Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. State of Uttar

RAMESH CHANDRA SHARMA & ORS. v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 8819 of 2022) FEBRUARY 20, 2023 [KRISHNA MURARI AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.] Land Acquisition Act, 1894– U.P. Land Acquisition (determination of compensation and declaration of a ward by agreement) Rules, 1997 – Payment of compensation – Classi fication of landholders as Pushtaini or Gair-Pushtaini – Impermissibility of –

Held: Classification made by the GNOIDA authority for the purposes of awarding differential compensation is bad in law – Land Acquisition Act does not distinguish between classes of owners , and uniformly provides compensation to all class of lan downers – Classification made between Pushtaini landowners and Gair-pushtaini landowners is violative of the law laid down in the Nagpur Trust case and Article 14 – Said classification made by t he executive actions is bad in law, and is liable to be set aside – Howeve r, since the mischief lies only within the classification, it can be severed, and the remaining part of the executive actions that set out to grant compensation for the purpose of rehabilitation remains valid in law – Impugned judgment passed by the Full Bench of the H igh Court set aside – Appellants entitled to the reliefs claimed in the Writ Petition filed before the High Court – Constitution of India – Art.14. Constitution of India – Art.14 – Reasonable Classif ication Test, Wednesbury Principle and Proportionality Test – D iscussed – Administrative Law. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. Whether the Appellants are bound by the compensation as per the agreement under the Land Acqu isition rules, and have waived off their right to seek enha nced compensation? The Respondent Authority argued that since the agreement was consented to, no challenge could exist in the C ourt. This argument in the facts of the case, has been raised only to be rejected. The issue involved in adjudication is not in respect of an agreement entered into by the appellants. Similar agreemen ts were also entered into with the Authority by such i dentically situated landholders who have been granted addition al compensation subsequent to the agreement by carving out a distinction on the basis of period of residence/occupati on of the land which was acquired by creating an artificial class ification of ‘Pushtaini’ and ‘Gair-Pushtaini’ landholders. Furthermore, since the issue of additional compensation by making an a rtificial classification of ‘pushtaini’ and ‘Gair-pushtani’ was not in existence at the time of the agreement, there was no occasion to c hallenge the same. Further, specifically in the context of the grant of ex-gratia payment, it is to be noted that the said payment gr anted to Pushtaini landowners through a separate notificatio n, was assessed, and given, after the agreement was signed by both, Pushtaini and Gair-pushtaini Landowners. The Appellants herein, under those circumstances, could not have challenge d the agreement vis a vis the exgratia payment on grounds of viol ation of Article 14, when no such violation existed at the tim e of the agreement. No man can be expected to predict a future violation of their rights and file a pre-emptive appeal.The A ppellants, because of their signing of the agreement, have not forfeited their right to seek revised compensation, because ,the cause of act ion accrued to them much after entering into the agreem ent. The issue no. 1 is answered accordingly in the negative and in favo ur of the Appellants.[Paras 27-30][448-D-H; 449-A-B,D]

2.1 Whether the classification made by and executive fia t between Pushtaini Landowners and Gair-pushtaini Landowners for payment of compensation at different rates is liable to be struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution? REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION TEST For any classification to survive the test of Article 14, th e classification must be based on intelligible differentia, and it must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by t he law. The object sought to be achieved must also be lawful, and if the object of the law itself is found to be discrimi natory, then such discrimination must be struck down. [Para 33][451-C-D ] PRADESH

2.2 While prima facie, the classification and the o bject sought to be achieved through the said classificati on seems reasonable, however, the devil lies in the details. The ju stification given by the GNOIDA Authority, and the Full-bench of the High Court assumes that only Pushtaini landowners permanently reside in the subject land or that the subject land is the primary source of income only for Pushtaini landowners, and this assumption has been backed by no empirical data produced by the authority. While the classification made by Greater Noida has been based on the object of giving fair compensation, however, such a laudable object of the classification would stand breached by the effec ts of such a classification, creating a dissonance between the obj ect and its effect. Many Gair-pushtaini landholders, whose main area of residence or their main source of income is also the subj ect land, would be subject to great discrimination and injustice, if the same compensation that has been granted to the pushtaini landhol ders is not extended to them. [Paras 38, 39][455-F-H; 456-A-B]

2.3 WEDNESBURY PRINCIPLE The classification made by GNOIDA does not find its footing in the Land Acquisition Act, or the UP-Land Acquisition Rules, and hence is contrary to law. The said classification also su ffers from not taking into account relevant consideration s. The Authority, without taking into account any empirical data, or calculating any possibility of Gair-pushtaini landown ers being rendered landless or without a primary source of income, m ade the impugned classification. These relevant factors, by not being taken into account, can and would cause great injustice to Gair-pushtaini landowners. Further, GNOIDA, by arbitrarily classifying the landowners as Pushtaini and Gair-pushtaini on the bas is of a cut-off date, have taken into account an irrelevant fa ctor. The cut-off date by itself, without any context of the landow ners on ground, is not indicative of who the most adversely affected landowners are. By not complying with these three factors while making the classification, this Court must strike d own such a classification. [Paras 44, 45][457-F-G; 458-A-B]

2.4 PROPORTIONALITY TEST The interfering law, i.e. the impugned notification that creates the classification, does not have a rationa l nexus to the object sought to be achieved, and thus, violates th e first two prongs of the proportionality test. Coming to the third and fourth prong of the proportionality test, i.e whether the c lassification created by the Authority was a necessity to achieve the s tate aim of compensating those landowners that are either direct residents 46 of the land or the land exists as their primary source of income and whether such measure was proportional to the object sought to be achieved. For this, it is pertinent to refer to Sect ion 23 of the Act, which provides for matters to be taken into account while determining the compensation. A bare perusal of Section 23 would show that, the grounds for classification as purpor ted by the GNOIDA authority, have already been covered by Section 23 of the Act. The fifth point of the said Section square ly covers the requirement of compensating for rehabilitation of t he affected landowners. In the presence of an already existing provi sion in the act, the classification created by the GNOIDA authority, must exist in furtherance of the said Section, and not in contrast of. [Paras 52-54][465-B-D; 466-C-D]

2.5 The classification if allowed to exist, can lead to sever al Gair-pushtaini landowners who may also need to be rehabilitated, cannot rehabilitate themselves without compensation for the same. This circumstance alone besides being discriminatr oy pits the said classification against Section 23 of the Act, causing an insubordination to the 1894 Act. Such a mischief, if allowed to exist, would not only nullify the purpose of the Act, but also violate the third and fourth principle of the proportionality test, and hence is liable to be struck down. Further, it is also import ant to note that the classification, even if allowed to exist, does not come with any safeguards against its potential abuse. As mentioned above, the said notification by way of its classificat ion creates disastrous mischief, and the notification does nothing to remedy such potential abuse. No guidelines for the said classification exist, nor are there any bars placed. If such classificati on is left unchecked, it may lead to bad precedence, and disas trous ramifications in the future. This lack of substantiv e guidelines also violates the fifth prong of the proportionalit y test. The impugned classification is liable to be struck down as violat ive of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. [Paras 55-57][466-D-H] PRADESH State Of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) AIR 75 : [1952] SCR 284; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (Banks Nationalisation) v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 : [1970] 3 SCR 530; Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. Vs. Union of India Thr. Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice (2018) 10 SCC 1 : [2018] 7 SCR 379; K. S. Puttaswamy & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569 – followed. Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat

(2020) 10 SCC 459 – relied on. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 – referred to.

¶3Whether the classification made by the Full-Benc h of the High Court between Pushtaini landowners and Gair-pushtaini landowners is in contravention to the law laid down by this Hon’ble Court in the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust and another vs. Vithal Rao and others (1973) 1 SCC 500? The classification made by the GNOIDA authority for the purposes of awarding differential compensation is bad in law, and it is precisely this kind of classification that has been barred. When the purpose of the acquisition of the land is for t he benefit of the public at large, then the nature of the owner of the said land is inconsequential to the purpose. If such a classi fication on the basis of the nature of owner is allowed, then o n the same grounds, there might be a possibility of future classifications where powerholding members of the society may get away with a large r compensation, and the marginalized may get lesser compensation. This is precisely what this Court in the abovementioned judgment predicted, and to preempt such arbitrary classification, clarified the position in law. The Land Acquisition Act does not distinguish between classes of owners, and uniformly provides compen sation to all class of landowners. The classification made between Pushtaini landowners and Gair-pushtaini landowners, on the basis of the reasoning mentioned above, is violative of t he law laid down in the Nagpur Trust case and Article 14 of the Constitution. [Para 59, 60][468-B-F] Nagpur Improvement Trust and Another Vs. Vithal Rao and Ors. (1973) 1 SCC 500 : [1973] 3 SCR 39 – relied on.

