State of Haryana and Others v. Raghbir Singh Gupta and Others

DEEPAK SIBAL, J. (Oral)

¶1The State of Haryana seeks condonation of delay of 352 days in filing of the instant intra court appeal. The reasons for the delay, as explained by the State, are that the impugned judgment is dated 01.03.2019 has been passed in terms of the judgment dated 13.12.2018 passed in an identical matter being  CWP-1486-2018 – Kidar Nath Kohli and ors vs. State of Haryana and ors in which on 28.01.2019, a copy of the judgment dated 13.12.2018 was received in the office of the Director, Secondary Education, Haryana; on 04.02.2019, the matter was referred by the Director, Secondary Education, Haryana to the Finance Department of the State; on

26.02.2019,   the   Finance   Department   sought   opinion   from  the   Legal Remembrancer and Administrative Secretary, Haryana (for short – LR) as also the Advocate General, Haryana (for short – AG) as to whether an intra CM-2139-LPA-2020 in/and -2-          2024:PHHC:027890-DB court appeal should be preferred against the judgment; even before such reference, on 20.02.2019, the AG had already opined that the present case was not a fit one for filing an appeal; after the aforesaid reference dated

26.02.2019, the LR also opined that in the present case no appeal be filed; after receipt of the opinions by the AG and the LR, for the purpose of implementation of the judgment, the case was sent by the Education Department   to   the   Finance   Department;   on   12.09.2019,   the   Finance Department made a recommendation  to challenge the judgment; the matter was again placed before the  LR who through his letter dated 05.12.2019 reiterated his earlier opinion; the matter then reached the AG who also reiterated his earlier opinion and that on 06.02.2020, the LR issued instructions for filing an appeal which was then drafted and filed on

24.07.2020.

¶2Learned State counsel submits that the delay was procedural and therefore, be condoned. He relies on the following judgments of the Supreme Court:-

(1)  State of Nagaland vs. Lipok AO and others, (2005) 3 SCC 752.

(2) Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through Lrs. and others vs. Union of India and others, (2023) 10 SCC 531

¶3Per contra, Mr. Gaurav Tyagi, who appears for respondent No. 1 to 3 submits that the law of limitation applies equally to all; in the present times of technological advancement no special treatment is required to be given to the State; even while seeking condonation of delay on procedural grounds, huge gaps within the so called procedural delays CM-2139-LPA-2020 in/and -3-          2024:PHHC:027890-DB remain unexplained; in the facts of the present case twice the LR and the AG have opined against the filing of the instant appeal; therefore, the delay on the part of the State should not be condoned and that in spite of the aforesaid opinions given by the LR and the AG the instant appeal has been filed without giving any reason for the change in the  opinions given earlier.

¶4Mr. Tyagi places reliance on the following judgments of the Supreme Court:-

(1)   Office of the Chief Post Master General and others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and another, (2012) 3 SCC

563.

(2) The   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   and   others   vs. Bherulal, (2020)10 SCC 654.

(3)  University of Delhi vs. Union of India and others,

(2020)13 SCC 745.

(4) The   State   of   Odhisha   and   others   vs.   Sunanda Mahakuda, (2021)11 SCC 560.

(5)  Union   of   India   vs.   Central   Tibetan   Schools Administration and others, (2021)11 SCC 557.

¶5Learned counsel for the parties have been heard and with their able assistance the record of the case has also been perused.

¶6In Living Media India Limited's case (supra), the issue before the Supreme Court was as to whether the office of the Chief Post Master General had shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 427 days in filing of the Special Leave Petition. The Supreme Court observed that the officers of the State or its instrumentality were well aware of the prescribed period of limitation for filing of applications/petitions/appeals. There was no separate period of limitation for the State especially when competent CM-2139-LPA-2 2  !"#$"% -4-          2024:PHHC:027890-DB LPA-&&'-2 2  (O)M* persons fa)iliar to !ourt pro!eedings .ere serving the State. =f the delay on the part of the State .as not satisfa!torily e(plained, the sa)e !ould not be !ondoned only be!ause su!h delay is on the part of the State espe!ially .hen !ondoning the delay .ould not advan!e any substantial *usti!e. A!!ording to the Supre)e 9ourt the State playing the !ard of an i)personal litigant !ould not be a!!epted in the light of advan!e)ent in te!hnology. he relevant observations by the Supre)e 9ourt in this regard in this regard::

¶12 It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies CM-2139-LPA-2020 in/and -5-          2024:PHHC:027890-DB being   used   and   available.   The   law   of   limitation undoubtedly   binds   everybody   including   the Government."

