Kulwant Singh Etc v. State of Pb.Etc

JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J (ORAL)

1.    The petitioners through the instant petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India are seeking setting aside of order dated 23.11.2001 (Annexure P-6) whereby their claim for reinstatement as Special Police Officer has been rejected.

2.    The  petitioners  vide  appointment  letter  dated  27.08.1994  were appointed as Special Police Officers (for short 'SPO'). They were appointed by Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police  and  their  job  was  track  patrolling.  On  the intervening night of 29/30.10.1997, they were on duty as members of escort party  on  Howrah  Express,  Amritsar.  A  commotion  erupted  between  few passengers and escort party. An FIR No. 64 dated 30.10.1997 under Section 395 of IPC was registered at Police Station, Government Railway Police, Patiala against members of the escort party. The petitioners along with other accused were arrested and thereafter released on bail vide order dated 11.12.1997. The petitioners came to be discharged from service vide orders dated 01.11.1997 CWP-3117-2002      2

,Anne-ure P." and P.% respective$0/. #heti faced cri1ina$ tria$ wherein theti ca1e to  e ac?uitted at the stage of state1ent under Section *"* )r.P.).  ecause tria$ )ourt for1ed an opinion that there was no incri1inating evidence to  e put up  against  the1.  #he  state1ent  of  co.accused  na1e$0  Ku$deep  Singh  was recorded under Section *"* )r.P.). #he tria$ )ourt after scrutini@ing evidence $ed  0  oth  sides  and  considering  their  argu1ents  vide  judg1ent  dated +*.+>.%++" ac?uitted Ku$deep Singh on the ground of  enefit of dou t. *.    #he petitioners after their ac?uitta$ preferred )AP =o. "&"3+ of %++"  efore this )ourt seeking their reinstate1ent. #he said petition ca1e up for consideration  efore  8ivision  Bench  of  this  )ourt  which  vide  order  dated ""."+.%++" disposed of with a direction to respondents to pass speaking order treating writ petition as representation of the petitioners. #he re$evant e-tracts of the pratier c$ause and order dated ""."+.%++" read as: P4a5!4 C6a7'! "PETITION under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction especially a writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the action of Respondents in striking off the names of petitioners from the Rolls of S.P.Os on the ground that they have been involved in a criminal case and then not re-instating/restoring the petitioners to their original position inspite of the fact that they have honourably been acquitted by a Judicial verdict even though it involves quashing of the discharge orders No. 34679-80/SPO Cell dated 1.11.97 (P-2) and No. 34677-78/SPO CELL dated 1.11.97(P-3) which were prepared by respondents but not served upon the petitioners till date being illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory, in colourable exercise of authority, in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and in violation of law laid down by the Hon'ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is further prayed that a writ in the nature of Mandamus may be issued directing the respondents to reinstate the CWP-3117-2002      3

petitioners as S.P.Os and also to consider them for appointment as Constables and to issue them constable numbers as they had been duly selected for appointment as Constables but they could not be issued Appointment Letters because of prosecution launched against them in Criminal Court as now they have been acquitted from the criminal charges by judicial verdict (Annexure P-1), as has been done in case of other similarly situated persons after their acquittal. It is further prayed that an interim direction may be given to the respondents to call back the petitioners on duty forthwith. It is further prayed that the petitioner may kindly be held entitled to all the consequential benefits in form of pay, fixation of the salary, back wages etc. etc.. with interest. It is further prayed that this Hon'ble Court may issue any other writ, order or direction which it may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case." Order dated 11.10.2001 "After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, we are of the opinion that the petitioner is required to approach the concerned authorities in respect of joining his duties on the basis of the order of the Court acquitting him in the criminal case. Let this petition be treated as a representation and the same shall be duly considered and decided in accordance with law, by a speaking order, by the competent authority, expeditiously say within one month of the receipt of a certified copy of this order. The petition stands disposed of. On a separate request, a copy of the order be given dasti on payment of usual charges."

