Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd. & Ors. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

Bbargava, 1. An industrial dispute arose between. 25 Co-operative Central Banks in the State of Andhra Pradesh and their workmen represented by the Andhra Pradesh Bal1k Em-ployees Federation, Hyderabad, which was ref.erred by the Gov-ernment of Andhra Pradesh to the Industrial 'I'ribunal, Hydera-bad, under section lO(l)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act · No. 14 of 1947. The subject-matter of the dispute was divided

into three issues. The first issue comprised a number of service conditions, viz., (l} Salary, Scales and Adjustments, (2). l)ear-ness Allowance, (3) Special Allowances, ( 4) other AlloWmices, (5) Unifoi111$ and Washing Allowances for .·subordinate stafi, (6) Conveyance Charges, (7) Provident Fund and Gratuity, (8) Leave Rules, (9) Joining Time on Transfer, (10) Rules relating to departmental enquiry against employees for miscon-duct, (11) Probationary Period and Confirmation, (12) Work-ing Hours and Overtinie Allowance, ( 13) Age of Retirement, (14) Security, (15) Common Good Fund, (16) Service Condi-tions and ( 17) Promotions. The second and the third i$$UeS both related to the question whether the transfers of some em-. plOyees of two of the Bariks, The Vijayawada Co-operative Cent-ral Bank, Ltd., Vijayawada, and The Vizianagaram Co-operatiVe Central Bank Ltd., Yizianagaram, were justified and, if not, to what reliefs were the emplgyees entitled. Before the Industrial Tribunal, one of the 'grounds raised on behalf of the Banks was that the reference of the .disputes to the Tribunal was invalid, because such disputes were required to be referred for decision tc the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies under section 61 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act No. 7 of 1964 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), and the effect of the provi-sions of the Act was to exclude the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunals to deal with the same disputes under the Industrial Dis-putfS Act. Various other pleas were also taken by the Banks in resisting the claims of the workmen, but, in these appeals, we are not concerned with them, because the Tribunal dealt with the point, mentioned by us above, as a preliminary issue and re-jected ·the contention of the Banks.. Twenty-four of the Banks thereupon challenged the preliminary decision of the Tribunal on this question, treatinj1; it as a preliminary award, by filing ·two Writ Petitions Nos. 2339 and 2742 of 1968 under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The High Court also rejected the plea of the Banks. These two. appeals have been brought up before us by certificate aj1;ainst the orders of the High Court dismissing the two writ petitions. In Civil Appeal No. 2093/1968, the appellants are 10 Banks who wero petitioners before the High Court in Writ Petition No. 2339 of 1968, while 2 of the petitioner-Banks in that writ petition have been implcaded as respondents. In Civil Appeal No. 2094 of 1968, the appellants are also 10 Banks who i!1 had joined in filing the other Writ Pe.ti.lion No. 27~2/1968 th_e High Court, while one of the petitioner-Banks m that Wiit F.lI-tion has been impleaded as respondent, and another has not JOID-cd the appeal as a party. In these appeals, therefore, we are only concerned with one single question as to whether the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate on the industrial dispute referred to it under s. 10(1) (d) of the Industrial Pisputes Act was barred by the provisions of s. 61 of the Act.

The Tribunal, and the High Court, in rejecting the plea taken on behalf of the Banks, expressed the view that the disputes actually referred to the Tribunal were not capable of being decid-ed by the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies under s. 61 of the Act and, consequently, the reference to the Industrial Tribu-nal under the Industrial Disputes Act was competent. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Banks took us through the provisions of the Act to indicate that, besides being a local and special Act, it is a self-contained Act enacted for the purpose of successful working of Co-operative Societies, including Co-opera-tive Banks, and there are provisions in the Act which clearly ex-clude the applicability of other laws if they happen to be in con-filct with the provisions of the Act. It is no doubt true that the Act is an enactment passed by State Legislature which received the assent of the President, so that, if any provision of a Central Act, including the Industrial Disputes Act, is repugnant to any provision of the Act, the provision of the Act will prevail and not the provision of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. The gene-ral proposition urged that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tri-bunal under the Industrial Disputes Act will be barred if the dis-putts in question can be competently decided by the Registrar <m<lcr s. 61 of the Act is, therefor~, correct and has to be accept-ed. The question, however, that has to be examined is whether the indu.;trial dispute referred to the Tribunal in the present cases was such as was required to be referred to the Registrar and to be decided by him under section 61 of the Act.