4.1 The classification made by both the executive actio ns is bad in law, and is liable to be set aside. The Land Acq uisition Act does not envisage any differential compensation on the basis of such classification, and hence, this Court must infer the compensation to be provided by the executive actions wit hin the confines of Section 23 of the Act. Section 23 of th e Land Acquisition Act states out the grounds for granting compe nsation in cases of acquisition of land under the Act. One su ch reason for the grant of compensation is rehabilitation, and it is this need for granting compensation for rehabilitation under the Act that is echoed by the impugned notification. A bare reading of both the executive actions in consonance with the Act would show that the need for giving compensation for rehabilitation is valid i n law and is backed by the parent statute. The mischief the n, is only limited to the arbitrary classification made by suc h actions. In such a case, since the mischief lies only within the cl assification, it can be severed, and the remaining part of the executi ve actions that sets out to grant compensation for the purpose of rehabilitation remains valid in law. Once the class ification is removed, and the executive actions are read in consonance wit h the parent act, it would be seen that since the Act, and now even the executive actions do not discriminate in terms of compensation, the ex gratia payment and the increas ed base amount, as enunciated by the executive actions, must b e given to all landowners in the subject area. [Paras 62, 63][468-H; 469-A-C]

4.2 Further, in cases of administrative action, even if the classification has a rational nexus to the objectiv e of the notification, the classification must also be legit imized by the parent statute. If the parent statute does not allo w for a classification, then, even if the classification vi s-à-vis the notification is able to pass the tests of Article 14, it would still be liable to struck down if the parent statute does not allow for the same. The impugned judgment passed by the Full Bench o f the High Court is not liable to be sustained and stands set as ide. As PRADESH a consequence, the Writ Petition filed by the appella nts before the High Court stands allowed and the appellants are held entitled to the reliefs claimed in the said Writ Petition. [Paras 65, 67][469-F-H; 470-A-B] Om Kumar & Ors. Vs. Union Of India (2001) 2 SCC 386 : [2000] 4 Suppl. SCR 693; Smt. Madhuri Srivasatava Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (2016) 6 SCC OnLine AII 2832; Gajraj Vs. State of U.P (2011) SCC OnLine AII 1711; Radheyshyam (Dead) through L.Rs & Ors. Vs. State Of UP & Ors. (2011) 5 SCC 553 : [2011] 8 SCR 359; Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Vs. Devendra Kumar & Ors.

(2011) 12 SCC 375; Savitri Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (2015) 7 SCC 21 : [2015] 7 SCR 512 – referred to. Case Law Reference [1973] 3 SCR 39 referred to Para 4 [2011] 8 SCR 359 referred to Para 10 [2015] 7 SCR 512 referred to Para 10 [1952] SCR 284 followed Para 34 [1970] 3 SCR 530 followed Para 35 [2018] 7 SCR 379 followed Para 36 [2000] 4 Suppl. SCR 693 referred to Para 43 [2017] 10 SCR 569 followed Para 48 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.8819 of 2022. From the Judgment and Order dated 30.03.2018 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in WC No.49326 of 2009. With Civil Appeal Nos. 8820 And 8821 of 2022. Salman Khurshid, S.G. Hasnain, Pradeep Kant, Ravindra Kumar Raizada, Ravindra Kumar, Sr. Advs., Prashant Kanha, Gaurav Srivastava, Aftab Ali Khan, Syed Mohd. Fazal, M.Z. Chaudhary, Ms. Azra Rehman, Ms. Aadya Mishra, Ms. Saba Baby Khan, Rohit Kumar Singh, Simranjeet Singh Rekhi, Harsh Jain, Anuvrat Sharma, Arun Kumar Singh, Ms. Alka Sinha, Binay Kumar Das, Ms. Priyanka Das, Ms. Neha Das, Ajai Kumar, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, Omanakuttan K. K., Advs. for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KRISHNA MURARI, J.

¶1These appeals are directed against the judgment and or der dated 30.03.2018 passed by a Full Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as ‘ the High Court ’), The reference to Full Bench came to be made under the f ollowing circumstances: -

1.1 Writ Petition No. 61449 of 2009, Smt. Madhuri Srivasatava Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. 1 along with other connected petitions were filed by certain landholders whose land was acquire d by NOIDA challenging the decision of the Board of Directors of NOIDA da ted

07.01.1998 as also the approval granted to the said resolution by the State Government dated 02.03.2009 whereby a distinction was carved out in the matter of payment of compensation by creating a classification between “Pushtaini” and “Gair-pushtaini” landholders. The ‘Pushtaini’ landholders whose lands were acquired, were given a dditional compensation @ Rs.3 per sq. yard along with 15% as rehabili tation bonus on the compensation already awarded, as also the 10% area of the acquired land, whereas those who were declared as ‘Gai r-pusht xcaini’ were denied this additional benefit. A Division Bench of the High Court vide Judgment and order dated 10.05.2016 dismissed the Writ Petition holding the classification to be reasonable having direct nexus with the object sought to be achieved i.e., rehabilitation of the original residents who are likely to become landless due to the acquisi tion of their land.

¶2Another bunch of Writ Petitions were filed by the prese nt appellants challenging a similar classification made by the Greater Noida Authority (hereinafter referred to as ‘ G Noida ’) in payment of compensation on the basis of the landholder being ‘Pushtaini’ and ‘Gair-Pushtaini’.

¶3While considering the Writ Petitions, another Division Bench disagreed with the views expressed in the case of Smt. Madhuri (Supra) and vide order dated 07.07.2017 referred the matter to be decided by a larger Bench. 1 (2016) 6 SCC OnLine AII 2832 PRADESH

¶4The Full Bench constituted in pursuance to the refe rence framed the following questions for adjudication :-

(i) Whether the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Madhuri Srivastava reported in

(2016) 6 ADJ 1 is in conflict to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust and Another Vs. Vithal Rao and Ors. 2 and also with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?

(ii) Whether the classification made under the U.P. Land Acquisition (determination of compensation and declaration of award by agreement) Rules, 1997, the distinction made among ‘Pushtaini’ and ‘Gair-Pushtaini’ farmers, is a classification having reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved?

¶5Vide impugned judgment and order dated 30.03.2018, the Full Bench answered question No. 1 in negative and question No. 2 in affirmative and upheld the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of Smt. Madhuri Srivastava (Supra). As a consequence of the answers to the questions framed, the Full Bench held that nothing remains to be decided in the Writ Petitions filed by the present appellants and the same were dismissed.

¶6Before we enter into the factual matrix of the case, we find it expedient to first trace out the etymology of the words “Pushtaini” and “Gair Pushtaini” used in the impugned classification, for language, once adopted inside the realm of law, materializes itself a much more powerful being, one which must be understood in the right historical context.

¶7The word ‘Pushtaini’ is a Persian word and finds its origin from the word ‘Pusht’, which means ‘back’. The said word has been historically used in the context of ancestry. Any possession, tale or legend, that has roots to a particular ancestry, to denote it’s significance to the said ancestry, the word ‘Pushtaini’ is used. As is obvious, since the word ‘Gair’ which finds its origin in Urdu language means ‘other than’, thus, ‘Gair-Pushtaini’ would mean one which is not ‘Pushtaini’.

¶8What we find most interesting however, is that ancestry as a concept, especially before times of modern private property ownership, 2 (1973) 1 SCC 500 had remained to be a tool for inclusivity and not exclusion. In such a context, the use of the word “Pushtaini” by the Authority, to excl ude compensation might be a historically inaccurate interp retation. While this is not consequential to the merits of the case, it is in our opinion a worthwhile observation, for law has to power to legitimize the meaning of words and can change the context in which a word used, and in turn can change the course of history itself. Background Facts

¶9Since the early 1970s, Liberalization took over India by storm, and it brought with it the promise of massive economic growth. A huge amount of money was infused in the Indian Economy with the purpose of developing Indian cities into massive global hubs of c apital and business. In line with this, Delhi began its journey of becoming a global city. This influx of capital into the city also brought wit h it massive employment opportunities, and people from all over the country started migrating to Delhi. To contain such influx of migrants and ensure dignified living for all who came to the city with the hopes of improving their lives, the government of India planned to develop residential and indus trial areas around the capital. For this, Gurgaon was developed acr oss the border of Haryana, and New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) was developed by the Uttar Pradesh Government in the adjoining district of Gautam Budh Nagar. In this period, the city enjoyed massive growth, both in terms of influx of capital and migration. This growth was so unprecedented, that it even exceeded the planning estimates as envisaged by the authorities. As a measure to accommodate such growth, the Uttar Pradesh Government, exercising its powers under Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development A ct, 1976, by notification dated 28.01.1991 created the township of Greater Noida, in an area of 38000 hectare, comprising of 124 villages of Gautam Budh Nagar.

¶10For its planned development, the Respondent-G. Noida started acquisition of land within its territorial area of operat ion under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘ 1894 Act’). In the same connection, notifications dated 03.1 0.2005 and

05.01.2006 were issued under Sections 4(1) and Section 6(1) of 189 4 Act for acquisition of total area of 580.1734 hectares of the land for plan development situate in different villages falling within the jurisdiction of G. Noida. The said notifications, which also included the land of t he present appellants, were subject matter of challenge bef ore the High Court in a bunch of Writ Petitions challenging the acquisition proceedings mainly on the ground of arbitrarily invoking urgency clause under Sections 17(1) read with Section 17 (4) of the 1894 Act. The bunch of the said Writ Petitions came to be decided by the another Full Bench of the High Court titled as Gajraj Vs. State of U.P3. The High Court concluded that the urgency clause was wrongly invoked, but saved the acquisition for the reason that much development had already taken place over the said land and the nature of land stands completely changed. The Full Bench further in order to compensate the landholders directed an additiona l compensation to be paid to the landholders at the rate of 64.70% of the already paid compensation and a further direction was issued to allot developed Abadi land to the extent of 10% of their acquired land, subject to a cap of Rs.2,500/- square meter. The Full Bench never m ade any distinction between ‘Pushtaini’ and ‘Gair-Pushtaini’ farmers for payment of the additional compensation or allotment of land. The Full Bench also relying upon the decisions rendered in the case of Radheyshyam (Dead) through L.Rs & Ors. Vs. State Of UP & Ors. 4, Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Vs. Devendra Kumar & Ors. 5, further held that merely because the farmers had received compensation under an agreement, it cannot be said that they have waived off the right to challenge the same. The Full Bench judgment in Gajraj (Supra) came to be affirmed by this Court in Savitri Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. 6

¶11The present appellants had also filed a Writ Petition being Writ Petition No. 62056 of 2011 challenged the notification issued under Sections 4 and 6 read with Section 17 of the Act. The said Writ Petition came to be disposed of in terms of the directions issued by the Full Bench in the case of Gajraj (Supra) vide judgment and order dated

01.11.2011.

