R. M. Seshadri v. The District Magistrate, Tanjore, and Another.

GHULAM HASAN J.-The appellant is the owner of a permanent cinema theatre called Sri Brahannayaki in Tiruthuraipundi, Tanjore District, and held a licence from the District Magistrate, Tanjore, in respect of the same with effect from September 5, 1950, to September 4, 1951. The licence is granted for one year at a time and is renewable from year to yrar. He objected to certain conditions in the licence imposed by the District Magistrate, Tanjore, in pursuance of 2 notifications (G. 0. Mis. 1054, Home, dated 28th March, 1948, and G. 0. Mis. 3422, dated 15th September, 1948) issued by the State of Madras purporting to act in exercise of powers conferred by section 8 of the Cinematograph Act of 1918. The impugned conditions may conveni-ently be set out here :

"4(a) The licensee shall exhibit at each performance one or more approved films of such length and for such length of time, as the Provincial 6-88 S. C. India/59 1954 Gov~rnment or the Central Government may, by R. M. Stjhadri general or special order. direct.

v. (b) The licensee shall comply with such directions District as the Provincial Government may by general or Magis1fate,

Taruore. special order give as to the manner in which approved Ghulam Ha.san ]. films shall be exhibited in the course of any perform-

ance."

Explanation :-"Approved Films" means a cinematograph film approved for the purpose of this condition by the Provincial Government or the Central Government.

Special condition 3.-The licensee should exhibit at the commencement of each performance not less than 2,000 feet of one or more approved films."

The appellant moved the High Court of Judicature at Madras under article 226 of the C',onstitution for an order or direction to the District Magistrate, Taniore, to delete the said conditions from his licence and to the State of Madras to rescind the notifications issued by it. His contention was that the conditions imposed by the said notifications are ultra vires and beyond the powers of the licensing authority and that they are void inasmuch as they contravened his freedom of speech and expression under article 19( 1) (a) and his right to carry on trade or business under article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. Both the contentions were rejected, the High Court holding that the conditions imposed were reasonable and were in the interests of the general public. The High Court granted leave to appeal to this Court.

The appellant who argued the appeal in person raised 2 main contentions. He argued firstly, that the notifications and conditions are beyond the competence of the Government of Madras and the District Ma-gistrate, and secondly, that in any event the conditions do not, as being outside the scope of the Cinematograph Act, amount to reasonable restrictions imposed in the interest of the general public.

We are of opinion that this appeal can be dis-posed of on the second ground. It may be stated that the Madras Cinematograph Rules, 1933, were amended by the notification G. 0. Mis. 1054, Home, dated March, 28, 1948, in exercise of the powers conferred by 1954 section 8 of the Cinematograph Act, 1918 (Central Act R. M. Seshodri II of 1918), and in place of condition 4 of the licence v. in Form A. the impugned conditions were inserted. District Magistrate, Section 8 empowers the State Government to make Tanjore. rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provi-Ghulam Hasan J. sions of the Act. The object of the Act as stated in the preamble is to make provisions for regulating exhibitions under the Cinematograph Act. Without going into the question whether it is within the con-templation of the Act that educational and instruc-tional films should be shown and whether the holder of a cinema licence may be compelled to exhibit such films as falling within the scope of the Act, the question which still arises for consideration is whether the impugned conditions amount to "reasonable restric-tions" within the meaning of article 19(6). Approved films are those films which are either produced by the Government or are ourchased from ' the private producers. As the priv;te producers do not possess any machinery for marketing their films the Govern-ment purchases them from such producers and charges hire from the cinema licensees for showing such films.

Condition 4(a) compels a li_censee to exhibit at each performance one or more approved films of such length and for such iength of time as the Provincial Government or Central Government may direct.

