Arjun v. Bhagirath

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD SECOND APPEAL No. - 556 of 1982 Arjun …..Appellant(s) Versus Bhagirath …..Respondent(s) Counsel for Appellant(s) : Amit Verma, G.n. Verma, Kamleshwar Prasad, Nipun Singh, Pramod Kumar Jain, Seema Agarwal Counsel for Respondent(s) : A.n. Bhargawa, B.p.singh, J. Verma, Manoj Kumar Singh, R. Shome, Rajesh Kumar Singh, Ranjeet Sharne, Siddhartha Verma, Sushil Kumar Pandey, V.k. Rathi, Yogesh Tiwari Court No. - 36 HON'BLE SAURABH SHYAM SHAMSHERY, J.

¶1This Second Appeal is of the year 1982.

¶2This Second Appeal was admitted on 17.02.1982 that grounds mentioned in the memo of appeal appears to be substantial questions of law in the present case.

¶3Sri Nipun Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Hemant Tyagi, learned counsel for the appellant fairly submitted that no question of law was mentioned in the memo of present second appeal. The grounds mentioned in memo of appeal are not substantial questions of law. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that substantial questions of law, which arose for consideration are as follows:- "i. Whether the injunction suit could be decreed by the first appellate court without there being any relief of declaration particularly when the title of the plaintiff was under cloud, based on alleged oral settlement? ii. Whether without proving the oral settlement, as alleged claimed by the plaintiff in the plaint, which is the basis of the suit, first appellate is justified in decreeing the suit? iii. Whether the first appellate court has completely misread and wrongly interpreted the sale deed dated 06.06.1970 in order to reach to an erroneous conclusion of having any oral partition taken place between the parties? iv. Whether the findings returned by the lower appellate court regarding the oral family partition are perverse, erroneous and based on complete mis-appreciation of evidence and the same would vitiate the judgment of first appellate court ?"

¶4The law in regard to framing of question of law for adjudication in a Second Appeal is being reiterated by Supreme Court in Nek Pal & Ors. Vs. Nagar Palika Parishad & Ors, 2024 INSC 574. Said order in its entirety is reproduced hereinafter:- "1. Leave granted.

¶2Our attention is invited to the impugned judgment of the High Court in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, "the CPC"). Following is the relevant part of the impugned judgment: "Since no substantial question of law was formulated at the time of admission of the appeal on 30.5.2003, hence having heard the matter partially and during the course of arguments, in the presence of learned Counsels of both the parties, this Court confined itself to adjudicate the following substantial questions of law:

Whether the alleged transaction of the disputed property was void ab initio being the violation of Section 7 of Hindu Public Religious Institution (Prevention of Dissipation of Properties) Act, 1962.

Whether the property was owned by Dera Baba Dargah Singh and was of the religious charitable nature. If it is so, whether it could have been transferred by the self claimed manager Jaswinder Singh in the nature and manner it was transferred?

Whether both the lower courts have rightly decreed the suit on the basis of Khasra, Khatauni and 'Kisan Bahi' which were issued by the revenue officials in favour of the lease holders."

3 . The aforesaid paragraph indicates that at the time of admitting

the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, substantial questions of law were not formulated. Unless substantial questions of law are formulated at the time of admission of the appeal or any time subsequent thereto, a second appeal cannot be finally heard. The reason is that a second appeal can be finally heard only on a substantial question of law formulated earlier. In fact, the act of finally hearing a second appeal without framing any substantial question of law is itself illegal. There is nothing on record to show that the High Court formulated the substantial questions of law and gave an opportunity to the parties to argue on the basis of those substantial questions of law. All that the High Court says is the Court has confined itself to three substantial questions of law. The High Court did not put the rival Advocates to the notice before the commencement of hearing that it was proposing to hear the appeal on specific substantial questions of law. The High Court could have framed substantial questions of law and heard the appeal after few days so that the Advocates had a notice that the appeal will be heard on specific substantial questions of law.

¶4Therefore, the procedure followed by the High Court is completely illegal and contrary to Section 100 of the CPC. Only on this ground, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 13th November, 2017 and restore Second Appeal Nos.34/2003 and 48/2003 to the file of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital. All contentions of the parties on merits of the Second Appeals are kept open.

¶5A copy of this order shall by forwarded by the Registry to the Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court of Uttarakhand. The Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court shall list the restored Second Appeals before the roster Bench on 27th August, 2024. The parties, who are appearing today, shall be under an obligation to appear before the High Court on that date. The High Court need not issue a notice to those parties.

¶6If the High Court wants to frame substantial questions of law as indicated in the impugned judgment or if the High Court desires to frame additional substantial questions of law, it is open for the High Court to do so. After completing the said exercise, the High Court shall fix a date for hearing of the Second Appeals taking into consideration the fact that the Second Appeals are 21 years old.

¶7We also clarify that till the date of the impugned judgment if any interim relief was operative in the restored Second Appeals, the same shall continue to operate.

¶8The Civil Appeals are partly allowed on the above terms.

¶9Pending applications, including the application for impleadment, stand disposed of accordingly."

¶5In the above background of position of law, Court heard learned counsel for the parties in order to ascertain as to whether there is any question of law involved in the present second appeal or not and if answer is in affirmative, questions of law(s) has to be framed and thereafter granting opportunity of hearing to both parties, the second appeal will be heard finally and in case answer remains in negative, fate of second appeal would be dismissal, therefore, present second appeal is listed today under the heading of 'For Orders'.

¶6Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of appellant has referred a copy of plaint annexed along with Miscellaneous Application filed on

22.11.2013, that plaintiffs/respondents have filed a suit for injunction simpliciter despite their title was disputed, therefore, the suit was not maintainable.

¶7Learner Senior Counsel further submitted that Learned Trial Court has framed following 9 issues:-"1-

क्यावादग्रस्तभूमि ए.1 ए.2

एचईकेस्वामीशीशरामवछज्जूथे? 2-

क्यावादग्रस्तभूमि बीईएफडीवादीगणकोपारिवारिकविभाजन(फैमिली

सेटिलमेन्टमेंमिली)

औरवादीगणउसकेस्वामीवकाबिजहोगये? 3-

क्यावादग्रस्तभूमि प्रतिवादीगण1

ता3

केपूर्वजरूढामेंअन्तर्गतधारा9

जमींदाराखात्माअधिनियममेंनिहितहोचुकीहै? 4-

क्याप्रतिवादीगण1

ता3

केपूर्वजरूढाकोवादग्रस्तभूमि परधारा7 एए

जमींदाराखात्माअधिनियमकेअन्तर्गतअधिकारप्राप्तहोगयेहैं? 5-

क्यावादकामूल्यांकनकमकियागयाहैऔरन्यायशुल्ककाभुगतान

अपर्याप्तहै? 6-

क्यावादअवधि सेबाहरहै? 7-

क्यावादपत्रकामानचित्रगलतहै? 8-

क्यावादमेंधारा38

ता41

विनिर्दिष्टअनुतोषअधिनियमबाधकहै? 9-अनुतोष?"

¶8The plaintiffs/respondents have claimed that predecessor in interest of Sri Sheeshram and predecessor in interest of appellants/defendants belongs to same generation and they remained in possession on part of land in dispute and subsequently in pursuance of an oral family settlement they took possession of all three parts. However, when allegedly appellants/defendants tried to disturb their possession, present suit was filed.

¶9Learned Trial Court after considering the materials on record decided issue nos.1 and 4 against the respondents/plaintiffs and in favour of appellants/defendants and claim of family settlement was rejected.