¶12It is also pertinent to mention at this stage that even before the land acquisition proceedings were initiated and notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the 1894 Act, were issued, the Respondent-Greater Noida in its 26 th Board meeting dated 28.10.1997 decided to classify the landholders for the purposes of payment of compensation for acquisition 3 (2011) SCC OnLine AII 1711 4 (2011) 5 SCC 553 5 (2011) 12 SCC 375 6 (2015) 7 SCC 21 of their land as ‘Pushtaini’, namely, those landholders who had purchased the land prior to the date of establishment of authority i.e., 28.01.1991 or thereafter got the land by partition or family settlem ent and ‘Gair-Pushtaini’ being those persons who purchased the la nd after its establishment. Thus, two classes of landholders were carved out for payment of compensation and those who were classified as ‘Pushtaini’ landholders, a higher amount of compensation was decided to be awarded to them in the name of their rehabilitation.

¶13Subsequently, on 15.07.2006, an agreement was entered into between Greater Noida and the appellants and other landholders under Rule 4(2) of the Land Acquisition Rules, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as ‘1997 Rules’) and in accordance with the resolution passed by Greater Noida in its 26 th Meeting, the ‘Pushtaini’ landholders were paid compensation @ Rs. 322 per sq. yard and the ‘Gair-Pushtaini’ landholders including the appellants herein were paid a lesser amount of compensation @ Rs.280 per sq. yard.

¶14The landholders continued with their agitation making demand of further compensation at the enhanced rate which resulted in constituting a Committee to consider the demand of enhanced r ate of compensation in the form of bonus/ex-gratia compensa tion. The Committee submitted its report after making a recommend ation for payment of the amount @ Rs.310 per square metre on account of E x-gratia to the Ancestral Agriculturists of the land situate in 8 Villages.

¶15The report of the Committee dated 25.10.2008 is b eing reproduced hereunder for a ready reference :- “ ANNEXURE P-4

25.10.2008 Recommendation of the Committee constituted in connec tion with making consideration on the demands of bonus/ex-gratia/ compensation enhancement at the enhanced rate in connection with the land of Village Ghodi Bachheda and other Villages as per Order No.4/4/1/2008 -C.X. (1) Lucknow dated

4.09.2008 of the Government of Uttar Pradesh Following Committee has been constituted in connection with making consideration on these types of demands and bonus / ex-gratia /compensation enhancement at the enhanced rate in connection with the land of Village Ghodi Bachheda a nd other Villages vide Order No.4/4/1/2008 C.X. (1) Lu cknow dated 4.09.2008 of the Government of Uttar Pradesh:-

¶1Shri Thakur Jaibir Singh, Hon’ble Minister, Rura l Engineering Service, Agricultural Foreign Trade and Agriculture Export Chairman

¶2Chief Executive Officer, Greater Noida - Member

¶3District Magistrate, Gautam Buddh Nagar -Member Coordinator Examined and perused the records made available in evidence of the Memos submitted by the representatives of agriculture is organizations / Agric ulturists and perused the background of the and its different a spects by the Committee and while convening Committee Meeting of the Committee of Villages / their representatives, even consideration was made in respect of the above matt er, particulars of which is given below:-

¶1Background-this decision was taken in the 26th me eting dated 28.10.1997 of the Greater Noida Authority Board that the rate of compensation be assessed on the basis of agr eement by the Authority for each financial year and those Agriculturists, who are agreed for executing the co nsent at the rates of the questioned Financial Years, they w hile executing the agreement/consent, may receive compen sation under contract/consent regulation and those Agricul turists, who are not agreed with the prescribed rate, the compensati on will be payable to them at the rate prescribed by the learn ed District Magistrate under provisions of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act 1994. On the basis of above sequenc e, for the year of 1997-98, the rate of compensation was ass essed @ Rs.110 per square and in future, it will be enhan ced in accordance with cost inflation index in each financial year. Vide Order No.902/778 3-0 7-1 43 N/04. of the Government of Uttar Pradesh, a High Level Committee under Chairmanship of the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meer ut was constituted. Committee has recommended its compensation value @ Rs.800-850 per square metre, in sequence ther eto, in the meeting of Greater Noida Authority Board hel d on

5.01.2008, while assessing the compensation @ Rs.85 0 per square metre, decision was taken to enforce this ra te with effect from 1.04.2007. Even the particulars of these types of Memos are al so mentioned in the recommendation dated 4.01.2008 of the Committee constituted under chairmanship of the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut vide Order da ted

31.12.2007 of the Government issued previously, where by it is clear that at that time also, The Villagers of t he above Villages were making demand for enhancement in compensation. The certain Memos of the Villagers we re forwarded to the Government for appropriate guideli nes/ directions while enclosing them as per Authority letter No.931 / land-record / L.P./2008 dated 7.03.2008/ 903/ land-record / LP/2008 dated 10.03.2008, Land Record/1 a/2008 date d

13.03.20081038/land-record/L.A./2008 dated 29.04.20 08, 1055/ land-record/ LA / 2008 dated 5.05.2008/ 1069/ land-record/ LA/2008 dated 9.05.2008, 1113, 1115/land-re cord/L A/2008 dated 06.06.08. Thereafter, by Order dated

10.05.2008 of the Chairman and Chief Executive Offi cer, Greater Noida, for examination of the demand of compensation enhancement raised by the Agriculturis ts, a Committee of District Magistrate, Gautam Buddha Nag ar, Chief Executive Officer, Deputy Chief Executive Off icer, Greater Noida was constituted and in its report dat ed

21.07.2008, recommendation was made to make consideration for additional amount @ Rs. 175 -200 square metre t o the Agriculturists of the land acquired in the Financia l Years 2006-2007 of the Village Ghodi Bachheda including o ther Villages. Such directions were given while making perus al of the Recommendation of the Committee in the 72nd Meeti ng dated 11.08.2008 of the Authority Board, that while maki ng calculation of the situation of its financial sourc e and its management, the case be referred to the Government. Vide Order No.4/4/1/2008 -C.X. (1) Lucknow dated 4.09.200 8 of the Government of Uttar Pradesh, the above Committee was constituted for giving recommendation in connection with making consideration on the demands of bonus / ex-gr atia/ enhancement of compensation and etc. at the enhanced rate in connection with the Village Ghodi Bachheda and o ther Villages.

¶2Meetings of the Committee -That first meeting o f the Committee was convened on 15.09.2008 in the confere nce room of Uttar Pradesh Sadan, New Delhi, in addition to t he Chairman of Committee, following officers have taken part-

¶1Shri Pankaj Agarwal, Chief Executive Officer, Gr eater Noida

¶2Shri Shravan Kumar Sharma, District officer, Gau tam Buddha Nagar In addition to above, following officers of the Greater Noida Authority were appeared in the above meeting-

¶1Shri Shailendra Chaudhary, Deputy Chief Executiv e Officer, Greater Noida.

¶2Shri Shishir, Special Executive Officer, Greater N oida Consideration and consultation was made in connection with the work area, operation and process of the constitu tion of the Committee in the meeting land this decision was taken that while convening a meeting with the Agriculturi sts and their representatives affected with the acquisition , their opinions and demands may be known by way of receivi ng representations from them and discussion may be made fr om them in this regard. In sequence of above, the meeting of Committee was conven ed on 22.09.2008 and 11.10.2008 respectively in the Conference Room of the Greater Noida Authority, wherein, while receivi ng the memo from the Agriculturists of Village and the ir representatives, the matter was discussed and consu lted in detail, wherein, mainly, following people have taken part-

¶1Ramesh Singh Rawal,

¶2Yogendra Singh Rawal,

¶3Subedar Ramchandra,

¶4Omprakash,

¶5Mahi Singh Bhati,

¶6Lokesh Bhati,

¶7Maha Singh Bhati,

¶8Pratap Singh Bhati,

¶9Pratap Singh Sarpanch,

¶10Prem Mukhiya,

¶11Inder Singh (Advocate),

¶12Ajit Singh Nagar,

¶13Kamal Bhati,

¶14Mange Ram Bharti

¶15Bhule Singh,

¶16Rakesh

¶17Braham Singh,

¶18Atmender,

¶19Maharaj Singh,

¶20Mehndi Hassan,

¶21Umesh,

¶22Vikram Singh,

¶23Satbir Pradhan,

¶24Naresh Upadhyay,

¶25Ajith Mukhiya,

¶26Rampal Havaldar,

¶27Nemvir, Pradhan, Garba and etc. etc.

¶3Grounds of the demand and memo submitted by the Agriculturist -There records were received in supp ort of detailed Memos and particulars in connection with t he demands from the Villages in their meeting by the Committ ee. The agriculturist of the land acquired in the year o f 2006-2007 of Village Ghodi Bachheda and including other Villages have collectively produced detailed and factual Mem os including necessary records before the Committee and even grounds were also raised by the Agriculturists oral ly in support of their demand, wherein, main grounds are includ ed, which are as under:-

¶1The farmers of questioned Villages have given va lue enhancement Memo on 2.04.2006, whereon, the Greater Noida Development Authority gave Assurance letter in written on 5.01.2007 after 10 days, that, after calling the rates of Tronica City and etc. in the GDA, till the last wee k of the February 2007, decision will be taken in connection with enhancing the compensation. In support of their stat ements copy of letter dated 5.01.2007 of the Deputy Chief Executiv e Officer, Greater Noida addressed to Ashok Pradhan, respected member, Lok Sabha and Sri Nawab Singh Nagar, is enclosed.

¶2They had also revealed their demand in connection w ith compensation enhancement in the meeting of committe e constituted under chairmanship of the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, but nothing benefit has been given to the Agriculturists of the acquired land in the financial year 2006-2007.

¶3The Villagers have produced their demand, while disclosin g detailed grounds before the Committee constituted u nder chairmanship of the learned District Magistrate vide Order dated 10.06.2008 of the Chairman and Chief Executiv e Officer, Greater Noida but, even then, the Committee, witho ut making intensive consideration thereon, has given recommendation for enhancement @ Rs. 175-200 per square metre, which is not in practical and it is against the principl e of natural justice and that this enhancement is insuff icient.