5.    #he respondents vide i1pugned order dated %*."".%++" has rejected representation  of  the  petitioners. #he  )o1petent Authoritti  has  he$d  that  the petitioners do not have right of their post  eing dai$0 wagers. It is apt to 1ention here that order dated +".""."44( where 0 petitioners were discharged was never CWP-3117-2002      4

set-aside and Division Bench of this Court had simply directed the respondents to consider representation of the petitioners. The said order till date holds the field.

5.    Mr. Ashok Bhardwaj, Advocate submits that by instructions dated

14.05.2008,  the  respondents  have  decided  to  reinstate  SPOs  who  have  been acquitted in criminal trial and were dismissed on account of registration of FIR. The subsequent instructions dated 11.05.2009 stand quashed by this Court vide judgment dated 13.01.2016 passed in CWP No. 14975 of 2009 titled as 'Pawan Kumar  (Constable)  Vs.  State  of  Punjab  and  others'.  The  petitioners  were acquitted in the criminal trial without recording their statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., thus, they stood acquitted for all purposes and respondents were bound to reinstate them as SPO.

6.    In  support  of  his  contentions  Mr.  Ashok  Bhardwaj  relies  upon Single Bench judgment of this Court in 'Gurmeet Singh (deceased) through his wife Vs. State of Punjab and others 2023 SCC Online P&H 9488', 'Pawan Kumar (Constable) Vs. State of Punjab 2016 SCC Online P&H 3515', 'Baljit Singh Vs. Director General of Police, Punjab and others CWP No. 9848 of 2023,'  'Palwinder  Singh  (deceased,  now  represented  by  LRs)  Vs  State  of Punjab and others CWP No. 13287 of 2017 and 'Surjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab 2013 SCC Online P&H 2925' and of Bombay High Court in 'Ratnakar P.M. Vs. UCO Bank 2009 SCC Online BOM 877' and judgments of Supreme Court  in  'Jagdish  Mitter  Vs.  Union  of  India  1963  SCC  Online  SC  75'and 'Joginder Singh Vs. UT Chandigarh 2015(2) SCC 377,'.

7.    Per contra, Mr. Inderpreet Singh Kang, AAG, Punjab submits that petitioners joined as SPO on 27.08.1994 and they came to be implicated in FIR No. 64 registered on 30.10.1997 i.e. within 3 years of their appointment. They were never made part of police force as constables. They were daily wagers and CWP-3117-2002      5

as per appointment letter dated 27.08.1994 could be discharged at any point of time without show cause notice. They have no vested or fundamental right to claim absorption. In view of different judgments of Supreme Court, no daily wager can claim absorption. The petitioners were found involved in commission of  an  offence  punishable  under  Section  395  IPC,  thus,  they  were  rightly discharged  from  service.  The  petitioners  at  this  belated  stage  cannot  be reinstated especially when they were daily wagers. In  support  of  his  contention,  he  relies  upon  Division  Bench judgment of this Court in CWP No. 11962 of 2005 titled as 'Sucha Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others', CWP No. 13562 of 2000 titled as 'Raminder Vs. State of Punjab and others' and CWP 17571 of 1998 titled as 'Parveen Kumar Vs. State of Punjab'.

8.    I have heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.

9.    The conceded position emerging from record is that the petitioners were appointed SPO in 1994 as daily wagers. The appointment was made by DSP in exercise of power conferred by Section 17 of Police Act. They were arrested in an FIR under Section 395 of IPC. They were dismissed from service in 1997 and they did not challenge order of dismissal till 2001. The trial Court acquitted the petitioners and after their acquittal, they approached this Court by way of CWP No. 16180 of 2001 which was disposed of by way of direction to respondents  to  decide  their  representation. The  respondents  turned  down,  by impugned order dated 23.11.2001, claim of the petitioners.

