Andhra Industrial Works, A.P. v. Chief Controller of Imports and Ors.

- SARKARJA, J.-In these four writ petitions under Artick 32 of tho 'Constitution, the parties and the basic questions for determination arc the same. They will therefore be disposed of by a common judg-ment.

The petitioner-firm is dealing in the manufacture of automobile parts, wires and cables. The petitioner made four applications on November 5,1969, March 23,1970, November 5, 1970 and November 6,1970, for the grant of licences to import stainless steel sheets and electrolytic copper wire bars, for the period April-March 1970 and April-March 1971. At the time of the receipt of the first application dated November 5, 1Q69, Respondent 3 (Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Hyderabad) received some complaints that the pctitioner-tirm was mis-utilizing the imported 11l'aterial. After a preli-minary investigation made by the C.B.I., a First Information Report was registered on December 12, 1969 with the police against the petitioner-firm and some others in respect of the commission of offen- "Ces under s.5 of the Imports (Control) Act, 1947 read with clause 5 ol the Imports (Control) Order, 1948. In the normal course, such .applications should have been disposed of within three weeks of the ·dates on which they were received. Since the respondents did not <dispose of the applications, the petitioner-firm filed four writ petitions (Nos. 3526-3529 of 1971) in the High Court of Madras praying for the issue of writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to issue the import licences applied for.

Before the High Court, no counter-affidavit was filed by the Res-1pondents. The High Court, instead of issuing a writ of Mandamus, directed the Respondents to consider and dispose of the applications in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible. The applications were however not disposed of for another five months. On September 20,1970, the petitioner moved the High Court for proceeding against ·the authorities for contempt of its order. Thereafter, on October 22, 1972, the petitioner caused a notice by registered post to be served -0n the respondents.

Respondent No. 3 then informed the pefitioner~fun,i by his com-munication dated November 7, 1972, that 1ts applrcat10ns had b~en ll rejected. The reasons set out in the impugned orders were: (1) Stam-Iess steel-sheets are not allowed for the manufacture of the end product of automobile parts as their import has been prohibited in terms of the existing instructions; (2) Since the petitioner-firm was a manufacturer ot automobile parts "import of Electrolytic copper wire bars for end use of 'automobile parts' is not permissible".

The petitioners challenge the aforesaid orders of November 7,. 19 72 passed by the 3rd Respondent, on the ground that in view of the Import Policy contained in the Red Book for the relevant period, they were entitled to the grant of these import licences, and that the "existing instructions" on the basis of which their applications were rejected, could not override that Import Policy. In any case, these instructions are unconstitutional; they do not amount to 'reasonable restrictions' within the contemplation of Article 19 of the Constitu-tion on the petitioners' right to carry on their trade. The petitioners. pray that the impugned orders, dated November 7, 1972, be declared void and a Mandamus directing the respondents to issue the licences fo1 the import of the materials in question for the licensing period, April 1969-March 1970, in favour of the petitioners.

At the outset, Mr. Prasad, appearing on behalf of the respondents, has raised these objections: ( 1) Article 19 ( 1) (g) on which the peti-tioners stake their claim can be availed of only by a citizen of India; the writ petition filed by the· firm is therefore not maintainable; (2) Since the petitioners had no fundamental right to the grant of the li-cences in question and the law in pursuance of which Respondent 3 passed the impugned order, was intra vires, the procedural irregularity or error, if any, committed by the Respondent in the exercise of his jurisdiction, not having resulted in violation of or threat to any funda-mental right of the petitioners, cannot be impeached by way of a peti-tion under Article 32 of the Constitution. Reference has been made to Sm1. Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P. (1 ) : (3) No Mandumus or other relier as prayed for by the petitioners, can be granted because the petitioners had no specific legal right to th~ licences, nor was the Respondent under a cor~esponding legal obligation to grant the same; ( 4) In any case, no import licences for the year 1969-70 in respect of the mate-rials in question can now be granted because of the restrictions subse-quently imposed by Import Control Policy of the year 1972.

In reply, Mr. Chitale submits that the Respondents have not fol-lowed the mandatory procedure prescribed in the Import Trade Con-trol Hand Book, contravention of which entitles the petitioners to the issue of a writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate order or direc-lion from this Court. This contravention, it is added, has, in effect, violated the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.

We find no merit in the preliminary objection that the writ peti-tion on behalf of the "firm" is not maintainable. Since "firm" stands for all the partners collectively, the petition is to be deemed to have been filed by all the i:•artners who are citizens of India. We, therefore, negative this objection.

We however, find force in the other contentions canvassed by the :learned Counsel for the Respondents.

It must be remembered that the jurisdiction of this Court under .Article 32 can be invoked only for the enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and not any other legal right . .A petitioner will not be entitled to relief under this Article, unless he .establishes that his fundamental right has been viobted or imminently threatened. Such violation, actual or potential may arise in a variety of ways, and it is not possible to give their exhaustive classification. But on ,the analogy of Ujjam Bai's case (supra) instances, most usual. in relation to laws regulating the citizen's right to carry on trade or :business guaranteed by Article 19 ( 1) (g) may be catalogued as JJnder:

(a) Where the impugned action is taken under a statute which

itself is ultra vires any provision of Part Ill of the Cons-titution.

