleged to have visited the Khureji and the Seelampur Protest sites on 15.01.2020, and to Aligarh Muslim University on 16.01.2020, for mobilization of Muslim Students against the CAA/NRC, for which an FIR No. 55/2020 was registered at Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh.

¶77It is alleged that two more inflammatory speeches were delivered by the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam; one at Asanol, West Bengal, on 22.01.2020, and another at Chakand, Gaya, Bihar, on 23.01.2020, for further mobilization of the Muslim population against the CAA/NRC.

¶78On 23rd-24th.01.2020, the Appellant-Umar Khalid visited the Seelampur protest site and allegedly held a secret meeting, directing the attendees to escalate protests into riots and stating that spilling of blood of the policemen is the only means to bring the government to its knees and secure withdrawal of the CAA/NRC. In the said meeting, he directed the co-accused persons to induce women of Seelampur to gather knives, bottles, acids, stones, chilli powder, and other dangerous materials to be used in the riots.

¶79On 11.02.2020, the official news broke regarding the State visit of the President of the United States of America on 24th and 25th February 2020. Later, on 17.02.2020, the Appellant-Umar Khalid gave a provocative

speech at Amravati, Maharashtra, making reference to the visit of the said dignitary and encouraging listeners and protesters to come out for protests on those dates.

¶80It is alleged that in furtherance of the conspiracy, on 22.02.2020, at the directions of the Appellant-Umar Khalid and other co-accused persons, protesters were moved from one protest site to another to undertake Chakka-Jaams, thereby, completely blocking the public roads and highways. A similar course of action allegedly occurred on 23.02.2020 at other protest sites, with protestors being moved in coordination to create mass chaos. These Chakka-Jaams escalated into violence, damaging properties, public and private, and attacks on police and Non-Muslims.

¶81It is further alleged that, on 24.02.2020, a few members of the DPSG threatened to expose those responsible for the riots, and there was a flurry of calls between the Appellant-Umar Khalid and other co-accused persons around 5 P.M. It is also alleged that the Appellant-Umar Khalid was provided with Personal Security Officers (PSOs) by the Delhi Police after there was an attempted firing incident near the Constitution Club in New Delhi, where he had gone to attend a meeting called by UAH. However, the investigations allegedly revealed that the Appellant did not take the PSOs with him to the conspiratorial meetings.

¶82Further, it is alleged that the conduct of both the Appellants shows premeditation and orchestration of the entire plan. Collectively, as per prosecution, these acts, communications, speeches, etc., fortify the allegation that these Appellants were not mere participants in the entire

chain of events, but rather were the top conspirators and the masterminds of the larger conspiracy to cause communal violence and riots in the Capital of the Country, thereby threatening the unity, security, and sovereignty of India.

¶83In the course of trial proceedings, the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam had filed an application, bearing I.A. No. 81/2021 in S.C. No. 163/2020 titled State v. Tahir Hussain & Ors., before the learned Trial Court seeking Regular Bail in the subject FIR, which came to be dismissed vide Order dated 11.04.2022.

¶84The Appellant-Umar Khalid, on the other hand, had moved a second bail application, being Bail Application No. 441/2024, before the learned Trial Court, which was dismissed vide Impugned Order dated 28.05.2024.

¶85Aggrieved thereby, the Appellants have moved the present Appeals before this Court, challenging their respective Orders and praying for the grant of regular bail.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS:-

¶86The learned Senior Counsels and counsels for the Appellants submitted that the case of the prosecution against the Appellants is weak, inasmuch as, the evidence included in the Charge-sheet and the supporting material do not, as such, implicate the Appellants in any of the offences for which they have been Charge-sheeted.

¶87It was submitted that the prosecution has no evidence of their presence in any meeting where violence was conspired. They have been arrayed as accused in the present case only on account of their call for

chakka-jaam, and on the basis of the statements of witnesses, most of whom have been shown as protected witnesses. However, the statements of such witnesses are merely reproduction of each other, and when taken at face value, do not disclose the commission of the alleged offences by the Appellants, rather they appear to be concocted, and the witnesses have been coerced into giving such statements out of fear of arrest.

¶88It was contended that the statements of these witnesses were also recorded belatedly, many of which were obtained after the arrest of the Appellants, and therefore, they lack reliability to support the case of conspiracy against them, also being riddled with serious lacunae and material misrepresentations and thus, no prima facie case is made out to refuse Bail to the Appellants.