10.    The petitioners were appointed vide letter dated 27.08.1994 wherein it was specifically mentioned that they may be discharged at any time without issuing show cause notice. The relevant extracts of the appointment letter dated

27.08.1994 read as: CWP-3117-2002      6

BIn compliance of order No.2598-2602/B-5, dt. 9.6.9  from !olic"  of  !#n$a%,  &'andi(ar'.  )'e  follo*in(  &andidates  are 'ere%" appointed as dail" *a(es +.!.,s in -o.t. /ail*a" !olice, !#n$a%  for  )racti  !atrollin(  d#ties  and  allotted  +!,s  n#m%er mentioned  a(ainst  eac'  t'eir  names,  s#%$ected  to  t'eir  medical fitness and c'aracter 1erifications. )'e" can %e disc'ar(ed at an" time *it'o#t t'e formalities of s'o* ca#se notice etc.2

"".    Ahi$e  on  dutti,  an  ;I<  =o.  &5  dated  *+."+."44(  ca1e  to  e registered against the petitioners. In the said ;I<, the petitioners were ac?uitted vide  judg1ent  dated  +*.+>.%++".  #he  re$evant  e-tracts  of  the  judg1ent  are reproduced as  e$ow:. "6. After the close of prosecution evidence, statement of accused Kuldip Singh was recorded under Section 313 Cr. P.C. The statements of other accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were dispensed with as there was no incriminating evidence to be put to them. The material witnesses examined by the prosecution had not identified the remaining accused. xxxx xxx xxx

¶17P.W.9 Ravinder Singh deposed that two years ago he had boarded Punjab Mail 3006 bound for Hawra. He was to go to Patna. The train started at 6.30 P.M. from Amritsar. He was travelling in the ordinary class. When the train reached near Railway Station Rajpura, two police officials in uniform armed with weapons entered their compartment and started pressurising the passengers as to why they were carrying heavy load of luggage. They started demanding money on one pretext or the other and started beating the passengers. The police officials had also demanded bribe from him but he had not paid. One of the passengers pulled the chain. The officials were under the influence of liquor. The moment the train stopped, the police officials rushed out of the compartment. One of the said persons was present in the Court. The witness pointed out towards Kuldip Singh accused. The passengers started raising slogans against Punjab Police. CWP-3117-2002      7

Thereafter the train started and stopped at Railway Station Rajpura. The matter was reported to the police. His complaint was Ex. PG. In his cross-examination this witness deposed that he had not mentioned the description of Kuldip Singh in complaint Ex. PG. Some of the details given by him were not mentioned in Ex. PG. He did not meet the Railway Station Master. He did not participate in any identification parade and did not know the accused earlier. He could not tell as to from how many persons Kuldip Singh had received the money. xxx xxx xxx

¶20Again P.W. 11 Ushesha Ram deposed that on 29.10.1997, he alongwith 14 other persons were going from Amritsar to Bihar in a train. They had purchased the tickets. when the train left Ludhiana, five police men came in the compartment and asked them to show tickets. The said police men demanded money from them but they had not paid the same. When they resisted their demand the said police officials started beating them. The police officials then alighted from the train at Rajpura. They had made hue and cry. The said police men did not snatch any thing from them . The accused present in the Court were not the police men referred by him in his statement today. The said witness was declared hostile but nothing-fruitful could be elicited by the Addl. Public Prosecutor for the State during cross-examination.

¶21P.W. 12 Khatar Ram deposed that on 29.10.1997, he alongwith 14 other companions were travelling in Hawra Mail. When the train left Railway Station Amritsar, six police officials came in their compartment under the influence of liquor. they were armed with weapons. They started checking their tickets and said that their tickets were invalid and demanded Rs.50/- from each of them. Some of the passengers had given them Rs.50/- each. When the train left Ludhiana Station, the said officials had asked them to give the said amount. They refused to give them the amount as their tickets were valid. Upon this an altercation took place between the police officials and passengers and they had beaten them. Thereafter one of the police men pulled the emergency chain and the train halted and they alighted from the train. They reported the MANOJ KUMAR CWP-3117-2002      8

matter  to  the  Guard.  When  the  train  reached  at  Rajpura,  they started raising slogans against the police. He had seen the accused present in the court but none of them were the culprits who had snatched the articles from them in the train. xxx      xxx      xxx

