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Commissioner of Income Tax, Shillong v. Tarajan Tea Co. (P) Ltd.

Dismissed
Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
4 February 1999
Bench
M. Srinivasan, U. C. Banerjee
Result
Appeal dismissed.

Headnote

Income Tax Act, 1961: Sectio11s 147(a) a11d (b) (As they stood before 1.4.1989) and 139.

Income Tax-Reassessment-Respondent-assessee-Assessment of-- No omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under Section 139 as contemplated in Sectio11 147(a}-No information obtained by the assessing officer subsequent to Assessme11t Order-Assessment re-opened by ITO a11d notice issued under Section 147(aj-Ground that in the case of another Tea Company, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had take11 the view that sale' of standing trees constituted revenue receipts a111i, therefore, liable to tax-Held, neither clause (a) nor clause (b) of the Section 147would apply in this case-The order passed by the AA.C. in another case is not 'i11formation' within the mea11ing of the sectio11 147-The order of the Assess-ing Officer re-opening the earlier order and passing a fresh assessment order held unsustainable.

Income T~roceedings under Section 147(a)--Conversio11 into proceedings under Section 147(b) without issuing a fresh notice and initiation of a fresh proceeding-Questio11 left open.

Headnote as published in the Digital Supreme Court Reports by the Supreme Court of India. Paragraph references point to the judgment below.

Judgment

Vijay Hansaria, Sunil Kumar Jain and Ajay Kumar Gupta for the Respondent.

The following Order the Court was delivered :

The three questions referred to the High Court for answer in this -r y matter are as follows :

"l. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the ca~e, the tribunal having held that there was no case for re-opening the assessment under Section 147(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on the reason recorded, nor any cause for re-opening of the assess-ment under section 147(b) of the Act on the reasons recorded on 31.3.77 was justified in law in sustaining the re-opening of assess-ment under section 147(b) of the Act on the reasons and grounds given in the order passed an appeal?

¶2Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was jusified in law in holding that the re-assessment poceeding initiated under Section 147(a) of the Act by issue of notice dated 31.12.76 under Section 148 of the.Act on the reasons recorded, could be validly converted into a proceeding under Section 147(b) of the Act subsequently?

¶3Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was justified in law in setting aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax cancelling the re-assessment orders p~sed by the Income Tax Officer in ig-norance of Section 144-B of the Act and in directing the Income Tax Officer to resort to the provisions of Section 144-B afresh inste~d of annuling and/or cancelling the re-assessment orders and without also taking into consideration the legal bar of limitation for the passing of re-assessment orders under Section 153 of the Act?"

_..4.

I

¶2The short facts which gave rise to that reference were that the respondent-assessee was duly assessed by the Income Tax Officer (I.T.O.) for the relevant period on the basis of the information supplied by the assessee. No particulars were left out by the assessee for enabling the completion of his assessment. However, the I.T.O. re-opened the assess-ment and issued a notice under Section 147(a) of the Income Tax Act on the basis that in the case of another Tea Company, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had taken the view that sale of standing trees constituted revenue receipts and, therefore, liable to tax. The I.T.O. was of the opinion that the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in the other case would amount to 'information' within the meaning of Section 147(a) of the Act in so far as the assessee-company is concerned.

¶3In the course of the proceedings under Section 147(a), the l.T.O. found that it could not be sustained under that sub-section and converted the same into a proceeding under Section 147(b) and concluded the matter. The order of the I.T.O. was challenged before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (A.A.C) who set aside the same. But on further appeal by the Revenue, the Tribunal modified the order of the A.A.C. and permitted the I.T.O. proceed afresh under Section 144B of the Act. When the matter came before the High Court, the reference was answered in favour of the assessee and the order passed by the I.T.O. on re-assessment was set aside. In fact, the High Court observed that the Tribunal ought to have quashed the order converting the proceedings under Section 147(b) from that under Section 147(a).

¶4On perusal of the records, we find that neither Section 147(a) nor Section 147(b) would apply in this case. The said Section at the relevant period (and prior to Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, w.e.f. 1.4.1989) read as follows :

"If -

(a) the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return under Section 139 for any assessment year to the Assessing Officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, or

(b) notwithstanding that there has been no omission or failure as mentioned in clause (a) on the part of the assessee, the Assess-ing Officer has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may, subject to the provisions of Ss. 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance,

as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereinafter in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year). 5. A perusal of the record in this case shows that there was no omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under Section 139 as contemplated in clause (a); nor was there any information in the possession of the Assessing Officer obtained by him subsequent to ,_. the assessment order. Whatever information was necessary was already

available to the Assessing Officer when the first assessment was made. '-._ T-Oe order passed by the A.AC. in another case is not 'information' within the meaning of the Section. Hence, neither clause (a) nor clause (b) of the Section would apply in this case.

¶6In the circumstances, it' is unnecessary for us to consider the question whether a proceeding under Section 147(a) could be converted into a proceeding under Section 147(b) in the course of th~ proceedings without issuing a fresh notice and initiation of a fresh proceeding. Without deciding that question, we come to the conclusion in this case that the order of the Assessing Officer re-opening the earlier order and passing a fresh assessment order is unsustainable and the view taken by the revenue authorities has been rightly set aside by the High Court.

¶7The appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.

Case details

Arising from

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1941 of 1993.

I From the Judgment and Order dated 32.92 of the Gauhati High Court in l.T.R. No. 7 of 1986.

Dr. V. Gauri Shankar, Rajiv Nanda, P. Parmeshwaran and B.K.

Appearances

Prasad for the Appellant.

Source: Supreme Court of India, Digital Supreme Court Reports, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open dataset (CC BY 4.0). Text was extracted from the official PDF and may contain conversion errors. Check the official PDF before relying on it.