¶89Moreover, it was submitted that there has been no recovery of arms or ammunition from, or at the instance of, either of the Appellants. They contended that the Call Detail Records (CDRs) that are being relied upon by the prosecution only loosely connect the Appellants to certain places of meetings or presence near protest sites, however, they do not, in absolute terms, establish their presence, as the CDRs only indicate physical presence within the zone of a particular tower, which cannot be taken as proof of the person being at the same place or of having met. Even otherwise, it was urged, that the presence of the Appellants at a particular place is not proof of the commission of an offence by them at the said site or otherwise.

¶90The learned counsels contended that merely being a part of WhatsApp group(s), cannot be deemed to be a criminal offence in itself.

The Appellants have not sent a single incriminating message to attract any criminal liability, and there is no basis to show that the discussions in WhatsApp groups, to which the Appellants were added, amount to offences under the UA(P) Act.

¶91The learned counsels submitted that the prosecution has selectively relied on messages to portray the group as homogenous, however, people from different sections of society, with varying political opinions and ideologies, were members of the group.

¶92It was submitted that as far as the Appellant Sharjeel Imam is concerned, at no point of time he was engaged in a discussion that the alleged turning point of the protests would be the State visit of the President of the United States.

¶93It was contended that, though, the Appellant Umar Khalid made a mere mention of the saiG GL JQL WDU\¶V visit in his speech on 17.02.2020 at Amravati, however, that it is not a circumstance to be read against him and cannot be said to have any nexus with riots that ensued a week later, since this Appellant made no utterances with respect to any protests taking place L Q 'HOK L  GXUL QJ WK H VDL G GL JQL WDU\¶V

¶94The learned counsels for the Appellants further submitted that the Appellants were not even in Delhi or near the site of riots at the relevant time, as the Appellant Sharjeel Imam had been in judicial custody for nearly a month since 28.01.2020 in another FIR registered against him, whereas the Appellant Umar Khalid was not present in North-East, Delhi, between 22.02.2020-25.02.2020. It was contended that neither of them is

visible in any of the CCTV footage, nor have any witnesses deposed to their presence at the scene of the purported incidents of violence. Moreover, it was submitted, the prosecution witnesses have rather supported the ASSHOODQW¶V VWDQG E\ VWDW ing that the Appellant Sharjeel Imam was neither in Shaheen Bagh nor at any other site of protest after the first week of January, 2020.

¶95The learned counsels submitted that the prosecution has roped in the Appellants in the present case solely on account of the speeches at four places made by the Appellant Sharjeel Imam; in Jamia on 13.12.2019, in Aligarh on 16.01.2020, in Asansol on 22.01.2020, and in Gaya on

23.01.2020. The learned counsel emphasized that the Appellant Sharjeel Iman was granted bail by the Allahabad High Court with respect to the speech made at Aligarh, holding that there was absolutely no instigation to violence in the same, findings of which remains unchallenged by the State. Even as far as the other speeches are concerned, the learned counsel submitted, those are not sufficient to constitute an offence under the UA(P) Act.

¶96On behalf of the Appellant Umar Khalid, it was submitted that he was implicated in the present case for his speech in Amravati on

17.02.2020, which was contended to be neither provocative nor inflammatory. Further, the prosecution did not even produce the video of the said speech along with the Chargesheet for proving its context, content, impact, and legality of the speech are concerned. However, it was submitted that a fair evaluation of the said speech would make it clear that

the Appellant Umar Khalid rather made categorical calls for protests to remain peaceful and had emphasized the µGandhian principles of unity and non-violence¶, and urged the public to fight hatred with love, to protest using democratic methods, and to remain non-violent, making no call for violence or incitement to violence.

¶97It was submitted that a total of 751 FIRs had been registered in relation to the said incidents, however, none of the witnesses, including protected witnesses, could connect the Appellants with any actual incident of violence.

¶98He further submitted that the Appellant Umar Khalid was arrayed as an accused in FIR 101/2020, registered at PS Khajuri Khas, wherein he was earlier granted bail, and now stands discharged.