25.  P.W. 11 and P.w. 12, the persons who were allegedly beaten and from whom money was snatched by the police officials have not supported  the  prosecution  story  and  have  failed  to  identify  the accused,  P.W.5  Sham  Raj,  Guard  has  also  not  supported  the prosecution story. In these circumstances it would not be safe to rely upon the sole testimony of Ravinder Singh P.W.9. This witness did not know Kuldip Singh and had identified him for the first time in Court. He had not participated in any identification parade. In his cross-examination he further deposed that he had come to the Court 2/3 times but had not seen the accused in the Court earlier than the day when his statement was recorded in the Court. He could not tell specifically as to from how many persons accused Kuldip Singh had received money. This witness has also not specifically deposed as to what particular weapon was being carried by accused Kuldip Singh and what particular role he had played at the time of commission of offence.  P.W.9  had  not  given  the  description  of  accused  Kuldip Singh in his complaint Ex. PG. There is no documentary evidence on record with regard to the injuries inflicted by the accused to any of  the  passengers.  None  of  the  witnesses  examined  by  the prosecution  has  deposed  that  they  had  paid  Rs.50/-  to  accused Kuldip  Singh.  Thus,  it  would  not  be  safe  to  rely  upon  the  sole testimony of P.W.9 with regard to the conviction of accused Kuldip Singh.  So  far  as  the  other  accused  are  concerned,  there  is absolutely  no  evidence  against  them  with  regard  to  their involvement in the commission of thencrime.

26.  Accordingly, in view of my above discussion, I hold that the prosecution has failed to prove its case. Accused Kuldip Singh is acquitted  by  giving  him  benefit  of  doubt  whereas  the  remaining accused are acquitted of the charge framed against them. File be consigned to the Record Room." CWP-3117-2002      9

12.    From  the  reading  of  judgment  dated  03.05.2001  passed  by Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Patiala,  it  comes  out  that  FIR  was  registered  on account of illegal demand made by petitioners from a few passengers. All these passengers were labourer and they hailed from State of UP or Bihar. The victims appeared before the trial Court and confirmed that illegal demand was made by police officials. One of them even identified co-accused Kuldeep Singh. The victims belonged to poor strata of the society. It is well known fact that stray witnesses  in  such  cases  come  to  Court  and  dare  to  depose  against  police officials. They in so many words confirmed their version. Despite this fact, it was unfortunate that all the accused were acquitted. This Court cannot set-aside judgment  of  acquittal  while  deciding  present  writ  petition,  however,  as  per recent judgment of Supreme Court in Ram Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2023 SCC online SC 1618  is supposed to look into findings of the trial Court and not to simply examine last paragraph wherein accused are acquitted on the ground of  benefit  of  doubt  or  otherwise.  The  relevant  extracts  of  the  judgment  of Supreme Court in Ram Lal (Supra) are reproduced as below: "28.  Expressions  like  "benefit  of  doubt"  and  "honorably acquitted", used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. In the present case, the Appellate Judge has recorded that Exh. P-3, the original marksheet carries the date of birth as 21.04.1972 and the same has also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. The conclusion that  the  acquittal  in  the  criminal  proceeding  was  after  full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. The court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression used." CWP-3117-2002      10

13.    From the perusal of findings recorded by trial Court and deposition of  witnesses,  this  Court  is  of  the  considered  opinion  that  petitioners  were acquitted taking a very liberal opinion and their acquittal cannot be considered as acquittal for the purpose of reinstatement in service. This Court is at pain to notice that State did not assail aforesaid judgment before Appellate Court though poor labourer dared to come to Court and deposed their woes. This attitude of State  compels  the  witnesses  to  stay  away  from  Court  proceedings  despite suffering at the hands of goons or police officials behaving like goons.

14.    The petitioners are relying upon instruction dated 14.05.2008 which is reproduced as below:- "Subject : Policy decision to take SPOs back in service who have been acquitted in Criminal Cases by the Courts. Please  refer  to  your  office  memo  No.  18313/CB-PC  dated

31.8.2007 on the subject cited above.

2. The case has been examined in this office in respect of those SPOs against whom criminal cases (s) were registered and they were discharged from service. Some of them have been acquitted. Clarification has been sought from time to time  whether  they  are  to  be  taken  back  in  service  or otherwise.

