Kanwal Lal v. State of Punjab

Ayyangar, J. upon the case falling within Exceptions 8 and 9 to

s. 499, I.P.C. Exception 8 runs in these terms : "It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter of accusation.

In order to establish a defence under this exception the accused would have to prove that the person to whom the complaint was made had lawful authority over the person complained against, in respect of the subject-matter of the accusation. If the District Panchayat Officer or the Panchayat had such lawful authority, the last paragraph of the offending com-munication would have justified such a plea. But there is no basis at all for this argument in view of the clear provisions of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952, under which statute alone Panchayats have jurisdiction. Chapter IV of that Act deals with the Criminal Jurisdiction of the Panchayat. Section 38 with which that Chapter opens enacts:

"The criminal jurisdiction of a Gram Panchayat shall be confined to the trial of offences specified in Schedule 1 A."

Prostitution is not an offence under the Indian Penal Code and the keeping of a disorderly or bawdy house is not an offence within Schedule 1 A to which offences alone the criminal jurisdiction of Panchayats extends. If this were not sufficient to negative any defence based upon Exception 8, reference may be made to s. 42 of the Gram Panchayat Act which by its 1st sub-section enacts:

"Subject to the provisions of sub-s. (3) no pan· 1962 chayat shall take cognizance of any offence Kll1lwal £41 under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in which y, either the complainant or the accused is a public Stall of Punjab servant." 4,_..,.,.,, J, So even if the complaint should be taken to be a complaint of a public nuisance it was doubly exclu-ded from the jurisdiction of the Panchayat since the appellant was a public servant. The defence based on Exception 8 must therefore fail.

Nor is there more substance in the invocation of the 9th exception. That exception runs:

"It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or of the public good."

Even if good faith be taken to have been established, the imputation has to be made for the protection of the interest of the person making it. Learned Counsel suggested that the terms of the provision were satis-fied since the appellant made the accusation to pro· tect his own interest. That is certainly not the mean· ing of the exception. It posits that the person to whom the communication is made has an interest in protecting the prrson making the accusation. In other words, besides the bona fides of the person mak-ing the imputation, the person to whom the imputa-tion'.is conveyed must have a common interest with the person making it which is served by the commu-nication. This exception merely reproduces the prin-ciple laid do\\<n by Lord Campbell, C. J., in Harri-son v. Bush (1).

"A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating (I) (IBM) 5 B. k B, Sff, 348; 119 E. 11.. 569.

1962 has an interest, or in reference to which he 'Kanwal ... La has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, altho-State ~J Punjab ugh it contains criminatory matter which, AJJllll:ar, J, without this privilege, would be slanderous and actionable."

The point of difference between exceptions 8 and 9 is that whereas in the former the person to whom the complaint is made must have lawful authority to deal with the subject matter of the complaint and take pro-ceedings against that person, there is no such require-ment in exception 9 where it is sufficient if a commu-nication is made to a person for the protection of one's own interest in which the other also has. an interest. This is clearly brought out by the illustra-tions to the exception.

It cannot be seriously suggested that the commu-nication now in question satisfies this test.

The appellant was therefore properly convicted of the offence and nothing was said about the sentence. Tke appeal fails and is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

\'. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Statl of Pw,jab

Appeal No. 106 of 1961.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 11, 1961, of the Punjab High Court in Cr. R. No. 580of1961.

Nciunit Lal, for the appellant.

Gopal 8inyh and P. D. JJfenon, for the respon-dent.

1962. September 28. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A:1yan1tr, J. AYYANGAR, ].-This is an appeal by special

leave against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab by which a Criminal Revision filed against an appellate order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana confirming the appellant's conviction and sentence wa< dismissed in l-imine.

The facts giving rise tci the appeal lie in a very narrow compass. The appellant wa:: prosecuted on a complaint filed by Mst. Ram Rakhi of the offence of defamation under s. 500, I.P.C. The appellant and Mst. Ram Rakhi were neighbours. The de-famatorv matter was contained in a communication addressed by the appellant who is a member of the police force to the District Panchayat Officer, Ludhiana. In this "application" the appellant alleged that the complainant was a woman of loose character who was having illicit connection with goondas, her paramours coming to her frequently at nights and that her immc,ral activities reflected badlv on the locality in which the appellant lived. There is no doubt that this was grossly defamatory of the complainant. The defence of the appellant subs-tantially was that in substance the allegations were true and that he was entitled to make this application to the Panchayat in order to seek the assistance of 1962 that body for getting the complainant out of the K11nwal L•I locality and for this purpose he relied upon the last v. paragraphs of the application which ran : State of Punj•t

"Petty problems like this can be easily solved by the village Panchayat imtead of referring the case to the Court. It is therefore requested that the Panchayat of village Sangha! (P. 0.

Sangha!) District Ludhiana may kindly be asked to take suitable action to end this prosti-tution add after getting the house in which Shadi (father of the complainant) is residing at present, vacated from him.~· The learned Magistrate considered a large volume of evidence that was led as regards the plea of justific-ation as well as of the qualified privilege within exceptions 8 and 9 of s. 499, I.P.C., and rejecting the defence, convicted the appellant of the offence charged and sentenced him to undergo rigorous im-prisonment for six months. The appellant filed an appeal which was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge and he recorded :

''I come to. the conclusion that accused Kanwal Lal was rightly convicted and sentenced by the Trial Court. The offence against him is fully established. He deserves no mercy. He was employed in the office of the Inspector General Police, Punjab Chandigarh and he tried, to use his office which he was holding simply to over-awe the poor complainant and her parents, just toget the possession of his house from them.

The quantum of sentence passed against the accused appears to be correct ;n view of his first offence and youthful age."

It was the revision filed against this judgment that was disQlissed in limi11e by the High Court.

1962 There being no dispute about the publication or Ktinwal Lal of the published matter being defamatory being of a

v. character falling within s. 499, I.P.C., the only State of Punjab argument that was addressed before us was based