¶99He submitted that the prosecution has relied upon the Appellant 6K DUM HHO ,PDP¶V Facebook posts, messages on the single WhatsApp Group of which the Appellant Sharjeel Imam is a member, the messages sent to other individuals who are not co-accused persons, statements under Section 161 and 164 of the Cr.P.C. of four witnesses, namely, Romeo, Bond, James (protected witnesses) and Tahira, and the pamphlets. All of these, when taken at face value, make out no offence at all, much less under a Special Statute such as the UA(P) Act.

¶100The Protected Witnesses, he contended, speak nothing but the fact that the Appellants opposed the CAA. The learned counsel urged that the statement of the protected witness-Bond, which refers to the Appellant Umar Khalid¶V VSH ech on 13.12.2019, wherein he has allegedly stated that

he had H[SODL QHG WK H GL IIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ D dharna´ DQG D ³ chakka-jaam´ and directed the Appellant Sharjeel Imam to organize a Chakka Jaam at Shaheen Bagh, where the said chakka jaam remained non-violent, does not fall within the ambit of Section 15 of the UA(P)Act.

¶101As for the protected witness-James, it was contended that the statement made by this witness is purely hearsay and holds weak evidentiary value.

¶102The learned counsels submitted that political action or strikes aimed at disrupting services are not, by themselves, offences under the UA(P) Act, and merely talking about violence is not the same as conspiring to commit an act covered by the UA(P)Act.

¶103The learned counsel submitted that even calling for a µsecession¶ is, at best, an µunlawful act¶ under the UA(P) Act, punishable up to 5/7 years, and falls under Section 13 of Chapter III of the UA(P) Act, and not under Chapter IV of the UA(P) Act, to which Section 43D (5) of the UA(P) Act applies. The rigours therein will, therefore, not be applicable in the present case. They submitted, even otherwise, this provision is only an additional condition to the existing considerations for the grant of bail. They placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in K.A. Najeeb (supra), to submit that the provision in the UA(P) Act is not as onerous for an accused as the bail provisions in NDPS, MCOCA, etc.

¶104They submitted that, in sum and substance, the prosecution has, other than the utterances in favor of Chakka Jaam and opposition to the CAA through public and non-violent protests and communications,

produced no cogent evidence to establish any ingredient of any offence under Chapters IV or VI of the UA(P) Act.

¶105It was contended that the Appellant-Umar Khalid, pursuant to the dismissal of his Appeal vide Order dated 18.10.2022, had approached the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition, being SLP(Crl.) No. 6857/2023, on which notice was issued, however, the Appellant later withdrew the said SLP vide Order dated 14.02.2024, with liberty to approach the learned Trial Court on the ground of change in circumstance. The learned counsel submitted that therefore, the Order dated 18.10.2022 would not act as a bar to the Appellant seeking bail on basis of the changed circumstances.

¶106Further, on the point of change in circumstances, it was submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in not appreciating that there had been a change in law, as neither the learned Trial Court nor this Court had the benefit of the Judgement passed by the Supreme Court in Vernon v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2023) 15 SCC 56, which was re-iterated in Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 6 SCC 591, at the time when the Orders were passed rejecting the first bail application and the Appeal thereagainst by the Appellant Umar Khalid.

¶107Further, it was submitted that there had also been another change in circumstance inasmuch as the learned Trial Court and this Court did not have the benefit of the Order dated 15.06.2021 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court granting bail to the co-accused Asif Iqbal Tanha, Natasha Narwal, and Devangana Kalita, on which the Appellants and other

co-accused are entitled to rely upon pursuant to Order dated 02.05.2023 passed by the Supreme Courtin S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 4287-4289/2021. He submitted that the learned Trial Court did not even return a finding on the plea of parity.

¶108The learned counsels submitted that out of the total of 18 co-accused persons, six are out on bail, and five of them were granted bail on merits. He contended that a bail application of one of the co-accused persons, namely Faizan Khan, was rejected by this Court, whose case is entirely GL VWL QJXL VK DEOH RQ IDFWV IURP WK H $S three of the aforementioned co-accused persons who were granted bail, were also alleged to be present in the meetings where the actual use of violence was discussed and were also alleged to be present at the protest sites where the violence later occurred. Despite these allegations, this Court had granted bail to them. The learned counsel vehemently contended that the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam is not even named in the FIR pertaining to the violent riots that happened in North-East Delhi, as opposed to the aforementioned co-accused persons.