3. After thorough consideration, it has been decided that as a policy,  as  far  as  this  issue  is  concerned  SPOs  should  be treated at par with Punjab Police personnel. Therefore, those SPOs  who  were  earlier  discharged  due  to  registration  of criminal  cases  against  them  but  subsequently  either discharged or acquitted by the Courts may be taken back as SPOs or be enlisted as constable (in the case of eligible SPOs in  list  'A')  as  the  case  may  be.  Fresh  verification  of antecedents  may  be  carried  out  before  taking  them  back. They should be discharged, if they come to adverse notice."

CWP-3117-2002      11

The above instructions do not advance cause of the petitioners. The instructions were issued in 2008 whereas they were dismissed in 1997 and even impugned order was passed in 2001. There was discretion of authority to take back as SPO or Constable. It is apt to mention here that SPO(s) were enlisted as constable on the compliance of conditions jotted down in the policy circulars. The instructions are simply re-iteration of judgments of Courts where it has been held  that  if  an  employee  has  been  dismissed  from  service  due  to  criminal proceedings, he may be re-instated in case of acquittal in criminal trial. The instructions do not create right of re-instatement as soon as acquittal takes place. The authorities are supposed to apply their mind and in a suitable case may re-instate dismissed employee. In the present case, the competent authority has not found it suitable to re-instate the petitioners.

15.    The respondents removed petitioners in 1997 and they approached this  Court  in  2002.  They  did  not  challenge  their  order  of  discharge  till  the conclusion of trial. Their claim since 2002 is based upon judgment of acquittal. It is settled proposition of law that standard of proof in departmental proceeding and criminal trial is different. A person cannot be re-instated on the sole ground of acquittal in the criminal proceedings. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and others vs. T. Srinivas, 2004

(7) SCC 442, the Apex Court while setting aside the order, passed by Tribunal and  upheld  by  the  High  Court  whereby  disciplinary  proceedings  had  been ordered to be stayed till the criminal trial is over, has observed that approach and objective in the criminal and disciplinary proceedings are altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the employee is guilty of such conduct whereas in the criminal proceedings the question is whether an offence registered against him is established and if established what sentence should be imposed. The relevant extracts of the judgment read as: CWP-3117-2002      12

"This Court in the said case of State of Rajasthan (supra) has further  observed  that  the  approach  and  the  objective  in  the criminal  proceedings  and  the  disciplinary  proceedings  is altogether distinct and different. It held that in the disciplinary proceedings the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such  conduct  as  would  merit  his  removal  from  service  or  a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings  the  question  is  whether  the  offences  registered against him are established and, if established, what sentence should  be  imposed  upon  him.  The  court  in  the  above  case further noted that the standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are distinct and different."

In Stanzen Toyotetsu India P. Ltd. vs. Girish V., 2014 (3) SCC 636, the Apex  Court  has  held  that  departmental  inquiry  is  aimed  at  maintaining discipline and efficiency in service while criminal prosecution for an offence is launched for violation of a duty that the offender owes to the society and both operate in separate and different spheres and intending to serve totally different purposes. The relevant extracts of the judgment read as:- "9. In A.P. SRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya [(1997) 2 SCC 699 : 1997  SCC  (L&S)  548]  this  Court  declared  that  the  purpose underlying departmental proceedings is distinctly different from the purpose behind prosecution of offenders for commission of offences by them. While criminal prosecution for an offence is launched for violation  of  a  duty  that  the  offender  owes  to  the  society, departmental  enquiry  is  aimed  at  maintaining  discipline  and efficiency in service. The difference in the standard of proof and the application of the rules of evidence to one and inapplicability to the other  was  also  explained  and  highlighted  only  to  explain  that conceptually the two operate in different spheres and are intended to serve distinctly different purposes."