¶10The decision on issue numbers 1 and 4 being relevant are reproduced hereinafter: " विवेचना

वादबिन्दु1

ता4:—

वादबिन्दु1

ता4

आपसमेंएकदूसरेसेसंबंधितहै।अतःइनकोनिर्धारणहेतु

एकसाथलियागयाहै।

वादीगणनेईश्वरदयालकोवादीसाक्षी1,

– खजानसिंहकोवादीसाक्षी2 के

– रूपमेंप्रस्तुतकियाहै।प्रतिवादीगणनेप्रतिवादीसाक्षी1

अर्जुनएवंप्रतिवादी – साक्षी2

रिडकूकोप्रस्तुतकियाहै।

वादीगणविवादितसम्पत्तिए

.1 ए .2 एच 0 ई 0

दोनोंपक्षोंकेवारिसानशीशराम

– वछज्जूकोहोनाअभिकथनकरतेहैं।वादीसाक्षी

ईश्वरदयालनेअपने

प्रतिपरीक्षणमेंस्वीकारकियाहैकि उसकोविवादितसम्पत्तिकाखसरानं

नहींमालूमऔरउनमेंबड़ोंनेकोईलिखि तमेंइजाजतनामानहींलिखारखा

औरउसनेनकोईमालकेकागजातदेखेहै।इससाक्षीनेआगेप्रतिपरीक्षणमें

स्वीकारकियाहैकि वहलोगछज्जूहरसे

25–30

–

सालसेअलगअलगहै

, SAPLoNo.o-o556oofo1982 परन् तुoकोल् हूoइकट्ठ ाoह।ै oऔरoइनदोनों o काoबंटवाराoहोoचुकाoथाoऔरoके वल oवि ववावि दतoसम् पलि ्oमश्ु तरकाoरहoगईoथी।oयवि दoशीशरामoवoछ?्ज ूoके oवादीoसाक्ष ी–oo1o के oअनुसारoबंटवाराoकाफीoसमयoपहलेoहोoचुकाoथाoतोoइसoसम् पलि ्oमुश् तरका छोड़ नेoकाoप्र ्न oनहीं oउठताoऔरoइनoपरि रस्थि स् थधि तयों oमoें वादoमoें आंणि शकoवि वभाजन काoजि सद्ध ान् तoलागूoहोoजाताoह।ै oवादीoनेoइनoसम् पलि ्o कोoमौलि खकoबंटवाराoकाoहोना oo8–9 ooसालoपहलेoहोनाo अणि भकणि थतoवि कयाoह।ै oपरन् तुoमौलि खकoबंटवाराoकाoकोईoगवाहoप्र स् तुतoनहीं oवि कया oगयाoह।ै oवादीoसाक्ष ी–oo2ooखजानoसिं सहoके oसमयoकोईoबंटवाराoनहीं oहुआoऔरoनo oबंटवाराoकाoकोईoदस् तावेजoलि लखाoगया।oवादीगणoनेoएoo1,ooएoo3ooसoीo1ooवoसीoo2ooभूवि मo oप्र धि तवादीगणoके oपूवरजoरू ठाoसे oo6–6–1970 ooकोoवि वቅ्र यoपत्र ooorooप्र दशर–oo1) ooद्व ाराo खरीदीoथी।oइसoवि वቅ्र यoपत्र oमेंoभीoमौलि खकoबंटवाराoकाoकोईoउ्ल ेखoनहीं oह।ै oइस वि वቅ्र यoपत्र oमेंoधि तहाईoवि हस् साoबेचनेoकाoउ्ल खे oवि कयाoगयाoह।ै oइसoवि वቅ्र यoपत्र oकी तफसीलoमेंoकलoप् लाटoजि जसकीoधि तहाईoवि हस् साoबेचाoगयाoहैoदीoगयीoहैoयवि दoदोनोंु पक्ष ों oमेंoबंटवाराoहोoगयाoहोताoतोoइसoवि वቅ्र यoपत्र oमoें बंटवाराoकाoउ्ल ेखoहोताoऔर चौहददीoमेंoवादीगणoकीoसम् पलि ्oजि जसकोoवहoअपनीoबतातेoहoैं लेनेoकाoउ्ल ेख होता।oयहoपरि रस्थि स् थधि तoयहoदशारतीoहैoवि कoवादीगणoऔरoउसके oपूवरजों oकाoइस सम् पलि ्oमेंoकोईoस् वावि मत् वoवoधारणoनहीं oथा। इसके oअधि तरि रक्त oवादीगणoनेoसम् पलि ्oए3,oए 2oबी3oवoबी2oकोoदगु ारoवoरि रडकू oके वि हस् सेoमेंoआनाबतायाoहैoऔरoउसकोoवि ववावि दतoसम् पलि ्oकाoमालि लकoएवंoकावि बज बतायाoह।ै oपरन् तुoप्र धि तवादीoसाक्ष ी–2oरि रडकू oनेoअपनेoसाቌ्ष यoमेंoअपनाoकोईoवास् ता औरoता्ल कु oइसoसम् पलि ्oए3oए 2oबी2oवoबी3oसेoनहीं oबतलायाoऔरoपूरीoसम् पलि ् प्र धि तवादीगणo1oताo3oकीoबताईoह।ै oकोईoभीoव् यवि क्त oअपनाoअधि धकारoआजoके oयगु मेंoसम् पलि ्oसेoछोड़ नाoनहीं oचाहताoह।ै oप्र धि तवादीoसाक्ष ी–2oकाoए3,oए 2oबी3oवoबी2 सम् पलि ्oकोoअपनीoनoबतानाoऔरoइसकाoपूणरoमालि लकoप्र धि तवादीगणoकोoबताना यहoदशारताoहैoवि कoइसoसम् पलि ्oपरoवादीगणoयाoउसके oपूवरजों oकाoकोईoता्ल कु औरoवास् ताoनहीं oथा। oवादoपत्र oके oमानधि चत्र oमेंoस् पष्ट oहोताoहैoवि कoएooo1ooएooo3ooबीoo1ooवoसीoo2ooपरoमकानातo oवादीगणoo1ooवoo2ooह।ै oजोoवि कoउन् हों नेoप्र धि तवादीगणoसेoo1970ooमेंoखरीदीoह।ै oवादीगणo oबीoबीoo1ooडीoबीoo3ooकोoअपनीoजगहoबंटवारेoसेoपहलेoहोनाoबतातेoह।ैं oपरन् तुoइसo oस् थानoपरoकोईoतामीरातoनoहोनाoतथाoबीoडीoवि दवारoमoें कोईoदरवाजाoo,ooरोशनदानo oलि खड़ कीoआवि दoनoहोनाoयहoदशारताoहैoवि कoवादीगणoकाoबीoबीoo1ooडीoबीoo3ooपरoकभीo कोईoकब् जाoधारणoवoस् वावि मत् वoनहीं oरहाoह।ै oअन् यथाoवादीगणoइसoस् थानoपरoकोई नoकोईoतामीरातoअवश् यoरखते। SAPLoNo.o-o556oofo1982 प्र धि तवादीगणoनेoवि ववावि दतoस् थानoके oलन्ै डoएक् वीजशनoकीoकायरवाहीoके oकागजात rप्र दशरo1)oपरoदालि खलoवि कयाoह।ै oजि जसमेंoरू डाoकीoआपलि ्यांoसहीoमानीoगयीoऔर भूवि मoएक् वायरoनहीं oकीoगयी।oयहoआदेशo1–5–1975oकाoप्र दशरoए–1oपरoह।ै oलन्ै ड एक् वीजीशनoकीoकायरवाहीoमेंoवादीगणoयाoउसके oपूवरजों oद्व ाराoकोईoकायरवाहीoन करनाoयहoदशारताoहैoवि कoवादीगणoकाoइसीoभूवि मoपरoकोईoस् वावि मत् वoवoधारणoनहीं थाoऔरoप्र धि तवादीगणoके oपासoउनके oधारणoमoें वि ववावि दतoभूवि मoथी। oप्र धि तवादीoसाक्ष ी–oo1ooअजरुनoएवंoप्र धि तवादीoसाक्ष ी–oo2ooरि रडकू oके oबयानoसेoस् पष्ट oहोताo हैoवि कoजमीं दाराoखात् माoके oवक्त oप्र धि तवादीगणoके oपूवरजों oकाoवि ववावि दतoभूवि मoपर oधारणoथाoऔरoवि ववावि दतoभूवि मoधाराoo9ooएवंoधाराoo7ooएoमेंoउनमेंoवि नवि हतoहोoचुकीoथी।o अतःoउपरोक्त oवि ववेचनाoसेoतथाoदोनों oपक्ष ों oके oवि वद्व ानoअधि धवक्त ाओoं के oतकjoको oध् यानoपूवरकoसुननेoके oपश्च ातoमoैं इसoवि नष् कषरoपरoआताoहएoवि कoवि ववावि दतoभूवि मoएooo1o,ू oएooo2ooएचoईoके oस् वामीoशीशरामoवoछ?्ज ूoनहीं oथेoऔरoबीoईoएसoडीoभूवि मoमौलि खकo वि वभाजनoमेंoवादीगणoकोoनहीं oवि मलीoऔरoनoवहoमालि लकoएवंoकावि बजoहए।oवादु oवि बन् दुoo1ooवoo2ooतदनुसारoवादीगणoके oवि वपरीतoनकारात् मकoरू पoसेoवि नधारि रतoवि कयoे oजातेoह।ैं oवि ववावि दतoभूवि मoप्र धि तवादीगणoo1ooताoo3ooके oपूवरजoरू ढाoके oअन् तगरतoधाराoo9o oजमीं दाराoखात् माoअधि धवि नयमoमेंoवि नवि हतoहोoचुकीoहैoऔरoउनकोoधाराoo7ooएoकoे oअधि धकारoप्र ा्त oहोoचुके oह।ैं oवादoवि बन् दुoo3ooवoo4ooतदनुसारoप्र धि तवादीगणoके oपक्ष oमoें स् वीकारात् मकoरू पoमेंoवि नधारि रतoवि कयेoजातेoह।ैं वादoवि बन् दoु सं०o–5:—oइसoवादoवि बन् दoु काoवि नधार णoमेरेoवि वद्व ानoपूवाधिर धकारीoद्व ारा नकारात् मकoरू पoमेंo20.05.1978oकोoवि कयाoजाoचुकाoह।ै oवहoवि नणरयoकाoभाग बनेगा। वादoवि बन् दoसं०–6:—oप्र धि तवादीगणoके oवि वद्व ानoअधि धवक्त ाoकाoतकर oथाoवि कoवादीगणु काoवि ववावि दतoभूवि मoपरo12oसालoसेoपहलेoसेoकब् जाoनहीं oह।ै oऔरoवादoकालावधि ध सेoबाधि धतoह।ै oवादoवि बन् दo1oवo2oके oवि नधार णoमेंoवादीगणoकाoकब् जाoनहीं oमानाoगयाु ह।ै oअतःoवादoकालावधि धoसेoबाधि धतoह।ै oवादoवि बन् दo5oतदनुसारoस् वीकारात् मकoरू पु मेंoवि नधारि रतoवि कयाoजाताoह। वादoवि बन् दoु सं०–7:—oप्र धि तवादीगणoके oवि वद्व ानoअधि धवक्त ाoकाoतकर oथाoवि कoवादoपत्र काoमानधि चत्र oगलतoह।ै oपरन् तुoउन् हों नेoइसoवि वषयoपरoकोईoशहादतoनहीं oदीoहoै और नoकोईoकमीशनoहीoजारीoकरायाoह।ै oअतःoइनoपरि रस्थि स् थधि तयों oमoें वादoपत्र oका मानधि चत्र o गलतoनहीं o मानाoजाoसकताoह।ै oवादoवि बन् दुo6 oनकारात् मकoरू पoमें वि नधारि रतoवि कयाoजाताoह।ै वादoवि बन् दुoसं०o–8:— oप्र धि तवादीगणoके oवि वद्व ानoअधि धवक्त ाoकाoतकर o थाoवि क वादीगणoवि ववावि दतoभूवि मoपरoकब् जाoनहीं oह।ै oवादoवि बन् दुo1oवo2oके oवि नधार णoमें