¶109Based upon the above, they contended that the Appellants are entitled to grant of bail on the grounds of parity with the three co-accused, namely Devangana Kalita, Natasha Narwal, and Asif Iqbal Tanha, who were granted bail by this Court and the same being upheld by the Supreme Court vide the Order dated 02.05.2023 passed in S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 4287-4289, apart from the merits of the case of the Appellants. They submit that therefore, the Appellants ought to be enlarged on Regular Bail, pending

trial before the learned Trial Court, having suffered more than 5 years in custody since their arrest. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE:-

¶110The learned SPP on behalf of the State UHL WHUDWHG WK H SUR case and the allegations leveled against the present Appellants to highlight the role played by them, and drew our attention to the Statement of several Witnesses under Section 161 and 164 of the Cr.P.C, including Protected Witnesses, WhatApp Chats, Speeches (both in video and transcripts), photographs, Social Media Posts, distribution of pamhplets, formation of WhatsApp Groups, etc., the electronic data running into 30,000 pages, which further delineated the role of the Appellants in detail. Further, learned SPP also took us through various speeches made by the Appellant on different occasions, to establish that the Appellants were the key conspirators whose sole purpose was to incite riots so as to cause violence, damage to public property and to create fear amongst the masses by dividing them on religious basis.

¶111Learned SPP submitted that the evidence on record clearly establishes existence of a systematic pattern of planning, preparation, and execution of violent protests that culminated in the Delhi riots of February 2020. It was contended that the Appellants are the masterminds behind the entire conspiracy, drawing our attention to the WhatsApp Chat between the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam and his brother Muzammil, wherein the Appellant has claimed himself to be the mastermind behind the chakka jaams.

¶112The learned SPP submitted that the Appellant 8PDU .K DOL G¶V FK DUDFWHUL ]DWL RQ DV D µYHWHUDQ RI VH , is amply supported by the chronological sequence of events and the coordinated nature of activities spanning several months. As for the Appellant Sharjeel Imam, as on 23.01.2020, he was aware of the impeding riots of February, 2020, which is evident from his speech at Chakand, Gaya, Bihar, where he stated WK DW ³ there are 4 weeks and a lot could be GRQH L Q  ZHHN V´ He submitted that the timing of the group formation, immediately following the enactment of the CAB, coupled with the Appellants¶ subsequent active role in protests, further establishes clear premeditation and planning.

¶113It was argued that Appellant Sharjeel Imam was directed by Appellant Umar Khalid to mobilize students across universities like JNU, Jamia Millia Islamia, Aligarh Muslim University, and Delhi University, highlighting their central role in the conspiracy to incite nationwide unrest.

¶114Our attention was invited to the Statements of the Protected Witnesses Bond, Romeo, Bravo, Saturn, and James, to contend that they have stated that the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam and others were persistently instigating the crowd by conveying that the Government is Anti-Muslim and the CAA is a law to be condemned as it targets only Muslims. Further, it was submitted that the Appellant-Umar Khalid, had instilled the idea among the masses that the Indian Government is a Hindu Government and is against the Muslims. Moreover, the Appellant-Umar Khalid stated that they would overthrow the Government at the right time. As a part of the

conspiracy, he submitted, the witnesses have stated that around 24 protest sites were created, and several meetings were held in this regard.

¶115The learned SPP, qua the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam, also referred to a pamphlet, the contents whereof are alleged to be inciting communal feelings and calling for a disruptive chakka-jaam on 13.12.2019. The same reads as below: ³&L WL ]HQVK L S $PHQGPHQW %L OO ZDV SD with week. This base is unconstitutional and intends to GL VHQIUDQFK L VH 0XVOL P¶V DQG SXW WK camps. It has already started in Assam and will followHOVHZK HUH 0XVOL P¶V DFURVV ,QGL NRC and CAB in one voice. Kashmir, Babri and now CAB, there are more than enough grounds for a strong rejection from Muslims across India. Assam has already started burning and people are being killed. However, the rule played by our religious and political leadership has also been disappointing. Thousands of Mulim youths are ready to disrupt Delhi which will give international media attention to our issues. The students of Jamia Millia Islamia have given a protest call for 3 PM today, from Jamia Jama Masjid. we, Muslim students of JNU, request you to join the protest in large numbers and plan for a Disruptive Chakka Jam accordingly´ (Emphasis Supplied)

¶116The learned SPP had contended that the pamphlets were misleading and communal in nature and were distributed in areas with a large population of Muslim persons, particularly near Mosques, with the clear intent and purpose of mass mobilization of Muslims. He submitted that these pamphlets also contained reference to sensitive issues like the Babri

Masjid and Kashmir (allegedly in reference to abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution).