Neither the length of the film nor the period of time for which it may be shown is specified in the condition and the Government is vested with an unregulated discretion to compel a licensee to exhibit a film of any length at its discretion which may con-sume the whole or the greater part of the time for which each performance is given. The exhibition of a film generally takes 2 hours and a quarter. Now if there is nothing to guide the discretion of the Govern-ment it is open to it to require the licensee to show approved films of such great length as may exhaust the whole of the time or the major portion of it intended for each performance. The fact that the length of the time for which the approved films may be shown is also unspecified leads to the same conclusion, in other 1954 words, the Government may compel a licensee to -R. M. Stshadri exhibit an approved film, say for an hour and a half

v. or even 2 hours. As the condition stands, there can DiJtrict be no doubt that there _is no principle to guide the Magistrate, Tanjori. licensing authority and a condition such as the above Ghulam Hasan]. may lead to the loss or total extinction of the business

itself. A condition couched in such wide language is bound to operate harshly upon the cinema business and cannot be regarded as a reasonable restncuon. It savours more of the nature of an imposition than a restnction. It is significant that the condition does not profess to lay down that the approved films must be of an educational or instructional character for the purpose of social or public welfare. We think, there-fore, that condition 4 (a) as it stands at present amounts to an unreasonable restriction on the right of the licensee to carry on his business and must be declared void as against the fundamental right of the appellant under article 19(1) (g).

Among the special conditions, condition No. 3 which requires the licensee to exhibit at the commencement of each performance not less than 2,000 feet of one or more of the approved films is open to similar objection. This condition lays down the minimum length of the film to be shown as 2,000 feet and gives no indication of the maximum. We are informed that the showing of a film of 2,000 feet will take about 20 minutes. This will work out to about I/7th of the total time of each performance if it is taken to last for 2! hours. Whether a maximum of 2,000 feet would be resonable is a matter we need not consider but as this is mentioned as the minimum it is obvious that the Government may com-pel the licensee to exhibit a film of 10,000 or 12,000 feet which in effect will amount to pushing out of the film intended to be shown by the licensee during the time allotted. Here again no maximum limit having been imposed it follows that the discretion of the authority is unrestrained and unfettered and must lead to an unjustificable interference with the right of the licensee to carry on his business. We hold, therefore, that this condition is equally obnoxious and must be deleted. We accordingly allow the appeal and hold that condition 4(a) and special condition 3 expressed 1954 as they are at present are void and have 110 legal effect R, M. Seshadri as against the fundamental right of the appellant under v •. , article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. District Magistrat• We express no opinion upon the first contention Tanjore advanced by the appellant. The appellant will get Ghulam Hasan :J. his costs from the respondent in this Court and in the Court below.

Appeal allowed.

DHIRUBHA DEVISINGH GOHIL

v. Octob.r 11.

THE STATE OF BOMBAY.

('NITH CONNECTED APPEALS]

[MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE.

JAGANNADHADAS and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]

Constitution of India (Fiw Amendment) Act, 1951, Art. 31-B -Government of lndia Act, 1935 (25 and 26 Geo. 5 CH. 42), s. 299-Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949-(Bombay Act LXII of 1949)-Whether ultra vires the Constitution.

Held, that the validity of the Bombay T;;iluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949 (Bombay Act LXII of 1949) cannot be questioned on the ground that it takes away or abridges the fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution of India in view of enactment of art. 31-B which has been inserted in the Constitution by the First Amendment thereof in 1951 and in view of the . Act having been specifically enumerated as item No. 4 in the Ninth Schedule.

On the language used in art. 31-B of the Constitution of India the validity of Bombay Act LXII of 1949 cannot also be challenged under s. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935.

The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others ( [ 1952] S.C.R. 889) distinguished.

CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 188, 188(A), 188(B) and 188(E) of 1952.

Appeals under article 133(1)(c) of the Con:ititution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 6th December, 1951. of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Civil Applications Nos. 409, 410, 411 and 780 of 1951.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 192 of 1952.

Appeal under article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated 24th August, 1951, of the Madras High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 5744 of 1951.

Appellant in person.

C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (R.

Ganapathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the respondent.

C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (P. A.

Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the Intervener (Union of India).

1954. October 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by