¶7In Bherulal's case (supra), the Supreme Court dismissed an application filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh seeking condonation of delay of 663 days in the filing of a Special Leave Petition. The Supreme Court was of the view that bureaucratic process given as an excuse by the State could not be taken as a ground to condone the delay and even if there was merit in the case the bar of limitation could come in the way of the State but of course that would depend on the facts of each case. The Supreme Court observed as follows:- "2. We  are  constrained  to  pen  down  a detailed   order   as   it   appears   that   all   our counseling to the Government and government authorities   has   fallen   on   deaf   ears   i.e.,   the Supreme Court of India cannot be a place for the Governments   to   walk   in   when   they   choose ignoring the period of limitation prescribed. We have   raised   the   issue   that   if   the   government machinery is so inefficient and incapable of filing appeals/petitions in time, the solution may lie in requesting   the   legislature   to   expand   the   time period   for   filing   limitation   for   government authorities because of their gross incompetence. That   is   not   so.   Till   the   statute   subsists,   the appeals/petitions   have   to   be   filed   as   per   the statues prescribed.

3.  No   doubt,   some   leeway   is   given   for   the Government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the   authorities   keep   on   relying   on   judicial CM-2139-LPA-2020 in/and -6-          2024:PHHC:027890-DB pronouncements   for   a   period   of   time   when technology   had   not   advanced   and   a   greater leeway was given to the Government. This position is more than elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. wherein the Court observed as under: "27.  It   is   not   in  dispute  that   the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant   with   the   issues   involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot   claim  that   they  have  a   separate period of limitation when the Department was   possessed   with   competent   persons familiar   with   court   proceedings.   In   the absence   of   plausible   and   acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department   cannot   take   advantage   of various   earlier   decisions.   The   claim   on account   of   impersonal   machinery   and inherited   bureaucratic   methodology   of making several notes cannot be accepted in CM-2139-LPA-2020 in/and -7-          2024:PHHC:027890-DB view of the modern technologies being used and   available.   The   law   of   limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform   all   the   government   bodies,   their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they   have   reasonable   and   acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated   benefit   for   the   government departments.   The   law   shelters   everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of   various   dates,   according   to   us,   the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay."

4. A reading of the aforesaid application shows that the reason for such an inordinate delay is stated to be only "due to unavailability of the documents and the process of   arranging   the   documents".   In   paragraph   4,   a CM-2139-LPA-2020 in/and -8-          2024:PHHC:027890-DB reference   has   been   made   to   "bureaucratic   process works, it is inadvertent that delay occurs".

¶5  A   preposterous   proposition   is   sought   to   be propounded that if there is some merit in the case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by. If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in any case. It is really a bar of limitation which can even shut out good cases. This does not, of course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court in an appropriate case to condone the delay."

¶8In University of Delhi's case (supra), while considering a challenge to a judgment of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court through which the Delhi High Court had declined to condone the delay of 916 days in the filing of an intra court appeal, the Supreme Court held that while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the Court should adopt a liberal approach and that at the time of such consideration the status of the party before the Court was   immaterial. After examining the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court should determine as to whether sufficient cause has been shown by the party seeking condonation of delay and that condonation of delay could not be taken lightly as on the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation a right accrues in favour of the opposite party. In this regard the following observations by the Supreme Court may be usefully referred to:- "23.From a consideration of the view taken by this Court through the decisions cited supra the position is clear that, by and large, a liberal approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay. The consideration for condonation of delay would not depend on the status of the party, namely, the Government or the public CM-2139-LPA-2 2  !"#$"% -9-          2024:PHHC:027890-DB LPA-&&'-2 2  (O)M* bodies so as to apply a different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to render even-handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation would not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating "sufficient cause" to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the courts based on the fact situation. In Katiji the entire conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been kept in focus. However, what cannot also be lost sight of is that the consideration therein was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay in a case where there was delay of four days pitted against the consideration that was required to be made on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800 %.

¶24As against the same, the delay in the instant facts in filing the LPA is 916 days and as such the consideration to condone can be made only if there is reasonable explanation and the condonation cannot be merely because the appellant is public body. The entire explanation noticed above, depicts the casual approach unmindful of the law of limitation despite being aware of the position of law. That apart when there is such a long delay and there is no proper explanation, laches would also come into play while noticing as to the manner in which a party has proceeded before filing an appeal. In addition in the instant facts not only the delay and laches CM-2139-LPA-2 2  !"#$"% -1 -          2024:PHHC:027890-DB LPA-&&'-2 2  (O)M* in filing the appeal is contended on behalf of the respondents seeking dismissal of the instant appeal but it is also contended that there was delay and laches in filing the writ petition itself at the first instance from which the present appeal had arisen. In that view, it would be necessary for us to advert to those aspects of the matter and notice the nature of consideration made in the writ petition as well as the LPA to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the High Court was justified.