CWP-3117-2002      13

The  Supreme  Court  in  Noida Entrepreneurs  Assn. v. Noida ,

(2007) 10 SCC 385, while discussing its catena of judgments has held that criminal proceedings are launched for an offence for violation of a duty, which the  offender  owes  to  the  society,  whereas,  the  departmental  enquiry  is  to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. The relevant extracts of judgment read as: "11. A bare perusal of the order which has been quoted in its totality goes to show that the same is not based on any rational foundation.  The  conceptual  difference  between  a  departmental enquiry and criminal proceedings has not been kept in view. Even orders passed by the executive have to be tested on the touchstone of  reasonableness.  [See Tata  Cellular v. Union  of  India [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651] and Teri Oat Estates

(P)  Ltd. v. State  (UT  of  Chandigarh) [Teri  Oat  Estates  (P) Ltd. v. State  (UT  of  Chandigarh),  (2004)  2  SCC  130]  .]  The conceptual  difference  between  departmental  proceedings  and criminal proceedings have been highlighted by this Court in several cases.  Reference  may  be  made  to Kendriya  Vidyalaya Sangathan v. T.  Srinivas [Kendriya  Vidyalaya  Sangathan v. T. Srinivas, (2004) 7 SCC 442 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1011] , Hindustan Petroleum  Corpn.  Ltd. v. Sarvesh  Berry [Hindustan  Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Sarvesh Berry, (2005) 10 SCC 471 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1605]  and Uttaranchal  RTC v. Mansaram  Nainwal [Uttaranchal RTC v. Mansaram Nainwal, (2006) 6 SCC 366 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1341] . '8.  …  The  purpose  of  departmental  enquiry  and  of prosecution  are  two  different  and  distinct  aspects.  The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which  law  has  provided  that  the  offender  shall  make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation  of  law  or  of  omission  of  public  duty.  The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and  efficiency  of  public  service.  It  would,  therefore,  be MANOJ KUMAR CWP-3117-2002      14

expedient  that  the  disciplinary  proceedings  are  conducted and  completed  as  expeditiously  as  possible.  It  is  not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be  stayed  pending  trial  in  the  criminal  cases  against  the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is  of grave  nature involving  complicated  questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public duty,  as  distinguished  from  mere  private  rights  punishable under criminal law. When the trial for a criminal offence is conducted  it  should  be  in  accordance  with  proof  of  the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872 [in short "the Evidence Act"]. The converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty  of  the  delinquent  officer  to  punish  him  for  his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That  the  strict  standard  of  proof  or  applicability  of  the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. … Under  these  circumstances,  what  is required to be  seen  is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending  on  its  own  facts  and  circumstances.'  [Ed. :  As observed in A.P. SRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, (1997) 2 SCC 699, pp. 704-05, para 8.] "

16.    The Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. Bhupendra Yadav, 2023 SCC Online SC 1181 while dealing with appointment in Armed Forces has held that standard of rectitude to be applied to any person CWP-3117-2002      15

seeking appointment in Law Enforcement Agency must always be higher and more rigorous. The Court has held: "24.   The  aforesaid  aspects  were  rightly  factored  in  by  the appellant-State Government while issuing the communication dated 24th August, 20178 and declaring that the respondent was unfit for appointment to the said post. The yardstick to be applied in cases where  the  appointment  sought  relates  to  a  Law  Enforcement Agency, ought to be much more stringent than those applied to a routine  vacancy.  One  must  be  mindful  of  the  fact  that  once appointed  to  such  a  post,  a  responsibility  would  be  cast  on  the respondent of maintaining law and order in the society, enforcing the  law,  dealing  with  arms  and  ammunitions,  apprehending suspected  criminals  and  protecting  the  life  and  property  of  the public at large. Therefore, the standard of rectitude to be applied to any person seeking appointment in a Law Enforcement Agency must always be higher and more rigourous for the simple reason that possession  of  a  higher  moral  conduct  is  one  of  the  basic requirements for appointment to a post as sensitive as that in the police service."

17.      The petitioners are claiming reinstatement on the ground of parity and acquittal in criminal proceedings. In all the cases cited by the petitioners, the employees were working for quite long time and they were working even during the pendency of the trial whereas petitioners were dismissed within 3 years from their appointment.