वादीगणकाकब्जाविवादितभूमि परनहींमानागयाहै।अतःवादविनिर्दिष्ट

अधिनियमकीधारा38

ता41

सेबाधितहै।वादबिन्दु8 तदनुसार

स्वीकारात्मकरूपमेंनिर्धारितकियाजाताहै।

– वादबिन्दुसं०9:—

वादबिन्दु1 व2

मेंवादीगणकेविपरीतनिर्धारणहोनेके

कारणवादीगणकोईअनुतोषपानेकेअधिकारीनहींहैंऔरवादखर्चेसहित

खारिजहोनेयोग्यहैं।मैंतदनुसारआदेशदेताहै। आदेश

वादीगणकाआज्ञापकव्यादेशकावादखर्चेसहितप्रतिवादीगणकेविरूद्ध

खारिजकियाजाताहै।"

¶11Accordingly the suit was dismissed vide a judgment dated

13.10.1978.

¶12The respondents/plaintiffs, filed an appeal before the 1st Civil Judge, Muzaffar Nagar which was allowed vide a judgment dated 3.2.1982, and the suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs was allowed.

¶13Learned Senior Counsel submitted that 1st Appellate Court did not frame points for determination and without setting-aside findings returned by learned Trial Court, took a different view, thus impugned order suffers from multiple illegalities.

¶14Learned Senior Counsel submitted that 1st Appellate Court decided issue which was not even being framed by learned Trial Court as to whether the disputed land in suit was solely acquired by the defendants or its co—sharer, still considering the materials on record, the 1st Appellate Court has placed reliance on a 'Bainama' executed by Rudha, predecessor in interest of appellants/defendants in favour of plaintiffs/respondents herein that 1/3rd share of entire land was sold in favour of plaintiffs.

¶15Much reliance was placed on the contents of 'Bainama' and it was held that said document was sufficient evidence to support the claim of plaintiffs/respondents herein. In the later part of the order, it was held that land in dispute was divided in three equal parts, therefore, it was held that partition took place and that claim of plaintiffs/respondents was accept to that they were owners of the land in dispute. For reference, decision of said issue is reproduced hereinafter: "

इसवादमेंयहदेखनाहैकि क्यापूरीविवादितभूमि प्रतिवादीगणकेबड़ोंकी

तन्हाथीअथवाक्याइसमेंतीनहिस्सेदारथे।जहाँवादीगणकेअनुसारभूमि

के 3

हिस्सेथेवहींप्रतिवादीगणकेअनुसारयहपूरीभूमि इसकेबड़ोंकीतन्हा

थीयहबातध्यानदेनेकीहैकि उपरोक्तदोनोंमेंसेकिसीबातकेसमर्थनमें

कोईप्रत्यक्षदस्तावेजीसाक्ष्यउपलब्धनहींहैजिससेयहपतालगेकि भूमि का

स्वामित्वकिसकेपासथा।जोदस्तावेजीसाक्ष्यइससम्बन्धमेंउपलब्धहैवह

भूमि केस्वामित्वकेअप्रत्यक्षसाक्ष्यकेरूपमेंहै।उनमेंमुख्यरूढाद्वारा

वादीगणकेपक्षमेंलिखागयाबैनामाप्रदर्शसं

0 1

है।उभयपक्षइसबैनामेंको

स्वीकारकरतेहैंऔरयहमानतेहैंकि इसबैनामेंद्वारापूरीभूमि का

हिस्सा

रूढानेवादीगणकेपक्षमेंबेंचाथा।मैनेइसबैनामेंकाध्यानसेअवलोकन

कियाहै।यद्यपि इसमेंपूरीभूमि केस्वामित्वकेबारेमेंकोईस्पष्टबातनहींहै

लेकिनइसबैनामेंसे

2 3

महत्वपूर्णबातेंसामनेआतीहैं।पहलीबातयहहैकि

रूढ़ाबैनामेंमेंबेंचीजानेवालीभूमि कोतिहाईहिस्सेकेरूपमेंमानाहै।दूसरी

महत्वपूर्णबातयहहैकि जोभूतिमबैनामाद्वाराबेंचीगई

,

उसकीउत्तरकी

चौहददीमेंस्कूलबतायागयाहैऔरकिसीरास्तेकाकोईजिक्रनहींहै।तीसरी

महत्वपूर्णबातयहहैकि बेंचीजानेवालीभूमि काक्षेत्रफल

गजलम्बाऔर

गजचौड़ाबतायागयाहै।इन्हींमुद्दोंसेयहदेखनाहोगाकि बेंचीजानेवाली

भूमि कीउसवक्तक्यानवैयतथी।प्रदर्शसं

0 1

मेंरूढानेयहस्पष्टलिखाहैकि

जोतिहाईहिस्सावहबेंचरहाहैवहएकप्लाटकेरूपमेंहैऔररूढाउसका

मालिकऔरकाबिजहै।प्रदर्शसं

0 1

मेंयहबातकहींनहींआयीहैकि रूढा

पूरीभूमि कामालिकथा।

यहभीध्यानदेनेकीबातहैकि संयोगसेबेचीगयी

हिस्सेकाक्षेत्रफलपूरीभूमि कालगभग1/3

हीआताहैजैसाकि यह

प्रतिवादीगणभीस्वीकारकरतेहैंऔरजोकमीशनकीरिपोर्ट11/

गसेस्पष्टहै।

इसप्रकारप्रदर्शसं0 1

मेंलिखीगयीउपरोक्तबातेंइसबातकीओरइशारा

करतीप्रतीतहोतीहैंकि बेंचीगयीभूमि ........

रूढाकास्वामित्वकेव1/3 भाग

परहीथाऔरयहभागएक........

