Prabhat Kiran Maithani & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr.

BEG, C.J.-The petitioners before us are employees of the Forest Research Institute and Colleges Dehra Dun in the post11 designated a11 Computers. Their grievance is that they should be treated as Re-11earch As11istants Grade II and given the same scale of pay and other conditions of service as are applicable to Research Assistan'ts Grade II. The respondents, Union of India and the Pr1!sident of the Forest Research Institute deny that the petitioners are entitled, to bi~ treated as Research Assistants Grade II. The petitionen; rely upon certain alleged admissions on behalf of the opposite parties, on certain classi-fications of Computers in the past, prior to the recommenda1ions of the Third Pay Commission 1973 as well as on the last menti.oned re-port of the Central Pay Commission. Furthermore, learned counsel has invited our attention to the case of Purshottam Lal and Ors. Vs. Union of India and another [1973 (1) S.C.C. 651] whereupon a Writ Petition by Computers, they were shown a11 having bee11 !~ven identical scales of pay with the Research Assistants Grade H. Thig decision however, does not deal with any \:Ontrciversy as to the cor-rect classification of computers in comparison with Research Assis-tants Grade II. All we need say is that this ca'se: deals with the posi-tion under the Report of 1959 of the Second Pay Commission which has no bearing on the position which follows frorri the Repc-rt of the Third Pay Commission of 1973. Moreover, it is evident that even at that time Research Assistants Grade II and Computen wei:e shown a8 separatl) classes even though their pay scales and the revised! pay 1cales were shown as identical. Thus the claim of the petitiom:rs is that this Court should not only include the Computers amon.gst Re-search Assistants Grade II, which is not borne out even from th• Report of the Second Pay Commission, but go further and equate their pays, so that, even though they belong to different classes, their scales of pay may be identical. We are afraid this is a matter which lay entirely within the sphere of the functions of the Pay Commission. This Court cannot satisfactorily decide 'uch disputed queations on the salender material on which the learned counsel for the peti1ioner ',Afr-relies in order to displace what appears to us to be, prima fade, th• ellcct of the Report of the Third Pay Commission of 1973. This report shows that Computers not only belong to a separate clas:s ol their own but received less pay than Research Assistants of Grade II.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner's tried to get out of the report of the Third Pay Commission contained in Chapter XVII relating to the Economists and Statisticians, wherein Computers are mentioned and dealt with in paragraphs 32 to 34, by asserting that their case should be covered by either Chapter XV, whic:h deals with "Scien-tific Services" (specifically mentioned therein) or Chapter XXI, con-cerned with Ministry of Agriculture, where the Forest Research Insti-tute and College's are mentioned in paragraphs 58 onwards. It seems to us to be erroneous to attempt to place Computers in Ch2,pter XV, which deals with specified "Scientific Services" where Computers are not mentioned, or in Chapter XXI, which also does not mention Com-puters at all. Learned Counsel for the petitioners tried to take advantage of the fact that paragraphs dealing with thx Forest Re-search Institute in Chapter XXI do not mention Computers. It does not follow from this that Computers necessarily belong to the class into which the petitioners want 10 get in without showing what the criteria and fwictions of persons entitled to be treated as Research Assistants of Grade II are as compared with the Computers who, .prima f acie belong to another class of workers dealing with statistics even though they may be in some way assisting in research or three may be some common functions. Indeed, everyone working in a research institute could, in some way, be said to be assisting in re-search: We think that these are questions entirely unfit for deter-mination upon a petition for a Writ for the enforcement of fundamen-tal rights. It requires : firstly, formulation of correct criteria for each classification; and, secondly, the application of these criteria to facts relating to the functions and qualifications for each class. The Pay Commission had done this elaborately.

The learned Solicitor General has invited our attention to the case of Union of India v. G. R. Prabhavalkar & Ors. reported in 1973 (3) S.C.R. 714, where this Court held that equation of posts is not a duty which the High Court was competent to carry out in proceed-ings under Article 226. We do not think that we have wider powers or that we can do with greater facility what a High Court cannot when exercising its writ issuing jurisdiction.

The learned counsel for the petitioners has tried to take us at some length into the material on which he assails the yiew taken by the opposite partie's. We are unable to agree that, on the material placed before us, we can accept the petitioners' interpretation of facts to which our attention was drawn. We are unable to consider other material also to which our attention was attemp,ted to be drawn be-cause, on the basis of the materials shown to us_, W() are satisfied that such matters are not fit for determination by us on the kind of mate-rial sought to be placed before us.

Finally, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that we may permit him to raise this matter before an Administrative or Service Tribunal if and when one is constituted. It is not necessary for us to give him any permission to do that. We may however observe that the petitiop.ers are at liberty to pursue other remedies, in.eluding those which may be available to them if any such Tribunal is set up in future. We want to make it clear that the question whether there is or there is not enough material on record in a particular case to establish the basis of a particular discrimination is one of fact for the determination of which no hard and fast rules can be laid down. Moreover, a discrimination, which involves the invocation of Articie 14, is not necessary covered by Article 16. We do not propose to discuss here the differences between Articles 14 ap.d 16, because we think that, eveµ the material relied upon on behalf of the petitioners before us shows that Computers and Research Assistants Grade II are classified separately. The validity of that classification cannot,

'. SUPREME COURT REP,ORTS s.c.R.

914 [1977] 2 we think, be displaced by the kind 9f evid~nce .relied upon on behalf of the· petitioners. And, until that classification is shown . to .... be unjustified, no question· of violating Al;ticle 16 can arise .. We, the.re-fore, Ieave the petitioners to other means of redress if they still feet aggrieved.

The result is that we dismiss the Writ Petition,. but make no order as to costs.

s. R. Petition dismissed.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 43 of J 976.

S. C. Agarwal for the Petitioners.

912 SUJ'REME COURT REPORTS [1977] 2 §.8.R,

L. N. Sinha, Sol Genl. and B. Ddtta for Respondents.