17.1     The petitioners in support of their claim of parity have relied upon judgments of this Court in Palwinder Singh (Supra), Gurmeet Singh (Supra) and Pawan Kumar (Supra). In Palwinder Singh's case, the petitioner joined as SPO in 1988 and he was dismissed in 2007 meaning thereby he worked for 19 years as SPO. CWP-3117-2002      16

He,  pursuant  to  2002  policy  of  the  State,  was  considered  for  the  post  of constable. He even participated in the test. In  Gurmeet  Singh's  case,  the  petitioner  served  respondent-department as SPO for 18 years. He was absorbed as constable. His order of absorption was later on withdrawn. He was never dismissed or suspended from service. He continued to work during the pendency of trial as well for more than 5 years after acquittal. In Pawan Kumar's case, the petitioner was appointment in 1994 and he was absorbed as constable. He was discharged in 2002 but reinstated in 2004 after his acquittal in criminal case. He was again discharged in terms of policy of 2009. The Court set-aside policy dated 06.05.2009 and allowed writ petition.

17.2    The facts of all the above-noted cases were totally different from the present case, thus, petitioners cannot take advantage of those cases. The petitioners herein had worked for minuscule period of 3 years and they were dismissed even prior to introduction of policy of 2002.

18.    The  petitioners  were  appointed  as  daily  wagers  and  in  the appointment letter it was specifically mentioned that they can be discharged at any time without the formalities of show cause notice. Neither the petitioners being  daily  wagers  have  vested  nor  fundamental  right  of  absorption  or continuity of service.

18.1    A Division Bench of this Court in Sucha Singh (Supra) has held that SPOs are appointed under Section 17 of Punjab Police Act, 1934 and they are daily wagers. Unless and until they are absorbed, they can be removed from service without giving an opportunity of hearing. The relevant extracts of the judgment read as: CWP-3117-2002      17

"7. There is no dispute that a public servant can not be dismissed or removed from service as a measure of punishment without holding a due and proper enquiry. However, the petitioner cannot claim the status of a Constable as he was never absorbed as such and therefore, the Punjab Police Rules do not apply. The SPO is appointed under Section 17 of the Police Act which allows the police Authorities to appoint the residents of neighbourhoods where the threat to peace is contemplated and the police force ordinarily deployed is considered not sufficient. Therefore, the nature of enlistment of the petitioner was such that he cannot claim to be a member of the service. Since he was a daily wager and has been discharged, no opportunity of hearing is required, especially when the Appointing Authority has passed the order of discharge on the receipt of report from D.S.P. The judgments cited by the State counsel in the cases of Raminder Singh (supra) and Parveen Kumar (supra) squarely covers the facts of this case against the petitioner. Thus, we do not find any merit in this petition and the same is dismissed without order as to costs. !etition dismissed.2 "3.%    A 8ivision Bench of this )ourt in Ra>&($!4 ,&(<= 2,7?4a3 whi$e re$0ing upon another 8ivision Bench Cudg1ent of this )ourt in Pra<een Kumar (Sutira) has he$d that a discharge of a SP2 is a discharge of a dai$0 wager and the  provision  of  Punja   Po$ice  <u$es  are  app$ica $e  on$0  when  a  person  is a sor ed as a consta $e. #he re$evant e-tracts of the judg1ent read as: " . )'ere is no disp#te *it' t'e proposition of la* t'at a p#%lic ser.ant cannot %e dismissed or remo.ed from ser.ice as a meas#re of p#nis'ment *it'o#t 'oldin( a d#e and proper en;#ir". : p#%lic ser.ant can onl" %e dismissed or remo.ed %" *a" of p#nis'ment after  compl"in(  *it'  r#les  of  nat#ral  $#stice.  7o*e.er,  in  t'e present case t'e petitioner co#ld not claim t'e stat#s of a &onsta%le as 'e *as ne.er a%sor%ed as s#c'. )'e pro.isions of !#n$a% !olice /#les  *o#ld  %ecome  applica%le  onl"  after  a%sorption  of  t'e petitioner as a &onsta%le. In !ar.een 6#marBs case @s#praA, t'e Ki.ision Benc' *as considerin( t'e case of some +!,s *'o 'ad MANOJ KUMAR CWP-3117-2002      18