रूपमेंथा।यहपरीक्षितप्रतिवादीगणसे

ज्यादावादीगणकेपक्षमेंसमर्थनकरतीहैक्योंकि यदि रूढापूरीभूमि का

मालिकहोतातोवहइसप्रकार1/3

भागकोएकप्लाटकेरूपमेंकभीन

बताताऔरनहीइसप्रकारपूरीभूमि से1/3

हिस्सानिकालनासम्भवहोता।

यदि रूढापूरीभूमि कामालिकहोतातो1/3

लिखनेकीभीकोईआवश्यकता

नहींथीबल्कि स्वामित्वकेरूपसेबेचेजानेवालीभूमि कीचौहददीऔर

क्षेत्रफलहीलिखदियाजाता।इसकेअतिरिक्तबेंचीजानेवालीभूमि कीस्थि ति

भीयहीदर्शितकरतीहैकि विक्रेतारूढापूरीभूमि केकेवलउतनीहिस्सेपर

काबिजथाजोउसनेबेंचीअन्यथाएककोनेमें1/3

हिस्साअलगकरता........

साधारणरूपमेंस्वाभाविकनहींप्रतीतहोता।यदि रूढ़ापूरीभूमि कामालिक

होतातोबेंचीगयीभूमि किसीभीएकतरफसेनिकालीनहींजाती,

इसकेलिए

एकविशेषकोनेको1/3

हिस्सेकेरूपमेंचुननाऔरउसेप्लाटबतानाकिसी

भीरूपमेंस्वाभाविकनहींहोता।इसप्रकारमेरीरायमेंविक्रयपत्रप्रदर्शसं0 1

वादीकाकथनकासमर्थनकरताहै।

मेरेउपरोक्तकथनकासमर्थनइसतरहसेभीहोजाताहैकि इसविक्रयपत्रमें

लिखीगयीचौहददीमेंउत्तरकीओरस्कूलदिखायागयाहै।प्रतिवादीगणने

अपनेबयानतहरीरीमेंस्वीकारकियाहैकि उत्तरकीओरएकरास्ताचलता SAPLoNo.o-o556oofo1982 ह।ै oवकीलoकमी्न रoके oरि रपोटरo11/गoमेंoभीoइसoरास् तेoकोoवि दखायाoगयाoहैoऔर उसकीoचौड़ ाईoलगभगo9oवि फटoवि दखायीoगयीoह।ै oयहoरास् ताoपूरबoके oआमoरास् ते सेoहोकरoपधि श्च मoमेंoइसoभूवि मoके oभीतरoपीछेoके oवि हस् सेoमoें गयाoहoै तथाoइसकाoकोई सम् बन् धoवि कसीoअन् यoभूखण् डoसेoनहीं oप्र तीतoहोता।oकमी्न रoकाoउपरोक्त oनक् शा यहoदर्शि शतoकरताoहैoवि कoइसo........oद्व ाराoवि ववावि दतoभूवि मoकाoपधि श्च मीoभूखण् डoआम रास् तेoसेoजोड़ ाoगयाoह।ै oयवि दoयहoपूरीoभूवि मoएकoहीoव् यवि क्त oकीoस् वावि मत् वoमoें होतीoतो वि नधि श्च तoरू पoसेoइसoप्र कारoकाoकोईoरास् ताoछोड़ नेoकीoआवश् यकताoनहीं oथी। वि वቅ्र यoपत्र oमेंoवर्शि णतoउपरोक्त oचौहददीoसेoयहoजि सद्ध oहोताoहoै वि कoवि वቅ्र यoपत्र oलि लखते समयoयहoरास् ताoमौजूदoनहीं oथा।oयवि दoयहoरास् ताoमौजूदoहोताoतोoउसकाoहवाला अवश् यoवि दयाoजाताoऔरoरास् तेoकीoभूवि मoछोड़ करoहीoवादीगणoकोoभूवि मoबेंची जाती।oस् वयंoप्र धि तवादीगणoकोoभीoयहीoकहनाoहैoवि कoरास् तेoकीoभूवि मoछोड़ oकरoही भूवि मo प्र धि तवादीगणoकोoबेंचीoगयीoह।ै oलेवि कनoवि वቅ्र यoपत्र o मoें लि लखीoचौहददी प्र धि तवादीगणoके oइसoकथनoकोoझूठाoकरoदेतीoह।ैं oउपरोक्त oचौहददीoयहoस् पष्ट करतीoहैoवि कoबेंचीoजानेoवालीoभूवि मoमेंoवतरमानoरास् ताoभीoशावि मलoथा।oवादीगणoने अपनेoवादoपत्र oमेंoयहoकहाoहoै वि कoपहलेoयहoरास् ताoवादीगणoकीoओरoसेoचलताoथा लेवि कनoयहoभूवि मoखरीदनेoके oबादoउन् हों नेoदधि क्ष णoकाoरास् ताoअपनीoभूवि मoमoें चला लि लयाoऔरoदगाoर वoरि रडकoकीoसहमधि तoसेoइतनाoहीoरास् ताoउ्रoकीoओरoइसoभूवि मु ू मेंoछोड़ oवि दया।oइसoबातoकाoस् पष्ट oवि वरोधoप्र धि तवादपत्र oमoें नहीं o वि कयाoगयाoह।ै वादीगणoकीoओरoसेoइसoकथनoसेoइन् कारoअवश् यoवि कयाoगयाoह।ै oवादीगणoका उपरोक्त oकथनoमेरीoरायoमेंoस् वयंoप्र धि तवादीगणoके oप्र धि तवादoपत्र oसेoहीoजि सद्ध oहो जाताoह।ै oप्र धि तवादoपत्र oके oपैराo9oमेंoप्र धि तवादीगणoनेoए.बी.सी.डी.oभूवि मoपरoवादी काoस् वावि मत् वoस् वीकारoवि कयाoह।ै oयहoध् यानoदेनेoकीoबातoहैoवि कoयहoपूरीoभूवि म ए.बी.सी.डी.oरास् तेoकीoभूवि मo9oवि फटoछोड़ नेoके oबादoकीoह।ै oयहoभीoध् यानoदेनेoकी बातoहैoवि कoइसoए.बी.सी.डी.oभूवि मoमेंoवादीगणoद्व ाराoवर्शि णतoदधि क्ष णoभूखण् डoकी लगभगo9oवि फटoभागoशावि मलoहैoक् यों वि कoए.बी.oकीoलम् बाईo21oवि फटoएoस् थानoसे शुरू oहोतीoह।ै oयवि दoवादीगणoदधि क्ष णीoवि हस् सेoके oमालि लकoहोतेoतोoउ्रoकीoओर रास् ताoए.1-ए.3oवि फटoछोड़ नेoके oबादoवादीगणoके oपासoके वलo12oवि फटoभूवि म बचतीoचावि हएoथीoलेवि कनoस् वयंoप्र धि तवादीगणoनेoयहoमानाoहैoवि कoवादीगणoके oपास 21oवि फटoभूवि मoह।ै oयहoपरि रस्थि स् थधि तयाएoदर्शि शतoकरतीoहoैं वि कoवादीगणoनेoशेषo9oवि फट दधि क्ष णीoवि हस् सेoसेoवि मलाकरoभूवि मoपूरीoकरoलीoहoै औरoयहoतबoसम् भवoहोoसकताoहै जबoदधि क्ष णीoवि हस् साoवादीगणoके oहीoस् वावि मत् वoमेंoहो।oइसoप्र कारoदधि क्ष णीoवि हस् सेoकी भूवि मoजोoइसoवादoमेंoवि ववावि दतoभूवि मoहै,oवादीगणoके oस् वावि मत् वoकाoआभासoवि मलता ह।ै oयहoपरि रस्थि स् थधि तoभीoवि कoपूराoभूखण् डoमेंoबराबरoके oतीनoवि हस् सेoबनायेoगयेoहoैंo,ooयहीo स् पष्ट oकरताoहैoवि कoयहoभूखण् डoतीनoलोगों oमoें बांटoवि दयाoगयाoथाoऔरoप्र धि तवादीगण oउसके oके वलoo1/3ooभागoके oहीoमालि लकoथेoअन् यथाoइसoप्र कारoस् पष्ट oतीनoवि हस् सेoमoें भूवि मoकाoबंटनाoस् वाभावि वकoनहीं oप्र तीतoहोता। प्र धि तवादीगणoकीoओरसेoभूवि मoअधि धग्र हणoकायरवाहीoके oदौरानoअपनेoपूवरजों oद्व ारा oदालि खलoकीoगयीoआपलि ्ooorooप्र पत्र oसooं0o38/ooकoतथाoउसoपरoहएoआदेशoपत्र oसoंotioु o39/ooगoकाoहवालाoवि दयाoहैoऔरoकहाoगयाoहैoवि कoइससेoयहoस् पष्ट oहोताoहैoवि कoयहo पूरीoभूवि मoप्र धि तवादीगणoके oबड़ ों oकीoथी।oमैनेoइनoप्र पत्र ों oकाoभीoअवलोकनoवि कया लेवि कनoमुझेoउनमेंoऐसीoकोईoबातoनहीं oवि मलीoजि जससेoप्र धि तवादीoकाoउपरोक्त oकथन oजि सद्ध oहो।oयहoप्र पत्र oलगभगoo30ooवषरoपुरानाoहैoजबoवादीगणoके oअनुसारoसभीo पक्ष कारoएकoसाथoरहतेoथेoइनoपरि रस्थि स् थधि तयों oमoें यवि दoवि कसीoएकoव् यवि क्त oनेoअपनी पूरीoभूवि मoके oबारेoमेंoआपलि ्oकीoहोoतोoउसके oआधारoपरoयहoमानाoजानाoसम् भव नहीं oहoै वि कoके वलoवहीoउसकाoस् वामीoथा। जहाएoतकoमौलि खकoसाቌ्ष यoकाo............oहैoवहoभीoवादीगणoकाoसमथरनoकरतीoह।ैं वादीगणoनेoअपनेoउपरोक्त oकथनoके oसमथरनoमेंoवादीoई1्व रoदयालoके oअधि तरि रक्त उसीoगाएवoके oएकoअन् यoव् यवि क्त oखजानoकोoउपस्थि स् थतoवि कयाoहैoजोoवि ववावि दतoभूवि म के oसटेoदधि क्ष णoमेंoरहताoह।ै oखजानoनेoवादीगणoके oकथनoकाoसमथरनoवि कयाoह।ै