In order to properly appreciate the submissions which have been made on behalf of the Banks by their counsel, it is necessary to set out the provisions of sections 16, 61, 62 and 133 of the Act which are as follows :-

"16. Amendment of bye-laws of a society :-(!) No amendment of any bye-law of a society shall be valid unless such amendment has been registered under this Act. Where such an amendment is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, then, it shall come into force on the day on which it is regis-tered.

( 2) Every proposal for such ame~dmen.t sha~I be forwarded to the Registrar who shall, 1f he 1s satisfied that the proposed amendment fulfils the C?nditions specified fo sub-section· ( 1 ) of section 7, register the amendment within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of such proposals :

Provided that the Government may, for sufficient cause which shall be recorded in writing, extend the said period for a further period of sixty days.

( 3) The Registrar shall forward to the society a copy of the registered amendment together with a certi-ficate signed and sealed by him, and such certifica.te shall be conclusive evidence that the amendment has been duly registered.

( 4) Where the Registrar is not so satisfied, he shall communicate . by registered post the order of re-fusal together with the reasons therefor, to the society within the period specified in sub-section (2).

( 5) If in the opinion of the Registrar, an amend-ment of the bye-laws of a society is necessary .or desir-able in the interest of such society or of the co-opera-tive movement, he may, in the manner prescribed, call upon the society, to make any amendment within such time as he may specify. If the society fails to make such an amendment within the time so specified the Registrar may, after giving the society an opportunity of making its representation, register such amendment and forward to the society by registered post a copy of the amendment together with a certificate signed by him; such a certificate shall be conclusive evidence that the amendment has been duly registered; and such an amendment shall have the same effect as an amendment of any bye-law made by the society.

¶61Disputes which may be referred to the Registrar

( 1) Notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute touching the consti-tution, management or the business of a society, other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its committee against a paid employee of the society, arises-

(a) among members, past members and persons

claimmg through members, past members and deceased members; or

(b) between a member, past member or person

claiming through a member, past member or deceased member and the society, its commillee or anv officer, agent or employee of the society; or (c) between the society or its committee and any

past committee, any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the nominee, heir or legal representative of any dereased officer, deceased agent, or de-ceased employee of the society; or (d) between the society and any other society; such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for deci-sion.

Explanation :-For tlie purposes of this sub- •ection a dispute shall include-

(i) a claim by a society for any debt or other

amount due to it from a member, past member or the nominee, heir or legal representative of a deceased member, whether such debt or other amount be admitted or not;

(ii) a claim by a surety against the principal debtor

where the S<'Ciety has recovered from the surety any amount in respect of any debt or other amount due to it from the principal debtor as a result of t~e default of the principal debtor whether such debt or other amount due be ad-mitted or not;

(iii) a claim by a society against a member, past

member or the nominee, heir or legal represen-tative of a deceased member for the delivery of possession to the society of land or other im-movable property resumed by it for breach of the conditions of assignment or a!lotment of such land or other immovable property.

(2) If any question arises whether a dispute refer-red to the Registrar under this section is a dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a society, such question shall be decided by the Registrar.

(3) (a) Every dispute relating to, or in connection

with, any election to a committee of a society referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (3) .of section 31, shall be referred for decision to a

Subordinate Judge to or where there is no Sub-ordinate Judge, the District Judge having jurisdiction over the place where the main office of the society is situated, whose decision thereon shall be final.

(b) Every dispute relating to or in connection with

any election to a com~ittee. of ~uch class of societies as may, by notification m the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, be srecified by the Govern-ment in this behalf and referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (3) of sec.lion 31, shall be referred for decision to a District Munsiff having jurisdiction over the place where the main office of the society is situated, and his decision thereon shall be final.

( 4) Every dispute relating to, or in connection with, any election to a committee shall be referred under sub-section ( 1) of sub-section ( 3) only after the date of declaration of the result of such election. 62. Action to be taken by the Registrar on such reference

( 1) The Registrar may, on receipt of the reference of a dispute under section 61-

( a) elect to decide the dispute himself; or (b) transfer it for disposal to any person who has

been invested by the Government with powers in that behalf; or ( c) refer it for disposal to an arbitrator.

(2) Where the reference relates to any dispute in-volving immovable property, the Registrar or such person Oil' arbitrator, may order that any person be joined as a party who has acquired any interest in such property subsequent to the acquisition of interest there-· in by a party to the reference and any decision that may be passed on the reference by the Registrar, or the per-son or the arbitrator aforesaid, shall be binding on the party so joined as if he were an original party to the reference.

