Bachchoo Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

RAGHUBAR DAYAL J.-Raja Kamlakar Sing;h of Shankargarh, U.P. took a lease from the District R•thubor D•yal J Board, Allahabad, with respect to the realisation of bayai and bazaar dues on the sale of commodities in the bazaar of Shankargarh. Bachchoo Lal was his employee t~ c0~llect these dues. On April 13, 1959, Bahadur Smgh, a peon of the Raja Sahib, asked Shyam Lal Kurmi, P.W. 2, who had sold two bullock load of linseed to Mewa Lal, respondent 2, in that 1963 bazaar, to accompany him to the Munim in order to Bttcl"4o• Lal pay the bayai dues there. Mewa Lal asked Shyam

•• Lal not to pay those dues. The peon, however, took Stal• of U. P. Shyam Lal to Bachchoo Lal, appellant, at the grain R•gAubar D•Jal J. godown. Mewa Lal, armed with a lathi, came

there and on Bachchoo Lal's asking him as to why he was creating obstruction in the realisation of the dues, filthily abused him and threatened to break his hand and feet and kill him. Bachchoo Lal, thereafter, instituted a complaint against Mewa Lal, on obtaining sanction of the District Magistrate for prosecuting Mewa Lal for an offence under s. 107 of the United Provinces District Board Act, 1922 (U.P. Act No. X of 1922), hereinafter called the Act. The trial Magistrate, the II Class Tashildar Magistrate of Karchana, convicted Mewa Lal of the offences under ss. 504 and 506, l.P.C., and also of an offence under s. 107 of the Act. On appeal, the Sessions Judge, Allahabad, acquitted Mewa Lal holding that proper authority in favour of Bachchoo Lal for prosecuting Mewa Lal under s. 107 of the Act had not been proved, that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try an offence under s. 506, Part II, 1.P.C. which was triable by a Magistrate of the I Class, and that the prosecution case under s. 504 I.P.C., was suspicious. Bachchoo !al filed an appeal against the acquittal of Mew a Lal, after obtaining the permission of the High Court under sub·s. (3) of s. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, herein-after called the Code. The High Court dismissed the appeal repelling the contentions for the appellant to the effect that the appellant, being the complaina· nt and therefore a party to the criminal case against Mewa Lal, ought to have been given notice of the appeal by the Sessions Judge and also ought to have been given an opportunity to be heard and that such notice and opportunity of hearing were necessary on the principles of natural justice and in view of the fact that s. 417 (3) of the Code conferred a substantive right Qf appeal on the complainant. .--· 1163 The High Court further held that though the BoeheAoa Lal Sessions Judge was wrong in holding that the v. sanction required by s. 182 of the Act had not been Stott -· of U. P. proved, the sanction was in the name of Raja Sahib Ragilubar D.-,.1 J. of Shankargarh and not of Bachchoo Lal and therefore the complaint was not a valid complaint and that the Raja Sahib could not collect Tah Bazari through his agents. It also held that the acquittal of the accused of the offence under s. 506 l.P.C., was justified and that the acquittal of the offence under s. 504 LP .C. could not be said. to be.

erroneous and that in any case the matter was too petty for interfering with an order of acquittal even if it had taken a different view of facts from the one taken by the Sessions Judge. The High Court, accordingly, dismissed the appeal. Bachchoo Lal has preferred this appeal after obtaining the requisite certificate from the High Court under Art. 134 ( l) (c) of the Constitution. The State of U.P. is the first respondent and Mewa Lal, the accused, is respondent No. 2.

Three questions have been raised on behalf of the appellant. One is that the Assistant Sessions Judge ought to have issued a notice of the hearing of the appeal to the appellant on whose complaint Mewa Lal was convicted by the Magistrate and against which order of conviction he had filed an appeal. No such notice was issued to him and therefore the order of the Assistant Sessions Judge acquitting l\1ewa Lal was not a good order. The second contention is that the High Court was wrong in holding that the Raja of Shankargarh could not collect the Tab Bazari dues through his agents.

The third contention is that Bachchoo Lal had req?isite sanction under s. 182 of the Act for prose-cuting ~ewa Lal and, therefore, the finding to the contrary 1s wrong .

362 SUPRENrE COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.

196! The third contention is correct. The requisite B•clzch" Lal authority under s. 182 of the Act is in favour of not

•• only the Raja of Shankargarh, but also in favour Stat1 o/ U. P. of several of his employees including Bachchoo Lal, Ragllu•ar Dayal J. the appellant.

We need not express an opinion on the second contention as we do not know the terms of the lease executed by the District Board in favour of the Raja of Shankargarh and as we are not concerned with the civil rights with respect to the manner of collecting the dues which he could collect under the 'lease. We are, however, of opinion that s. 107 does

not make obstruction or molestation of an employee of the person under contract with the Board an offence.

Section 107 of the Act reads :

''Whoever obstructs or molests a person employed by, or under contract with, the Board under this Act in· the performance of his duty or in the fulfilment of his contract, or removes a mark set up for the purpose of indicating any levels or direction necessary to the execution of works authorised by this Act, shall be liable on conviction to a fine which may extend to fifty rupees."

The section speaks of the obstructio~ or molestation of two classes of persons. One class of persons consists of persons employed by the District Board under the Act. The Raja of Shankargarh or Bachchoo Lal is not an employee of the District Board. The second class of persons consists of those who are under contract with the Board under the Act. Surely, the person under contract with the Board is the Raja of Shankargarh and not Bachchoo Lal. Bachchoo Lal is only an employee of the Raja. ·

We did not hear the learned counsel on the J96J merits of the case under s. 504 of the Code and accept the finding of the court• below. BceA'h" •• lAl St•I• of U. P. In view 'of the considerations mentioned, no R•tliubar D~1ol interference is possible with the acquittal of the respondent No. 2 on merits. It is, therefore, not necessary to decide the first question raised for the appellant.

We accordingly dismiss the appeal.

RAM RAN BIJAI SINGH AND OTHERS Jiii v. J;ril ZS.

BEHAR! SINGH ALIAS BAGANDHA SINGH

(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,

K. C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH and

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)

Land Reform•-LandR mortgaged-After redomption posse•sion soWJht but re.fused by-Per.<onB in poBseBBion vacate-Olaim of occupancy right-Right by adverse possession-Property vesting in state-OonBtruction of Statute-Suit lands if in "khaB poBsession"-Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (ZXX of 1950), ... 2. (k), 3 (1), 4,6-lndian Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908), art. 144.

The appellants' ancestors had executed a registered rehan bond of the suit land along with other lands. In 1941 the appellants paid off the amount due on the rehan bond and entered satisfaction on the bond. On the redemption of the bond the appellants sought to get possession of the suit land.

These lands were in the possession of Respondents 1 and 2 who refused to surrender possession claiming title on the basis 9f their being entitled to occupancy rights in the lands,