इसकेविरुद्धप्रतिवादीगणकीओरसेकोईस्वतंत्रसाक्षीनहींआयाहै।

प्रतिवादीगणकेगवाहकेरूपमेंरिडकूआयाहैजोउनकासगाचचेराभाईहै।

रिडकूकेबयानमेंकईविसंगतियांहैंजोउसेपूरीतरहसेअविश्वसनीयबना

देतीहैं।इसबातकाकोईमहत्वनहींहैकि रिडकूनेपश्चिमवालेअपनेहिस्से

कोअपनाहोनास्वीकारनहींकियाहैक्योंकि यहमानाजासकताहैकि ऐसा

करकेउसनेअपनेपट्टीदारकीमददकीहै,

जबकि उसकीस्वयंकीकोईहानि

नहींहुई।

प्रतिवादीगणकेविद्वानअधिवक्तानेअपनीबहसमेंयहकहाहैकि यदिवादीगण

कीबंटवारेकीबातमानीभीजायतोवादीगणतथाप्रतिवादीगणकाविवादित

भूमि परआधा

-

आधाहिस्साहोनाचाहिए

हिस्साहोनेकाकोईप्रश्नहीनहीं

उठता।मेरीरायमेंहिस्सेकीअसमानताकेआधारपरयहनहींकहाजा

सकताकि पक्षकारोंकाहिस्साहीनहींबनता।प्रतिवादीगणकेविद्वान

अधिवक्तानेयहभीकहाहैकि वादीगणविवादितभूमि कोजहरियाके

.........

कीनहींबतातेऔरनहीसम्पत्तिकाअन्यप्रमाणबतातेहैं।उनकेअनुसारयह

पूरीभूमि जमींदारीविनाशअधिनियमकीधारा

मेंउनकेपितादयाराममें

निहितहोगयीथीअतःवेलोगअकेलेइसकेस्वामीहुए।मेरीरायमेंउनकायह

कथनभीअविश्वसनीयहैक्योंकि वादपत्रमेंयहस्पष्टलिखाहैकि यहभूमि

टाउनएरियासीमाक्षेत्रमेंआतीहैऔरइसबातसेप्रतिवादीगणनेभीइन्कार

नहींकियाहै।यहपरिस्थि ति यहस्पष्टकरतीहैकि धारा

मेंनिहितहोनेका

कोईप्रश्नहीनहींउठता।प्रतिवादीगणकेविद्वानअधिवक्तानेअपनेबयानमेंदो

अन्यबातोंकाभीउल्लेखकियाहैलेकिनमेरीरायमेंयहबातेंभीमहत्वहीनहैं।

उनकेअनुसारहिन्दूपरिवारमेंएकबारबंटवाराहोनेपरयहीमान्यताहोतीहै

कि सारीसम्पत्तियांबंटगयीहैं।अतःउनकेअनुसारजबवे

सालपूर्व

बंटवाराहोनाकहतेहैंतोविवादितभूमि बंटवारेसेअलगमाननाउचितनहीं

होगा।मेरीरायमेंइसमान्यताकेबारेमेंउनकायहकथनसहीहैलेकिनयह

मान्यताअन्ति मरूपसेनहींहोताकि वादीनेअपनेबयानमेयहबातसशपथ

कहीहैकि दोनोंबंटवारेउसकेसामनेहुएथेऔरविवादितभूमि पहलेबंटवारे

केसमयसंयुक्तछोड़ीगयीथी।अतःअबउपरोक्तमान्यताकामहत्वनहींरह

जाता।प्रतिवादीगणकेविद्वानअधिवक्तानेयहभीकहाहैकि वादीगणके

मकानकीकोईखि ड़कीयादरवाजादक्षिणकीओरविवादितभूमि परनहीं

खुलताजिससेयहप्रमाणितहोताहैकि दक्षिणवालीविवादितभूमि सेवादीगण

काकोईसम्बन्धनहींरहाहै।विद्वानमुन्सि फनेभीइसबातकोमानतेहुए

विवादितभूमि परवादीकास्वामित्वमाननेसेइन्कारकरदियाहै।मेरीरायमें

केवलयहपरिस्थि ति भूमि केस्वामित्वकेनिर्धारणकेलिएकिसीभीरूपमें

पर्याप्तनहींहोसकती।जैसाकि ऊपरकहाहैवादीकोअन्यसाक्ष्यस्पष्टरूप

सेविवादितभूमि परवादीकास्वामित्वसिद्धकरतीहै।अतःइसपरिस्थि ति

कामहत्वनहींरहजाताहै।

मेरेसमक्षअन्यकोईमुद्दानहींउठायागयाहै।मेरेउपरोक्तनिष्कर्षोंकेआधार

परयहस्पष्टहोजाताहैकि वादीगणविवादितभूमि केस्वामीहैंअतःउनका

इसभूमि परव्यादेशसम्बन्धीवादडिग्रीहोनेयोग्यहै। आदेश

अपीलसव्ययस्वीकारकीजातीहै।वादीगणकावादसव्ययडिग्रीकियाजाता

हैतथाप्रश्नगतनिर्णयखण्डि तकियाजाताहै।"

¶16Learned Senior Counsel submitted that oral settlement was not even proved by evidence, therefore, 1st Appellate Court has erred in accepting sale deed dated 6.6.1970 to be a sufficient piece of evidence that oral partition has taken place and was effected also.

¶17Learned Senior Counsel lastly submitted that finding returned by 1st Appellate Court were perverse, therefore, present Second Appeal involves above referred questions of law.

¶18Learned Senior Counsel has place reliance on a judgment passed by Supreme Court in Dilbagrai Punjabi Vs. Sharad Chandra, 1988 (Supp) SCC 710 and relevant part thereof is reproduced hereinafter: "5. xxx It is true that the High Court while hearing the appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence and reverse the conclusion reached by the first appellate court, but at the same time its power to interfere with the finding cannot be denied if when the lower appellate court decides an issue of fact a substantial question of law arises. The court is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record and if it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error which arises is of a magnitude that it gives birth to a substantial question of law, the High Court is fully authorised to set aside the finding. This is the situation in the present case. We, therefore, do not discover any defect in the judgment of the High Court, and the appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs."

¶19Per Contra, Sri Rajesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for contesting respondents has supported the impugned order and submitted that 1st Appellate Court was completely justified to reverse the finding returned by the learned Trial Court since it can independently re-evaluate and re-appreciate all oral as well as documentary evidence to decide issues.

¶20The finding returned by first Appellate Court was based on correct appreciation of evidence which records a sale deed between Rudha, predecessor-in-interest of appellant/defendants and plaintiffs/respondents which was an important piece of evidence and since it's content specifically discloses that 1/3rd part of entire land was sold, but it does not state that out of entire land, only 1/3rd of it was sold, therefore, it was a clear case that upon the partition 1/3rd part of entire land was given to Rudha.