( 3) The Registrar may, by order for reasons to be recorded therein, withdraw any reference transferred under clause (b) of sub-section ( 1) or referred under clause ( c) of that sub-section and may elect to decide the dispute himself or transfer it to any other person under cla.use (b) of sub-section (1) or.refer it to any other arbitrator under clause ( c) of that sub-section. 212 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS [1970] I s.c.R.

( 4) The Registrar, such person or arbitrator shall decide the dispute in accordance with the provi-sions of this Act and the rule; and bye-laws and such decision shall, subject to the provisions of section 76, be final. Pending final decision on the dispute, the Registrar, such person or arbitrator, as the case may be, may make such interlocutory order; as he may deem necessary in the interests of justice.

¶133Act to override other laws :-The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything in-· consistent therewith contained in any other law."

Reliance was placed on the non-0bstante clause "Notwith-standing anything in any law for the time being in force" occur-ring in s. 61 of the Act which has the effect that a dispute covered by this section must necessarily be referred to the Regist-rar for decision, so that it cannot be referred to any other autho-rity under any other law. Further strength is sought in support cf this proposition from the provisions of section 133 of the Act which clearly lays down that the provisions of the Act have overriding effect if there be any provision in any other .aw in-consistent with the provisions of the Act. Then, it was argued that the language of s. 61 of the Act is wide enough to cover the disputes referred to the Tribunal in these cases, because the dis-putes are between co-operative. societies and their employees and they touch the business of the ·co-operative societies. In support of this submission, learned counsel referred u~ to a number of decisions of various High Courts in which the scope of the pro-visions contained in s. 61 of the Act or of similar provisions in other local enactments was considered. Most of these decisions were concerned with laying down the meaning of the expression "touching the business of the society" so as to include within its soope disputes of different nature between the co-operative socie-ties and their employees. The cases which have been brought to our notice are :

( 1) a decision of a learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court in G.l.P. Railway Employees Co.operative Bank Ltd. v. Bhikhaji Merwanji Karanjia-Employee( 1\, in which a similar provision contained in s. 54 of the Bombay Co-operative Socie-ties Act No. 7 of 1925 was interpreted;

(2) a decision in Sagar Motor Trunsport Karamchari Union, Sagar v. Amar Kamgar Passenger Transport Company Co-opera-tive Society, Sagar and Another(2 ), where the Madhya Pradesh ffigh Court interpreted section 55 (2) of the Madhya Pradesh

<t) A.!.R. 1941 Born. 341. (2) (1969) 18 lndian Factories and Labour Reports. 27.

Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 wh_ich requi!~d a disp~te. r~­ garding tenns of employment, working cond1t1011s and d1Sc1pli· nary action taken by a society, arising between a society and its. employees, to be decided by the Registrar or any Officer appoint· ed hy him;

( 3) a decision of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in M. S. Madhva Rao and Others v. D. V. K. Surya Rao, Member of the Pithapuram Co-operative Bank, Pithapuram and Others(1 ) in which section 51 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act No. 6 of 1932, which was verv similar to s. 61 of the Act, was interpreted;'"and ·

( 4) a decision of a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Farklmndali Nannhay v. Potdar (V.B.) ('), in which also s. 54 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Ad No. 7 of 1925. crune up for interpretation.

Learned counsel for the appeliants also brought to /our notice a decision of a single Judge of the Calcutta High C6urt in Co· operative Milk Societies Union, Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and' others(•), whe_re a dispute as to wages, wage-scales aJllCi dearness allowance was held not to be a dispute. within the meaning of that word as defined in the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940, and sought to distinguish it on the ground that the decision in that case turned on the meaning specially given in that Act to the word "dispute"

It appears to us that it is .not necessary to exrunine in detail the reasons given by the High Courts in the above cited cases for the interpretation placed by them on provisions similar to s. 61 of the Act in view of a very recent decision of this Court in The Decean Merchants Co·Of?erative Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Dalf-chand Jugraj & Others('). In that case, this Court had to inter· pret section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (Maharashtra Act 32 of 1961), the relevant provision of" which is reproduced below :-

"91. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any dispute touching the constitution, elections of the office bearen, conduct of general meetings, management or businesll of a society shall be referred by any of the parties to the dispute, or by a federal society to which the society is Rffiliated, or by a creditor of the society, to the Regist· rar, if both the parties thereto are one· or other of the following :-