¶117The learned SPP also brought our attention to the extracts from the Speech dated 13.12.2019 delivered by the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam, which reads as under:

¶118He submitted that, from a bare perusal of the same, it would appear that the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam intended for a mass mobilization by referring to the contemporaneous Chakka-Jaam as only as a µVSDUN ¶ . He further referred to the mention of Chakka-Jaam aimed at disrupting essential services such as the supply of milk and water in Delhi.

¶119The learned SPP contended that on 15.12.2019, Appellant-Sharjeel Imam made inciteful speeches against the government at Shaheen Bagh and had brought 200 non-locals to completely block the road at Shaheen Bagh and purportedly spoke about secession and the creation of a different nation for Muslims on the basis of terror and violence. He further submitted that the Appellant Umar Khalid also came to Shaheen Bagh, and gave provocative speeches, and, along with the other Appellants and their associates, told people that ³XQWL O EORRG L V QRW VSL OOH QRW EHQG´

¶120The learned SPP submitted that on 16th and 17th December, 2019, the Appellant-Umar Khalid directed the formation of the JCC WhatsApp Group, and this fact has been supported by the protected witness Bond. He further submitted that another protected witness, James, also corroborated the fact that the appellant Umar Khalid exercised control over, and had influence on, the decisions of the JCC.

¶121It is alleged that, as a result of delivering inflammatory and inciteful speeches at Jamia Nagar and calling for disruptive Chakka-Jaam through the circulation of pamphlets, violent riots took place on 13.12.2019 and

16.12.2019 at Jamia Nagar, and New Friends Colony, which involved

destruction of public property and injuries to a total of 45 police personnel and more than 100 civilians. For these incidents, two FIRs bearing no. 242/2019 and 298/2019 were registered at the aforesaid Police Stations.

¶122Further, the learned SPP relied upon the transcripts from another Speech by the Appellant-Sharjeel Imam on 16.01.2020 at Aligarh Muslim University, extracts from the said speech are as under:

¶123The prosecution cited the other inflammatory speeches made by the Appellant Sharjeel Imam, one in Asanol, West Bengal, on 22.01.2020, where he had incited the public to call a nationwide bandh, and another in Chakand, Gaya, Bihar, on 23.01.2020, where he openly admitted to causing Chakka Jaams at Shaheen Bagh, forcing the closure of showrooms and petrol pumps, and causing deliberate public inconvenience, all of which he lauded as successful. Further, from the said Speech, reading thus:

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on: 09.07.2025 Pronounced on: 02.09.2025 + CRL.A. 184/2022 SHARJEEL IMAM .....Appellant Through: Mr. Talib Mustafa, Mr. Ahmad Ibrahim, Ms. Ayesha Zaidi, Mr. Abhishek Singh, Mr. Jeet Chakrabarti, Mr. Akif Abidi and Mr. Kartik Venu, Advs. Versus THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI .....Respondent Through: Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG, Mr. Amit Prasad, SPP for State, with Mr. Dhruv Pande, Mr. Aarush Bhatia, Mr. Ayodhya Prasad, Ms. Ruchika Prasad, Mr. Harshil Jain, Mr. Saravjeet Singh, Mr. Amit Gupta, Mr. Shubham Sharma, Mr. Vikramaditya Singh, Advocates. Mr. P.S. Kushwaha, Addl. CP (Special Cell), Insp. Anil Kumar, Insp. Suhaib Ahmad, ASI Sanjay Kumar, HC Dheeraj Goswami (Special Cell) + CRL.A. 631/2024 UMAR KHALID .....Appellant Through: Mr.Trideep Pais, Sr. Adv. with Ms.Sanya Kumar, Mr.Sahil Ghai, Ms.Sakshi Jain & Ms.Saloni Anubastha, Advs Versus STATE (GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI) .....Respondent Through: Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG, Mr. Amit Prasad, SPP for State, Mr. Madhukar Pandey, SPP for State with Mr. Dhruv Pande, Mr. Aarush Bhatia, Mr. Ayodhya Prasad, Ms. Ruchika Prasad, Mr. Umesh Kumar Singh, Mr. Sulabh Gupta, Mr. Harshil Jain, Mr. Saravjeet Singh, Mr. Daksh Sachdeva, Mr. Amit Gupta, Mr. Shubham Sharma, Mr. Vikramaditya Singh, Advocates. Mr. P.S. Kushwaha, Addl. CP (Special Cell), Insp. Anil Kumar, Insp. Suhaib Ahmad, ASI Sanjay Kumar, HC Dheeraj Goswami (Special Cell) + CRL.A. 677/2022 ATHAR KHAN .....Appellant Through: Mr. Arjun Dewan, Ms. Varisha Sharma and Mr. Aryan Deol, Advs. Versus STATE OF NCT OF DELHI .....Respondent Through: Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG, Mr. Amit Prasad, SPP for State, Mr. Madhukar Pandey, SPP for State with Mr. Dhruv Pande, Mr. Aarush Bhatia, Mr. Ayodhya Prasad, Ms. Ruchika Prasad, Mr. Umesh Kumar Singh, Mr. Sulabh Gupta, Mr. Harshil Jain, Mr. Saravjeet Singh, Mr. Daksh Sachdeva, Mr. Amit Gupta, Mr. Shubham Sharma, Mr. Vikramaditya Singh, Advocates. Mr. P.S. Kushwaha, Addl. CP (Special Cell), Insp. Anil Kumar, Insp. Suhaib Ahmad, ASI Sanjay Kumar, HC Dheeraj Goswami (Special Cell) + CRL.A. 210/2022 & CRL.M.A.12338/2023, CRL.M.A.13472/2023 ABDUL KHALID SAIFI @KHALID SAIFI .....Appellant Through: Ms.Rebecca M. John, Sr. Adv. with. Mr. Rajat Kumar, Ms. Praavita Kashyap and Ms. Anushka Baruah, Advs versus STATE .....Respondent Through: Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG, Mr. Amit Prasad, SPP for State, with Mr. Dhruv Pande, Mr. Aarush Bhatia, Mr. Ayodhya Prasad, Ms. Ruchika Prasad, Mr. Harshil Jain, Mr. Saravjeet Singh, Mr. Amit Gupta, Mr. Shubham Sharma, Mr. Vikramaditya Singh, Advocates. Mr. P.S. Kushwaha, Addl. CP (Special Cell), Insp. Anil Kumar, Insp. Suhaib Ahmad, ASI Sanjay Kumar, HC Dheeraj Goswami (Special Cell) + CRL.A. 233/2022 & CRL.M.A. 29808/2023, CRL.M.(BAIL) 620/2022 MOHD SALEEM KHAN .....Appellant Through: Mr.Gautam Khazanchi, Mr.Vaibhav Dubey, Ms.Anshala Verma, Mr.AyushSachan, Mr.Vinayak Chawla and Ms.Pooja Deepak, Advs Versus STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) .....Respondent Through: Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG, Mr. Amit Prasad, SPP for State, Mr. Madhukar Pandey, SPP for State with Mr. Dhruv Pande, Mr. Aarush Bhatia, Mr. Ayodhya Prasad, Ms. Ruchika Prasad, Mr. Umesh Kumar Singh, Mr. Sulabh Gupta, Mr. Harshil Jain, Mr. Saravjeet Singh, Mr. Daksh Sachdeva, Mr. Amit Gupta, Mr. Shubham Sharma, Mr. Vikramaditya Singh, Advocates. Mr. P.S. Kushwaha, Addl. CP (Special Cell), Insp. Anil Kumar, Insp. Suhaib Ahmad, ASI Sanjay Kumar, HC Dheeraj Goswami (Special Cell) + CRL.A. 271/2022 SHIFA UR REHMAN .....Appellant Through: Mr.Salman Khurshid, Sr. Adv. with Mr.Bilal Anwar Khan, Ms.Anshu Kapoor and Ms.Sidra Khan, Advs Versus STATE OF NATIONAL CAPITAL TERRITORY PS CRIME BRANCH BEING INVESTIGATED BY SPECIAL CELL .....Respondent Through: Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG, Mr. Amit Prasad