¶21The evidence that there was an oral partition and its effect also was supported by the said sale deed as well as it was supported by the boundaries of the land in dispute.

¶22Learned counsel for contesting respondents also submitted that it was not necessary to frame points for determination if the First Appellate Court has crystallized the issue for consideration, since in the impugned order it was specifically noted that "

इसवादमेंयहदेखनाहैकि क्यापूरी

विवादितभूमि प्रतिवादीगणकेबड़ोंकीतन्हाथीअथवाक्याइसमेंतीनहिस्सेदारथे।" "

इन्हींमुद्दोंसेयहदेखनाहोगाकि बेंचीजानेवालीभूमि कीउसवक्तक्यानवैयतथी।"

¶23Learned counsel for the contesting respondents refers following finding of first Appellate Court: "

यहपरिस्थि ति भीकि पूराभूखण्डमेंबराबरकेतीनहिस्सेबनायेगयेहैं, यही

स्पष्टकरताहैकि यहभूखण्डतीनलोगोंमेंबांटदियागयाथाऔरप्रतिवादीगण

उसकेकेवल1/3

भागकेहीमालिकथेअन्यथाइसप्रकारस्पष्टतीनहिस्सेमें

भूमि काबंटनास्वाभाविकनहींप्रतीतहोता।"

¶24Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

¶25As referred above, this Court has to decide firstly as to whether this Second Appeal involves any substantial questions of law and if any substantial question of law exists, this Court has to formulate the same.

¶26Court takes note of a recent judgment passed by Supreme Court in Rabindranath Panigrahi Vs. Surendra Sahu, 2025 INSC 333 and its relevant paragraphs being 6 and 7 are reproduced hereinafter: "6. The principles governing the scope of Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC are well-settled. To state that, under Section 100 C.P.C a High Court is not to disturb findings of fact, would be now like stating the obvious. [See: Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179; Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, (2007) 1 SCC 546; State Bank of India v. S.N. Goyal (2008) 8 SCC 9215; and Suresh Lataruji Ramteke v. Sau. Sumanbai Pandurang Petkar,

(2023) SCC OnLine SC 1210.] Yet recently, this Court lamented that despite numerous judgments spelling out the scope of this power, the High Court repeatedly falls in error. [See: Jaichand v. Sahnulal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864] The present is another such case.

¶7In the present case, the questions as framed by the High Court, in our view, do not meet the criteria to be substantial questions of law. For a question to be substantial, reference can be made to the discussion made in, amongst a host of other judgments, Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal (2006) 5 SCC 545, wherein it was held as under: "21. ..."[W]hen a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest Court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law." This Court laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial : (Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR 1962 SC 1314] , SCR pp. 557-58) "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." " In Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala (2020) 19 SCC 57, it was observed that:- "28. To be "substantial", a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way." [See: P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K. Patkar 2023 SCC OnLine SC1483; and Ramachandra Reddy v. Ramulu Ammal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3301]"

¶27Now in above background of rival submissions and judgment passed by learned Trial Court and First Appellate Court and discussion on law, Court proceeds to consider as to whether present second appeal has any substantial questions of law which can be formulated under Section 100 C.P.C.

¶28This first issue is as to whether it was mandatory for the First Appellate Court to frame points for determination or not and for that the Court takes note of a judgment passed by this Court in Smt. Qamrunnisa And Others Vs. Smt. Tamizan And Others, 2026:AHC:79265 and its relevant paragraph nos. 6,7,8 and 9 are reproduced hereinafter: "6. Learned counsel for appellants vehemently pressed the first purported question of law, i.e., whether First Appellate Court was justified in dismissing first appeal without framing points for determination and has placed reliance on a judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of Nafees Ahmad and another vs. Soinuddin and others, 2025 INSC 520, however, the Court finds that said judgment is in fact against the submission of counsel for appellants.

¶7In Nafees Ahmad (supra) the High Court while considering a second appeal has formulated a similar nature of question of law and held that since First Appellate Court has not framed points for determination, therefore, appeal was returned back for fresh consideration. However, a challenge to it before Supreme Court was allowed and it was held that it is not always mandatory to frame points for determination and it would depend how the judgment was written. For reference entire judgment passed by Supreme Court in Nafees Ahmad (supra) is quoted hereinafter:

"1. Leave granted.

¶2This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench dated 4-9-2017 in Second Appeal No.69/2008, by which the Second Appeal filed by the respondents – herein came to be partly allowed and the matter was remitted to the First Appellate Court on the ground that the First Appellate Court failed to comply with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

¶3The High Court, while deciding the Second Appeal, formulated the following substantial question of law:- "Whether it is incumbent upon the Appellate Court to frame the point of determination as per the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC while deciding the first appeal or not?"

¶4Order 41 Rule 31 CPC reads thus: "Rule 31. Contents, date and signature of judgment.─

The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state ─

(a) the points for determination;

(b) the decision thereon;

(c) the reasons for the decision; and

(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled,and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein."

¶5It appears that the High Court relying upon few decisions took the view that Order 41 Rule 31 CPC is mandatory and the failure on the part of the Appellate Court to frame the points for determination as per the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC would vitiate the entire judgment and make it wholly void.

¶6Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, we are in complete disagreement with the view taken by the High Court.

¶7We propose to follow the dictum as laid by this Court in the case of "G. Amalorpavam And Others v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai And Others" reported in (2006) 3 SCC 224, wherein this Court observed that whether in a particular case, there has been substantial compliance, with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC should be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions, by itself, may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void and may be ignored if there has been a substantial compliance with it.

¶8We may elaborate the issue a little further from a different angle.

¶9The Privy Council observed in "Mt. Fakrunisa v. Moulvi Izarus" reported in AIR 1921 PC 55, at p. 56, as under:

"In every appeal it is incumbent upon the appellants to show reason why the judgment appealed from should be disturbed; there must be some balance in their favour when all the circumstances are considered, to justify the alteration of the judgment that stands. Their Lordships are unable to find that this duty has been discharged."

¶10The Privy Council decision referred to above was looked into by a three-Judge Bench in the case of "Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur Kalyan Singh and Anr." reported in (1963) 2 SCR 733, wherein this Court observed as under:

"With respect, we agree with this and hold that it is the duty of the appellant to show that the judgment under appeal is erroneous for certain reasons and it is only after the appellant has shown this that the appellate court would call upon the respondent to reply to the contention. It is only then that the judgment of the appellate court can fully contain all the various matters mentioned in Ruel 31, Order 41."

¶11This Court observed in "Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya" reported in (1955) 2 SCR 1, at page 8: "Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: ... Too technical construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it."

¶12The provisions of Rule 31 should therefore be reasonably construed and should be held to require the various particulars to be mentioned in the judgment only when the appellant has actually raised certain points for determination by the Appellate Court, and not when no such points are raised.

¶13We must also look into the provisions of Rule 30 of Order 41 for the purpose of fortifying our interpretation of Rule 31. Order 41 Rule 30 CPC reads thus: "30. Judgment when and where pronounced. (1) The Appellate ─ Court, after hearing the parties or their pleaders and referring to any part of the proceedings, whether on appeal or in the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, to which reference may be considered necessary, shall pronounce judgment in open Court, either at once or on some future day of which notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.

(2) Where a written judgment is to be pronounced, it shall be sufficient if the points for determination, the decision thereon and the final order passed in the appeal are read out and it shall not be necessary for the Court to read out the whole judgment, but a copy of the whole judgment shall be made available for the perusal of the parties or their pleaders immediately after the judgment in pronounced."

¶14Thus, this Rule does not make it incumbent on the Appellate Court to refer to any part of the proceedings in the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred. The Appellate Court can refer, after hearing the parties and their pleaders, to any part of these proceedings to which reference be considered necessary. It is in the discretion of the Appellate Court to refer to the proceedings. It is competent to pronounce judgment after hearing what the parties or their pleaders submit to it for consideration.

It follows therefore that if the appellant submits nothing for its consideration, the Appellate Court can decide the appeal without any reference to any proceedings of the courts below and, in doing so, it can simply say that the appellants have not urged anything which would tend to show that the judgment and decree under appeal were wrong. [See : "Thakur Sukhpal Singh" (supra)]

¶15In the aforesaid view of the matter, we allow this appeal.

¶16The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside.

¶17Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of."