(a) a society, its committee, any past committee,

any past or present officer, any past or present agent, any past or present servant or nominee, heir or legal representative of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased servant of the society, or the Liquidator of the society; -One of the questions which the Court formulated as requiring an answer was : what is the meaning of the expression "touching the business of the society"? In order to decide this question, the Court analysed the provisions of s. 91(1) and held :-

"Five kinds of disputes are mentioned in sub-s. ( 1); first, disputes touching the constitution of a society; secondly, disputes touching election of the office-bearers of a society; thirdly, disputes touching the con-duct of general meetings of a society; fourthly, disputes touching the management of a society; and fifthly, dis-putes touching the business of a society. It is clear that the word 'business' in this context does not mean affairs of a society because election of office-bearers, conduct of general meetings and management of a society would be treated as affair> of a society. In this sub-section the word 'business' has been used in a narrower sense and it means the actual trading or com-mercial or other similar business activity of the society which the society is authorised to enter into under the Act and the Rules and its bye-laws."

1n that case, this Court was concerned with the question whether

dispute touching the assets of a society was a dispute touching the business of the society, and it was in that cont.ext that the interpretation mentioned above was given by this Court. In considering the full scope of s. 91 (I ) of the Maharashtra Act 32 of 1961, the Court further proceeded to hold :-

"While we agree that the nature of business which a society does can be ascertained from the objects of the society, it.is difficult to subscribe to the proposition that whatever the society does or is necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its objects can be said to be part of its business. We, however, agree that the word 'touching' is very wide and would include any matter which relates to or concerns the business of a ~ociety, but we are doubtful whether the word 'affects' should also be used in defining the scope of the word 'touching' ".

This comment was made when taking notic~ of the decisio!l of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court m Farkhundalz v. Potdar('). The Court also held : -

"One other limitation on .the word 'dispute' may also be placed and that is that the word 'disp~te'

covers only those disputes which are capable of bemg resolved by the Registrar or his nominee."

Considering the similarity betweens. 61 of the Act and. s: 91(1) of the Maharashtra Act 32 of 1961, we are of the opm10n that the interpretation already placed by t.'1is Court on the provisions of s. 91(1) of th~ Maharashtra .Act 32 of 1~61 is .fully appli" cable to the provisi.Qns of s. 61 of the Act with which we are concerned. Consequently, in deciding these appeals, we must proceed on the basis that s. 61 of the Act requires reference of a dispute to the Registrar only if the dispute is capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nominee, and, further, the dispute between the 1f co-operative society and the employee touches the business of' e society in the sense explained by this Court in that case. ··,. .

Applying' these tests, we have no doubt at all that the dispute covered by . the first issue referred to the Industrial Tribunal in the present cases could not possibly be referred for decision to the Registrar under s. 61 of the Act. The dispute related to alter-ation of a number of conditions of service of the workmen which relief could only be granted by an Industrial Tribunal dealing with an industrial dispute. The Registrar, it is clear from the provisions of the Act, could not possibly have granted the reliefs claimed under this issue because of the limitations placed on his powers in the Act itself. It is true that s. 61 by itself does not contain any clear indication that the Registrar cannot entertain a dispute relating to alteration of conditions of service of the em-ployees if a registered society; but the meaning given to the ex: pression "touching the business of th~ society'', in our opinion, makes it very doubtful whe.ther a dispute in respect of alteration of conditions of service can be held to be covered by this expres-sion. Since the word "business" is equated with the actual trad-ing or commercial or other similar business activity of the sociefy, and since it has been held that it would be difficult to subscribe to the proportion that whatever the society does or is nocessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its objects, such as laying down the conditions of service of its employees, can be said to be a part of its business, it would appear that a dispute relating to conditions of service a of the workmen employed by the H society canriot be held to be dispute touching the business of

the society. Further, the position is clarified by the· provisions of sub-s. ( 4) of s. 62 of the Act which limit the power to be

U) [1962] P~LJc 51.