(b) Where the statute concerned is intra vires but the impug-

ned action is without jurisdiction on account of a basic defect in the constitution of the authority or tribunal or owing to the absence of a preliminary jurisdictional fact i.e. a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction; ( c) Where the impugned action is based on a misconstruction

of the illfra vires statute or is so contrary to the estab-lished procedure or rules of natural justice that it results in violation of a fundamental right.

The instant case is clmrly not covered by any of the categories. Herein, it is not contended that the Import and Export (Control) Act, 194 7 or any Order or rule made thereunder is ultra vires. Nor is the validity of the Import Control Policy Statement (for the period April-March 1969) known as Red Book impeached. Indeed, this Policy statement is the sheet-anchor of the petitioners' claim. Such a Policy Statement, as distinguished from an Import or Export Con-trol Order issued under s.3 of the said Act, is not a statutory docu-ment. No person can merely on the basis of such a Statement claim a ri~ht to the grant of an import licence, enforceable at law. More-over: such a Policy can be changed, rescinded or altered by mere -administrative Orders or executive instructions issued at any time.

From the counteFaffidavit filed on behalf of the Respondents, it is clear that the Import Trade Control Policy (Red Book-Vol.I) had been amended and the import of the materials in question for utiliza-tion in the end products of most 'automobile parts' was prohibited as per instructions conveyed by Chief Controller of Imports & Exports in his Jetter No. IPC(Gen. 33)/73172/:>499, dated September 29, 1972 although general notice of this amendme_nt was published 1'at~r on August 18 1973 (Vide Annexure R-5). fhe result was that m accordance with the amended Import Trade Control Policy, the Res-pondent could not, in November 1972, grant the licences applied for to the petitioners in respect of the past period, April 1969-March

It is nobody's case that Respondent 3 lacked inherent jurisdiction to deal with and decline the application for the grant of the licences. Serious complaints of the commission of criminal offences -arising out of the misutilization of materials previously imported under import licences, were pending investigation by the C.B.I. against the peti-tioners. Subsequently, a criminal complaint has also been made in court for trial of the petitioners and others for those offences. In these circumstances, it could not be said that the dispos•al of the applications, was ,delayed by Respondent 3 due. to ulterior motives, or that the re-fusal to grant the licences was violative of the rules of natural justice.

So that as it may, on the basis of an Import Trade Policy an •appli-cant has no absolute right, much less a fundamental right, to the grant of an import licence. The nature of such a claim came up for consideiation before this Court in Deputy Assistant Iron and Steel Control.er and anr. v. L. Maneckchand, Proprietor, Katrel/a Metal Corpn., Madras.(')

That was an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the High Court rendered in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Art. 226. The writ-petitioner asked for the issl'~ of a Mandamus requiring the authorities to consider his application for licence to import stainless steel in terms of 1968-69 Policy and not in accordance with 1970· 71 Policy when the application was made. This Court held that in view of s.3(1) (a) of the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947 and cl.6 (1) (a) of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, an applicant has no vested right to an import licence in terms of the policy in force at the time of the application. No case for the Mandamus prayed had been made out, particularly when the delay in disposing of the application for licence was not due to the fault of the Licensing Authority.

The ratio of Maneckchand's case (supra), is applicable with grea-ter force to the present petitions which have been made under Article 32 of the Constitution. The instant case is no doubt one of delay on the part of the authority, but this delay could not be said to be 'undue' or motivated by bad faith. In view of the supervening criminal pro-ceedings •against the petitioners, the Respondent might have thought that it was better for him to defer decision on the applications till the termination of the criminal proceedings ..

Nor do we find any substance in the> contention that the "existingi instructions" or the orders made in pursuance of the Import & Export Control Act place "unreasonable restrictions" on the petitioners' right to carr/y on trade or business. These restrictions obviously have been imposed in the interests of the general public and national economy. Again, in this connection the observations made by this Court in Maneckchand's case (supra) are relevant and may be extracted :

" .. it has to be borne in mind that in the present stage of our industrial development imports requiring foreign ex-cll'ange have necessarily to be appropriately controlled and regulated. Possible abuses of import quota have also to be

cffcclively checked and this inevitably requires proper scru-tiny of the various applications for import licence. In gran-ting licences for imports, the authority concerned has to keep in view various factors which may have impact on im-ports of other items of relatively greater priority in the lar-ger interest of the overall economy of the country which has to be the supreme consideration".

Lastly, there is no question of the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Excepting a nebulous allegation in the rejoinder, the :i;etitioners have not set up any plea of hostile discrimi1mtion. They have not given any particulars whatever, of any other applicant, simi-larly situated, who might have been granted such an import licence in like circumstances.

For all the reasons aforesaid, the petitions fail and are dismissed, but, in the circumstances of the case, without any order as to costs. V.P.S. Petitions dis1nissecL