State of Madhya Pradesh v. Pappu @ Ajay

Or. AFHJIT PASA'fAT, J. 1. Leave granted'.

·, I > ' f' ~ .. · .2. Since the only question involved.in this appeal is whether learned Single Judge was justified in reducing the sentence, as imposed by the High Court on the respondent, detailed. refer-erke to the factual aspects .is unnecessary.

¶3The respondent faced trial for offences punishable un-der Sections 376(1) read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'the IPC') and Sections 324 and 452 IPC. For the first offence, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years with a fine of Rs.2,000/- with de-fault stipulations. For the second offence, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year with a fine of Rs.500/- with default stipulations. Similarly, for the last offence, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- with default stipulations.

¶4He preferred an appeal before the High Court and the High Court, by the impugned order, held that since the respon-dent had undergone imprisonment for about five months and 25 days, the sentence should be reduced to the period already undergone in respect of the first offence.

¶5The State of Madhya Pradesh has questioned correct· ness of the judgment on the ground that considering the gravity J'\ of the offence involved, the High Court ought not to have re-

duced the sentence to the period undergone which, as noted above, was less than six months.

¶6Learned counsel for the respondent supported the judg-ment of the High Court.

¶7In the instant case the victim was examined as PW-3. It is to be noted that three persons faced trial and the co-ac-cused persons were acquitted of the charges.

¶8As rightly submitted by learned counsel for the appel-lant - State, no reason has been indicated by the High Court to direct reduction of sentence.

¶9The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. It could be a.chieved through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and the courts are required to mould the sen-tencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of law-lessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins. Pro-tection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be. l the object of law whic_h must be achieved by imposing appro-priate sentence. Therefore, law as a corner-stone of the edifice. B' of "ord~r" should meet the challenge_s confronting the society.

Friedman in his "Law in Changing. Society" stated that, "State i of criminal law continues to be as it should be a decisive reflec-tion o.f social consciousness of so.ciety". Therefore, in operat-ing the sentencing system, law·should adopt the corrective f== machinery or the deterrence ·b?sed on factual matrix. By deft modulation sE:11tencing process be stern where it should be, and I-tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances· ih each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the na-ture of weapons used and all. other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration.

¶10Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sen-tence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure under such serious threat~. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was ex-ecuted or committed etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu

(AIR 1991 SC 14_63).

¶11The criminal law adher~s in general to the principle of proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpabil-ity of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows some significant discretion to the Judge in arrivin'g at a sentence in I each case, presumably to perrnft sentences that reflect more subtle consider~tions of culpability th~t are raised by the spe- '='f-cial facts of each case. Judges in essence affirm that punish-ment ought always to fit the crime;_ yet in practice sentences are determined largely by otrer considerations. Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that are offered to justify a sentence. Sometimes the desirability of keeping him out of cir-culation, and sometimes even the tragic results of his crime. Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from just desert as the basis of punishment and create cases of appar-ent injustice that are serious and widespread.

¶12After giving due consideration to the facts and circum-stances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate sen-tence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and miti-gating factors and circumstances in which a crime has been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the Court. Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been very aptly indicated in Dennis Councle MCGDautha v. State of Callifornia: 402 US 183: 28 L. D. 2d 711 that no formula of a fool-proof nature is possible that would provide a reasonable crite-rion in determining a just and appropriate punishment in the infi-nite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof formula which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess various cir-cumstances germane to the consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment may be equitably distinguished.

¶13Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile exer-cise. The social impact of the crime, e.g. where it relates to j offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropria-

tion of public money, treason and other offences involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency which have great impact on so-cial order, and public interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing meager sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be re-sult-wise counter productive in the long run and against societal interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system.

¶14The Court will be failing in its duty if appropriate pun-ishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the soci-ety to which the criminal and victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should con-form to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime war-ranting public abhorrence and it should "respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal". If for extremely heinous crime of murder perpetrated in a very brutal manner without any provo-cation, most deterrent punishment is not given, the case of de-terrent punishment will lose its relevance.

¶15These aspects have been elaborated in State of M.P v. Ghanshyam Singh (2003(8) SCC 13), and State of M.P v. Babbu Barkare alias Dalap Singh (2005.(5) SCC 413).

¶16Considering the legal position as indicated above the High Court's order is clearly unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. The judgment of the Trial Court is restored. The re-spondent shall surrender to custody forthwith to serve the re-mainder of sentence.

¶17The appeal is allowed.

CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISD.ICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1213 of 2008

From the final Judgment and Order dated 27.1.2004 of the·High ;Court o(Madhya Pradesh at'Jabalpufhi Criminal Ap-

. .Govind Goel,. C,D. Singh and Sunny Chaudhary for the Appellant.

. Nirrnal Chopra for the Respondent. . ·

" .. , " ' . •', '

~ , .. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by