exercised by the Registrar, when dealing with a d!sPute re~erred to him under s. 61, by a mandate that he shall decide the dispute in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules and bye-laws. On the face of it, the provisions of the Act, the rules and the bye-Jaws could not possibly permit the Registrar to change conditions of service of the workmen employed by the society. For the purpose of bringing facts to our notice in the present appeals, the Rules framed by the Andbra Pradesh Gov· emment under the Act, and the bye-laws of one of the appellant Banks have been placed on the Paper-books of the appeals be-fore us. It appears from them that the conditions of service of the employees of the Bank have all .~en laid d~n by f.raming special bye-laws. Most of the cond!l1ons of semce, which the workmen want to be altered to their benefit, have thus been laid down by the bye-laws, so that any alteration in those conditiOllll of service will necessarily require a change in the bye-laws. Such a change could not possibly be directed by the Registrar when, under s. 62 ( 4) of the Act, he is specifically required to decide the dispute referred to him ·in accordance with the provisions o~ the bye-laws. It may also be noticed that a dispute referred to the Registrar under s. 61 of the Act can even be transferred for disposal to a person who may have been invested by the Govern-ment with powers in that behalf, or may be referred for disposal to an arbitrator by the Registrar. Such person or arbitrator, when deciding the dispute, will also be governed by the mandate in s. 62 ( 4) of the Act, so that he will also be bound to reject the claim of the workmen which is nothing else than a request for alteration of conditions of service contained in the bye-laws. It is thus clear that, in respect of the dispute relating to alteration of various conditions of service, the Registrar or other person dealing with it under s. 62 of the Act is not competent to grant the relief claimed by the workmen at all. On the principle Wd down by this Court in the case ~f the Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. (1), therefore, it must be held that this dis· ..... pute is not a dispute covered by the provisions of s. 61 of the Act. Such a dispute is not contemplated to be dealt with under I s. 62 of the Act and must, therefore, be held to be outside the scope of section 61.

· In this connection, we may take notice of the view expressed by a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court in South Arcot Co-operative Motor Transport Society, Ltd. (for ex-service-mm) v. Syed Batcha and Others('), where dealing with an in-dustrial claim, the learned Judge held :-

"Therefore, in regard to an industrial claim fdr like the retrenchment compensation, the remedy the •::' worker woµld be only to enforce it by the machinery -;;. created by the Industrial Disputes Act, namely, by ss. 10

and 33C(2). The Madras Co-operative Societies Act being itself a special statute, the authority, acting under it, would have no jurisdiction beyond what the enact-ment itself conferred on him. He could not, therefore, have jllkisdiction to decide a dispute under the Indus-trial Disputes Act."

That decision also related to s. 51 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932, which was similar in . terms to s. 61 of the Act. .

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Banks, however, urged a new point to challenge the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to deal with the dispute relating to conditions of service to the effect that ihe conditions of service having been made the subject-m11tter of bye-laws, an Industrial Tribunal will not be competent to alter them, because even an Industrial Tri-bunal has no jurisdiction to make orders contrary to law. For this purpose, he referred us to a number of decisions of this Court in Dalmia Cement (Bharat), Ltd., New Delhi v. Their Work-men and Another('); The Management of Marina Hotel v. The Workmen('); Cinema Thratres v. Their Workmen('); and The Hindllltan Tim~s Ltd., New Delhi v. Their Workmen & Vice Versa('). In all these cases, it was held that an Industrial Tribunal acted illegally in prescribing leave in excess of the num-ber of days ll!id down by the Delhi Shops and Establishments Act, 1954. In s. 22 of that Act there was a specific prohibition that leave for sickness or casual leave with full wages shall not exceed 12 days; and it was held that a direction made by the Tribunal granting to the workmen more than 12 days' sickness or casual leave was illegal. The principle of the decisions in tho•.e cases does not, however, appear to us to be applicable to the cases before us, because, in the present cases, there is no prohibition contained in the Act that the conditions of service prescribed are not to be altered. The argument on behalf of the Bapk, however, was that the bye-laws, which contained the con-ditions of service, are themselves law, so that any direction made by an Industrial Tribunal altering a condition of service con-tained in a bye-law would be an order contrary to law and, hence, illegal.

We are unable to accept the submission that the bye-laws of ff a co-operative society framed in pursuance of the provisions of