¶4Analysis - The Notification was issued on 5.01.2006 under Section 6/17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in the proposal of acquisition of 580.1730 hectare land of Village Gonda Bachheda and that the possession of the acquired land was handed over to the Greater Noida Authority on 14.05. 2006 by the Additional Collector (L A). After approving the value of compensation @ Rs.385 per square metre on 28.06.200 6 from the Divisional Commissioner, Meerut, the compensation amount was distributed @ Rs.385 per square metre to the Ancestral Agriculturists and @ Rs.334.78 per square metre to the ancestral Agriculturists. That the land of the follo wing Villages were acquired for well-planned development of the Greater Noida in the Financial Years 2006-2007 incl uding Village Gonda, Bachada and other Villages and that the possession of the above land was taken after 01.04.2006 and the Agriculturists of the above land are making deman d for enhancement of compensation. Agriculturist organization, Agriculturists of these Villagers have also given a number of Memos for demanding enhancement of compensation at the time of constituti on of the Committee under chairmanship of the Divisional Commissioner, Meerut vide Order dated 31.12.2007 of the Government and even prior to it. The copy of consent letter dated 5.01.2007 signed by the then Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Greater Noida and consideration and consultation made on the Memos submitted on 5.01.2007 in the matter by the Villagers with Membe r of Parliament Shri Ashok Pradhan and the then MLA Shri Nawab Singh Nagar was also provided to the agriculturi sts, wherein, it is mentioned that this decision has been taken i n connection with enhancing the compensation of the acquired land that after calling the rates of compensation of t he land being acquired by the Ghaziabad Development Authority and the land of Tronica City of Housing Development Board, till the last week of February, decision will be taken in conne ction with enhancing the compensation. It is clear by it that the Agriculturists were raising demand of enhancing the compensation even in the month of February 2007, whereon , the Assurance was given at the Competent Level of Authori ty. The Committee constituted under chairmanship of the learned District Magistrate has revealed the facts in detail in i ts report dated 31.07.2008 on the above overall points raised by the Agriculturists. The Committee has perused the recommendation dated 21.07.2008 of the Committee constituted under the chairmanship of the learned District Magistrate, Ga utam Buddha Nagar. Such finding has been concluded in its report dated 21.07.2008 that it is not possible to make any c hange in the rate of compensation in accordance with law, because of receiving the compensation after fulfillment of the agreement under the Agreement Regulation after acqui sition of the land by the concerned Agriculturists, but, the Committe e has recommended in its report dated 21.07.2008 to a ward certain amount in the detailed circumstances on accou nt of ex-gratia.

¶5Recommendation - As per the information provided by the Special Executive Officer (L A), Greater Noida, mos t of the Agriculturist of the acquired land in the financial year 2006 2007 of Village Ghodi Bachheda, including other Vil lages, as per the Government Order dated 29.09.2001, under the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Land Acquisition (Determination of Compensation and Declaration of Award by Agreeme nt) Rules, 1997, have received Compensation. Therefore, it would not be possible under the rule to make any enhancem ent/ change in the compensation rates of the award to be declare d. Accordingly, it would be appropriated only to give additional amount on account of Ex gratia to be awarded as relief to the Agriculturists of these Villages. In the report dated 21.07.20 08 of the Committee constituted under the chairmanship of the learned District Magistrate, recommendation has been gi ven to award additional amount @ Rs.175-200 per square metre. But, in opinion of the Committee, there is justification to make partial enhancement in above amount. Therefore, in view of the above detailed factual an alysis, consultation, discussion, consideration made from t he Agriculturists and assurance given at the level of Au thority, this Committee is hereby made recommendation to mak e payment of the amount @ Rs.310 per square metre on account of Ex gratia to the ancestral Agriculturists of the questi oned land of 8 Villages detailed in Para No.4 possession of which has been received in the financial year 2006-2007 a nd the Committee is hereby further recommended to submit t he recommendation before the Greater Noida Authority B oard for necessary proceedings. Sd/-, Shravan Kumar Sharma, District Magistrate, Gautam Buddha Nagar Sd/- (Pankaj Agarwal), Chief Executive Officer, Greater Noida Sd/- (Thakur Jaiveer Singh), Hon’ble Minister Rural Engineering Service Agriculture Foreign Trade and Agriculture Export, Uttar Pradesh”

¶16Based on the aforesaid report, a decision was taken in the 74th Board Meeting of Greater Noida for payment of addi tional compensation/ex-gratia @ Rs.310 per square metre only to the ‘Pushtaini’ farmers of 8 villages.

¶17The Minutes of the 74th Board Meeting of the Greater Noida Authority dated 03.11.2008 are being reproduced hereunder :- “ ANNEXURE P-5 S. No.1 - For approval of minutes of 74th Board Meeting of the authority 74th Board meeting of Authority was held on 03.11.2008. Minutes of this meeting (enclosure), has been sent to the members of authority vide semi Government letter No.U MC/ 74th Board Meeting/ 2008 / 265 dated 3.11.2008. Minutes of the above meeting is being submitted herewith for ap proval of the Authority Board. S.No. 9-In connection with demand of bonus/ex-grat ia/ compensation enhancement of the Agriculturists of t he land of Village Ghodi Bachheda and Other Villagers acquire d in the Financial Year 2006 2007 by Greater Noida The Agriculturists of the land of following Villagers, whose land was acquired in the financial year 2006 -2007 by the Greater Noida, have submitted a lots of Memos, while making demand of compensation enhancement-Which have been submitted to the Government from time to time for appropriate directions and guidelines. For examination of the demand of compensation and management of Agriculturist, following a Committee of District Ma gistrate, Gautam Buddha Nagar, Additional Chief Executive Off icer, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Greater Noida was constituted vide Order dated 10.06.2008 of the Chai rman, Greater Noida, and the above committee has recommend ed to make consideration on awarding additional amount @ Rs.175-200 per square metre to the cultivators, whose land was acquired in the financial year 2006, 2007, in V illage Ghodi Bachheda including other Villages, in its report dated

21.07.2008. In the 72nd meeting of the Board held o n

11.08.2008, while using the Recommendation of the Committee, this direction was given that, while mak ing calculation of the situation of the financial source s and its management, the matter may be referred to the Government , as per Government Order No.4/4/1/2008 - C.X. (1) Luck now dated 4.09.2008 of the Government of Uttar Pradesh, the committee was constituted in connection with making consideration on the demands of the Agriculturists in connection with bonus / Ex gratia / compensation enhancement of the enhanced rates in connection with the land of Vil lage Ghodi Bachheda and other Villages.

¶1Sri Thakur Jaiveer Singh Hon’ble Minister, Rural Engineering Service, Agriculture Foreign Trade and Agriculture export -Chairman

¶2Chief Executive Officer, Greater Noida member

¶3District Magistrate, Gautam Buddha Nagar -Member Coordinator The committee has submitted its recommendation on

25.10.2008, wherein, the recommendation has been made to make payment on account of ex-gratia @ Rs.310 square metre to the ancestral agricultural of the land whose pos session has been received in the Financial Year 2006-2007 o f

1.04.2006 by the Greater Noida in respect of the land of Village Ghodi Bachheda and recommendation has been made to submit the matter with recommendation of the Commit tee before the Greater Noida Authority Board for necess ary proceedings. The report dated 25.10.2008 of the Commi ttee is enclosed and that it is a part of agenda. Overall Compensation Amount of Rs.5522134695.00 (Rupees Five Arab fifty two crores twenty one lakhs thirty four thousand six hundred ninety five only), calculated @ Rs.385 per square metre. applied at that time against the land measur ing 1434.3207 of the above Villages acquired in the fin ancial year 2006-2007, has already been sent to the learne d Additional District Magistrate (L.A.). And as per letter No .527/ 8 -VK BHL a dated 23.06.2008 received from the land acquisition officer, the amount of Rs.5,27,56,68,56 8 (Five Arab Twenty seven crores, fifty six lakhs sixty eight t housand five hundred sixty eight only), which is 95.54%, has alread y been distributed among the concerned Agriculturists. As p er the information received vide letter No.833/Eight-A. D.O. (L A) /08 dated 21.10.2008 of the Additional Collector ( L.A. ), out of the questioned acquired land of the above Vi llages, the area measuring 1392.9586 hectare, is ancestral area. So, in case of making payment at the enhanced rates to the ancestral Agriculturist, that is, on making payment @ Rs.3 10 per square metre as recommended by the Committee, t hen, their shall financial burden of Rs.4318171660 (Rupees four Arab twenty one crores eighty one lakhs seventy one thousand six hundred and sixty only). The report of the Committee is submitted for consideration o f the Authority Board.”

¶18Vide order dated 15.01.2009, the State Government granted its approval for payment of enhanced compensation/ex-gratia/bonus to the ‘Pushtaini’ landholders.