¶31In the matter of condonation of delay and laches, the well-accepted position is also that the accrued right of the opposite party cannot be lightly dealt with. In that regard, rather than taking note of the hardship that would be caused to the respondent No.13 as contended by the learned Senior Counsel, what is necessary to be taken note is the manner in which the Respondent No.11, DMRC has proceeded in the matter. The Respondent No.11, DMRC is engaged in providing the public transport and for the said purpose the Government through policy decision has granted approval to generate resources through property development and in that regard the development as earlier indicated, is taken up. Pursuant thereto the Respondent No.11 has received a sum of Rs.218.20 crores from Respondent No.13 as far back as in the year 2008. The said amount as indicated is used for its projects providing metro rail service to the commuting public. In such circumstance, if at this stage the inordinate delay is condoned unmindful of the lackadaisical manner in which the appellant has proceeded in the matter, it would also be contrary to public interest.! CM-2139-LPA-2020 in/and -11-          2024:PHHC:027890-DB

¶9Similar views were taken by the Supreme Court in Sunanda Mahakuda's case (supra) and Central Tibetan Schools Administration's case (supra).

¶10In Sheo Raj Singh's case (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with a challenge to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court condoning delay of 479 days in presentation of an appeal filed against the decision of the reference court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Supreme Court held that while considering the prayer for condonation of delay the Court has to adopt a liberal view. However, the power to condone delay should be exercised only after examining the offered explanation for the delay and that at the time of exercising such discretion, the Court should lean towards substantial justice rather than adopt a technical approach. While giving certain leeway to the State, the Supreme Court reiterated that the discretion to be exercised by the Courts, at the time of condonation of the delay, should be justice oriented and pragmatic.

¶11After   going   through   the   afore   referred   judgments   of   the Supreme Court the position of law that can be culled out is that while considering   an  application  for condonation  of delay  in  the filing  of petitions/applications/appeals, the Court should adopt a liberal approach. At that time the discretion to be exercised by the Court should be justice oriented and that which would further substantial justice and/or public interest. However, the power of the Court to condone delay cannot be taken lightly as on the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation a right accrues in favour of the other party. The status of the applicant is immaterial but CM-2139-LPA-2020 in/and -12-          2024:PHHC:027890-DB since the State machinery is impersonal, when the delay is on the part of the State some leeway may be given to the State. However, in the present times of  advancement   in   technology such   leeway  would   only  be  marginal especially when the State is manned by competent officers who are well versed with the law of limitation.

¶12In the present case, there is a delay of 352 days in the filing of the   appeal. The State seeks  to explain the delay by terming  it as "procedural". A closer scrutiny of the offered explanation shows that the delay in the filing of the appeal occurred due to the to and fro shuffling of the  file  of  the  case  between   the  litigant,  the  finance   and  the  legal departments of the State. Twice over the LR and the AG opined that the case was not a fit one for filing of an appeal. However, on the insistence of not the litigant department but the Finance Department of the State the appeal was preferred on an opinion by the LR. No reasons are available on the record as to why did the LR have a change of heart when on two earlier occasions he had opined to the contrary and this was in spite of the fact that even till date the opinion of the AG is not to file the instant appeal.

¶13Several gaps are also found in the explanation offered by the State for condoning the inordinate delay of 352 days. Some of them go into months while some are spread over a few weeks. Illustratively, in February 2019, the AG as also the LR had opined that the present appeal would have no legs to stand, legally or factually. After about 07 months i.e. on

12.09.2019, the Finance Department of the State of Haryana sent the file back to the office of the AG. No worthwhile explanation is forthcoming for the delay of about 07 months in this regard. It is another matter that after CM-2139-LPA-2020 in/and -13-          2024:PHHC:027890-DB such reference both the AG and the LR, through their opinions given for the second time on 23.10.2019 and 05.12.2019 respectively, opined that it would be not worthwhile to test the judgment impugned through the appeal before a Division Bench.

¶14In the light of the afore facts, we are not inclined to exercise our discretion to condone the delay of 352 days in the filing of the appeal as the   explanation   offered   by   the   State   for   the   delay   contains   several unexplained  gaps   and   because in  the  light  of  the  repeated  opinions expressed by the office of the AG and the LR, condonation of the delay would neither further public interest nor the cause of substantial justice especially when no explanation is also found on the record as to why the LR reviewed  his opinion given twice earlier. Resultantly, the application seeking condonation of the delay is dismissed and consequently, the accompanying appeal also meets the same fate as the application.

¶15All pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. (DEEPAK SIBAL) JUDGE (DEEPAK MANCHANDA) JUDGE January 30, 2024 Jyoti 1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Sr. No.242-8 CM-2139-LPA-2020 in/and Date of decision: 30.01.2024 State of Haryana and others ....Appellants Versus Raghbir Singh Gupta and others ....Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK SIBAL HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE DEEPAK MANCHANDA Present: Mr. Dushyant Saharan, AAG, Haryana. Mr. Gaurav Tyagi, Advocate and Mr. Ashok Tyagi, Advocate for respondents No.1 to 3. * * *