¶8In order to consider above submissions including a submission that Trial Court has returned a perverse finding and has not appreciated the evidence on record, Court also takes note of judgment passed by First Appellate Court which has considered the order passed in suit whereby it was decreed and has rejected all grounds, as such, it was a judgment where there was no necessity to frame points for determination since it were not involved.

¶9In above background Court also takes note of a judgment passed by Supreme Court in Malluru Mallappa (D) Thru. Lrs. vs. Kuruvathappa and others, 2020 INSC 173 that if First Appellate Court has display conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons on all issues and contentions, the object of Section 96 CPC got satisfied."

¶29As already noted in earlier part of this judgment that First Appellate Court has not framed specific points for determination, but has crystallized the issues for consideration after taking note of all the materials on record as well as respective stand of the parties that "

इसवाद

मेंयहदेखनाहैकि क्यापूरीविवादितभूमि प्रतिवादीगणकेबड़ोंकीतन्हाथीअथवा

क्याइसमेंतीनहिस्सेदारथे।" "

इन्हींमुद्दोंसेयहदेखनाहोगाकि बेंचीजानेवालीभूमि

कीउसवक्तक्यानवैयतथी।"

¶30The First Appellate Court has made a specific consideration on map and boundaries mentioned in the sale deed, therefore, it was not a case that despite no point of determination was made, first Appellate Court has even failed to apply his mind rather it was a case where issues were crystallized, specific consideration was made and reasons were assigned that why an order of reversal can be passed, therefore, this second appeal does not involve question of law that whether due to non-determination of point of determination, the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court renders to be absolutely illegal.

¶31Now the Court proceeds to consider as to whether in given set of circumstances a suit simpliciter injunction can be filed or not by the respondents/plaintiff and whether it is a question of law to be framed in present Second Appeal.

¶32Plaintiffs have specifically claimed that parties to the suit belongs to same pedigree. There was an oral settlement which was executed and the entire land was divided into three equal parts and accordingly they were in possession. Subsequently, Rudha has sold 1/3rd of the disputed land, being owner of it after parition and since sale deed was on record therefore, plaintiffs have claimed their ownership on disputed plot and only on a ground that there was denial in written statement filed by the appellants/defendants, would not mean that plaintiff cannot file a suit of injunction simpliciter, therefore, in the given set of circumstances, this argument is also not sustainable and there is no question of law that in given circumstances a suit for injunction simpliciter was not maintainable.

¶33This Court takes note of judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of Ranjeet Alias Bhaiyu Mohite Vs. Nandita Singh & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 3252 of 2025, decided on 25.02.2025 and for reference relevant paragraph no.18 of it is reproduced hereinafter:- "18. We are of the considered view that the High Court erred in rejecting the plaint in its entirety under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC merely because the Appellant had not, at the outset, sought the relief of possession for the small portion allegedly occupied by the Respondents. A plain reading of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (SRA) makes it evident that: 'Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.' This provision empowers a person in possession of property to file a suit for declaration and protect that possession through an injunction. The requirement to seek "further relief" applies where a plaintiff, already "able to seek" possession or another substantive remedy, omits doing so. Consequently, where the plaintiff is in possession of the bulk of the suit property and only a minor portion is out of his immediate control, a simple omission to claim possession from the start does not, in itself, mandate outright rejection of the entire plaint. Instead, as long as the plaintiff pleads possession of most of the property and seeks declaratory relief along with an injunction to protect that possession, the proviso to Section 34 is not violated. In such a situation, any partial lapse, like failing to claim possession over a small portion, may be cured by a suitable amendment, especially when the suit is at a preliminary stage. As the appellant has sought the consequential relief of injunction therefore the plaint is not barred by section 34 which principle has been thoroughly expounded by this Court in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594 in the following extract: '21. To summarise, the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is as under:

(a) Where a cloud is raised over the plaintiff's title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with the plaintiff's lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter.

(b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession.

(c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title (either specific, or implied as noticed in Annaimuthu Thevar [Annaimuthu Thevar v. Alagammal, (2005) 6 SCC 202] ). Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction. Even where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction.

(d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straightforward, the court may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon his property. The court should use its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases where it will refer to the plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts of the case."

¶34Now this Court proceeds to consider the third issue that whether first Appellate Court has completely misread contents of sale deed dated

6.6.1970 or that a finding returned that oral partition took place was erroneous and perverse. The Court finds that in the order under challenge, First Appellate Court has carefully perused contents of sale deed and returned a finding that since Rudha has sold 1/3rd part of entire land and without any disclosure of any other land, therefore, it was held that there was a prior partition as well as boundaries of the disputed land also confirms that partition has taken place, therefore, it was finding of fact and not on law, therefore, an argument that question of law arose in regard to misrepresentation of sale deed does not hold good and is accordingly rejected.

¶35Now the last issue is regarding finding of oral family partition that whether it was palpably perverse so much as that it involves interpretation of law.

¶36In this regard Court takes note of a judgment passed by this Court in Sheikh Mohd.Murtuza Vs. Sheikh Wajid Ali, 2025:AHC:208350. Its relevant paragraph no. 14 is reproduced hereinafter:- "१४. '

विधि केसारवान्प्रश्न'

कीव्याख्यासिविलप्रक्रियासंहिताकीधारा

१००मेंनहींकीगयीहै।इसकीव्याख्याउच्चतमन्यायालयद्वाराकईनिर्णयोंमें

कीगईहै।ऐसाहीएकनिर्णय

चन्द्रभान(मृत)

द्वाराविधिकप्रतिनिधीवअऩ्य

बनामसरस्वतीवअन्य, २0

२२एस.सी.सी.

आनलाईनएस.सी.

१२७३है,

जहाँउच्चतमन्यायालयकेद्वारापूर्वमेंपारित

चुन्नीलालवीमेहताऐंडसन्सलि.

प्रति दसेनच्युरीस्पि नंगएण्डमैन्यूफैक्चरिंगकम्पनीलिं.,

१९६२एस.सी.सी.

आनलाईनएस.सी. ५७ व

हीरोविनोथ(अवयस्क)

प्रति शेषामल, (२00 ६)५ एस.सी.सी.

केप्रकरणोंमेंपारितनिर्णयोंकोसंदर्भितकियाऔर

अनुसरणभीकिया।उक्तकेमहत्वपूर्णअंशकोहिन्दीअनुवादसहितनिम्न

उल्लेखि तकियाजारहैहैः- "28. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons (supra), this Court agreed with and approved a Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju and Ors.5 which laid down the principles for deciding when a question of law becomes a substantial question of law.

¶29In Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, this Court followed Sir Chunilal v. Mehta & Sons (supra) and other judgments and summarized the tests to find out whether a given set of questions of law were mere questions of law or substantial questions of law.

¶30The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth (supra) are set out herein below: "21. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood contradistinction with technical, of no substance or consequence, or as something in academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta 551A 235: AIR 1928 PC 172] the phrase "substantial question of law" as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549: AIR 1962 SC 1314] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju [AIR 1951 Mad 969:

(1951) 2 MLJ 222 (FB)]: (Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549: AIR 1962 SC 1314], SCR p. 557) "When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law." The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would be, whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so, whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or the question raised is palpably absurd, the question would not be a substantial question of law.

उपरोक्तकाहिन्दीअनुवादनिम्नहैः

- "२८.