¶19For the sake of convenience, the break-up of compensati on granted to both the categories of landowners is bei ng produced hereunder:- ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE APPELLANTS

¶20The learned Counsel for the Appellants Contended that:- I. Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act does not allow for a discrimination between Pushtaini and Gair-pushtaini landowners in determination of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. I. In light of the law laid down by this Court in the Nagpur Improvement Trust Case (Supra), no distinction between the abovementioned two sets of classes of landowners can be made on the basis of the date of purchase of the land and the date of establishment of G NOIDA. The Ld. Counsel argued that all the landowners whose land was acquired should stand on the same pedestal. II. The Land of both the classes of landowners have been acquired under the same procedure, for the same public purpose and having the same market value, and hence, any difference in the rate of compensation provided to any party is highly discriminatory and is violative of Article 14. III. Further, it has also been argued that merely by sig ning the agreement, the Appellants herein cannot be said to have waived their right to Appeal the compensation, especially since the fact that the ex-gratia payment granted to the Pushtaini landowners was awarded after the agreement was signed. IV. It has also been contended that the ex-gratia payment as a form of compensation does not exist in the Land Acquisition Act, and can only be interpreted as one of the reasons for payment within Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, and in such a scenario, the payment must be universally made to all parties. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENTS

¶21The Ld. Counsel for the Respondents Contended that: I. The UP Land Acquisition Rules have been formed under the Land Acquisition Act,1894. These rules prescribe for method of compensation between the acquirer and the acquiree through an agreement. The Appellants, by way of an agreement, voluntarily accepted the compensation being granted to them. Further, while accepting the compensation, the Appellants herein also submitted an Affidavit stating that the compensation is agreed upon and accepted by the parties. It was only three years later that the Appellan ts decided to file a writ challenging the compensation, after entering into the agreement and explicitly agreeing to the compensation amount. II. The Appellants had entered into an agreement as per the law of the land and had accepted the compensation granted to them. In such a scenario, there exists no legal remedy of the Appellants to re-open the agreement on grounds of a subsequent increase in compensation to a different party. There is no remedy to re-open the agreement by way of approaching the Court in the statue. III. The distinction created between the two classes of l and owners has been done on the basis of their residence. The base compensation given to both the classes is the same, and only an additional 15% extra amount is given to Pushtaini landowners as rehabilitation bonus, which is not a necessity for the Gair-pushtaini landowners as they do not reside in the concerned land and are not sons of the soil. IV. As regards to the ex-gratia payment given to the Pushtaini landowners, the same is merely an additional compensation based on the classification between sons of the soils and mere investors in the land. The payment is based on reasonable classification and is not violative of Article 14. Issues

¶22In the aftermath of the aforesaid litigations in the High Court, the following three questions arise for adjudication in these Appeals :- I. Whether the Appellants, by signing the agreement,have waived their right to seek for revised compensation? II. Whether the classification made under the Land Acquisition Act, and the UP Land Acquisition Rules,1997 between Pushtaini Landowners and Gair-pushtaini Landowners for the payment of compensation at different rates is liable to be struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution? III. Whether the classification made by the Full-Bench of the High Court between Pushtaini landowners and Gair-pushtaini landowners is in contravention to the law laid down by this Hon’ble Court in the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust and Another vs. Vithal Rao and Others (1973) 1 SCC 500?

¶23We have heard, Shri Pradeep Kant, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, Shri. Ravindra Kumar, learned Sen ior Counsel appearing for the Greater Noida and Shri Ravindra Kumar Raiz ada, learned counsel for the State of U.P./A.A.G., at great length.

¶24At the outset, we would like to clarify that in the present appeals, we are only concerned with the legality and validity of action of G. Noida paying an enhanced compensation to the landholders by carving out an artificial class of ‘Pushtaini’ landholders from among the same class of landholders whose land was acquired by the same notification for the same purpose. There is no challenge to the validity of th e acquisition itself as the same stands finally settled by this Court. Analysis Whether the Appellants are bound by the compensation as per the agreement under the Land Acquisition rules, a nd have waived off their right to seek enhanced compensation?

¶25It has been vehemently submitted on behalf of Greater Noida that the appellants herein did not exhaust their remedy under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and approach the High Court, a nd has sidestepped a procedural requirement. Section 18 of the 1894 Act reads as under :- “Reference to Court. - (1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collecto r for the determination of the Court, whether his objection b e to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensa tion, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionm ent of the compensation among the persons interested.

(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: Provided that every such appl ication shall be made,

(a) if the person making it was present or represente d before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award;

(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2), or with in six months from the date of the Collector’s award, whicheve r period shall first expire.”

¶26The first and foremost thing to be taken note of is tha t the nature of the challenge in the Writ Petition filed by the appellants before the High Court was based on violation of Article 14, which is a fundamental right enshrined in the Constitution. Such a challenge, irrespective of the existence of any alternative remedy under a statute cannot put a bar on the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Courts.

¶27The Respondent Authority argued that since the agreement was consented to, no challenge could exist in the Court. This argument in the facts of the case, has been raised only to be re jected. The issue involved in adjudication is not in respect of an agreement entered into by the appellants. Similar agreements were also entered into with the Authority by such identically situated landholders who have been granted additional compensation subsequent to the agreement by carving out a distinction on the basis of period of residence/occupation of the land which was acquired by creating an artificial classification of ‘Pushtaini’ and ‘Gair-Pushtaini’ landholders.

¶28Furthermore, since the issue of additional compensatio n by making an artificial classification of ‘pushtaini’ and ‘Gair-pushtani’ was not in existence at the time of the agreement, there was no occasion to challenge the same.

¶29Further, specifically in the context of the grant of ex-gratia payment, it is to be noted that the said payment granted to P ushtaini landowners through a separate notification, was assessed, and giv en, after the agreement was signed by both, Pushtaini and Gair-p ushtaini Landowners. The Appellants herein, under those circumstances, could not have challenged the agreement vis a vis the ex-gratia payment on grounds of violation of Article 14, when no such violation existed at the time of the agreement. No man can be expected to predict a future violation of their rights and file a pre-emptive appeal. This Court is reminded of the words of Francis Bacon, who in the 17th century wrote about the link between legal certainty and justice: “For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle? So if the law give an uncertain sou nd, who shall prepare to obey it? It ought therefore to warn before it strikes... Let there be no authority to shed blood ; nor let sentence be pronounced in any Court upon cases, exc ept according to a known and certain law Nor should a man be deprived of his life, who did not first know that he was r isking it.’ (Quoted in Coquillette, Francis Bacon pp 244 and 248, from Aphorism 8 and Aphorism 39? A Treatise on Univer sal Justice).”

¶30On the basis of the above-mentioned reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the Appellants, because of their signing of the agreement, have not forfeited their right to seek revised compensation, because ,the cause of action accrued to them much after e ntering into the agreement. The issue no. 1 is answered accordingly in the negative and in favour of the Appellants. Whether the classification made by and executive fi at between Pushtaini Landowners and Gair-pushtaini Landowners for payment of compensation at different rates is liable to be struck down as violative of Article 14 of t he Constitution?

¶31The High Court, while upholding the classification between ‘Pushtaini’ and ‘Gair-pushtaini’ landowners, stated that there is no discrimination being caused to similarly situated parties, and the judgment rendered by the Division Bench in the case of Smt. Madhuri Srivastava (Supra) lays down the correct law. Thus, the Full Bench upheld the classification and negated the challenge made to the said classification. The relevant paragraphs of the impugned judgment are repr oduced hereunder :- “Before coming on merits of the case, it would be appropr iate to state that sovereign power of state to acquire p rivate property for public purpose is based upon maxim “sa lus populi est suprema lax” means welfare of the public is paramount law and maxim “necessita publica major est quam privata” means public necessity is greater than privat e. The maxim “eminent domain” (sabai bhumi Govind Ki) means state is supreme owner of the land. Constitution of India incorporates these maxims. Acquisition of private p roperty can be made by legislation, exercising powers under Articl es 245 and 246 of the Constitution. Subject “acquisiti on and requisition of property for the purposes of the Unio n” was mentioned as Entry No. 33 of List-I and “acquisitio n and requisition of property except for the purposes of the U nion” was mentioned as Entry No. 36 of List-II of the Sev enth Schedule of Constitution. By Section 26 of Constitu tion (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, Entry No. 33 of List-I and Entry No. 36 of List-II were deleted and Entry No. 42 of List-III of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution was amen ded as “acquisition and requisition of property”. Acquisit ion of private parties can be made by exercise of executive power under Article 298 of Constitution. Union of India and State Governments can acquire private property, exercisin g legislative or executive powers. While dealing with an issue pertaining to classifica tion and its reasonability, we must also keep in mind that the governance is not a simple thing. It encounters and deals with the proble ms which come from persons in an infinite variety of re lations. Classification is the recognition of those relation s, and, in making it a wide latitude of discretion and judgment must b e given. Having considered all aspects of the matter by keep ing in mind the Constitutional provisions discussed above and al so the intent of the Act, 1894 especially the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of the Act, 1894, we are of considered opinion that the classification introduced among the Pushtaini and Gair-pushtaini farmers is reasonable with intelligible di fferentia and that in no manner causes any discrimination among the similarly situated person. The law laid down in the case of Smt. Madhuri Srivastava (supra) has taken adequate care of all these provisions while concluding that the Pushtaini and Gairpushtaini farmers are two different classes and the resolution to award additional compensation on different rates is not at all discriminatory.”

¶32To assess the validity of the impugned classification, we must put it through the rigours of Article 14 and see whether it survives the baptism. It is a well established principle of law, that t he state, as per Article 14, cannot deny equality before law and equal protection of the law. REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION TEST

¶33For any classification to survive the test of Article 14, the classification must be based on intelligible differentia, and it must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the law. At this stage, it is important to note that the object sought to be achieved must also be lawful, and if the object of the law itself is found to be discriminatory, then such discrimination must be struck down. This has been held in a catena of judgments.

