City Corner v. Personal Asstt. to Collector & Addl. District Magistrate, Nellore

ALAGIRISWAMI, J.-On 15-7-1974 the appellant applied for a licence under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) P!ac-~s of Public Resort Act, 1888 for conducting games of skill and dances and other quality performances in a village adjoining the district headquarters' town of Nellore, wirti its 12 cinema theatres, in Andhra Pradesh. That Act has been extended to this Panch<i'at. On 25-9-1974 the licence was refused by the Executive Officer of the Panchayat. Its grant had been obiected to by the Superintendent of Police as also two associations called Mitramandaii and the Town Yuvajanasangham. But on aprpeal to the village Panchayat as provided in section 129 of the Panchayats Act a licence was granted on 1st October, 1974. The Mitramandali made a reperesentation to the Chief Minister and the District Panchayat Officer, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, the Superintendent of I Police, the Tehsildar, and the Revenue Divisional Officer also reported

against the< grant of licence. On 21st January 1975 the Additional Dis-trict Magistrate issued a notice to the appellant to show cause why the licence issued to him should not be cancelled. The appellant had in the meanwhile put up semi-permanent structures as required under the terms of the licence which even according to the Executive Engineer, Ziia Parishad, Nellore should have cost him Rs. 27,000/-. He com-menced his business on 22nd January 1975 and the show cause notice issued by the District Magistrate reached him on the 25th. He sent a reply on the 27th: and on the 28th the licence was cancelled. The appellant's writ petition questioning the cancellation was dismissed by a Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, so was an appeal against that dismissal by a Division Bench .. This appeal has been filed in pursuance of special leave granted by this Court.

In his r·eply to the show cause notice the appellant had asked for copies of the various documents on the basis of which the show cause notice had been issued and stated that in their absence he was not in a position to submit a detailed explanation in reply and he was, how-ever,, offering a tentative explanation promising a fuller and detailed - - ,.i--

40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1976] 2 S.C.R. i

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explanation after the receipt of the copies. In particular in respect of a refer~nce to a m?rder in the show cause notice he stated that it took place m the prep.11~es of another amusement park long after it was closed f~r want of licence. The District Magistrate considered that the explanat10n offered was a routine one and was not convinciag. I

Section 12 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Places of Public Resort Act enables the District Magistrate to cal! for and examine the record ~f any proc;eeding taken under the Act, to call for any report in connection therewith, to make or cause to be made any further enquiry an_d to pass any order which. the authority holding the proceeding might have passed. Under section 9 any authority granting a licence may for reasons rec?r<!led in writing, revoke or sqspend the same when he has reason to beheve:

(a) that the licence has b_een fraudulently obtained;

(b) that the enclosed place or building has been used for other

purposes of public resort or entertainment than that for which the licence was granted; and ( c) that the place or building can no longer be safely used for

the purpose for which the licence was granted.

Undoubtedly none of the reasons applied in this case. Under section 7 if the authority is satisfied .

(a) that the enclosed place or building may safely be used for

the purpose of public resort or entertainment proposed; (b) that no objection, arising from its situation, ownership, or

the purpose proposed, exists, he shall grant to the applicant a written licence. The only ground in this section applicable to the present case would be 'the purpose pro-posed'.

The argument before us was that the power of the District Magist-rate to revoke the licence under s. 12 can be for only any of ilie grounds mentioned in s. 9. The power under s. 12 is to pass any order which the authority holding the proceeding might have passed,. that is, an order granting, revoking or suspending. In other words, if the aufuority competent to grant the licence refuses, the District Magistrate in exer-cise of his power under s. 12 may grant the licence and vice-versa, Similarly he can revoke or suspend the licence granted by the authority or where the authority has revoked or suspended the licence cancel that order. In other words the power under s. 12 is to pass ilie kind of order which might be passed under section 7 or 9. The reasons for which this power can be exercised are not restricted to those mentioned in section 7 or 9. The revisional power under s. 12 is not a limited one. It is as wide as that of the original authority. The considerations which the District Magistrate took into account in revoking ilie anoellant's licence were the same as those which were before the Village Panchayat when it decided to 1ITant the licence. The revising authoritv is Pntitled on the same material to take a vi(!w different from that of the authority whose order· is1 revised.

But the main ground of attack against the order of cancellation is· that I J in maKin.g iUhe Distnct Magistrate had failed to observe the pnncip1es i

of nat1:1ra1 justice. The order that the District Magistrate passed is a quasi-judicial order and therefore the appellant is right in contending that the principles of natural justiCe should have been followed before that order was passed. · It is now well established by decisions ofl this Court that such is the requirement of law even where the statute in question itself does not so provide. It is also well established that the principles of natural justice do not necessarily conform to a fix·ed for-mula, nor is it a procrustean bed into which all proceedings must be fitted. The principles 6f natural justice will always depend upon the facts of each case. The learned Judges of the High Court examined the various documents the copies of which had been asked for by the app·ellant and came to the conclusion that the show cause notice issued to him contained a summary of; all those documents which was sufficient to enable the appellant to make his representation. We cannot say that this conclusion is wrong. It is not always necessary that the documents asked for should itself be furnished provided the substance of those documents is furnished, always provided, however, that the summary is not misleading. Such is -not the case here. ·But when the appellant asked for the original documents he could at least have been told that he had already been given a summary of the documents which was sufficient to enable him to make his representation and he could make his full·er representation as he had promised in his earlier so-called in-terim reply. The District_ Magistrate's characterisation of the interim reply of the appellant as a routine one is not correct. After all the opinion of the Village Panchayat which is a representative body of all the villagers is entitled to great if not greater weight than that of the Mitramandli and the Town Yuvajanasangham, the composition of which or the strength of which we do not know. The Village Pancha-yat was also comp·etent on a consideration of all the facts to form its own opinion. The opinions of representative bodies should not be !.ightly brushed aside unless of course there is reason to think that they have acted out of considerations other than relevant. We are of opinion that the order passed by the District Magistrate post-haste immediately he received the appellant's reply without either giving him the copies asked.for o'r at least telling him that the material already furnished was sufficient to enable him to make his representation and if he had any further representation to make he could do so offends the principles of natural justice. We are aware that we are dealing with an appeal questioning the proceedings initiated under Article 226 of the Constitu-tion where the power of the court is a limited one, that is to say, limited to cases where there is any error of law apparent on the face of the record. But the observance of the principles of natural justice is funda-mental to the discharge of any quasi-judicial function. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of the District Magistrate. Then: will be no order as to costs.