The State of Rajasthan v. The Mewar Textile Mills Ltd, Bhilwara and Others

GHULAM HASAN J.-This appeal is brought under a certificate granted by the High Court of Rajasthan under article 133 ( c) of the Comtitution of India against a judgment and order of that High Court in writ petition under article 226 holding the appointment of one Shri Sukhdeo Narain as invalid and directing that all proceedings taken by him as the Industrial Court under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act (No. XIV of 1947) are null and void.

1954 We are informed that Shri Sukhdeo Narain has Thi State of ceased to work as an Industrial Tribunal and the". Rajasthan present appeal, therefore, becomes infructuous, but we

v. are invited by the Advocate-General on behalf of the Tht Mewar Tex· tile Mills Ltd., State of Rajasthan who is the appellant before us to

Bhilwara decide the question as to the validity of the appoint-and Ot™rs.

ment, as it is likely to affect other awards made by Ghulam HaJan ]. tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act. We

according! y proceed to give our decision.

The question involved in the case is whether the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain is invalid because he does not fulfil the qualifications laid down for a tribunal under section 7(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Section 7(3) hereinafter referred to as the Industrial Act says:- "Where a tribunal consists of one member only, that member, and where it consists of two or more members, the chairman of the tribunal, shall be a person who- (a) is or has been a Judge of a High Court; or (b) is or has been a District Judge ;

"

The Industrial Act was applied to Rajasthan by the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950 (Ordinance IV of 1950), by the Rajpramukh on January 24, 1950. By this adaptation section 7 of the Industrial Act came to be applied to Rajasthan. Shri Sukhdeo Narain was appointed on October 9, 1950, by a notificati<;m which ran as follows :- "In exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947) the Government of Rajasthan is pleased to constitute an Industrial Tribunal consisting of Shri Sukhdeo Narain, a retired Judge of the High Court of the erstwhile Jodhpur State for the adjudication of an Industrial dispute in the Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara, in Rajasthan."

The appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain was objected to by the respondent on the ground that the words "a Judge of a High Court" in section 7(3) mean 1954 "a Judge of the High Court of Judicature for Rajas-The State of than established under the Rajasthan High Court Rajasthan v,. Ordinance, 1949" and as Shri Sukhdeo Narain had T ht Mewar Tex-been a Judge of the High Court of the former State of tile Mills Ltd., Jodhpur, he could not be held to be Judge of the High Bhilwara and Others. Court under section 7(3) of the Industrial Act. · This J. objection was upheld by the High Court. GhUlam Has an

Though the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain in the notification was based upon the fact that he was a retired Judge of the High Court of · Jodhpur, in argu-ments· it was also contended before the High Court that even if he was not qualified for appointment as a former Judge of a High Court, he was certainly quali-fied for appointment as a former District Judge. The High Court repelled this contention. It appears that the United State of Rajasthan came into existence on April 7, 1949, and the United State of Matsya was integrated with it on May · 15, 1949. Section 5 of Ordinance No. IV of 1950 lays down that :

"For the purpose of the application of any Central law to Rajasthan, unless there be anything repugnant in the subject or context,-

(ix) references therein to other civil, criminal and revenue courts, to public offices, and to Judges, Magistrates, officers or authorities shall be deemed to be references to such courts, offices and Judges, Magistrates, officers or authorities of or in Rajasthan."

The High Court held that the word "Rajasthan" as defined in Ordinance I of 1949 means the United State of Rajasthan and "the Judges and other officers"

mentioned in section 5 (ix) must be held to be those in the service of the United State of Rajasthan. Accord-ingly they held that Shri Sukhdeo Narain could not be held to be a District Judge within the meaning of section 7(3) (b) and his appointment as an Industrial Tribunal under that section was, therefore, invalid.

We are of opinion that this_ appeal can be decided on a short ground. The Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act (XL VIII of 1950) came into force on May 20, 1950. By section 34 it was provided that the

1132 SUl'REME COURT REPORTS [1954]

1954 Industrial Disputes Act, XIV of 1947, shall be amended The Stat1 ef in the manner specified in the Schedule and the Rqjast!,.an Schedule substituted sub-section (2) to section (1) of

v. the Industrial Act as follows :- Tht Mewar T1x-tile Mills Lld., "It extends to the whole of India except the State

8hilwara of Jammu and Kashmir."

and Others.

Oh~/am Hasan ]' As we have already stated the appointment of Shri

Sukhdeo Narain was made on October 9, 1950, i.t:., after the Industrial Disputes Act had become applic-able to Rajasthan. It is not necessary therefore to invoke the provisions of Ordinance IV of 1950 in deciding the question of the validity of the appoint-ment. The argument based on section 34 of Act XL VIII of 1950 was put forward before the High Court at the time of the hearing of the application for leave to appeal and it was contended that in view of section 34 the provisions of Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950, namely section 5, sub-sections (vii) and (ix), stood amended or repealed but the High Court observed that even if this argument had been .raised before them in appeal, it would have made no difference. It has been contended before us by Mr. Hajela, the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the State, that after the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 was extended to Rajasthan by section 34 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, XLVIII of 1950, the provisions of the former stood amended by section 34 and could not be read subject to section 5 of the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordin-ance IV of 1950. We think there is force in this contention. ·, The effect of section 34, as we have already indicated, was to extend the territorial appli-cation of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to the whole of India· including Rajasthan the exception being the State of Jammu and Kashmir only. This being so the words "A Judge of a High Court and a District Judge" used in section 7(3) (a) and (b) respectively of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, must be held now to include "A Judge of the High Court and a District Judge in the former State of Jodhpur". There is now no room for the application of section 5 of Ordinance IV of 1950 according to which a Judge of the High Court and a District Judge could only mean a Judge of the 1954 High Court for Rajasthan established under the Tiu Stat• qf Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949 and a District Raja.sthan Judge of or in Rajasthan within the meaning of v. TM Mewar T ,,,_ section 5 (ix) of Ordinance No. IV of 1950. Accordingly Iii< Mthq J,td., we , ·Bhilwara

hold that the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain and Ot/urs. was perfectly valid.

Ghulam Ha.son We accordingly set aside the order of the High Court but without costs, as the respondent is not represented.

Agent for the appellant : R. H. Dhebar.

HEM RAJ

(). 1954

THE STATE OF AJMER

Marth 17. (And Connected Appeal)

[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., VIVIAN BosE

and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]

Constitution of India, art. 136(1)-Principles gorcrning the exercise of powers by the Supreme Court under art. 136(1)-Confes-sions-Whether can be corroborated by evidence already in possession of police.

Unless it is shown that execeptional and special circumstan~ ces exist that substantial and grave injustice has been done and the case in question presents features _of sufficient gravity to war~ rant a review of the decision appealed against, the Supreme Court does not exercise its overriding powers under art. 136 ( 1) of the Constitution and the circumstance that the appeal has been admitted by special leave does not entitle the appellant to open out the whole case and contest all the findings of fact and raise every point which could be raised in the High Court. Even at the final hearing only those points can be urged which are fit to be urged at the preliminary stage when the leave to appeal is asked for.

·The contention that confession cannot be corroborated by the use of materials already in the possession of the police is devoid of force. A confession made and recorded even during a trial can be corroborated by the evidence already recorded. It may .be made and recorded in the court of committing magistrate and materia,ls already in the possession of the police may be used for purpose ef corroboration.