¶34The reasonable classification test was first introduced to Indian Jurisprudence in the case of State Of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar7 . The issue raised therein was against the Bengal Special Courts Act which was enacted for the purpose of speedier trial of certain offences. This Act was challenged on the touchstone of Article 14 on grounds of the Act giving arbitrary powers to the state government. The Court, while dismissing the appeal of the state held that:- “It can be taken to be well settled that the principle underlying the guarantee in Article 14 is not that the same rules of l aw should be applicable to all persons within the Indian territo ry or that the same remedies should be made available to them irrespective of differences of circumstances [Chara njit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869 : 1950 SC C 833] . It only means that all persons similarly circumstanc ed shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed [Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corpn., 81 L Ed 109 : 299 US 183 (1936) : 1936 SCC OnLine US SC 145] . Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation, and there should be n o discrimination between one person and another if as regards 7 (1952) AIR 75 the subjectmatter of the legislation their position is substantially the same. This brings in the question of classification. As there is no infringement of the equal protection rule, if the law deals alike with all of a certain class, the legislature has the undoubted right of cl assifying persons and placing those whose conditions are substantially similar under the same rule of law, while applying d ifferent rules to persons differently situated. It is said that the entire problem under the equal protection clause is one of classification or of drawing lines [ Dowling : Case s on Constitutional Law, 4th Edn. 1139.]. In making the classification the legislature cannot certainly be expec ted to provide “abstract symmetry”. It can make and set apar t the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience. It can recognise ev en “degrees of evil” [Skinner v. Oklahoma, 86 L Ed 1655 : 316 US 535 at p. 540 (1942) : 1942 SCC OnLine US SC 125] , but the classification should never be arbitrary, artific ial or evasive. It must rest always upon real and substant ial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the thing in respect to which the classification is made; and classification made without any reasonable basis sho uld be regarded as invalid [Southern Railway Co. v. Greene , 54 L Ed 536 : 216 US 400 at p. 412 (1910) : 1910 SCC OnLine US SC 59] . These propositions have not been controv erted before us and it is not disputed also on behalf of the respondents that the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it, to show that there has been transgres sion of constitutional principles. I am not at all impressed by the argument of the le arned Attorney General that to enable the respondents to invoke the protection of Article 14 of the Constitution it has got to be shown that the legislation complained of is a piece of “hostile” legislation. The expressions “discriminatory” and “ho stile” are found to be used by American Judges often simultaneously and almost as synonymous expressions in connection with discussions on the equal protection clause. If a legislati on is discriminatory and discriminates one person or clas s of persons against others similarly situated and denie s to the former the privileges that are enjoyed by the latter, i t cannot but be regarded as “hostile” in the sense that it a ffects injuriously the interests of that person or class. Of co urse, if one’s interests are not at all affected by a particular piece of legislation, he may have no right to complain. But if it is established that the person complaining has been discriminated against as a result of legislation an d denied equal privileges with others occupying the same posi tion, I do not think that it is incumbent upon him, before he can claim relief on the basis of his fundamental rights, t o assert and prove that in making the law, the legislature was actuated by a hostile or inimical intention against a particular person or class. For the same reason I cannot agree with the learne d Attorney General that in cases like these, we should enq uire as to what was the dominant intention of the legisl ature in enacting the law and that the operation of Article 14 w ould be excluded if it is proved that the legislature had no intenti on to discriminate, though discrimination was the nece ssary consequence of the Act. When discrimination is alleged against officials in carrying out the law, a question of intention may be material in ascertaining whether the officer act ed mala fide or not [Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 62 L Ed 1 154 : 247 US 350 (1918) : 1918 SCC OnLine US SC 148] ; but no question of intention can arise when discrimination follows or arises on the express terms of the law itself .”

¶35In the case of Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (Banks Nationalisation) v. Union of India8, R.C.Cooper, who was the director of Central Bank of India filed a petition against the Un ion of India challenging the provisions of The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance, 1969. The Court while deciding this case held that it cannot overlook the violation of fundamental rights of the citizens on mere technicalities. It then further went on to state that the Courts won’t look into the objects of the impugned act and rather they will look into the effect of the impugned act. Th e Court found the said Act in clear violation of Article 14 since only 14 banks were restrained from conducting banking business in the futur e while 8 (1970) 1 SCC 248 other banks including foreign banks were allowed to continue Banking in India. It has been observed in the said case as under :- “By article 14 of the Constitution the State is enjoined not to deny to any person equality before the law or the e qual protection of the laws within the territory of India. The Article forbids class legislation, but not reasonable classific ation in making laws. The test of permissible classification under an Act lies in two cumulative conditions: (1) classification under the Act must be founded on an intelligible differen tia distinguishing persons, transactions or things grou ped together from others left out of the group; (ii) the diff erential has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act: there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act. The legislative policy as to the necessity is a mat ter of legislative judgment and the Court will not examine the propriety of it. The legislation need not be all embracing and it is for the Legislature to determine what categories wil l be embraced. In Dalmia case (Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R . Tendolkar, 1959 SCR 279) it was said that the two t ests of classification were first that there should be an i ntelligible differentia which distinguished persons or things g rouped from others left out and secondly the differentia must hav e a rational relation to the object sought to be achieve d by the statute”

¶36Most recently, a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. Vs. Union of India Thr. Se cretary, Ministry of Law and Justice 9, while considering the question of scrapping Section 377, IPC as violative of Article 14 has detailed out the test of reasonable classification under Article 14 as under :- “We, first, must test the validity of Section 377 IPC on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution. What Artic le 14 propounds is that “all like should be treated alike”. In othe r words, it implies equal treatment for all equals. Thoug h the legislature is fully empowered to enact laws applic able to a particular class, as in the case at hand in which Section 377 9 (2018) 10 SCC 1 applies to citizens who indulge in carnal intercourse, y et the classification, including the one made under Section 377 IPC , has to satisfy the twin conditions to the effect th at the classification must be founded on an intelligible d ifferentia and the said differentia must have a rational nexus wi th the object sought to be achieved by the provision, that is, S ection 377 IPC. Section 377 has consigned a group of citizens to the margins. It has been destructive of their identities. By imposing the sanctions of the law on consenting adults involved in a sexual relationship, it has lent the authority of the State to perpetuate social stereotypes and encourage discrimination. Gays, lesbians, bisexuals and transgenders have been relegated to the anguish of closeted identities. Sexual orientation has become a target for exploitation, if not blackmail, in a networked and digital ag e. The impact of Section 377 has travelled far beyond the punishment of an offence. It has been destructive of an ident ity which is crucial to a dignified existence”

¶37In the case at hand, it has been held by the Full Bench of the High Court that the classification between Pushtaini and Gair-pushtaini Landowners is based on one class of landowners being sons of the soil, while the other class being mere landowners, who are not directly attached to the land. Further, the object of this classification, as stated by the full bench of the High Court, is to rehabilitate the original residents, i.e the sons of the soil, who are likely to become landless due to the acquisition of their land.

¶38While prima facie, the classification and the object sought to be achieved through the said classification seems reasonable, however, the devil lies in the details. The justification given by the GNOIDA Authority, and the Full-bench of the High Court assumes th at only Pushtaini landowners permanently reside in the subject land or that the subject land is the primary source of income only f or Pushtaini landowners, and this assumption has been backed by no empirical data produced by the authority.

39.While the classification made by Greater Noida has been based on the object of giving fair compensation, however, such a laudable object of the classification would stand breached by the effects of such a classification, creating a dissonance between the object a nd its effect. Many Gair-pushtaini landholders, whose main area of residence or their main source of income is also the subject land, would be subject to great discrimination and injustice, if the same compensation that has been granted to the pushtaini landholders is not extended to them.

¶40Further, it is also to be noted that this Court at this stage cannot enter into a fact finding mission to verify the claims of the respondent authority. To justify such a classification, the respondent authority should have discharged their burden of proof to back their claim. Mere statements without any evidence cannot be accepted by us as justification for the said classification, which can have a debilitating effect on those who are at the losing side of the classification.

¶41To survive the rigors of Article 14, the impugned classification must not only make it through the abovementioned test, but also clear the Wednesbury Principle, and by extension the Proportionality test. WEDNESBURY PRINCIPLE

¶42In the case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation 10, the King’s Bench Division was tasked with the question of under what circumstances can the Court interfere in cases of administrative law making. While dealing with this, the Court held that interference in administrative decisions was permissible, only if

(i) the order was contrary to law (ii) or relevant factors were not considered, or (iii) irrelevant factors were considered or, (iv) or the decision was such that no other authority under similar circumstances would have come to this conclusion. The relevant paragraph of the judgment are reproduced herein: “In the result, this appeal must be dismissed. I do not wish t o repeat myself but I will summarize once again the pri nciple applicable. The Court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view to seeing whether they have taken into account matters which they ought not to take into account, or, conversely, have refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which they ou ght to take into account. Once that question is answered in f avour of the local authority, it may be still possible to say that, although the local authority have kept within the four corners of the matters which they ought to consider, they h ave nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable th at no 10 [1948] 1 KB 223 reasonable authority could ever have come to it. In s uch a case, again, I think the Court can interfere. The power of the Court to interfere in each case is not as an appellate authority to override a decision of the l ocal authority, but as a judicial authority which is concerned, and concerned only, to see whether the local authority have contravened the law by acting in excess of the powers which Parliament has confided in them. The appeal must be dismissed with costs.”

¶43The Wednesbury principle was first introduced to I ndian Jurisprudence in the case of Om Kumar & Ors. Vs. Union Of India11. Here, again, a similar question was posed before the Supreme Court, as to when can the Court exercise its power of judicial review in cases of executive law making. This Court, reiterated the same principle s laid down in the Wednesbury case. The relevant extracts from the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “Lord Greene said in 1948 in the Wednesbury case [(1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. He said that interfere nce was not permissible unless one or the other of the f ollowing conditions was satisfied, namely the order was cont rary to law, or relevant factors were not considered, or ir relevant factors were considered; or the decision was one whic h no reasonable person could have taken. These principles were consistently followed in the UK and in India to jud ge the validity of administrative action.”

¶44The classification made by GNOIDA does not find its footing in the Land Acquisition Act, or the UP-Land Acquisition Rules, and hence is contrary to law. The said classification also suffers from not taking into account relevant considerations. The Authority, without taking into account any empirical data, or calculating any possibi lity of Gair-pushtaini landowners being rendered landless or without a primary source of income, made the impugned classification. These r elevant factors, by not being taken into account, can and would cause grea t injustice to Gair-pushtaini landowners. 11 (2001) 2 SCC 386

¶45Further, GNOIDA, by arbitrarily classifying the landowners as Pushtaini and Gair-pushtaini on the basis of a cut-off date, have taken into account an irrelevant factor. The cut-off date by itself, without any context of the landowners on ground, is not indicative of who the most adversely affected landowners are. By not complying with these three factors while making the classification, this Court must strike down such a classification.