(I) [1961] ll L.L.J. 130 (2) (1962) 3 S.C.R. I. (3) [12641 ll L.L.J. 128. (4) [1964]I. S.C.R. 234. L12Sup.CI/69--1$ the Act can be held w be law or to have the force of law. It has no doubt been helJ that, if a statute gives power to a Govern-ment or other authority to make rules, the rules so framed have the force of statute anJ are to be deemed to be incorporated as a part of the statute. That principle, however, does not apply to bye-laws of the nature that a co-operative society is empowered by the Act to make. The bye-laws that are contemplated by the Act can be merely those which govern the internal management, business or administration of a society. They may be binding between the persons affected by them, but they do not have the force of a statute. lo respect of bye-laws laying down condi-tions of service of the employees of a society, the bye-laws would be binding between the society and the employees just in the same manner as conditions of service laid down by contract bet-ween the parties. In fact, after such bye-laws laying down the conditions of service arc made and any person enters the employ-ment of a society, those conditions of service will have to bti treated as conditions accepted by the employee when entering the service and will thus bind him like conditions of service speci-fically forming part of the contract of service. The bye-laws that can be framed by a society under the Act are similar in nature to the Articles of Association of a Company incorporated under the Companies Act and such Articles of Association have never been held to have the force of law. In a number of cases, conditions of service for indu,tncs arc laid down by Standing Orders certi-fied under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and it has been held that, though such Standing Orders are binding between the emplo) crs and the employees of the in-dustry governed by those Standing Orders, they do not have such force of Jaw as to be binding on Industrial Tribunals adjudicating an industrial dispute. The jurisdiction which is granted to In-dustrial Tribunal> by the Industrial Disputes Act is not the juris-diction of merely administ_ering the existing laws' and enforcing existing contracls. ·Industrial Tribunals have the right even to vary contracts of service between the employer and the employees which jurisdiction can never be exercised by a civil court or a Registrar acting under the Co-opera1ive Societies Act, so that the circumstance that, in granting relief on issue No. 1, the Tri-bunal will have to vary the special bye-laws framed by the Co-operative Bank does not lead to the inference that the Tribunal would be incompetent to grant the reliefs sought in this refe-rence. Jn fact, the reliefs could only be granted by the Industrial Tribunal and could not fall within the scope of the powers of the Registrar dealin_e with a dispute under s. 61 of the Act.

We may also, in tt.is connection, take notice of the submission made by learned counscl tha• the Registrar could have granted relief under s 16(5) of the Act if he thought that it was advis~

. --:-··11 .... --:- ·~

·~

\ CO-OP.

BANK v. INDUST.·TRIBUNAL. (Bhargava, J.) 219 ------- - . able to grant that relief to the workIDen. . In our opinion, submission must be rejected, for two. reasons. The first reason .is that action taken by the Registrar under s. 16(5) of the Act Will not be a decision on a dispute referred to him under s. 61 of the Act. When dealing with the dispute under s. 61. of the A_ct, the Registrar is bound to decide the dispute in accordance WJ!h the existing bye-laws, so that, if the dispute relates to _altera:10n of conditions of service laid down in the bye-laws, he will be mcom-petent to grant the relief claimed. It is also to be noticed that a dispute referred to a Registrar under s. 61 of the Act may be transferred for disposal to a person who has been invested by the Government with powers in that behalf, or may be referred for disposal to an arbitrator. On· the face of it, such ]'.lerson or arbi-trator cannot possibly exercise the powers of the Registrar under' s. 16(5) of.the Act. The second reason is that, under s. 16(5} of the Act, the power given to the Registrar to propose amend-ments in the bye-laws and to'enforce them if the proposal is not accepted by a society is to be exercised only when the Registrar is of the opinion that it is necessary or desirable to do so in the interests of such society · or of the co-operative movement. Amendments in bye-laws nnder s. 16(5) of the Act are not con-templated in the interests of the workmen or for the purpose of resolving industrial disputes. The provisions of s. 16(5} of the Act thus appear to us to be irrelevant when considering the scope of the jurisdiction of the Registrar under s. 61 of the Act. Conse-quent!y. the decision of the Hi~h Court holding that the Tnounal had jurisdiction to deal with the industrial dispute referred to it

We may also take notice of an argument advanced at the last stage by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Banks that, in any case, matters covered by issues Nos. 2 and 3 referred to the Tribunal could have been competently decided by the Regis-trar, and the reference in respect of those two issues at least should be· held to be incompetent. We do not think that· at this stage there· is any need for us to decide this question, because such a point was not raised at aU in . the petitions filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court. In those petitions, the competence of the reference to the Industrial Tnounal as a whole was challenged on the ground that it was barred because of t~e jurisdiction of the Registrar to· deal. with the dispute under section 61 of the Act. Consequently, we need not deal with the question whether a particular issue forming part of the reference has been competently referred or not. - · ·

.The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing V.P.S. Appeals 4ismisseq. . '

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 2093 and 2094 of 1968.

Appeals from the judgment and orcer dated August 5, 1968 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 1339 and 2742 of 1968.

C. B. Agarwala, K. Srinivasa Murthy, B. P. Singh and Nattnit Lal, for the appellants (in both the appeals).

A. S. R. Chari, M. K. Ramamurthi, S. Papp11, Madan Mohan, /. Ramamurthi, Vineet Kumar, P. S. Khera and Bindra Thakur, for respondent No. 2 (in both the appeals).