सरचुन्नीलालबनाममेहताएंडसंस(

पूर्वमेंउल्लेखि त) केमामले में,

यहन्यायालयरिम्मलपुडीसुब्बारावबनामनूनीवीरजूएवंअन्यमें

मद्रासउच्चन्यायालयकीपूर्णपीठकेनिर्णयसेसहमतहुआऔरउसे

अनुमोदितकिया,

जिसमेंयहनिर्णयकरनेकेसिद्धांतनिर्धारितकिएगए

थेकि कब'

विधि काप्रश्न'

एक'

विधि कासारवानप्रश्न'

बनजाताहै। SAPLoNo.o-o556oofo1982

२९.oहीरोoवि वनोथoबनामoशेषम् मलoके oप्र करणoमें,oइसoन् यायालयoनेoसर चु्न ीलालoबनामoमेहताoएंडoसंसorपूवरoमेंoउ्ल ेलि खत)oऔरoअन् यoवि नणरयों oका अनुसरणoवि कयाoऔरoसूत्र ों oकोoसक्षं ेवि पतoवि कयाoवि कoक् याoसंदर्शि भतoवि वधि धoके प्र ्न oमात्र oवि वधि धoके oप्र ्न oथेoयाoवि वधि धoके oसारवानoप्र ्न oथे।

३०.oहीरोoवि वनोदorपूवरoमेंoउ्ल ेलि खत)oमामलेoमेंoइसoन् यायालयoके oवि नणरयoके प्र ासंवि गकoप्र स् तरoवि नम् नoहैं: "२१.oसंशोधि धतoधाराo१००oसीपीसीoमेंoप्र यक्त oवाक् यांशo"वि वधि धु काoसारवानoप्र ्न "oकोoसविं हताoमेंoपरि रभावि षतoनहीं oवि कयाoगयाoह।ै "वि वधि धoके oप्र ्न "oकोoयोग् यoबनानेoके oलि लएoसारवानoशब् दoकाoअथरoहै सारभूत,oआवश् यक,oवास् तवि वक,oउधि चतoमूल् यवान,oमहत् वपूणरoया वि वचारणीय।oइसेoतकनीकी,oसारहीनoयाoपरि रणामहीन,oयाoमात्र शक्षै णि णकoके oवि वपरीतoसमझाoजानाoचावि हए।oहालाएवि क,oयहoस् पष्ट oहै वि कoवि वधाधि यकाoनेo"सामान् यoमहत् वoके "oशब् दों oकोoजोड़ करo"वि वधि ध के oसारवानoप्र ्न "oके oदायरेoकोoपरि रभावि षतoनहीं oकरनेoकाoवि वकल् प चुनाoह,ै oजैसाoवि कo संवि हताoकीoधाराo१०९oयाoसंवि वधानoके अनुच् छेदo१३३r१)rक)oजैसेoकईoअन् यoप्र ावधानों oमेंoवि कयाoगया ह।ै oजि जसoवि वधि धoके oसारवानoप्र ्न oपरoवि द्व तीयoअपीलoकीoसुनवाईoकी जाएगी,oवहoआवश् यकoरू पoसेoसामान् यoमहत् वoवि वधि धoकाoसारवान प्र ्न o नहीं o होनाoचावि हए।oगरु नoवि द्ाoबनामoरामoवि द्ाo५५ IA २३५:oAIRo१९२८oPCo१७२]oमें,o"oवि वधि धoकाoसारवानoप्र ्न " वाक् यांश,oजैसाoवि कoतत् कालीनoवि व्य मानoधाराo१००oसी.पी.सी. rजि जसेoबादoमेंoसंशोधनoअधि धवि नयम,o१९७३oद्व ाराoहटाoवि दयाoगया) के oअंधि तमoखंडoमेंoप्र यक्त oवि कयाoगयाoथा,oजि जसoपरoवि वचारoहआु ु औरoमाननीयों o नेoमानाoवि कo इसकाoअथरo सामान् यoमहत् वoका सारवानoप्र ्न oनहीं ,oबस्थि ल् कoएकoसारवानoवि वधि धo काoप्र ्न oथाoजो प्र करणoसेoसंबंधि धतoथा।oसरoचु्न ीलालoके oप्र करणoमoें [१९६२oसप r३) oएससीआरo५४९: oएआईआरo१९६२oएससीo१३१४] संवि वधानoपीठoनेoरि रम् मलपुडीoसुब् बाoरावoबनामoनूनीoवीरराजू [एआईआरo१९५१oमैडo९६९:or१९५१) o२oएमएलजेo२२२ rएफबी)]oमेंoमद्र ासoउच् oन् यायालयoकीoपूणरoपीठoद्व ाराoलि लएoगए वि नम् नलि ललि खतoदृ वि ष्ट कोणoसेoसहमधि तo व् यक्त o की:orसरoचु्न ीलाल मामलाo[१९६२oसपor३)oएससीआरo५४९oएआईआरo१९६२ एससीo१३१४],oएससीआरoपृष्ठ o५५७) "जबoकोईoवि वधि धoकाoप्र ्न oउधि चतoरू पoसेoतकर -योग् यoहो,oजहाएoउस परoमतभेदoकीoसंभावनाoहोoयाoजहाएoन् यायालयoनेoउसoप्र ्न oपर वि वस् तारoसेoवि वचारoकरनाoऔरoवैकस्थि ल् पकoवि वचारों oपरoचचाoर करना आवश् यकoसमझाoहो,oतबoवहoप्र ्न ,oवि वधि धoकाoसारवानoप्र ्न oहोगा। दसरीoओर,oयवि दoवहoप्र ्न ,oव् यावहारि रकoरू पoसेoसवरच् oन् यायालयू के oवि नणरयoसेoआच् छावि दतoहोoयाoयवि दoप्र ्न oके oवि नधार णoमoें लागoू वि कए जानेoवालेoसामान् यoजि सद्ध ांतoअच् छीoतरहoसेoस् थावि पतoहों oऔर के वलoउनoजि सद्ध ांतों oकोoप्र करणoके oवि वशेषoतथ् यoपरoलागूoकरनेoका प्र ्न oहो,oतोoवहoवि वधि धoकाoसारवानoप्र ्न oनहीं oहोगा।"

३१.oवि कसीoप्र करणoमेंoसंदर्शि भतoप्र ्न ,oएकoवि वधि धoकाoसारवानoप्र ्न oहैoया नहीं , oयहoवि नधारि रतoकरनेoकाoउधि चतoपरीक्ष णoयहoहोगाoवि कo क् याoयह सवरसाधारणoके oलि लएoमहत् वपूणरo हैoयाoवहoपक्ष कारों oके oअधि धकारों oको प्र त् यक्ष oऔरoमूलतःoप्र भावि वतoकरताoहै,oऔरoयवि दoऐसाoहै,oतोoक् याoयहoइस अथरoमेंoएकoअवि नणरतoप्र ्न oहैoवि कoइसoन् यायालयoद्व ाराoइसकाoअंधि तमoरू प सेoवि नपटाराoनहीं o वि कयाoगयाoह।ै oयवि दo प्र ्न o उच् तमoन् यायालयoद्व ारा

निर्धारितकियाजाचुकाहोयाप्रश्नकेनिर्धारणमेंलागूकिएजानेवाले

सामान्यसिद्धांतसुस्थापितहैंऔरउनसिद्धांतोंकोलागूकरनेकामात्र

प्रश्नहैयासंदर्भितप्रश्नस्पष्टतःबेतुकाहै,

तोवहप्रश्नविधि कासारवान

प्रश्ननहींहोगा।" (

हिन्दीअनुवादन्यायालयद्वाराकियागयाहै)"

¶37The claim of the plaintiffs is based on an oral partition and that it was acted upon. There was a simple denial on behalf of defendants i.e. appellants, therefore, it has to be considered that on basis of documentary as well as oral evidence, whether any such oral partition took place or not and whether it was acted upon or not.

¶38Learned Trial Court has rejected evidence of sale deed only on a ground that no such oral partition was mentioned in the sale deed as well as contents of sale deed does not give a basis that there was an oral partition, whereas the First Appellate Court has considered contents of sale deed and its effect thereof in detail.

¶39The Boundaries of the land in dispute mentioned in the sale deed as well as effect of oral evidence also makes clear that an oral partition took place, therefore, it was a case whether on basis of evidence, the view taken by the First Appellate Court was a possible view or not. The possible view was based on correct appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence, therefore, in light of a judgment passed in Dilbagrai Punjabi (supra), on which learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance has failed to show any error on such magnitude which could give rise to a substantial question of law in present case of reversal.

¶40The judgment passed by the First Appellate Court cannot be said to be manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law. It was also not a case where dealing with evidence was patently, illegal or settled legal provisions were absolutely ignored as well as it was not a case where finding returned by the First Appellate Court was based on no evidence i.e. no perversity was shown. In this regard Court takes note of Damodar Lal Vs. Sohan Devi & Ors, 2016 (3) SCC 78 and its relevant paragraphs nos.8,9 and 10 are reproduced hereinafter: " 8. "Perversity" has been the subject-matter of umpteen number of decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by several decisions of this Court that the first appellate court, under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts unless the findings are based on evidence or are perverse.

¶9In Krishnan v. Backiam, (2007) 12 SCC 190, it has been held at para 11 that: (SCC pp. 192-93) "11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect."

¶10In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram, (2010) 15 SCC 530, at para 10, this principle has been reiterated: (SCC p. 532) "It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent."

¶41Outcome of above discussion is that question of law proposed by learned Senior Counsel does not pass the test of it being a substantial question of law for the purpose of Section 100 C.P.C., accordingly, present Second Appeal is dismissed. (Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J.) September 14, 2026 SB High Court of Judicature at Allahabad