¶46While the Wednesbury principle has been used as a guiding principle of interpretation, the Indian Court have now adopted a much more rigorous test, i.e., is proportionality test, to see whether an administrative action can survive the rigours of Article 14. PROPORTIONALITY TEST

¶47In the case of Om Kumar (Supra) , this Court held that the administrative measure must not be more drastic than is necessary for attaining the desired result. This was the first formal introduction of the Proportionality test to Indian Jurisprudence, however the Court pointed out that the proportionality test has been used by the Indian Courts even before this judgment. The relevant paragraphs from the said report reads as under :- “27.The principle originated in Prussia in the nine teenth century and has since been adopted in Germany, France and other European countries. The European Court of Justice at Luxembourg and the European Court of Human Rights a t Strasbourg have applied the principle while judging the validity of administrative action. But even long bef ore that, the Indian Supreme Court has applied the principle of “proportionality” to legislative action since 1950, as stated in detail below.

¶28By “proportionality”, we mean the question whether, while regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the appropria te or least-restrictive choice of measures has been made by the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative orde r, as the case may be. Under the principle, the Court will se e that the legislature and the administrative authority “maint ain a proper balance between the adverse effects which th e legislation or the administrative order may have on the rig hts, liberties or interests of persons keeping in mind the p urpose which they were intended to serve”. The legislature a nd the administrative authority are, however, given an are a of discretion or a range of choices but as to whether the choi ce made infringes the rights excessively or not is for t he Court. That is what is meant by proportionality.

29.The above principle of proportionality has been applied by the European Court to protect the rights guaranteed under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 and in particular, f or considering whether restrictions imposed were restr ictions which were “necessary” — within Articles 8 to 11 of the said Convention [corresponding to our Article 19(1)] and to find out whether the restrictions imposed on fundamental freedoms were more excessive than required. (Handyside v. UK [(1976) 1 EHR 737] ). Articles 2 and 5 of the Convention co ntain provisions similar to Article 21 of our Constitution relat ing to life and liberty. The European Court has applied the princi ple of proportionality also to questions of discrimination under Article 14 of the Convention (corresponding to Article 14 of our Constitution). (See European Administrative Law by J. Schwarze, 1992, pp. 677-866).

¶30On account of a Chapter on Fundamental Rights in Part III of our Constitution right from 1950, Indian Courts did not suffer from the disability similar to the one exper ienced by English Courts for declaring as unconstitutional legi slation on the principle of proportionality or reading them in a manner consistent with the charter of rights. Ever since 1 950, the principle of “proportionality” has indeed been appl ied vigorously to legislative (and administrative) action i n India. While dealing with the validity of legislation infr inging fundamental freedoms enumerated in Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India — such as freedom of speech a nd expression, freedom to assemble peaceably, freedom to form associations and unions, freedom to move freely thro ughout the territory of India, freedom to reside and settle in any p art of India, — this Court has occasion to consider whether the restrictions imposed by legislation were disproport ionate to the situation and were not the least restrictive of the choi ces. The burden of proof to show that the restriction wa s reasonable lay on the State. “Reasonable restrictions” under Articles 19(2) to (6) could be imposed on these freedoms on ly by legislation and Courts had occasion throughout to consider the proportionality of the restrictions. In numerous judgmen ts of this Court, the extent to which “reasonable restr ictions” could be imposed was considered. In Chintamanrao v. State of M.P. [1950 SCC 695 : AIR 1951 SC 118 : 1950 SCR 759] Mahajan, J. (as he then was) observed that “reasona ble restrictions” which the State could impose on the fundament al rights “should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public”.

¶31“Reasonable” implied intelligent care and deliberati ons, that is, the choice of a course which reason dictat ed. Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invaded the right could not be said to contain the quality of reasona bleness unless it struck a proper balance between the right s guaranteed and the control permissible under Articles 19(2) to (6). Otherwise, it must be held to be wanting in that quali ty. Patanjali Sastri, C.J. in State of Madras v. V.G. Row [(1 952) 1 SCC 410 : AIR 1952 SC 196 : 1952 SCR 597 : 1952 Cri LJ 966] , observed that the Court must keep in mind the “natur e of the right alleged to have been infringed, the un derlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disp roportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time” . This principle of proportionality vis-àvis legislation wa s referred to by Jeevan Reddy, J. in State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co. [(1996) 3 SCC 709] recently. This level of scrutiny has b een a common feature in the High Court and the Supreme Court in the last fifty years. Decided cases run into thous ands.

¶32So far as Article 14 is concerned, the Courts i n India examined whether the classification was based on intelligib le differentia and whether the differentia had a reasonable nexus with the object of the legislation. Obviously, when the Court s considered the question whether the classification was based on intelligible differentia, the Courts were examin ing the validity of the differences and the adequacy of the differences . This is again nothing but the principle of proporti onality. There are also cases where legislation or rules hav e been struck down as being arbitrary in the sense of bein g unreasonable [see Air India v. Nergesh Meerza [(1981) 4 SCC 335 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 599] (SCC at pp. 372-373)]. But this latter aspect of striking down legislation only on the bas is of “arbitrariness” has been doubted in State of A.P. v. McDowell and Co. [(1996) 3 SCC 709] .

¶33In Australia and Canada, the principle of proportionality has been applied to test the validity of statutes [se e Cunliffe v. Commonwealth [(1994) 58 Aust LJ 791] Aust LJ (at 8 27, 839) (799, 810, 821)]. In R. v. Oakes [(1986) 26 DLR (4t h) 200] Dickson, C.J. of the Canadian Supreme Court ha s observed that there are three important components of the proportionality test. First, the measures adopted m ust be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrationa l considerations. In short, they must be rationally c onnected to the objective. Secondly, the means, must not onl y be rationally connected to the objective in the first sense, but should impair as little as possible the right to fr eedom in question. Thirdly, there must be “proportionality” between the effects of the measures and the objective. See also R oss v. Brunswick School Dishut No. 15 [(1996) 1 SCR 825] (S CR at p. 872) referring to proportionality. English Courts had no occasion to apply this principle to legislation. The aggri eved parties had to go to the European Court at Strasbourg for a declaration.

¶34In U.S.A., in City of Boerne v. Flores [(1997) 521 US 507] the principle of proportionality has been appl ied to legislation by stating that “there must be congruen ce and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedie d and the means adopted to that end”.

¶35Thus, the principle that legislation relating to res trictions on fundamental freedoms could be tested on the anvi l of “proportionality” has never been doubted in India. T his is called “primary” review by the Courts of the validi ty of legislation which offended fundamental freedoms. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxx

¶45Under Article 3(1) of the Human Rights Act, 199 8 the English Court can now declare the legislative actio n as incompatible with the rights and freedoms referred t o in the schedule. The Minister is then to move Parliament f or necessary amendment to remove the incompatibility. While doing so, the English Court, can now apply strict scruti ny or proportionality to legislative and administrative a ction. The principle is now treated as central to English law (See Human Rights Law and Practice by Lord Lester of Herne Hill, Q .C. & David Pannick QC, 1999, para 3.16). The more the threshold of Wednesbury irrationality is lowered wh en fundamental human rights are on play, the easier it will become to establish judicial review as an effective remedy with Article 13 of the 1998 Act (see, ibid, Supplement August, 2000, par a

4.13.12).

¶48This test of proportionality has been developed by the Indian Courts throughout the years and has now attained the form of a fiv e-pronged test, as stated in the K. S. Puttaswamy & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. 12 judgment, and more recently, in the Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat 13.

¶49In K.S.Puttaswamy (Supra), a nine-Judge Bench of this Court while deciding the question as to whether the Constitution of India guarantees to each individual a fundamental right to privacy, expounded the ‘principle of proportionality and legitimacy’ in relation to infringement of rights as a result of State measures. It was held that proportionality is essential for protection from arbitrary State action as it ensures that the nature and quality of the encroachment on the right is in proportion to 12 (2017) 10 SCC 1 13 (2020) 10 SCC 459 the purpose of law. While summarizing the aforementioned p rinciple into a four-pronged test, the Bench held: “…The action must be sanctioned by law; The proposed action must be necessary in a democratic society for a legitimate aim; The extent of such interference must be proportionate t o the need for such interference; There must be procedural guarantees against abuse o f such interference.”

¶50In the case of Gujrat Mazdoor Sabha (Supra) during covid-19, the Central Government had passed a notification severely affecting the pay of unskilled workers, on the grounds of national emerg ency. This notification was challenged on grounds of violation of Article 14, specifically in violation of the principle of proportionality. The Court held that, in order to determine the validity of state action that could infringe on fundamental rights, it must pass the following conditions, namely, (i) The interfering with the fundamental rights must have a state purpose,

(ii) the said rights infringing measure must be based on a rational nexus between the interference and the state aim,(iii) the measur es bust be necessary to achieve the state aim,(iv) the restrictions must be necessary to protect the legitimate objective and (v) The state should provide sufficient safeguards for the possibility of an abuse of such rights infringing interference. On the basis of these conditions of proportionality, this Court struck down the notification.