been  discharged  from  service  on  the  basis  of  complaints  and without affording any opportunity of hearing to him. The Division Bench  held  that  the  discharge  of  the SPOs was  one  of  the  two options open to the respondents. The SPOs could have been either discharged or subjected to disciplinary proceedings. In the present case also, the name of the petitioner has been merely removed from the roll. It is, therefore, a case of discharge of a daily wager. In the written statement, it is categorically stated that the activities of the petitioner were such that he was not found fit for the job of SPO . In other words, the work of the petitioner was not found satisfactory. That being so, the matter is squarely covered by the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Parveen Kumar (supra). The petitioner was working on temporary basis. Therefore, he has no right to the post.

5. Consequently, we find no merit in the writt petition and the same is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed."

19.    A Division Bench of this Court in Lokesh Rana (Supra) has held that a contractual employee has no right to get his contract renewed which was for a limited period. The relevant extracts of the said judgment read as:- "The  facts  of  the  present  case  undisputedly  establish  that  the contractual appointment of the appellants has come to an end in 2019 and that fresh appointments have also been made pursuant to the impugned advertisement in which the appellants had also participated  and  two  of  them  have  also  been  selected  and appointed. In the backdrop of the aforesaid admitted facts, the law is settled that once the period of contractual appointment is over,  the  High  Court,  in  exercise  of  its  extra  ordinary  power under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  cannot  direct continuance  of  service  beyond  the  contractual  period  as  that would amount to grant of an open ended permanent appointment by  the  High  Court  even  in  the  absence  of  any  order  of appointment  or  engagement  on  the  part  of  the  employer.  The CWP-3117-2002      19

direction  seeking  continuation  after  the  contractual  period  is over, therefore, cannot be granted and has rightly been rejected. In view of the position, as sketched out above, we are dissuaded to interfere with the impugned order and judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge. The appeal being bereft of merit is, accordingly, dismissed."

20.    The respondents have granted constabulary number to various SPOs in view of its policies or multiple orders passed by different benches of this Court.  Nevertheless,  there  was  no  fundamental  or  vested  right  of  anyone  to claim absorption. It was only policy of the State to appoint SPOs as constables because  of  their  nature  of  service,  performance,  medical  condition  and experience. SPOs were absorbed post 2002 and petitioners were discharged in 1997, thus, they were not entitled to benefit of any policy of absorption.

21.    There is another aspect of the matter which needs to be considered. The petitioners joined respondents as SPO in 1994 and they were discharged from service within a short span of 3 years. A long period of 3 decades has passed away. The petitioners were discharged in 1997, thus for last 27 years, they are not in service. They were not regular employees and if an order of reinstatement is passed, they would at the best be reinstated as daily wagers. At the time of their appointment as well as dismissal, there was no provision in Punjab  Police  Rules  to  absorb  SPOs.  It  was  from  2002  onwards  the  State Government by way of different policy circulars and in view of judgments of this Court absorbed SPOs. There was no absorption of SPOs prior to 2002 and before  that  date  petitioners  had  already  been  discharged  from  service.  The petitioners,  at  this  stage  i.e.  after  26  years  from  their  discharge,  cannot  be reinstated especially when they were daily wagers and were found involved in criminal activity. Neither were they regular employees nor dismissed because of CWP-3117-2002      20

fault on the part of respondents. The reinstatement of daily wagers at this belated stage neither would be justified nor in public interest.

22.    In  view  of  above  discussions  and  findings,  this  Court  is  of  the considered  opinion  that  the  present  petition  deserves  to  be  dismissed  and accordingly dismissed.

08.02.2024              [JAGMOHAN BANSAL] manoj                JUDGE

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP-3117-2002 Date of decision: 08.02.2024 KULWANT SINGH AND ANOTHER ….PETITIONERS Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS ...RESPONDENTS CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL Present: Mr. Ashok Bhardwaj, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Inderpreet Singh Kang, AAG, Punjab. ****