¶51Although the fifth prong, as mentioned in the Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha (Supra) has not been expressly mentioned in Puttaswamy, Chandrachud J (as His Lordship then was), in our view, rightly has read that in in the Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha case (supra) to complete the test. State action that leaves sufficient room for abuse, thereby acting as a threat against free exercise of fundamental rights, ought to necessarily be factored in in the delicate balancing act that the jud iciary is called upon to do in determining the constitutionality of such state action - whether legislative, executive, administrative or otherwise. The relevant paragraph of the judgment has been mentioned herein: “The principle of proportionality has been recogniz ed in a slew of cases by this Court, most notably in the seven -judge bench decision in K S Puttaswamy vs. Union of India . The principle of proportionality envisages an analysis of the following conditions in order to determine the validity of s tate action that could impinge on fundamental rights:

(i) A law interfering with fundamental rights must be in pursuance of a legitimate state aim;

(ii) The justification for rights-infringing measur es that interfere with or limit the exercise of fundamental rig hts and liberties must be based on the existence of a ratio nal connection between those measures, the situation in fact and the object sought to be achieved;

(iii) The measures must be necessary to achieve the object and must not infringe rights to an extent greater t han is necessary to fulfil the aim;

(iv) Restrictions must not only serve legitimate purpose s; they must also be necessary to protect them; and

(v) The State should provide sufficient safeguards agains t the abuse of such interference. We are unable to find force in the arguments of the le arned counsel for the Respondent. The impugned notificati ons do not serve any purpose, apart from reducing the overhead costs of all factories in the State, without regard to the na ture of their manufactured products. It would be fathomable , and within the PART G 30 realm of reasonable possibility during a pandemic, if the factories producing medical equipment su ch as life-saving drugs, personal protective equipment or sanitisers, would be exempted by way of Section 65(2), whi le justly compensating the workers for supplying their valu able labour in a time of urgent need. However, a blanket notification of exemption to all factories, irrespecti ve of the manufactured product, while denying overtime to the workers , is indicative of the intention to capitalize on the pandemic to force an already worndown class of society, into the chains of servitude.”

¶52We have already in the discussion for the reaso nable classification test held that the interfering law, i.e. the impugned notification that creates the classification, does not have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved, and thus, violates the first two prongs of the proportionality test.

¶53We then come to the third and fourth prong of the proportionality test, i.e whether the classification created by the Authority was a necessity to achieve the state aim of compensating those la ndowners that are either direct residents of the land or the land exi sts as their primary source of income and whether such measure was proportional to the object sought to be achieved. For this, it is pert inent to refer to Section 23 of the Act, which provides for matters to be taken into account while determining the compensation. The said Section reads as under : -“23. Matters to be considered in determining compensa tion. -

(1) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the Court shall t ake into consideration first, the market value of the land at the date of the publ ication of the [notification under section 4, sub-section (1)] ; secondly, the damage sustained by the person intereste d, by reason of the taking of any standing crops trees whic h may be on the land at the time of the Collector’s taking poss ession thereof; thirdly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interest ed, at the time of the Collector’s taking possession of the land, by reason of serving such land from his other land; fourthly, the damage (if any) sustained by the pers on interested, at the time of the Collector’s taking poss ession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, movable or immovable, in any other manner, or his earnings; fifthly, in consequence of the acquisition of the l and by the Collector, the person interested is compelled to ch ange his residence or place of business, the reasonable expe nses (if any) incidental to such change, and sixthly, the damage (if any) bona fide resulting from diminution of the profits of the land between the time of the publica tion of the declaration under section 6 and the time of the Collector’s taking possession of the land.”

¶54A bare perusal of Section 23 would show that, the grounds for classification as purported by the GNOIDA authority, have already been covered by Section 23 of the Act. The fifth point of the said S ection squarely covers the requirement of compensating for rehabilit ation of the affected landowners. In the presence of an already existing provision in the act, the classification created by the GNOIDA authori ty, must exist in furtherance of the said Section, and not in contrast of.

¶55The classification, as discussed above, if allowed to exist, can lead to several Gair-pushtaini landowners who may also need to be rehabilitated, cannot rehabilitate themselves without compensation for the same. This circumstance alone besides being discriminatroy pits the said classification against Section 23 of the Act, causing an insubordination to the 1894 Act. Such a mischief, if allowed to exist, would not only nullify the purpose of the Act, but also violate the third and fourth principle of the proportionality test, and hence is liable to be struck down.

¶56Further, it is also important to note that the classification, even if allowed to exist, does not come with any safeguards against its potential abuse. As mentioned above, the said notification by way of its classification creates disastrous mischief, and the notification does nothing to remedy such potential abuse. No guidelines for the said classification exist, nor are there any bars placed. If such classification is left unchecked, it may lead to bad precedence, and disastrous ramificat ions in the future.This lack of substantive guidelines also violates the fifth prong of the proportionality test.

¶57On the basis of the abovementioned discussions emerging from the settled principles, Issue no. 2 is answered in affirmative and in favour of the Appellants herein, and the impugned classification is liable to be struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Whether the classification made by the Full-Bench of the High Court betweenPushtaini landowners and Gair-pushtaini landowners is in contravention to thelaw laid down by this Hon’ble Court in the case of Nagpur Improvement Trustand another vs. Vithal Rao and others (1973) 1 SCC 500?

¶58 In the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust (Supra) this Hon’ble Court was tasked to deal with the question of whether certain provisions the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 were in violation of Article 14. Here, the impugned provisions of the said Act allowed the acquisition of lands at rates lower than the rates as pre scribed in the Land Acquisition Act. What is relevant to our case, is that the Court, while deciding this matter, held that the authority, while acquiring land, cannot distinguish between types of owners, as the object of achieving land for public purposes is met with, irrespective of the type of owner whose land is being acquired. The relevant paragraphs from the judgment reads as under:- “It is now well-settled that the State can make a reas onable classification for the purpose of legislation. It is equal ly well-settled that the classification in order to be reasonab le must satisfy two tests: (i) the classification must be f ounded on intelligible differentia and (ii) the differentia m ust have a rational relation with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation in question. In this connection it must be borne in mind that the object itself should be lawful. The object itself cannot b e discriminatory, for otherwise, for instance, if the object is to discriminate against one section of the minority th e discrimination cannot be justified on the ground that there is a reasonable classification because it has rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. What can be reasonable classification for the purpo se of determining compensation if the object of the legislati on is to compulsorily acquire land for public purposes? It would not be disputed that different principles of compensation cannot be formulated for lands acquire d on the basis that the owner is old or young, healthy or ill, tall or short, or whether the owner has inherited the prope rty or built it with his own efforts, or whether the owner is polit ician or an advocate. Why is this sort of classification not sustainable? Because the object being to compulsorily acquire for a public purpose, the object is equally achieved whether the land belongs to one type of owner or another type.”

¶59In our opinion, a bare reading of the abovementioned judgment makes it amply clear that the classification made by t he GNOIDA authority for the purposes of awarding differential compensation is bad in law, and it is precisely this kind of classification that has been barred. When the purpose of the acquisition of the land is for the benefit of the public at large, then the nature of the owner of th e said land is inconsequential to the purpose. If such a classification on t he basis of the nature of owner is allowed, then on the same grounds, there might be a possibility of future classifications where powerholding members of the society may get away with a larger compensati on, and the marginalized may get lesser compensation. This is precisely what this Court in the abovementioned judgment predicted,and to pre-empt such arbitrary classification, clarified the position in law.

¶60The Land Acquisition Act does not distinguish between classes of owners, and uniformly provides compensation to a ll class of landowners. The classification made between Pushtaini landowners and Gair-pushtaini landowners, on the basis of the reasoning mentioned above, is violative of the law laid down in the Nagpur Trust case (Supra) and Article 14 of the Constitution. Conclusion

¶61In light of the above-mentioned reasoning, we are of the opinion that the classification made by both the executive actions is bad in law, and is liable to be set aside. The Land Acquisition Act does not envisage any differential compensation on the basis of such classifi cation, and hence, this Court must infer the compensation to be provided b y the executive actions within the confines of Section 23 of the Act.

62.Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act states out the grounds for granting compensation in cases of acquisition of land under the Act. One such reason for the grant of compensation is rehabilitation, and it is this need for granting compensation for rehabilitation under the Act that is echoed by the impugned notification. A bare reading of both the executive actions in consonance with the Act would show that the need for giving compensation for rehabilitation is valid in law and is backed by the parent statute. The mischief then, is only limited to t he arbitrary classification made by such actions. In such a case, we are of the opinion that since the mischief lies only within the classification, it can be severed, and the remaining part of the executive actions that sets out to grant compensation for the purpose of rehabilitation remains valid in law.

¶63 Once the classification is removed, and the executive actions are read in consonance with the parent act, we would see that since the Act, and now even the executive actions do not discriminate in terms of compensation, the ex-gratia payment and the increased base amount, as enunciated by the executive actions, must be given to all landowners in the subject area.

¶64At this stage, we would like to state that while the objective of the said classification might have been noble, however, such classification only on the basis of conjectures and surmises cannot be sustained. If a claim is being made to differentiate between class of persons, such claim must be backed by empirical data. While this Court is not a fact-finding Court and is a Court of law, however, the law must also not be understood in isolation, but in the context in which it exists, as the law does not exist like an object within the statutes, but lives and evolves with the people it governs.

¶65Further, in cases of administrative action, eve n if the classification has a rational nexus to the objective of the notification, the classification must also be legitimized by the parent statute. If the parent statute does not allow for a classification, then, even if the classification vis-à-vis the notification is able to pass the tests of Article 14, it would still be liable to struck down if the parent statute does not allow for the same.

¶66 The establishment of Greater Noida, as discussed above, was done for a noble purpose, i.e., to accommodate in the city all those who came travelling from every corner of the country in searc h of a better life. While doing so however, as can be seen in the present case, some residents whose land was subject to acquisition in the pursui t of the said aim, were faced with discrimination. In such cir cumstance, it becomes the duty of this Court to dispense justice, and rectify the harm caused to those at the receiving end of the discrimination.

¶67In view of the above discussions, the impugned judgment passed by the Full Bench of the High Court is not liable to be sust ained and stands set aside. As a consequence, the Writ Petiti on filed by the appellants before the High Court stands allowed and the appellants are held entitled to the reliefs claimed in the said Writ Petition.

¶68Accordingly, the appeals stand allowed.

¶69In the facts and circumstances, we do not make any order as to costs. Divya Pandey Appeals allowed. (Assisted by : Rakhi, LCRA)